diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/mips/bcm63xx/reset.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/mips/bcm63xx/reset.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/mips/bcm63xx/reset.c	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/mips/bcm63xx/reset.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
 #define BCM6368_RESET_DSL	0
 #define BCM6368_RESET_SAR	SOFTRESET_6368_SAR_MASK
 #define BCM6368_RESET_EPHY	SOFTRESET_6368_EPHY_MASK
-#define BCM6368_RESET_ENETSW	0
+#define BCM6368_RESET_ENETSW	SOFTRESET_6368_ENETSW_MASK
 #define BCM6368_RESET_PCM	SOFTRESET_6368_PCM_MASK
 #define BCM6368_RESET_MPI	SOFTRESET_6368_MPI_MASK
 #define BCM6368_RESET_PCIE	0
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -1422,13 +1422,13 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, un
 	kvm->arch.sca = (struct bsca_block *) get_zeroed_page(alloc_flags);
 	if (!kvm->arch.sca)
 		goto out_err;
-	spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
 	sca_offset += 16;
 	if (sca_offset + sizeof(struct bsca_block) > PAGE_SIZE)
 		sca_offset = 0;
 	kvm->arch.sca = (struct bsca_block *)
 			((char *) kvm->arch.sca + sca_offset);
-	spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
 
 	sprintf(debug_name, "kvm-%u", current->pid);
 
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -357,5 +357,7 @@
 #define X86_BUG_MDS		X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
 #define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY	X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the  MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
 #define X86_BUG_SWAPGS		X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
+#define X86_BUG_TAA		X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
+#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT	X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ struct kvm_rmap_head {
 struct kvm_mmu_page {
 	struct list_head link;
 	struct hlist_node hash_link;
+	struct list_head lpage_disallowed_link;
 
 	/*
 	 * The following two entries are used to key the shadow page in the
@@ -273,6 +274,7 @@ struct kvm_mmu_page {
 	/* hold the gfn of each spte inside spt */
 	gfn_t *gfns;
 	bool unsync;
+	bool lpage_disallowed; /* Can't be replaced by an equiv large page */
 	int root_count;          /* Currently serving as active root */
 	unsigned int unsync_children;
 	struct kvm_rmap_head parent_ptes; /* rmap pointers to parent sptes */
@@ -724,6 +726,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {
 	 */
 	struct list_head active_mmu_pages;
 	struct list_head zapped_obsolete_pages;
+	struct list_head lpage_disallowed_mmu_pages;
 	struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node mmu_sp_tracker;
 	struct kvm_page_track_notifier_head track_notifier_head;
 
@@ -798,6 +801,8 @@ struct kvm_arch {
 
 	bool x2apic_format;
 	bool x2apic_broadcast_quirk_disabled;
+
+	struct task_struct *nx_lpage_recovery_thread;
 };
 
 struct kvm_vm_stat {
@@ -811,6 +816,7 @@ struct kvm_vm_stat {
 	ulong mmu_unsync;
 	ulong remote_tlb_flush;
 	ulong lpages;
+	ulong nx_lpage_splits;
 };
 
 struct kvm_vcpu_stat {
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -77,6 +77,18 @@
 						  * Microarchitectural Data
 						  * Sampling (MDS) vulnerabilities.
 						  */
+#define ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO		BIT(6)	 /*
+						  * The processor is not susceptible to a
+						  * machine check error due to modifying the
+						  * code page size along with either the
+						  * physical address or cache type
+						  * without TLB invalidation.
+						  */
+#define ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR		BIT(7)	/* MSR for TSX control is available. */
+#define ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO			BIT(8)	/*
+						 * Not susceptible to
+						 * TSX Async Abort (TAA) vulnerabilities.
+						 */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD		0x0000010b
 #define L1D_FLUSH			BIT(0)	/*
@@ -87,6 +99,10 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL		0x00000119
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3		0x0000011e
 
+#define MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL		0x00000122
+#define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE		BIT(0)	/* Disable RTM feature */
+#define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR		BIT(1)	/* Disable TSX enumeration */
+
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS		0x00000174
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP		0x00000175
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP		0x00000176
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear)
 #include <asm/segment.h>
 
 /**
- * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
  *
  * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
  * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers
 }
 
 /**
- * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
  *
  * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
  */
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -880,4 +880,11 @@ enum mds_mitigations {
 	MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV,
 };
 
+enum taa_mitigations {
+	TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+	TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
+	TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
+};
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/Kconfig linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/Kconfig
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/Kconfig	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/Kconfig	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -1755,6 +1755,51 @@ config X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
 
 	  If unsure, say y.
 
+choice
+	prompt "TSX enable mode"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF
+	help
+	  Intel's TSX (Transactional Synchronization Extensions) feature
+	  allows to optimize locking protocols through lock elision which
+	  can lead to a noticeable performance boost.
+
+	  On the other hand it has been shown that TSX can be exploited
+	  to form side channel attacks (e.g. TAA) and chances are there
+	  will be more of those attacks discovered in the future.
+
+	  Therefore TSX is not enabled by default (aka tsx=off). An admin
+	  might override this decision by tsx=on the command line parameter.
+	  Even with TSX enabled, the kernel will attempt to enable the best
+	  possible TAA mitigation setting depending on the microcode available
+	  for the particular machine.
+
+	  This option allows to set the default tsx mode between tsx=on, =off
+	  and =auto. See Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt for more
+	  details.
+
+	  Say off if not sure, auto if TSX is in use but it should be used on safe
+	  platforms or on if TSX is in use and the security aspect of tsx is not
+	  relevant.
+
+config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF
+	bool "off"
+	help
+	  TSX is disabled if possible - equals to tsx=off command line parameter.
+
+config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_ON
+	bool "on"
+	help
+	  TSX is always enabled on TSX capable HW - equals the tsx=on command
+	  line parameter.
+
+config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO
+	bool "auto"
+	help
+	  TSX is enabled on TSX capable HW that is believed to be safe against
+	  side channel attacks- equals the tsx=auto command line parameter.
+endchoice
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -31,11 +31,14 @@
 #include <asm/intel-family.h>
 #include <asm/e820.h>
 
+#include "cpu.h"
+
 static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
 
 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -102,6 +105,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	ssb_select_mitigation();
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
 	mds_select_mitigation();
+	taa_select_mitigation();
 
 	arch_smt_update();
 
@@ -266,6 +270,100 @@ static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
 early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
 
 #undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"TAA: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
+static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static bool taa_nosmt __ro_after_init;
+
+static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]	= "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_VERW]		= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED]	= "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
+};
+
+static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* TSX previously disabled by tsx=off */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* TAA mitigation is turned off on the cmdline (tsx_async_abort=off) */
+	if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+	else
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+	/*
+	 * VERW doesn't clear the CPU buffers when MD_CLEAR=1 and MDS_NO=1.
+	 * A microcode update fixes this behavior to clear CPU buffers. It also
+	 * adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is enumerated by the
+	 * ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR bit.
+	 *
+	 * On MDS_NO=1 CPUs if ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR is not set, microcode
+	 * update is required.
+	 */
+	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+	if ( (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+	/*
+	 * TSX is enabled, select alternate mitigation for TAA which is
+	 * the same as MDS. Enable MDS static branch to clear CPU buffers.
+	 *
+	 * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
+	 * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
+	 */
+	static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+
+	if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+		cpu_smt_disable(false);
+
+out:
+	pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	} else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+	} else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+		taa_nosmt = true;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V1 : " fmt
 
 enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
@@ -780,13 +878,10 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
 }
 
