diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/mips/bcm63xx/reset.c linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/mips/bcm63xx/reset.c
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/mips/bcm63xx/reset.c	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/mips/bcm63xx/reset.c	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
 #define BCM6368_RESET_DSL	0
 #define BCM6368_RESET_SAR	SOFTRESET_6368_SAR_MASK
 #define BCM6368_RESET_EPHY	SOFTRESET_6368_EPHY_MASK
-#define BCM6368_RESET_ENETSW	0
+#define BCM6368_RESET_ENETSW	SOFTRESET_6368_ENETSW_MASK
 #define BCM6368_RESET_PCM	SOFTRESET_6368_PCM_MASK
 #define BCM6368_RESET_MPI	SOFTRESET_6368_MPI_MASK
 #define BCM6368_RESET_PCIE	0
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/powerpc/boot/wrapper linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/powerpc/boot/wrapper
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/powerpc/boot/wrapper	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/powerpc/boot/wrapper	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -161,6 +161,28 @@ case "$elfformat" in
     elf32-powerpc)	format=elf32ppc	;;
 esac
 
+ld_version()
+{
+    # Poached from scripts/ld-version.sh, but we don't want to call that because
+    # this script (wrapper) is distributed separately from the kernel source.
+    # Extract linker version number from stdin and turn into single number.
+    awk '{
+	gsub(".*\\)", "");
+	gsub(".*version ", "");
+	gsub("-.*", "");
+	split($1,a, ".");
+	print a[1]*100000000 + a[2]*1000000 + a[3]*10000;
+	exit
+    }'
+}
+
+# Do not include PT_INTERP segment when linking pie. Non-pie linking
+# just ignores this option.
+LD_VERSION=$(${CROSS}ld --version | ld_version)
+LD_NO_DL_MIN_VERSION=$(echo 2.26 | ld_version)
+if [ "$LD_VERSION" -ge "$LD_NO_DL_MIN_VERSION" ] ; then
+	nodl="--no-dynamic-linker"
+fi
 
 platformo=$object/"$platform".o
 lds=$object/zImage.lds
@@ -412,7 +434,7 @@ if [ "$platform" != "miboot" ]; then
     if [ -n "$link_address" ] ; then
         text_start="-Ttext $link_address"
     fi
-    ${CROSS}ld -m $format -T $lds $text_start $pie -o "$ofile" \
+    ${CROSS}ld -m $format -T $lds $text_start $pie $nodl -o "$ofile" \
 	$platformo $tmp $object/wrapper.a
     rm $tmp
 fi
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/powerpc/Makefile linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/powerpc/Makefile
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/powerpc/Makefile	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/powerpc/Makefile	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -66,29 +66,35 @@ endif
 UTS_MACHINE := $(OLDARCH)
 
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN),y)
-override CC	+= -mlittle-endian
-ifneq ($(cc-name),clang)
-override CC	+= -mno-strict-align
-endif
-override AS	+= -mlittle-endian
 override LD	+= -EL
-override CROSS32CC += -mlittle-endian
 override CROSS32AS += -mlittle-endian
 LDEMULATION	:= lppc
 GNUTARGET	:= powerpcle
 MULTIPLEWORD	:= -mno-multiple
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE += $(call cc-option,-mno-save-toc-indirect)
 else
-ifeq ($(call cc-option-yn,-mbig-endian),y)
-override CC	+= -mbig-endian
-override AS	+= -mbig-endian
-endif
 override LD	+= -EB
 LDEMULATION	:= ppc
 GNUTARGET	:= powerpc
 MULTIPLEWORD	:= -mmultiple
 endif
 
+ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
+cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN)		+= $(call cc-option,-mabi=elfv1)
+cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN)		+= $(call cc-option,-mcall-aixdesc)
+aflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN)		+= $(call cc-option,-mabi=elfv1)
+aflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN)	+= -mabi=elfv2
+endif
+
+cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN)	+= -mlittle-endian
+cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN)		+= $(call cc-option,-mbig-endian)
+ifneq ($(cc-name),clang)
+  cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN)	+= -mno-strict-align
+endif
+
+aflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN)		+= $(call cc-option,-mbig-endian)
+aflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN)	+= -mlittle-endian
+
 ifeq ($(HAS_BIARCH),y)
 override AS	+= -a$(CONFIG_WORD_SIZE)
 override LD	+= -m elf$(CONFIG_WORD_SIZE)$(LDEMULATION)
@@ -121,7 +127,9 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN),y)
 CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_PPC64)	+= $(call cc-option,-mabi=elfv2,$(call cc-option,-mcall-aixdesc))
 AFLAGS-$(CONFIG_PPC64)	+= $(call cc-option,-mabi=elfv2)
 else
+CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_PPC64)	+= $(call cc-option,-mabi=elfv1)
 CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_PPC64)	+= $(call cc-option,-mcall-aixdesc)
+AFLAGS-$(CONFIG_PPC64)	+= $(call cc-option,-mabi=elfv1)
 endif
 CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_PPC64)	+= $(call cc-option,-mcmodel=medium,$(call cc-option,-mminimal-toc))
 CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_PPC64)	+= $(call cc-option,-mno-pointers-to-nested-functions)
@@ -212,6 +220,9 @@ cpu-as-$(CONFIG_E200)		+= -Wa,-me200
 KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(cpu-as-y)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(cpu-as-y)
 
+KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(aflags-y)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(cflags-y)
+
 head-y				:= arch/powerpc/kernel/head_$(CONFIG_WORD_SIZE).o
 head-$(CONFIG_8xx)		:= arch/powerpc/kernel/head_8xx.o
 head-$(CONFIG_40x)		:= arch/powerpc/kernel/head_40x.o
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -340,5 +340,7 @@
 #define X86_BUG_MDS		X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
 #define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY	X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the  MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
 #define X86_BUG_SWAPGS		X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
+#define X86_BUG_TAA		X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
+#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT	X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
 	u64 smbase;
 	bool tpr_access_reporting;
 	u64 ia32_xss;
+	u64 arch_capabilities;
 
 	/*
 	 * Paging state of the vcpu
@@ -1226,6 +1227,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(st
 void kvm_arch_mmu_notifier_invalidate_page(struct kvm *kvm,
 					   unsigned long address);
 
+u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void);
 void kvm_define_shared_msr(unsigned index, u32 msr);
 int kvm_set_shared_msr(unsigned index, u64 val, u64 mask);
 
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -71,10 +71,26 @@
 						  * Microarchitectural Data
 						  * Sampling (MDS) vulnerabilities.
 						  */
+#define ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO		BIT(6)	 /*
+						  * The processor is not susceptible to a
+						  * machine check error due to modifying the
+						  * code page size along with either the
+						  * physical address or cache type
+						  * without TLB invalidation.
+						  */
+#define ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR		BIT(7)	/* MSR for TSX control is available. */
+#define ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO			BIT(8)	/*
+						 * Not susceptible to
+						 * TSX Async Abort (TAA) vulnerabilities.
+						 */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL		0x00000119
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3		0x0000011e
 
+#define MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL		0x00000122
+#define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE		BIT(0)	/* Disable RTM feature */
+#define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR		BIT(1)	/* Disable TSX enumeration */
+
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS		0x00000174
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP		0x00000175
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP		0x00000176
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear)
 #include <asm/segment.h>
 
 /**
- * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
  *
  * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
  * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers
 }
 
 /**
- * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
  *
  * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
  */
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -852,4 +852,11 @@ enum mds_mitigations {
 	MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV,
 };
 
+enum taa_mitigations {
+	TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+	TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
+	TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
+};
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/Kconfig linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/Kconfig
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/Kconfig	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/Kconfig	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -1695,6 +1695,51 @@ config X86_INTEL_MPX
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+choice
+	prompt "TSX enable mode"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF
+	help
+	  Intel's TSX (Transactional Synchronization Extensions) feature
+	  allows to optimize locking protocols through lock elision which
+	  can lead to a noticeable performance boost.
+
+	  On the other hand it has been shown that TSX can be exploited
+	  to form side channel attacks (e.g. TAA) and chances are there
+	  will be more of those attacks discovered in the future.
+
+	  Therefore TSX is not enabled by default (aka tsx=off). An admin
+	  might override this decision by tsx=on the command line parameter.
+	  Even with TSX enabled, the kernel will attempt to enable the best
+	  possible TAA mitigation setting depending on the microcode available
+	  for the particular machine.
+
+	  This option allows to set the default tsx mode between tsx=on, =off
+	  and =auto. See Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt for more
+	  details.
+
+	  Say off if not sure, auto if TSX is in use but it should be used on safe
+	  platforms or on if TSX is in use and the security aspect of tsx is not
+	  relevant.
+
+config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF
+	bool "off"
+	help
+	  TSX is disabled if possible - equals to tsx=off command line parameter.
+
+config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_ON
+	bool "on"
+	help
+	  TSX is always enabled on TSX capable HW - equals the tsx=on command
+	  line parameter.
+
+config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO
+	bool "auto"
+	help
+	  TSX is enabled on TSX capable HW that is believed to be safe against
+	  side channel attacks- equals the tsx=auto command line parameter.
+endchoice
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -30,11 +30,14 @@
 #include <asm/intel-family.h>
 #include <asm/e820.h>
 
