Okay, I want to start my talk.
The title is remote attation on arm torsion of t with the rise on the required.
So this one is corroborate with U.H. Tsugiyama at the critical security.
So this slide shows today's contents.
At first, I want to introduce opti and the horizon.
After that, I want to talk about my end development, remote attation on opti.
With the rise on the horizon barrier.
It requires predictive visit and provision in the face and remote attation face.
I'll post the current status and I'll talk about three future plans.
Key management using HSTM and the cable confirmation and set key based attestem keys.
And I want to conclude this talk.
And the context is very popular on smart home.
Not only smart home, the game must be used.
For example, Nintendo Switch.
So the opti is an open source.
Secure OS for context.
It's for us the global home's API.
So global hot GPT grant API and GPT internal.
The opti has a simple attestation mechanism.
But it does not satisfy the current limitation.
So we developed a total remote attestation mechanism who opti.
So the horizon is a very fire.
The open source is very fire based on IT graph.
This figure shows the load and adpact.
Load means the person do something.
And adpact is an information.
This figure has two phrases.
So the green part is rolls at provision phase.
And pink part is adpact at provision phase.
So the rolls and many information to verify here.
Not only verify here, the information is used by attestem.
Attestor.
I talked a later detail.
At remote attestation phase, verify here is this adpact.
And attestor send a remote attestion evidence.
The evidence is verified by attestor and make a attestion result.
So the green part decides attestor is not.
So let's also require C-bar-home attestation evidence.
We implement this part.
This figure shows the software we developed.
The most part is opti.
We developed opti API to create the attestation address opti.
This part.
The API calls P-T-A, so the T-A.
So the T-A works as a part of opti.
The P-T-A measures a shared 2-5-6 of opti.
This part hash.
And the creator attestation evidence is C-bar-home att.
After that, P-T signs attestation evidence.
We also developed sample software to test this.
The part sample T-A, sample C-A, cranked up, sample line party,
and sample setting of the horizon.
We developed.
So this figure shows the provision in a phase.
Before provisioning, we need sample prequisite.
So, and also, in this case, opti of the builder.
Opti builder have two prepear signing private key and signing public key.
And also, prepare signing key ID and sign ID.
And the reference bar is offered by T-A builder.
T-A builder offer a T-A ID.
After the T-A, they measure hash.
This information is used by provisioning.
So, rule part is attestation and error part is verified.
So, at first, endorsement offers signing private key and signing key ID.
And sign ID to P-T-A of opti.
It works as a signer.
So, T-A get ID from T-A builder.
The hash bar is baried at runtime.
So, T-A does not know the hash bar is.
So, signing public key and signing key ID and sign ID is used by Verizon.
And, as a reference bar, T-A ID and hash bar is set to Verizon.
So, this part, yeah, I talked about later.
So, this slide another day of provisioning.
So, T-A builder, T-A builder, T-A ID and make a T-A.
After that, T-A builder measure hash bar is opti developer,
P-A signing key and signing public key and signing key ID and sign ID.
Signing key is used by P-T-A and signing public key is used by P-A provisioner.
So, in this case, provisioner sets the verifier.
So, this slide is result of Verizon provisioning.
So, this slide shows the error part is signing public key and property ID.
So, this slide shows the remote extra place.
At first, she or gang party send her already quest.
After that, verifier send back already quest with nouns.
So, grant up send already quest to T-A.
T-A knows T-A ID.
So, nouns on T-A is used by RAPI.
RAPI is processed at attached P-T-A and makes RAPI.
If then send back to verifier.
So, RAPI result is send to the gang party.
If RAPI result is good.
Lange party and T-A makes a communication.
So, current status.
The code of OPT was merged by OPT-O-D line.
The sample code are confirmed on QM and Raspberry Pi.
We are now trying to update examples.
So, from here, I want to talk about the future plan.
So, current implementation and bets are signing key in the P-P-T-A binary.
So, it's not so secure.
So, I want to use key in H-S-N.
So, there are two solutions.
We have another plan, white box cryptography.
But white box cryptography are not so secure.
The same are we think.
And we are now planning to use secure element.
C-A-M of N-X-P-A-C-P-U.
It depends on our target board.
So, next future plan use secure boot confirmation.
Because current remote attesium does not measure.
It confirms the secure boot.
However, the boot process is mutable.
Because the B-L-1 is mutable.
So, we can change the B-L-3 parts.
So, we want to confirm the secure boot of secure OS.
In this case, OP-T.
So, the third plan is a certificate based attestation key.
So, current implementation use signing key directory.
It's not scalable.
We want to use PK-SAT-SAT-SAT-SAT-SAT-SAT-SAT-SAT-SAT.
In order to use PK-SAT-SAT-SAT-SAT, the device build-up become endosvent.
Each device has its own key PK-SAT-SAT-SAT-SAT-SAT-SAT.
So the verifyer also has to issue us load sativate.
So it makes scalable, however, the endosar must take a pk sativate whole sign in key,
and the verification.
The verification process is a little bit complicated.
So in this case, there are two endosarment device builder and opti builder.
The device build-up prepared sign in key,
and the sign in private key, have to get pk sativate from load CA.
So as the provisioning, the sign in key and pk sign in key ID,
and pk sativate is set by HSM device.
So the sign in key is also assigned at pta.
Also has a TID and Verizon.
Verifier has to get a load sativate and other IDs and hash.
So this is this finier compared to implementation.
And honestly, this finier does not show scalability improvement,
but the future is more scalable.
So it can keep the scalability.
And another flaw is verifier sign ID.
So currently implementers use sign ID.
However, there is no guarantee for signer.
So if the code of signer should be verified.
So the second future plan has take a second confirmation with this answer.
Okay, I want to conclude my talk.
I report the current opti's Verizon verifier.
So there are three future plans.
Thank you, thank you for listening.
How long sign in key ribs?
Oh, in this case, sign in key ribs.
You are in we use pta.
So it cannot change.
So if you want to change, you have to leave the pta.
Sign ID sign ID sign ID sign ID sign ID sign ID.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Current implementation is a sign ID.
Yes, no guarantee now.
So I want to improve.
Okay.
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
I guess this part.
Okay.
So we also verify the B2 and B3.
Yeah, not only B2, not only it only.
Okay, only.
Okay.
In this case, we want to use grant side.
The question is,
Hsn is used grant side or sub aside.
The answer is, in this case, grant side.
I don't know the question, so there was so many things.
I was a loss of it.
If this one is translated into the last one, that was on the outside.
So what kind of comparison do you see on this word in the last word?
Oh, I think that you put feelings for you think it's completely different about what you're doing.
And what's on the IUD side.
Mm-hmm.
The key perspective specifically for the configuration.
How much of this kind of use is still for configuration,
what do you do?
Do I need to need the question?
The question is, this model is a private sub-imperimentation.
So, the short answer is, no, because this implementation depend on hardware security.
So, how do Hsn or real bootloader?
So, this model does not use virtualization.
So, I guess the current server have to use virtualization.
Virtualization needs some, have to say.
So, I mean, no component that you have developed can be used for that use case.
Like, if possible, some do not present.
So, no component in your use case can be used in case.
Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah.
We can use all components.
Yes, yeah.
Okay.
So, thank you very much.
Thank you.