 #define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
+#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
 
 void arch_smt_update(void)
 {
-	/* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
-	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
-		return;
-
 	mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 
 	switch (spectre_v2_user) {
@@ -812,6 +907,17 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	switch (taa_mitigation) {
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_VERW:
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+		if (sched_smt_active())
+			pr_warn_once(TAA_MSG_SMT);
+		break;
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED:
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		break;
+	}
+
 	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 }
 
@@ -1127,6 +1233,9 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 		x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 }
 
+bool itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation);
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"L1TF: " fmt
 
@@ -1282,11 +1391,24 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf
 		       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
 		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
 }
+
+static ssize_t itlb_multihit_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if (itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation)
+		return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages\n");
+	else
+		return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Vulnerable\n");
+}
 #else
 static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
 {
 	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
 }
+
+static ssize_t itlb_multihit_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Processor vulnerable\n");
+}
 #endif
 
 static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
@@ -1308,6 +1430,21 @@ static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
 		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
 }
 
+static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if ((taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED) ||
+	    (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF))
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+			       taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+	}
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation],
+		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
 static char *stibp_state(void)
 {
 	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
@@ -1373,6 +1510,12 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
 	case X86_BUG_MDS:
 		return mds_show_state(buf);
 
+	case X86_BUG_TAA:
+		return tsx_async_abort_show_state(buf);
+
+	case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT:
+		return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1409,4 +1552,14 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev,
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MDS);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_TAA);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
+}
 #endif
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -891,13 +891,14 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(s
 	c->x86_cache_bits = c->x86_phys_bits;
 }
 
-#define NO_SPECULATION	BIT(0)
-#define NO_MELTDOWN	BIT(1)
-#define NO_SSB		BIT(2)
-#define NO_L1TF		BIT(3)
-#define NO_MDS		BIT(4)
-#define MSBDS_ONLY	BIT(5)
-#define NO_SWAPGS	BIT(6)
+#define NO_SPECULATION		BIT(0)
+#define NO_MELTDOWN		BIT(1)
+#define NO_SSB			BIT(2)
+#define NO_L1TF			BIT(3)
+#define NO_MDS			BIT(4)
+#define MSBDS_ONLY		BIT(5)
+#define NO_SWAPGS		BIT(6)
+#define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT	BIT(7)
 
 #define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist)	\
 	{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
@@ -915,26 +916,26 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
 	VULNWL(NSC,	5, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
 
 	/* Intel Family 6 */
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL,		NO_SPECULATION),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET,	NO_SPECULATION),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL,		NO_SPECULATION),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL,		NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET,	NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL,		NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID,	NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID,	NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
 	VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH,		NO_SSB),
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID,		NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID,		NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
 	/*
 	 * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
@@ -945,13 +946,13 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
 	 */
 
 	/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x10,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x11,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x10,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x11,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
 	/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
-	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 	{}
 };
 
@@ -962,19 +963,30 @@ static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned
 	return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
 }
 
-static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void)
 {
 	u64 ia32_cap = 0;
 
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
+
+	return ia32_cap;
+}
+
+static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+	/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
-		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
-
 	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
@@ -991,6 +1003,21 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
 
+	/*
+	 * When the CPU is not mitigated for TAA (TAA_NO=0) set TAA bug when:
+	 *	- TSX is supported or
+	 *	- TSX_CTRL is present
+	 *
+	 * TSX_CTRL check is needed for cases when TSX could be disabled before
+	 * the kernel boot e.g. kexec.
+	 * TSX_CTRL check alone is not sufficient for cases when the microcode
+	 * update is not present or running as guest that don't get TSX_CTRL.
+	 */
+	if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
+	    (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RTM) ||
+	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
@@ -1409,6 +1436,8 @@ void __init identify_boot_cpu(void)
 	enable_sep_cpu();
 #endif
 	cpu_detect_tlb(&boot_cpu_data);
+
+	tsx_init();
 }
 
 void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -44,6 +44,22 @@ struct _tlb_table {
 extern const struct cpu_dev *const __x86_cpu_dev_start[],
 			    *const __x86_cpu_dev_end[];
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
+enum tsx_ctrl_states {
+	TSX_CTRL_ENABLE,
+	TSX_CTRL_DISABLE,
+	TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+};
+
+extern __ro_after_init enum tsx_ctrl_states tsx_ctrl_state;
+
+extern void __init tsx_init(void);
+extern void tsx_enable(void);
+extern void tsx_disable(void);
+#else
+static inline void tsx_init(void) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL */
+
 extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern int detect_extended_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
@@ -51,4 +67,6 @@ extern int detect_ht_early(struct cpuinf
 
 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
 
+extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void);
+
 #endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -642,6 +642,11 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x8
 		detect_vmx_virtcap(c);
 
 	init_intel_energy_perf(c);
+
+	if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_ENABLE)
+		tsx_enable();
+	if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_DISABLE)
+		tsx_disable();
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ obj-y			+= bugs.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS)	+= proc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES) += capflags.o powerflags.o
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL)		+= intel.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL)		+= intel.o tsx.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD)		+= amd.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_CYRIX_32)		+= cyrix.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_CENTAUR)		+= centaur.o
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Intel Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ *	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+enum tsx_ctrl_states tsx_ctrl_state __ro_after_init = TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+void tsx_disable(void)
+{
+	u64 tsx;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+
+	/* Force all transactions to immediately abort */
+	tsx |= TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure TSX support is not enumerated in CPUID.
+	 * This is visible to userspace and will ensure they
+	 * do not waste resources trying TSX transactions that
+	 * will always abort.
+	 */
+	tsx |= TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+}
+
+void tsx_enable(void)
+{
+	u64 tsx;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+
+	/* Enable the RTM feature in the cpu */
+	tsx &= ~TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure TSX support is enumerated in CPUID.
+	 * This is visible to userspace and will ensure they
+	 * can enumerate and use the TSX feature.
+	 */
+	tsx &= ~TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+}
+
+static bool __init tsx_ctrl_is_supported(void)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+	/*
+	 * TSX is controlled via MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL.  However, support for this
+	 * MSR is enumerated by ARCH_CAP_TSX_MSR bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
+	 *
+	 * TSX control (aka MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL) is only available after a
+	 * microcode update on CPUs that have their MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+	 * bit MDS_NO=1. CPUs with MDS_NO=0 are not planned to get
+	 * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support even after a microcode update. Thus,
+	 * tsx= cmdline requests will do nothing on CPUs without
+	 * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support.
+	 */
+	return !!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR);
+}
+
+static enum tsx_ctrl_states x86_get_tsx_auto_mode(void)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+		return TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+
+	return TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
+}
+
+void __init tsx_init(void)
+{
+	char arg[5] = {};
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!tsx_ctrl_is_supported())
+		return;
+
+	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "tsx", arg, sizeof(arg));
+	if (ret >= 0) {
+		if (!strcmp(arg, "on")) {
+			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
+		} else if (!strcmp(arg, "off")) {
+			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+		} else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto")) {
+			tsx_ctrl_state = x86_get_tsx_auto_mode();
+		} else {
+			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+			pr_err("tsx: invalid option, defaulting to off\n");
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* tsx= not provided */
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO))
+			tsx_ctrl_state = x86_get_tsx_auto_mode();
+		else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF))
+			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+		else
+			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
+	}
+
+	if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_DISABLE) {
+		tsx_disable();
+
+		/*
+		 * tsx_disable() will change the state of the
+		 * RTM CPUID bit.  Clear it here since it is now
+		 * expected to be not set.
+		 */
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+	} else if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_ENABLE) {
+
+		/*
+		 * HW defaults TSX to be enabled at bootup.
+		 * We may still need the TSX enable support
+		 * during init for special cases like
+		 * kexec after TSX is disabled.
+		 */
+		tsx_enable();
+
+		/*
+		 * tsx_enable() will change the state of the
+		 * RTM CPUID bit.  Force it here since it is now
+		 * expected to be set.
+		 */
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+	}
+}
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -466,8 +466,16 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct
 			/* PKU is not yet implemented for shadow paging. */
 			if (!tdp_enabled || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
 				entry->ecx &= ~F(PKU);
+
 			entry->edx &= kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features;
 			cpuid_mask(&entry->edx, CPUID_7_EDX);
+			if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) &&
+			    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+				entry->edx |= F(SPEC_CTRL);
+			if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+				entry->edx |= F(INTEL_STIBP);
+			if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
+				entry->edx |= F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
 			/*
 			 * We emulate ARCH_CAPABILITIES in software even
 			 * if the host doesn't support it.
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include <linux/srcu.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
 