+#include "cpu.h"
+
 static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
 
 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -94,6 +97,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	ssb_select_mitigation();
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
 	mds_select_mitigation();
+	taa_select_mitigation();
 
 	arch_smt_update();
 
@@ -247,6 +251,93 @@ static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
 early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
 
 #undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"TAA: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
+static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+
+static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]	= "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_VERW]		= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED]	= "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
+};
+
+static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* TSX previously disabled by tsx=off */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* TAA mitigation is turned off on the cmdline (tsx_async_abort=off) */
+	if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+	else
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+	/*
+	 * VERW doesn't clear the CPU buffers when MD_CLEAR=1 and MDS_NO=1.
+	 * A microcode update fixes this behavior to clear CPU buffers. It also
+	 * adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is enumerated by the
+	 * ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR bit.
+	 *
+	 * On MDS_NO=1 CPUs if ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR is not set, microcode
+	 * update is required.
+	 */
+	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+	if ( (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+	/*
+	 * TSX is enabled, select alternate mitigation for TAA which is
+	 * the same as MDS. Enable MDS static branch to clear CPU buffers.
+	 *
+	 * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
+	 * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
+	 */
+	static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+
+out:
+	pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	} else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V1 : " fmt
 
 enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
@@ -758,13 +849,10 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
 }
 
 #define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
+#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
 
 void arch_smt_update(void)
 {
-	/* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
-	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
-		return;
-
 	mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 
 	switch (spectre_v2_user) {
@@ -790,6 +878,17 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	switch (taa_mitigation) {
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_VERW:
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+		if (sched_smt_active())
+			pr_warn_once(TAA_MSG_SMT);
+		break;
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED:
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		break;
+	}
+
 	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 }
 
@@ -1178,6 +1277,11 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigatio
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
 
+static ssize_t itlb_multihit_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Processor vulnerable\n");
+}
+
 static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_HYPERVISOR_GUEST
@@ -1197,6 +1301,21 @@ static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
 		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
 }
 
+static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if ((taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED) ||
+	    (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF))
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+			       taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+	}
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation],
+		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
 static char *stibp_state(void)
 {
 	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
@@ -1262,6 +1381,12 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
 	case X86_BUG_MDS:
 		return mds_show_state(buf);
 
+	case X86_BUG_TAA:
+		return tsx_async_abort_show_state(buf);
+
+	case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT:
+		return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1298,4 +1423,14 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev,
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MDS);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_TAA);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
+}
 #endif
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -847,13 +847,14 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(s
 #endif
 }
 
-#define NO_SPECULATION	BIT(0)
-#define NO_MELTDOWN	BIT(1)
-#define NO_SSB		BIT(2)
-#define NO_L1TF		BIT(3)
-#define NO_MDS		BIT(4)
-#define MSBDS_ONLY	BIT(5)
-#define NO_SWAPGS	BIT(6)
+#define NO_SPECULATION		BIT(0)
+#define NO_MELTDOWN		BIT(1)
+#define NO_SSB			BIT(2)
+#define NO_L1TF			BIT(3)
+#define NO_MDS			BIT(4)
+#define MSBDS_ONLY		BIT(5)
+#define NO_SWAPGS		BIT(6)
+#define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT	BIT(7)
 
 #define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist)	\
 	{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
@@ -871,26 +872,26 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
 	VULNWL(NSC,	5, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
 
 	/* Intel Family 6 */
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL,		NO_SPECULATION),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET,	NO_SPECULATION),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL,		NO_SPECULATION),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL,		NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET,	NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL,		NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID,	NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID,	NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
 	VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH,		NO_SSB),
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID,		NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID,		NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
 	/*
 	 * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
@@ -901,13 +902,13 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
 	 */
 
 	/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x10,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x11,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x10,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x11,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
 	/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
-	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 	{}
 };
 
@@ -918,19 +919,30 @@ static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned
 	return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
 }
 
-static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void)
 {
 	u64 ia32_cap = 0;
 
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
+
+	return ia32_cap;
+}
+
+static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+	/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
-		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
-
 	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
@@ -947,6 +959,21 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
 
+	/*
+	 * When the CPU is not mitigated for TAA (TAA_NO=0) set TAA bug when:
+	 *	- TSX is supported or
+	 *	- TSX_CTRL is present
+	 *
+	 * TSX_CTRL check is needed for cases when TSX could be disabled before
+	 * the kernel boot e.g. kexec.
+	 * TSX_CTRL check alone is not sufficient for cases when the microcode
+	 * update is not present or running as guest that don't get TSX_CTRL.
+	 */
+	if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
+	    (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RTM) ||
+	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
@@ -1287,6 +1314,8 @@ void __init identify_boot_cpu(void)
 	enable_sep_cpu();
 #endif
 	cpu_detect_tlb(&boot_cpu_data);
+
+	tsx_init();
 }
 
 void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -44,9 +44,27 @@ struct _tlb_table {
 extern const struct cpu_dev *const __x86_cpu_dev_start[],
 			    *const __x86_cpu_dev_end[];
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
+enum tsx_ctrl_states {
+	TSX_CTRL_ENABLE,
+	TSX_CTRL_DISABLE,
+	TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+};
+
+extern enum tsx_ctrl_states tsx_ctrl_state;
+
+extern void __init tsx_init(void);
+extern void tsx_enable(void);
+extern void tsx_disable(void);
+#else
+static inline void tsx_init(void) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL */
+
 extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 
 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
 
+extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void);
+
 #endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -582,6 +582,11 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x8
 		detect_vmx_virtcap(c);
 
 	init_intel_energy_perf(c);
+
+	if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_ENABLE)
+		tsx_enable();
+	if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_DISABLE)
+		tsx_disable();
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ obj-y			+= bugs.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS)	+= proc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES) += capflags.o powerflags.o
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL)		+= intel.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL)		+= intel.o tsx.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD)		+= amd.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_CYRIX_32)		+= cyrix.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_CENTAUR)		+= centaur.o
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Intel Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ *	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+enum tsx_ctrl_states tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+void tsx_disable(void)
+{
+	u64 tsx;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+
+	/* Force all transactions to immediately abort */
+	tsx |= TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure TSX support is not enumerated in CPUID.
+	 * This is visible to userspace and will ensure they
+	 * do not waste resources trying TSX transactions that
+	 * will always abort.
+	 */
+	tsx |= TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+}
+
+void tsx_enable(void)
+{
+	u64 tsx;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+
+	/* Enable the RTM feature in the cpu */
+	tsx &= ~TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure TSX support is enumerated in CPUID.
+	 * This is visible to userspace and will ensure they
+	 * can enumerate and use the TSX feature.
+	 */
+	tsx &= ~TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+}
+
+static bool __init tsx_ctrl_is_supported(void)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+	/*
+	 * TSX is controlled via MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL.  However, support for this
+	 * MSR is enumerated by ARCH_CAP_TSX_MSR bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
+	 *
+	 * TSX control (aka MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL) is only available after a
+	 * microcode update on CPUs that have their MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+	 * bit MDS_NO=1. CPUs with MDS_NO=0 are not planned to get
+	 * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support even after a microcode update. Thus,
+	 * tsx= cmdline requests will do nothing on CPUs without
+	 * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support.
+	 */
+	return !!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR);
+}
+
+static enum tsx_ctrl_states x86_get_tsx_auto_mode(void)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+		return TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+
+	return TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
+}
+
+void __init tsx_init(void)
+{
+	char arg[5] = {};
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!tsx_ctrl_is_supported())
+		return;
+
+	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "tsx", arg, sizeof(arg));
+	if (ret >= 0) {
+		if (!strcmp(arg, "on")) {
+			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
+		} else if (!strcmp(arg, "off")) {
+			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+		} else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto")) {
+			tsx_ctrl_state = x86_get_tsx_auto_mode();
+		} else {
+			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+			pr_err("tsx: invalid option, defaulting to off\n");
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* tsx= not provided */
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO))
+			tsx_ctrl_state = x86_get_tsx_auto_mode();
+		else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF))
+			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+		else
+			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
+	}
+
+	if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_DISABLE) {
+		tsx_disable();
+
+		/*
+		 * tsx_disable() will change the state of the
+		 * RTM CPUID bit.  Clear it here since it is now
+		 * expected to be not set.
+		 */
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+	} else if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_ENABLE) {
+
+		/*
+		 * HW defaults TSX to be enabled at bootup.
+		 * We may still need the TSX enable support
+		 * during init for special cases like
+		 * kexec after TSX is disabled.
+		 */
+		tsx_enable();
+
+		/*
+		 * tsx_enable() will change the state of the
+		 * RTM CPUID bit.  Force it here since it is now
+		 * expected to be set.
+		 */
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+	}
+}
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -447,6 +447,18 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct
 			entry->ebx |= F(TSC_ADJUST);
 			entry->edx &= kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features;
 			cpuid_mask(&entry->edx, CPUID_7_EDX);
+			if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) &&
+			    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+				entry->edx |= F(SPEC_CTRL);
+			if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+				entry->edx |= F(INTEL_STIBP);
+			if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
+				entry->edx |= F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
+			/*
+			 * We emulate ARCH_CAPABILITIES in software even
+			 * if the host doesn't support it.
+			 */
+			entry->edx |= F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
 		} else {
 			entry->ebx = 0;
 			entry->edx = 0;
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -546,7 +546,6 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
 	u64 		      msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
 #endif
 