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/cmpxchg.h>
@@ -44,6 +45,30 @@
 #include <asm/vmx.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_page_track.h>
 
+extern bool itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation;
+
+static int __read_mostly nx_huge_pages = -1;
+static uint __read_mostly nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio = 60;
+
+static int set_nx_huge_pages(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int set_nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+
+static struct kernel_param_ops nx_huge_pages_ops = {
+	.set = set_nx_huge_pages,
+	.get = param_get_bool,
+};
+
+static struct kernel_param_ops nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio_ops = {
+	.set = set_nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio,
+	.get = param_get_uint,
+};
+
+module_param_cb(nx_huge_pages, &nx_huge_pages_ops, &nx_huge_pages, 0644);
+__MODULE_PARM_TYPE(nx_huge_pages, "bool");
+module_param_cb(nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio, &nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio_ops,
+		&nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio, 0644);
+__MODULE_PARM_TYPE(nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio, "uint");
+
 /*
  * When setting this variable to true it enables Two-Dimensional-Paging
  * where the hardware walks 2 page tables:
@@ -131,9 +156,6 @@ module_param(dbg, bool, 0644);
 
 #include <trace/events/kvm.h>
 
-#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
-#include "mmutrace.h"
-
 #define SPTE_HOST_WRITEABLE	(1ULL << PT_FIRST_AVAIL_BITS_SHIFT)
 #define SPTE_MMU_WRITEABLE	(1ULL << (PT_FIRST_AVAIL_BITS_SHIFT + 1))
 
@@ -142,6 +164,20 @@ module_param(dbg, bool, 0644);
 /* make pte_list_desc fit well in cache line */
 #define PTE_LIST_EXT 3
 
+/*
+ * Return values of handle_mmio_page_fault and mmu.page_fault:
+ * RET_PF_RETRY: let CPU fault again on the address.
+ * RET_PF_EMULATE: mmio page fault, emulate the instruction directly.
+ *
+ * For handle_mmio_page_fault only:
+ * RET_PF_INVALID: the spte is invalid, let the real page fault path update it.
+ */
+enum {
+	RET_PF_RETRY = 0,
+	RET_PF_EMULATE = 1,
+	RET_PF_INVALID = 2,
+};
+
 struct pte_list_desc {
 	u64 *sptes[PTE_LIST_EXT];
 	struct pte_list_desc *more;
@@ -179,14 +215,23 @@ static u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mas
 static u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask;
 
 static void mmu_spte_set(u64 *sptep, u64 spte);
+static bool is_executable_pte(u64 spte);
 static void mmu_free_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include "mmutrace.h"
+
 void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_mask)
 {
 	shadow_mmio_mask = mmio_mask;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask);
 
+static bool is_nx_huge_page_enabled(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages);
+}
+
 /*
  * the low bit of the generation number is always presumed to be zero.
  * This disables mmio caching during memslot updates.  The concept is
@@ -324,6 +369,11 @@ static int is_last_spte(u64 pte, int lev
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool is_executable_pte(u64 spte)
+{
+	return (spte & (shadow_x_mask | shadow_nx_mask)) == shadow_x_mask;
+}
+
 static kvm_pfn_t spte_to_pfn(u64 pte)
 {
 	return (pte & PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -767,10 +817,16 @@ static gfn_t kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(struct
 
 static void kvm_mmu_page_set_gfn(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int index, gfn_t gfn)
 {
-	if (sp->role.direct)
-		BUG_ON(gfn != kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, index));
-	else
+	if (!sp->role.direct) {
 		sp->gfns[index] = gfn;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (WARN_ON(gfn != kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, index)))
+		pr_err_ratelimited("gfn mismatch under direct page %llx "
+				   "(expected %llx, got %llx)\n",
+				   sp->gfn,
+				   kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, index), gfn);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -829,6 +885,17 @@ static void account_shadowed(struct kvm
 	kvm_mmu_gfn_disallow_lpage(slot, gfn);
 }
 
+static void account_huge_nx_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	if (sp->lpage_disallowed)
+		return;
+
+	++kvm->stat.nx_lpage_splits;
+	list_add_tail(&sp->lpage_disallowed_link,
+		      &kvm->arch.lpage_disallowed_mmu_pages);
+	sp->lpage_disallowed = true;
+}
+
 static void unaccount_shadowed(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 {
 	struct kvm_memslots *slots;
@@ -846,6 +913,13 @@ static void unaccount_shadowed(struct kv
 	kvm_mmu_gfn_allow_lpage(slot, gfn);
 }
 
+static void unaccount_huge_nx_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	--kvm->stat.nx_lpage_splits;
+	sp->lpage_disallowed = false;
+	list_del(&sp->lpage_disallowed_link);
+}
+
 static bool __mmu_gfn_lpage_is_disallowed(gfn_t gfn, int level,
 					  struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
 {
@@ -2382,6 +2456,9 @@ static int kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(stru
 			kvm_reload_remote_mmus(kvm);
 	}
 
+	if (sp->lpage_disallowed)
+		unaccount_huge_nx_page(kvm, sp);
+
 	sp->role.invalid = 1;
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -2533,6 +2610,11 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcp
 	if (!speculative)
 		spte |= shadow_accessed_mask;
 