-	u64 		      arch_capabilities;
 	u64 		      spec_ctrl;
 
 	u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow;
@@ -2866,12 +2865,6 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
 
 		msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
 		break;
-	case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
-		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
-		    !guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(vcpu))
-			return 1;
-		msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->arch_capabilities;
-		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
 		msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
 		break;
@@ -3028,11 +3021,6 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
 		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,
 					      MSR_TYPE_W);
 		break;
-	case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
-		if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
-			return 1;
-		vmx->arch_capabilities = data;
-		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
 		if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
 			if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
@@ -5079,9 +5067,6 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vm
 		++vmx->nmsrs;
 	}
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
-		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, vmx->arch_capabilities);
-
 	vm_exit_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl);
 
 	/* 22.2.1, 20.8.1 */
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ static bool pdptrs_changed(struct kvm_vc
 	gfn_t gfn;
 	int r;
 
-	if (is_long_mode(vcpu) || !is_pae(vcpu))
+	if (is_long_mode(vcpu) || !is_pae(vcpu) || !is_paging(vcpu))
 		return false;
 
 	if (!test_bit(VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR,
@@ -995,6 +995,43 @@ static u32 emulated_msrs[] = {
 
 static unsigned num_emulated_msrs;
 
+u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
+{
+	u64 data;
+
+	rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, &data);
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO;
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO;
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
+
+	/*
+	 * On TAA affected systems, export MDS_NO=0 when:
+	 *	- TSX is enabled on the host, i.e. X86_FEATURE_RTM=1.
+	 *	- Updated microcode is present. This is detected by
+	 *	  the presence of ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR and ensures
+	 *	  that VERW clears CPU buffers.
+	 *
+	 * When MDS_NO=0 is exported, guests deploy clear CPU buffer
+	 * mitigation and don't complain:
+	 *
+	 *	"Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode"
+	 *
+	 * If TSX is disabled on the system, guests are also mitigated against
+	 * TAA and clear CPU buffer mitigation is not required for guests.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+	    (data & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+		data &= ~ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
+
+	return data;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_arch_capabilities);
+
 static bool __kvm_valid_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
 {
 	if (efer & EFER_FFXSR) {
@@ -2070,6 +2107,11 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *
 	case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2:
 		break;
 
+	case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
+			return 1;
+		vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = data;
+		break;
 	case MSR_EFER:
 		return set_efer(vcpu, msr_info);
 	case MSR_K7_HWCR:
@@ -2344,6 +2386,12 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *
 	case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
 		msr_info->data = 0x100000000ULL;
 		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities;
+		break;
 	case MSR_MTRRcap:
 	case 0x200 ... 0x2ff:
 		return kvm_mtrr_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index, &msr_info->data);
@@ -7168,7 +7216,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs(struct
 		kvm_update_cpuid(vcpu);
 
 	idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
-	if (!is_long_mode(vcpu) && is_pae(vcpu)) {
+	if (!is_long_mode(vcpu) && is_pae(vcpu) && is_paging(vcpu)) {
 		load_pdptrs(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu, kvm_read_cr3(vcpu));
 		mmu_reset_needed = 1;
 	}
@@ -7392,6 +7440,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_setup(struct kvm_vcpu
 {
 	int r;
 
+	vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
 	kvm_vcpu_mtrr_init(vcpu);
 	r = vcpu_load(vcpu);
 	if (r)
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -279,6 +279,8 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabi
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+TAA - TSX Asynchronous Abort
+======================================
+
+TAA is a hardware vulnerability that allows unprivileged speculative access to
+data which is available in various CPU internal buffers by using asynchronous
+aborts within an Intel TSX transactional region.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability only affects Intel processors that support Intel
+Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) when the TAA_NO bit (bit 8)
+is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.  On processors where the MDS_NO bit
+(bit 5) is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR, the existing MDS mitigations
+also mitigate against TAA.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the TAA
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`tsx_async_abort_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this TAA issue:
+
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+   CVE-2019-11135  TAA    TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA) condition on some
+                          microprocessors utilizing speculative execution may
+                          allow an authenticated user to potentially enable
+                          information disclosure via a side channel with
+                          local access.
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+When performing store, load or L1 refill operations, processors write
+data into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in
+those buffers can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
+
+Intel TSX is an extension to the x86 instruction set architecture that adds
+hardware transactional memory support to improve performance of multi-threaded
+software. TSX lets the processor expose and exploit concurrency hidden in an
+application due to dynamically avoiding unnecessary synchronization.
+
+TSX supports atomic memory transactions that are either committed (success) or
+aborted. During an abort, operations that happened within the transactional region
+are rolled back. An asynchronous abort takes place, among other options, when a
+different thread accesses a cache line that is also used within the transactional
+region when that access might lead to a data race.
+
+Immediately after an uncompleted asynchronous abort, certain speculatively
+executed loads may read data from those internal buffers and pass it to dependent
+operations. This can be then used to infer the value via a cache side channel
+attack.
+
+Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
+Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
+
+The victim of a malicious actor does not need to make use of TSX. Only the
+attacker needs to begin a TSX transaction and raise an asynchronous abort
+which in turn potenitally leaks data stored in the buffers.
+
+More detailed technical information is available in the TAA specific x86
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst <tsx_async_abort>`.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the TAA vulnerability can be implemented from unprivileged
+applications running on hosts or guests.
+
+As for MDS, the attacker has no control over the memory addresses that can
+be leaked. Only the victim is responsible for bringing data to the CPU. As
+a result, the malicious actor has to sample as much data as possible and
+then postprocess it to try to infer any useful information from it.
+
+A potential attacker only has read access to the data. Also, there is no direct
+privilege escalation by using this technique.
+
+
+.. _tsx_async_abort_sys_info:
+
+TAA system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current TAA status
+of mitigated systems. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+   * - 'Vulnerable'
+     - The CPU is affected by this vulnerability and the microcode and kernel mitigation are not applied.
+   * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
+     - The system tries to clear the buffers but the microcode might not support the operation.
+   * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
+     - The microcode has been updated to clear the buffers. TSX is still enabled.
+   * - 'Mitigation: TSX disabled'
+     - TSX is disabled.
+   * - 'Not affected'
+     - The CPU is not affected by this issue.
+
+.. _ucode_needed:
+
+Best effort mitigation mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode-based
+mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
+effort mitigation mode.  This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
+without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
+
+This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
+microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the
+CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection takes
+effect; otherwise a few CPU cycles are wasted pointlessly.
+
+The state in the tsx_async_abort sysfs file reflects this situation
+accordingly.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+--------------------
+
+The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode which is
+required. If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
+enables the mitigation by default.
+
+
+The mitigation can be controlled at boot time via a kernel command line option.
+See :ref:`taa_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+.. _virt_mechanism:
+
+Virtualization mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Affected systems where the host has TAA microcode and TAA is mitigated by