+	if (level > PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL && (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK) &&
+	    is_nx_huge_page_enabled()) {
+		pte_access &= ~ACC_EXEC_MASK;
+	}
+
 	if (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK)
 		spte |= shadow_x_mask;
 	else
@@ -2598,13 +2680,13 @@ done:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static bool mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep, unsigned pte_access,
-			 int write_fault, int level, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
-			 bool speculative, bool host_writable)
+static int mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep, unsigned pte_access,
+			int write_fault, int level, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
+		       	bool speculative, bool host_writable)
 {
 	int was_rmapped = 0;
 	int rmap_count;
-	bool emulate = false;
+	int ret = RET_PF_RETRY;
 
 	pgprintk("%s: spte %llx write_fault %d gfn %llx\n", __func__,
 		 *sptep, write_fault, gfn);
@@ -2634,18 +2716,15 @@ static bool mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu
 	if (set_spte(vcpu, sptep, pte_access, level, gfn, pfn, speculative,
 	      true, host_writable)) {
 		if (write_fault)
-			emulate = true;
+			ret = RET_PF_EMULATE;
 		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(is_mmio_spte(*sptep)))
-		emulate = true;
+		ret = RET_PF_EMULATE;
 
 	pgprintk("%s: setting spte %llx\n", __func__, *sptep);
-	pgprintk("instantiating %s PTE (%s) at %llx (%llx) addr %p\n",
-		 is_large_pte(*sptep)? "2MB" : "4kB",
-		 *sptep & PT_PRESENT_MASK ?"RW":"R", gfn,
-		 *sptep, sptep);
+	trace_kvm_mmu_set_spte(level, gfn, sptep);
 	if (!was_rmapped && is_large_pte(*sptep))
 		++vcpu->kvm->stat.lpages;
 
@@ -2657,9 +2736,7 @@ static bool mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu
 		}
 	}
 
-	kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
-
-	return emulate;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static kvm_pfn_t pte_prefetch_gfn_to_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn,
@@ -2693,9 +2770,11 @@ static int direct_pte_prefetch_many(stru
 	if (ret <= 0)
 		return -1;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < ret; i++, gfn++, start++)
+	for (i = 0; i < ret; i++, gfn++, start++) {
 		mmu_set_spte(vcpu, start, access, 0, sp->role.level, gfn,
 			     page_to_pfn(pages[i]), true, true);
+		put_page(pages[i]);
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -2743,40 +2822,71 @@ static void direct_pte_prefetch(struct k
 	__direct_pte_prefetch(vcpu, sp, sptep);
 }
 
-static int __direct_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int write, int map_writable,
-			int level, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool prefault)
+static void disallowed_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator it,
+				       gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t *pfnp, int *levelp)
 {
-	struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator iterator;
+	int level = *levelp;
+	u64 spte = *it.sptep;
+
+	if (it.level == level && level > PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL &&
+	    is_nx_huge_page_enabled() &&
+	    is_shadow_present_pte(spte) &&
+	    !is_large_pte(spte)) {
+		/*
+		 * A small SPTE exists for this pfn, but FNAME(fetch)
+		 * and __direct_map would like to create a large PTE
+		 * instead: just force them to go down another level,
+		 * patching back for them into pfn the next 9 bits of
+		 * the address.
+		 */
+		u64 page_mask = KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level - 1);
+		*pfnp |= gfn & page_mask;
+		(*levelp)--;
+	}
+}
+
+static int __direct_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int write,
+			int map_writable, int level, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
+			bool prefault, bool lpage_disallowed)
+{
+	struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator it;
 	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
-	int emulate = 0;
-	gfn_t pseudo_gfn;
+	int ret;
+	gfn_t gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	gfn_t base_gfn = gfn;
 
 	if (!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa))
-		return 0;
+		return RET_PF_RETRY;
 
-	for_each_shadow_entry(vcpu, (u64)gfn << PAGE_SHIFT, iterator) {
-		if (iterator.level == level) {
-			emulate = mmu_set_spte(vcpu, iterator.sptep, ACC_ALL,
-					       write, level, gfn, pfn, prefault,
-					       map_writable);
-			direct_pte_prefetch(vcpu, iterator.sptep);
-			++vcpu->stat.pf_fixed;
-			break;
-		}
+	trace_kvm_mmu_spte_requested(gpa, level, pfn);
+	for_each_shadow_entry(vcpu, gpa, it) {
+		/*
+		 * We cannot overwrite existing page tables with an NX
+		 * large page, as the leaf could be executable.
+		 */
+		disallowed_hugepage_adjust(it, gfn, &pfn, &level);
 
-		drop_large_spte(vcpu, iterator.sptep);
-		if (!is_shadow_present_pte(*iterator.sptep)) {
-			u64 base_addr = iterator.addr;
+		base_gfn = gfn & ~(KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(it.level) - 1);
+		if (it.level == level)
+			break;
 
-			base_addr &= PT64_LVL_ADDR_MASK(iterator.level);
-			pseudo_gfn = base_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-			sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, pseudo_gfn, iterator.addr,
-					      iterator.level - 1, 1, ACC_ALL);
+		drop_large_spte(vcpu, it.sptep);
+		if (!is_shadow_present_pte(*it.sptep)) {
+			sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, base_gfn, it.addr,
+					      it.level - 1, true, ACC_ALL);
 
-			link_shadow_page(vcpu, iterator.sptep, sp);
+			link_shadow_page(vcpu, it.sptep, sp);
+			if (lpage_disallowed)
+				account_huge_nx_page(vcpu->kvm, sp);
 		}
 	}
-	return emulate;
+
+	ret = mmu_set_spte(vcpu, it.sptep, ACC_ALL,
+			   write, level, base_gfn, pfn, prefault,
+			   map_writable);
+	direct_pte_prefetch(vcpu, it.sptep);
+	++vcpu->stat.pf_fixed;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static void kvm_send_hwpoison_signal(unsigned long address, struct task_struct *tsk)
@@ -2798,25 +2908,23 @@ static int kvm_handle_bad_page(struct kv
 	 * Do not cache the mmio info caused by writing the readonly gfn
 	 * into the spte otherwise read access on readonly gfn also can
 	 * caused mmio page fault and treat it as mmio access.
-	 * Return 1 to tell kvm to emulate it.
 	 */
 	if (pfn == KVM_PFN_ERR_RO_FAULT)
-		return 1;
+		return RET_PF_EMULATE;
 
 	if (pfn == KVM_PFN_ERR_HWPOISON) {
 		kvm_send_hwpoison_signal(kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva(vcpu, gfn), current);
-		return 0;
+		return RET_PF_RETRY;
 	}
 
 	return -EFAULT;
 }
 
 static void transparent_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-					gfn_t *gfnp, kvm_pfn_t *pfnp,
+					gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t *pfnp,
 					int *levelp)
 {
 	kvm_pfn_t pfn = *pfnp;
-	gfn_t gfn = *gfnp;
 	int level = *levelp;
 
 	/*
@@ -2843,8 +2951,6 @@ static void transparent_hugepage_adjust(
 		mask = KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1;
 		VM_BUG_ON((gfn & mask) != (pfn & mask));
 		if (pfn & mask) {
-			gfn &= ~mask;
-			*gfnp = gfn;
 			kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
 			pfn &= ~mask;
 			kvm_get_pfn(pfn);
@@ -3012,11 +3118,14 @@ static int nonpaging_map(struct kvm_vcpu
 {
 	int r;
 	int level;
-	bool force_pt_level = false;
+	bool force_pt_level;
 	kvm_pfn_t pfn;
 	unsigned long mmu_seq;
 	bool map_writable, write = error_code & PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
+	bool lpage_disallowed = (error_code & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) &&
+				is_nx_huge_page_enabled();
 