+having disabled TSX previously, are not vulnerable regardless of the status
+of the VMs.
+
+In all other cases, if the host either does not have the TAA microcode or
+the kernel is not mitigated, the system might be vulnerable.
+
+
+.. _taa_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the TAA mitigations at boot time with
+the option "tsx_async_abort=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  off		This option disables the TAA mitigation on affected platforms.
+                If the system has TSX enabled (see next parameter) and the CPU
+                is affected, the system is vulnerable.
+
+  full	        TAA mitigation is enabled. If TSX is enabled, on an affected
+                system it will clear CPU buffers on ring transitions. On
+                systems which are MDS-affected and deploy MDS mitigation,
+                TAA is also mitigated. Specifying this option on those
+                systems will have no effect.
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx_async_abort=full".
+
+The kernel command line also allows to control the TSX feature using the
+parameter "tsx=" on CPUs which support TSX control. MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is used
+to control the TSX feature and the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM
+and HLE) in CPUID.
+
+The valid options are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  off		Disables TSX on the system.
+
+                Note that this option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
+                not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1
+                and which get the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
+                update. This new MSR allows for the reliable deactivation of
+                the TSX functionality.
+
+  on		Enables TSX.
+
+                Although there are mitigations for all known security
+                vulnerabilities, TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
+                several previous speculation-related CVEs, and so there may be
+                unknown security risks associated with leaving it enabled.
+
+  auto		Disables TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enables TSX
+                on the system.
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx=off".
+
+The following combinations of the "tsx_async_abort" and "tsx" are possible. For
+affected platforms tsx=auto is equivalent to tsx=off and the result will be:
+
+  =========  ==========================   =========================================
+  tsx=on     tsx_async_abort=full         The system will use VERW to clear CPU
+                                          buffers. Cross-thread attacks are still
+					  possible on SMT machines.
+  tsx=on     tsx_async_abort=off          The system is vulnerable.
+  tsx=off    tsx_async_abort=full         TSX might be disabled if microcode
+                                          provides a TSX control MSR. If so,
+					  system is not vulnerable.
+  tsx=off    tsx_async_abort=off          ditto
+  =========  ==========================   =========================================
+
+
+For unaffected platforms "tsx=on" and "tsx_async_abort=full" does not clear CPU
+buffers.  For platforms without TSX control (MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=0)
+"tsx" command line argument has no effect.
+
+For the affected platforms below table indicates the mitigation status for the
+combinations of CPUID bit MD_CLEAR and IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bits MDS_NO
+and TSX_CTRL_MSR.
+
+  =======  =========  =============  ========================================
+  MDS_NO   MD_CLEAR   TSX_CTRL_MSR   Status
+  =======  =========  =============  ========================================
+    0          0            0        Vulnerable (needs microcode)
+    0          1            0        MDS and TAA mitigated via VERW
+    1          1            0        MDS fixed, TAA vulnerable if TSX enabled
+                                     because MD_CLEAR has no meaning and
+                                     VERW is not guaranteed to clear buffers
+    1          X            1        MDS fixed, TAA can be mitigated by
+                                     VERW or TSX_CTRL_MSR
+  =======  =========  =============  ========================================
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace and guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If all user space applications are from a trusted source and do not execute
+untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation can be
+disabled. The same applies to virtualized environments with trusted guests.
+
+
+2. Untrusted userspace and guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If there are untrusted applications or guests on the system, enabling TSX
+might allow a malicious actor to leak data from the host or from other
+processes running on the same physical core.
+
+If the microcode is available and the TSX is disabled on the host, attacks
+are prevented in a virtualized environment as well, even if the VMs do not
+explicitly enable the mitigation.
+
+
+.. _taa_default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+The kernel's default action for vulnerable processors is:
+
+  - Deploy TSX disable mitigation (tsx_async_abort=full tsx=off).
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -2189,6 +2189,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
 					       mds=off [X86]
+					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)
 				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -4052,6 +4053,67 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 			platforms where RDTSC is slow and this accounting
 			can add overhead.
 