+	force_pt_level = lpage_disallowed;
 	level = mapping_level(vcpu, gfn, &force_pt_level);
 	if (likely(!force_pt_level)) {
 		/*
@@ -3031,32 +3140,30 @@ static int nonpaging_map(struct kvm_vcpu
 	}
 
 	if (fast_page_fault(vcpu, v, level, error_code))
-		return 0;
+		return RET_PF_RETRY;
 
 	mmu_seq = vcpu->kvm->mmu_notifier_seq;
 	smp_rmb();
 
 	if (try_async_pf(vcpu, prefault, gfn, v, &pfn, write, &map_writable))
-		return 0;
+		return RET_PF_RETRY;
 
 	if (handle_abnormal_pfn(vcpu, v, gfn, pfn, ACC_ALL, &r))
 		return r;
 
+	r = RET_PF_RETRY;
 	spin_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
 	if (mmu_notifier_retry(vcpu->kvm, mmu_seq))
 		goto out_unlock;
 	make_mmu_pages_available(vcpu);
 	if (likely(!force_pt_level))
-		transparent_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, &gfn, &pfn, &level);
-	r = __direct_map(vcpu, write, map_writable, level, gfn, pfn, prefault);
-	spin_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
-
-	return r;
-
+		transparent_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, gfn, &pfn, &level);
+	r = __direct_map(vcpu, v, write, map_writable, level, pfn,
+			 prefault, false);
 out_unlock:
 	spin_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
 	kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
-	return 0;
+	return r;
 }
 
 
@@ -3383,38 +3490,38 @@ exit:
 	return reserved;
 }
 
-int handle_mmio_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct)
+static int handle_mmio_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct)
 {
 	u64 spte;
 	bool reserved;
 
 	if (mmio_info_in_cache(vcpu, addr, direct))
-		return RET_MMIO_PF_EMULATE;
+		return RET_PF_EMULATE;
 
 	reserved = walk_shadow_page_get_mmio_spte(vcpu, addr, &spte);
 	if (WARN_ON(reserved))
-		return RET_MMIO_PF_BUG;
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (is_mmio_spte(spte)) {
 		gfn_t gfn = get_mmio_spte_gfn(spte);
 		unsigned access = get_mmio_spte_access(spte);
 
 		if (!check_mmio_spte(vcpu, spte))
-			return RET_MMIO_PF_INVALID;
+			return RET_PF_INVALID;
 
 		if (direct)
 			addr = 0;
 
 		trace_handle_mmio_page_fault(addr, gfn, access);
 		vcpu_cache_mmio_info(vcpu, addr, gfn, access);
-		return RET_MMIO_PF_EMULATE;
+		return RET_PF_EMULATE;
 	}
 
 	/*
 	 * If the page table is zapped by other cpus, let CPU fault again on
 	 * the address.
 	 */
-	return RET_MMIO_PF_RETRY;
+	return RET_PF_RETRY;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(handle_mmio_page_fault);
 
@@ -3464,7 +3571,7 @@ static int nonpaging_page_fault(struct k
 	pgprintk("%s: gva %lx error %x\n", __func__, gva, error_code);
 
 	if (page_fault_handle_page_track(vcpu, error_code, gfn))
-		return 1;
+		return RET_PF_EMULATE;
 
 	r = mmu_topup_memory_caches(vcpu);
 	if (r)
@@ -3548,18 +3655,21 @@ static int tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcp
 	unsigned long mmu_seq;
 	int write = error_code & PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
 	bool map_writable;
+	bool lpage_disallowed = (error_code & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) &&
+				is_nx_huge_page_enabled();
 
 	MMU_WARN_ON(!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa));
 
 	if (page_fault_handle_page_track(vcpu, error_code, gfn))
-		return 1;
+		return RET_PF_EMULATE;
 
 	r = mmu_topup_memory_caches(vcpu);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 
-	force_pt_level = !check_hugepage_cache_consistency(vcpu, gfn,
-							   PT_DIRECTORY_LEVEL);
+	force_pt_level =
+		lpage_disallowed ||
+		!check_hugepage_cache_consistency(vcpu, gfn, PT_DIRECTORY_LEVEL);
 	level = mapping_level(vcpu, gfn, &force_pt_level);
 	if (likely(!force_pt_level)) {
 		if (level > PT_DIRECTORY_LEVEL &&
@@ -3569,32 +3679,30 @@ static int tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcp
 	}
 
 	if (fast_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, level, error_code))
-		return 0;
+		return RET_PF_RETRY;
 
 	mmu_seq = vcpu->kvm->mmu_notifier_seq;
 	smp_rmb();
 
 	if (try_async_pf(vcpu, prefault, gfn, gpa, &pfn, write, &map_writable))
-		return 0;
+		return RET_PF_RETRY;
 
 	if (handle_abnormal_pfn(vcpu, 0, gfn, pfn, ACC_ALL, &r))
 		return r;
 
+	r = RET_PF_RETRY;
 	spin_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
 	if (mmu_notifier_retry(vcpu->kvm, mmu_seq))
 		goto out_unlock;
 	make_mmu_pages_available(vcpu);
 	if (likely(!force_pt_level))
-		transparent_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, &gfn, &pfn, &level);
-	r = __direct_map(vcpu, write, map_writable, level, gfn, pfn, prefault);
-	spin_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
-
-	return r;
-
+		transparent_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, gfn, &pfn, &level);
+	r = __direct_map(vcpu, gpa, write, map_writable, level, pfn,
+			 prefault, lpage_disallowed);
 out_unlock:
 	spin_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
 	kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
-	return 0;
+	return r;
 }
 
 static void nonpaging_init_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
@@ -4510,23 +4618,24 @@ int kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *
 	enum emulation_result er;
 	bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu.direct_map || mmu_is_nested(vcpu);
 
+	r = RET_PF_INVALID;
 	if (unlikely(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK)) {
 		r = handle_mmio_page_fault(vcpu, cr2, direct);
-		if (r == RET_MMIO_PF_EMULATE) {
+		if (r == RET_PF_EMULATE) {
 			emulation_type = 0;
 			goto emulate;
 		}
-		if (r == RET_MMIO_PF_RETRY)
-			return 1;
-		if (r < 0)
-			return r;
 	}
 
-	r = vcpu->arch.mmu.page_fault(vcpu, cr2, error_code, false);
+	if (r == RET_PF_INVALID) {
+		r = vcpu->arch.mmu.page_fault(vcpu, cr2, error_code, false);
+		WARN_ON(r == RET_PF_INVALID);
+	}
+
+	if (r == RET_PF_RETRY)
+		return 1;
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
-	if (!r)
-		return 1;
 
 	if (mmio_info_in_cache(vcpu, cr2, direct))
 		emulation_type = 0;
@@ -4965,7 +5074,7 @@ mmu_shrink_scan(struct shrinker *shrink,
 	int nr_to_scan = sc->nr_to_scan;
 	unsigned long freed = 0;
 