+	tsx=		[X86] Control Transactional Synchronization
+			Extensions (TSX) feature in Intel processors that
+			support TSX control.
+
+			This parameter controls the TSX feature. The options are:
+
+			on	- Enable TSX on the system. Although there are
+				mitigations for all known security vulnerabilities,
+				TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
+				several previous speculation-related CVEs, and
+				so there may be unknown	security risks associated
+				with leaving it enabled.
+
+			off	- Disable TSX on the system. (Note that this
+				option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
+				not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have
+				MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1 and which get
+				the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
+				update. This new MSR allows for the reliable
+				deactivation of the TSX functionality.)
+
+			auto	- Disable TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present,
+				  otherwise enable TSX on the system.
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to tsx=off.
+
+			See Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+			for more details.
+
+	tsx_async_abort= [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the TSX Async
+			Abort (TAA) vulnerability.
+
+			Similar to Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS)
+			certain CPUs that support Transactional
+			Synchronization Extensions (TSX) are vulnerable to an
+			exploit against CPU internal buffers which can forward
+			information to a disclosure gadget under certain
+			conditions.
+
+			In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded
+			data can be used in a cache side channel attack, to
+			access data to which the attacker does not have direct
+			access.
+
+			This parameter controls the TAA mitigation.  The
+			options are:
+
+			full       - Enable TAA mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+				     if TSX is enabled.
+
+			off        - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			tsx_async_abort=full.  On CPUs which are MDS affected
+			and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not
+			required and doesn't provide any additional
+			mitigation.
+
+			For details see:
+			Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+
 	turbografx.map[2|3]=	[HW,JOY]
 			TurboGraFX parallel port interface
 			Format:
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+TSX Async Abort (TAA) mitigation
+================================
+
+.. _tsx_async_abort:
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel attack on internal buffers in some
+Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data Sampling (MDS).  In this
+case certain loads may speculatively pass invalid data to dependent operations
+when an asynchronous abort condition is pending in a Transactional
+Synchronization Extensions (TSX) transaction.  This includes loads with no
+fault or assist condition. Such loads may speculatively expose stale data from
+the same uarch data structures as in MDS, with same scope of exposure i.e.
+same-thread and cross-thread. This issue affects all current processors that
+support TSX.
+
+Mitigation strategy
+-------------------
+
+a) TSX disable - one of the mitigations is to disable TSX. A new MSR
+IA32_TSX_CTRL will be available in future and current processors after
+microcode update which can be used to disable TSX. In addition, it
+controls the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM and HLE) in CPUID.
+
+b) Clear CPU buffers - similar to MDS, clearing the CPU buffers mitigates this
+vulnerability. More details on this approach can be found in
+:ref:`Documentation/hw-vuln/mds.rst <mds>`.
+
+Kernel internal mitigation modes
+--------------------------------
+
+ =============    ============================================================
+ off              Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or
+                  tsx_async_abort=off is supplied on the kernel command line.
+
+ tsx disabled     Mitigation is enabled. TSX feature is disabled by default at
+                  bootup on processors that support TSX control.
+
+ verw             Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is
+                  advertised in CPUID.
+
+ ucode needed     Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not
+                  advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization
+                  scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the
+                  hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best
+                  effort approach without guarantee.
+ =============    ============================================================
+
+If the CPU is affected and the "tsx_async_abort" kernel command line parameter is
+not provided then the kernel selects an appropriate mitigation depending on the
+status of RTM and MD_CLEAR CPUID bits.
+
+Below tables indicate the impact of tsx=on|off|auto cmdline options on state of
+TAA mitigation, VERW behavior and TSX feature for various combinations of
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits.
+
+1. "tsx=off"
+
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits     Result with cmdline tsx=off
+----------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO     MDS_NO     TSX_CTRL_MSR  TSX state     VERW can clear  TAA mitigation       TAA mitigation
+                                    after bootup  CPU buffers     tsx_async_abort=off  tsx_async_abort=full
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+    0          0           0         HW default         Yes           Same as MDS           Same as MDS
+    0          0           1        Invalid case   Invalid case       Invalid case          Invalid case
+    0          1           0         HW default         No         Need ucode update     Need ucode update
+    0          1           1          Disabled          Yes           TSX disabled          TSX disabled
+    1          X           1          Disabled           X             None needed           None needed
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+
+2. "tsx=on"
+
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits     Result with cmdline tsx=on
+----------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO     MDS_NO     TSX_CTRL_MSR  TSX state     VERW can clear  TAA mitigation       TAA mitigation
+                                    after bootup  CPU buffers     tsx_async_abort=off  tsx_async_abort=full
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+    0          0           0         HW default        Yes            Same as MDS          Same as MDS
+    0          0           1        Invalid case   Invalid case       Invalid case         Invalid case
+    0          1           0         HW default        No          Need ucode update     Need ucode update
+    0          1           1          Enabled          Yes               None              Same as MDS
+    1          X           1          Enabled          X              None needed          None needed
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+
+3. "tsx=auto"
+
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits     Result with cmdline tsx=auto
+----------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO     MDS_NO     TSX_CTRL_MSR  TSX state     VERW can clear  TAA mitigation       TAA mitigation
+                                    after bootup  CPU buffers     tsx_async_abort=off  tsx_async_abort=full
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+    0          0           0         HW default    Yes                Same as MDS           Same as MDS
+    0          0           1        Invalid case  Invalid case        Invalid case          Invalid case
+    0          1           0         HW default    No              Need ucode update     Need ucode update
+    0          1           1          Disabled      Yes               TSX disabled          TSX disabled
+    1          X           1          Enabled       X                 None needed           None needed
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+
+In the tables, TSX_CTRL_MSR is a new bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES that
+indicates whether MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is supported.
+
+There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:
+
+      Bit 0: When set it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
+             sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
+             XBEGIN instruction).
+
+      Bit 1: When set it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
+             (i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
+             CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/drivers/base/cpu.c linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/drivers/base/cpu.c
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/drivers/base/cpu.c	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/drivers/base/cpu.c	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -536,12 +536,27 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mds(struct devic
 	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev,
+					struct device_attribute *attr,
+					char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_store_bypass, 0444, cpu_show_spec_store_bypass, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -550,6 +565,8 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner
 	&dev_attr_spec_store_bypass.attr,
 	&dev_attr_l1tf.attr,
 	&dev_attr_mds.attr,
+	&dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr,
+	&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/include/linux/cpu.h linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/include/linux/cpu.h
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/include/linux/cpu.h	2019-11-12 13:13:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/include/linux/cpu.h	2019-11-16 04:27:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -52,6 +52,11 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct devi
 			     struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev,
 			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev,
+					struct device_attribute *attr,
+					char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev,
+				      struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/Makefile linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/Makefile
--- linux-libre-4.4.201-gnu/Makefile	2019-11-12 20:35:46.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.4.202-gnu/Makefile	2019-11-16 09:59:12.000000000 -0500
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 VERSION = 4
 PATCHLEVEL = 4
-SUBLEVEL = 201
+SUBLEVEL = 202
 EXTRAVERSION = -gnu
 NAME = Blurry Fish Butt
 