-	spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
 
 	list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
 		int idx;
@@ -5015,7 +5124,7 @@ unlock:
 		break;
 	}
 
-	spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
 	return freed;
 }
 
@@ -5039,8 +5148,58 @@ static void mmu_destroy_caches(void)
 		kmem_cache_destroy(mmu_page_header_cache);
 }
 
+static bool get_nx_auto_mode(void)
+{
+	/* Return true when CPU has the bug, and mitigations are ON */
+	return boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !cpu_mitigations_off();
+}
+
+static void __set_nx_huge_pages(bool val)
+{
+	nx_huge_pages = itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation = val;
+}
+
+static int set_nx_huge_pages(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	bool old_val = nx_huge_pages;
+	bool new_val;
+
+	/* In "auto" mode deploy workaround only if CPU has the bug. */
+	if (sysfs_streq(val, "off"))
+		new_val = 0;
+	else if (sysfs_streq(val, "force"))
+		new_val = 1;
+	else if (sysfs_streq(val, "auto"))
+		new_val = get_nx_auto_mode();
+	else if (strtobool(val, &new_val) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	__set_nx_huge_pages(new_val);
+
+	if (new_val != old_val) {
+		struct kvm *kvm;
+		int idx;
+
+		mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
+
+		list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
+			idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+			kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_all_pages(kvm);
+			srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+
+			wake_up_process(kvm->arch.nx_lpage_recovery_thread);
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int kvm_mmu_module_init(void)
 {
+	if (nx_huge_pages == -1)
+		__set_nx_huge_pages(get_nx_auto_mode());
+
 	pte_list_desc_cache = kmem_cache_create("pte_list_desc",
 					    sizeof(struct pte_list_desc),
 					    0, SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
@@ -5104,3 +5263,116 @@ void kvm_mmu_module_exit(void)
 	unregister_shrinker(&mmu_shrinker);
 	mmu_audit_disable();
 }
+
+static int set_nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	unsigned int old_val;
+	int err;
+
+	old_val = nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio;
+	err = param_set_uint(val, kp);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages) &&
+	    !old_val && nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio) {
+		struct kvm *kvm;
+
+		mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
+
+		list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list)
+			wake_up_process(kvm->arch.nx_lpage_recovery_thread);
+
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void kvm_recover_nx_lpages(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	int rcu_idx;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	unsigned int ratio;
+	LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
+	ulong to_zap;
+
+	rcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+	spin_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	ratio = READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio);
+	to_zap = ratio ? DIV_ROUND_UP(kvm->stat.nx_lpage_splits, ratio) : 0;
+	while (to_zap && !list_empty(&kvm->arch.lpage_disallowed_mmu_pages)) {
+		/*
+		 * We use a separate list instead of just using active_mmu_pages
+		 * because the number of lpage_disallowed pages is expected to
+		 * be relatively small compared to the total.
+		 */
+		sp = list_first_entry(&kvm->arch.lpage_disallowed_mmu_pages,
+				      struct kvm_mmu_page,
+				      lpage_disallowed_link);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->lpage_disallowed);
+		kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp, &invalid_list);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->lpage_disallowed);
+
+		if (!--to_zap || need_resched() || spin_needbreak(&kvm->mmu_lock)) {
+			kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(kvm, &invalid_list);
+			if (to_zap)
+				cond_resched_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+		}
+	}
+
+	spin_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, rcu_idx);
+}
+
+static long get_nx_lpage_recovery_timeout(u64 start_time)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages) && READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio)
+		? start_time + 60 * HZ - get_jiffies_64()
+		: MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
+}
+
+static int kvm_nx_lpage_recovery_worker(struct kvm *kvm, uintptr_t data)
+{
+	u64 start_time;
+	long remaining_time;
+
+	while (true) {
+		start_time = get_jiffies_64();
+		remaining_time = get_nx_lpage_recovery_timeout(start_time);
+
+		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
+		while (!kthread_should_stop() && remaining_time > 0) {
+			schedule_timeout(remaining_time);
+			remaining_time = get_nx_lpage_recovery_timeout(start_time);
+			set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
+		}
+
+		set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
+
+		if (kthread_should_stop())
+			return 0;
+
+		kvm_recover_nx_lpages(kvm);
+	}
+}
+
+int kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = kvm_vm_create_worker_thread(kvm, kvm_nx_lpage_recovery_worker, 0,
+					  "kvm-nx-lpage-recovery",
+					  &kvm->arch.nx_lpage_recovery_thread);
+	if (!err)
+		kthread_unpark(kvm->arch.nx_lpage_recovery_thread);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (kvm->arch.nx_lpage_recovery_thread)
+		kthread_stop(kvm->arch.nx_lpage_recovery_thread);
+}
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -56,23 +56,6 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio
 void
 reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *context);
 
-/*
- * Return values of handle_mmio_page_fault:
- * RET_MMIO_PF_EMULATE: it is a real mmio page fault, emulate the instruction
- *			directly.
- * RET_MMIO_PF_INVALID: invalid spte is detected then let the real page
- *			fault path update the mmio spte.
- * RET_MMIO_PF_RETRY: let CPU fault again on the address.
- * RET_MMIO_PF_BUG: a bug was detected (and a WARN was printed).
- */
-enum {
-	RET_MMIO_PF_EMULATE = 1,
-	RET_MMIO_PF_INVALID = 2,
-	RET_MMIO_PF_RETRY = 0,
-	RET_MMIO_PF_BUG = -1
-};
-
-int handle_mmio_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct);
 void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly);
 bool kvm_can_do_async_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -202,4 +185,8 @@ void kvm_mmu_gfn_disallow_lpage(struct k
 void kvm_mmu_gfn_allow_lpage(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn);
 bool kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(struct kvm *kvm,
 				    struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, u64 gfn);
+
+int kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
+
 #endif
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/mmutrace.h linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/mmutrace.h
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/mmutrace.h	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/mmutrace.h	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -322,6 +322,65 @@ TRACE_EVENT(
 		  __entry->kvm_gen == __entry->spte_gen
 	)
 );
+
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	kvm_mmu_set_spte,
+	TP_PROTO(int level, gfn_t gfn, u64 *sptep),
+	TP_ARGS(level, gfn, sptep),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u64, gfn)
+		__field(u64, spte)
+		__field(u64, sptep)
+		__field(u8, level)
+		/* These depend on page entry type, so compute them now.  */
+		__field(bool, r)
+		__field(bool, x)
+		__field(u8, u)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->gfn = gfn;
+		__entry->spte = *sptep;
+		__entry->sptep = virt_to_phys(sptep);
+		__entry->level = level;
+		__entry->r = shadow_present_mask || (__entry->spte & PT_PRESENT_MASK);
+		__entry->x = is_executable_pte(__entry->spte);
+		__entry->u = shadow_user_mask ? !!(__entry->spte & shadow_user_mask) : -1;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("gfn %llx spte %llx (%s%s%s%s) level %d at %llx",
+		  __entry->gfn, __entry->spte,
+		  __entry->r ? "r" : "-",
+		  __entry->spte & PT_PRESENT_MASK ? "w" : "-",
+		  __entry->x ? "x" : "-",
+		  __entry->u == -1 ? "" : (__entry->u ? "u" : "-"),
+		  __entry->level, __entry->sptep
+	)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	kvm_mmu_spte_requested,
+	TP_PROTO(gpa_t addr, int level, kvm_pfn_t pfn),
+	TP_ARGS(addr, level, pfn),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u64, gfn)
+		__field(u64, pfn)
+		__field(u8, level)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->gfn = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+		__entry->pfn = pfn | (__entry->gfn & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1));
+		__entry->level = level;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("gfn %llx pfn %llx level %d",
+		  __entry->gfn, __entry->pfn, __entry->level
+	)
+);
+
 #endif /* _TRACE_KVMMMU_H */
 
 #undef TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -499,6 +499,7 @@ FNAME(prefetch_gpte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vc
 	mmu_set_spte(vcpu, spte, pte_access, 0, PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL, gfn, pfn,
 		     true, true);
 
+	kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
 	return true;
 }
 
@@ -572,12 +573,14 @@ static void FNAME(pte_prefetch)(struct k
 static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr,
 			 struct guest_walker *gw,
 			 int write_fault, int hlevel,
-			 kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool map_writable, bool prefault)
+			 kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool map_writable, bool prefault,
+			 bool lpage_disallowed)
 {
 	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = NULL;
 	struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator it;
 	unsigned direct_access, access = gw->pt_access;
-	int top_level, emulate;
+	int top_level, ret;
+	gfn_t gfn, base_gfn;
 
 	direct_access = gw->pte_access;
 
@@ -622,36 +625,49 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu
 			link_shadow_page(vcpu, it.sptep, sp);
 	}
 
-	for (;
-	     shadow_walk_okay(&it) && it.level > hlevel;
-	     shadow_walk_next(&it)) {
-		gfn_t direct_gfn;
+	/*
+	 * FNAME(page_fault) might have clobbered the bottom bits of
+	 * gw->gfn, restore them from the virtual address.
+	 */
+	gfn = gw->gfn | ((addr & PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(gw->level)) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	base_gfn = gfn;
 
+	trace_kvm_mmu_spte_requested(addr, gw->level, pfn);
+
+	for (; shadow_walk_okay(&it); shadow_walk_next(&it)) {
 		clear_sp_write_flooding_count(it.sptep);
-		validate_direct_spte(vcpu, it.sptep, direct_access);
 
-		drop_large_spte(vcpu, it.sptep);
+		/*
+		 * We cannot overwrite existing page tables with an NX
+		 * large page, as the leaf could be executable.
+		 */
+		disallowed_hugepage_adjust(it, gfn, &pfn, &hlevel);
 
-		if (is_shadow_present_pte(*it.sptep))
-			continue;
+		base_gfn = gfn & ~(KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(it.level) - 1);
+		if (it.level == hlevel)
+			break;
 
-		direct_gfn = gw->gfn & ~(KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(it.level) - 1);
+		validate_direct_spte(vcpu, it.sptep, direct_access);
 
-		sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, direct_gfn, addr, it.level-1,
-				      true, direct_access);
-		link_shadow_page(vcpu, it.sptep, sp);
+		drop_large_spte(vcpu, it.sptep);
+
+		if (!is_shadow_present_pte(*it.sptep)) {
+			sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, base_gfn, addr,
+					      it.level - 1, true, direct_access);
+			link_shadow_page(vcpu, it.sptep, sp);
+			if (lpage_disallowed)
+				account_huge_nx_page(vcpu->kvm, sp);
+		}
 	}
 
-	clear_sp_write_flooding_count(it.sptep);
-	emulate = mmu_set_spte(vcpu, it.sptep, gw->pte_access, write_fault,
-			       it.level, gw->gfn, pfn, prefault, map_writable);
+	ret = mmu_set_spte(vcpu, it.sptep, gw->pte_access, write_fault,
+			   it.level, base_gfn, pfn, prefault, map_writable);
 	FNAME(pte_prefetch)(vcpu, gw, it.sptep);
-
-	return emulate;
+	++vcpu->stat.pf_fixed;
+	return ret;
 
 out_gpte_changed:
-	kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
-	return 0;
+	return RET_PF_RETRY;
 }
 
  /*
@@ -717,9 +733,11 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_
 	int r;
 	kvm_pfn_t pfn;
 	int level = PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL;
-	bool force_pt_level = false;
 	unsigned long mmu_seq;
 	bool map_writable, is_self_change_mapping;
+	bool lpage_disallowed = (error_code & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) &&
+				is_nx_huge_page_enabled();
+	bool force_pt_level = lpage_disallowed;
 
 	pgprintk("%s: addr %lx err %x\n", __func__, addr, error_code);
 
@@ -746,12 +764,12 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_
 		if (!prefault)
 			inject_page_fault(vcpu, &walker.fault);
 
-		return 0;
+		return RET_PF_RETRY;
 	}
 
 	if (page_fault_handle_page_track(vcpu, error_code, walker.gfn)) {
 		shadow_page_table_clear_flood(vcpu, addr);
-		return 1;
+		return RET_PF_EMULATE;
 	}
 
 	vcpu->arch.write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable = false;
@@ -773,7 +791,7 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_
 
 	if (try_async_pf(vcpu, prefault, walker.gfn, addr, &pfn, write_fault,
 			 &map_writable))
-		return 0;
+		return RET_PF_RETRY;
 
 	if (handle_abnormal_pfn(vcpu, mmu_is_nested(vcpu) ? 0 : addr,
 				walker.gfn, pfn, walker.pte_access, &r))
@@ -799,6 +817,7 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_
 			walker.pte_access &= ~ACC_EXEC_MASK;
 	}
 
+	r = RET_PF_RETRY;
 	spin_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
 	if (mmu_notifier_retry(vcpu->kvm, mmu_seq))
 		goto out_unlock;
@@ -806,19 +825,15 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_
 	kvm_mmu_audit(vcpu, AUDIT_PRE_PAGE_FAULT);
 	make_mmu_pages_available(vcpu);
 	if (!force_pt_level)
-		transparent_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, &walker.gfn, &pfn, &level);
+		transparent_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, walker.gfn, &pfn, &level);
 	r = FNAME(fetch)(vcpu, addr, &walker, write_fault,
-			 level, pfn, map_writable, prefault);
-	++vcpu->stat.pf_fixed;
+			 level, pfn, map_writable, prefault, lpage_disallowed);
 	kvm_mmu_audit(vcpu, AUDIT_POST_PAGE_FAULT);
-	spin_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
-
-	return r;
 
 out_unlock:
 	spin_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
 	kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
-	return 0;
+	return r;
 }
 
 static gpa_t FNAME(get_level1_sp_gpa)(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -590,8 +590,14 @@ static int get_npt_level(void)
 static void svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
 {
 	vcpu->arch.efer = efer;
-	if (!npt_enabled && !(efer & EFER_LMA))
-		efer &= ~EFER_LME;
+
+	if (!npt_enabled) {
+		/* Shadow paging assumes NX to be available.  */
+		efer |= EFER_NX;
+
+		if (!(efer & EFER_LMA))
+			efer &= ~EFER_LME;
+	}
 
 	to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.efer = efer | EFER_SVME;
 	mark_dirty(to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -2219,17 +2219,9 @@ static bool update_transition_efer(struc
 	u64 guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
 	u64 ignore_bits = 0;
 
-	if (!enable_ept) {
-		/*
-		 * NX is needed to handle CR0.WP=1, CR4.SMEP=1.  Testing
-		 * host CPUID is more efficient than testing guest CPUID
-		 * or CR4.  Host SMEP is anyway a requirement for guest SMEP.
-		 */
-		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP))
-			guest_efer |= EFER_NX;
-		else if (!(guest_efer & EFER_NX))
-			ignore_bits |= EFER_NX;
-	}
+	/* Shadow paging assumes NX to be available.  */
+	if (!enable_ept)
+		guest_efer |= EFER_NX;
 
 	/*
 	 * LMA and LME handled by hardware; SCE meaningless outside long mode.
@@ -6556,16 +6548,9 @@ static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct k
 						       NULL, 0) == EMULATE_DONE;
 	}
 
-	ret = handle_mmio_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, true);
-	if (likely(ret == RET_MMIO_PF_EMULATE))
-		return x86_emulate_instruction(vcpu, gpa, 0, NULL, 0) ==
-					      EMULATE_DONE;
-
-	if (unlikely(ret == RET_MMIO_PF_INVALID))
-		return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, 0, NULL, 0);
-
-	if (unlikely(ret == RET_MMIO_PF_RETRY))
-		return 1;
+	ret = kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, PFERR_RSVD_MASK, NULL, 0);
+	if (ret >= 0)
+		return ret;
 
 	/* It is the real ept misconfig */
 	WARN_ON(1);
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ struct kvm_stats_debugfs_item debugfs_en
 	{ "mmu_unsync", VM_STAT(mmu_unsync) },
 	{ "remote_tlb_flush", VM_STAT(remote_tlb_flush) },
 	{ "largepages", VM_STAT(lpages) },
+	{ "nx_largepages_splitted", VM_STAT(nx_lpage_splits) },
 	{ NULL }
 };
 
@@ -587,7 +588,7 @@ static bool pdptrs_changed(struct kvm_vc
 	gfn_t gfn;
 	int r;
 
-	if (is_long_mode(vcpu) || !is_pae(vcpu))
+	if (is_long_mode(vcpu) || !is_pae(vcpu) || !is_paging(vcpu))
 		return false;
 
 	if (!test_bit(VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR,
@@ -1032,6 +1033,14 @@ u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
 	rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, &data);
 
 	/*
+	 * If nx_huge_pages is enabled, KVM's shadow paging will ensure that
+	 * the nested hypervisor runs with NX huge pages.  If it is not,
+	 * L1 is anyway vulnerable to ITLB_MULTIHIT explots from other
+	 * L1 guests, so it need not worry about its own (L2) guests.
+	 */
+	data |= ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO;
+
+	/*
 	 * If we're doing cache flushes (either "always" or "cond")
 	 * we will do one whenever the guest does a vmlaunch/vmresume.
 	 * If an outer hypervisor is doing the cache flush for us
@@ -1043,8 +1052,35 @@ u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
 	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
 		data |= ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH;
 
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO;
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO;
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
+
+	/*
+	 * On TAA affected systems, export MDS_NO=0 when:
+	 *	- TSX is enabled on the host, i.e. X86_FEATURE_RTM=1.
+	 *	- Updated microcode is present. This is detected by
+	 *	  the presence of ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR and ensures
+	 *	  that VERW clears CPU buffers.
+	 *
+	 * When MDS_NO=0 is exported, guests deploy clear CPU buffer
+	 * mitigation and don't complain:
+	 *
+	 *	"Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode"
+	 *
+	 * If TSX is disabled on the system, guests are also mitigated against
+	 * TAA and clear CPU buffer mitigation is not required for guests.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+	    (data & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+		data &= ~ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
+
 	return data;
 }
+
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_arch_capabilities);
 
 static int kvm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
@@ -5951,17 +5987,17 @@ static int kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier(str
 
 	smp_call_function_single(freq->cpu, tsc_khz_changed, freq, 1);
 
-	spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
 		kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
 			if (vcpu->cpu != freq->cpu)
 				continue;
 			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
-			if (vcpu->cpu != smp_processor_id())
+			if (vcpu->cpu != raw_smp_processor_id())
 				send_ipi = 1;
 		}
 	}
-	spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
 
 	if (freq->old < freq->new && send_ipi) {
 		/*
@@ -6099,12 +6135,12 @@ static void pvclock_gtod_update_fn(struc
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
 	int i;
 
-	spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list)
 		kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
 			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
 	atomic_set(&kvm_guest_has_master_clock, 0);
-	spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
 }
 
 static DECLARE_WORK(pvclock_gtod_work, pvclock_gtod_update_fn);
@@ -7491,7 +7527,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs(struct
 		kvm_update_cpuid(vcpu);
 
 	idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
-	if (!is_long_mode(vcpu) && is_pae(vcpu)) {
+	if (!is_long_mode(vcpu) && is_pae(vcpu) && is_paging(vcpu)) {
 		load_pdptrs(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu, kvm_read_cr3(vcpu));
 		mmu_reset_needed = 1;
 	}
@@ -8072,6 +8108,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, un
 	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.mask_notifier_list);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.lpage_disallowed_mmu_pages);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.assigned_dev_head);
 	atomic_set(&kvm->arch.noncoherent_dma_count, 0);
 
@@ -8100,6 +8137,11 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, un
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int kvm_arch_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(kvm);
+}
+
 static void kvm_unload_vcpu_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	int r;
@@ -8206,6 +8248,11 @@ int x86_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kv
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_set_memory_region);
 
+void kvm_arch_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(kvm);
+}
+
 void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	if (current->mm == kvm->mm) {
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -358,6 +358,8 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabi
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -11,3 +11,5 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run
 
    l1tf
    mds
+   tsx_async_abort
+   multihit.rst
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/multihit.rst linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/multihit.rst
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/multihit.rst	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/multihit.rst	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+iTLB multihit
+=============
+
+iTLB multihit is an erratum where some processors may incur a machine check
+error, possibly resulting in an unrecoverable CPU lockup, when an
+instruction fetch hits multiple entries in the instruction TLB. This can
+occur when the page size is changed along with either the physical address
+or cache type. A malicious guest running on a virtualized system can
+exploit this erratum to perform a denial of service attack.
+
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+Variations of this erratum are present on most Intel Core and Xeon processor
+models. The erratum is not present on:
+
+   - non-Intel processors
+
+   - Some Atoms (Airmont, Bonnell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus, Saltwell, Silvermont)
+
+   - Intel processors that have the PSCHANGE_MC_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
+
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this issue:
+
+   ==============  =================================================
+   CVE-2018-12207  Machine Check Error Avoidance on Page Size Change
+   ==============  =================================================
+
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+Privileged software, including OS and virtual machine managers (VMM), are in
+charge of memory management. A key component in memory management is the control
+of the page tables. Modern processors use virtual memory, a technique that creates
+the illusion of a very large memory for processors. This virtual space is split
+into pages of a given size. Page tables translate virtual addresses to physical
+addresses.
+
+To reduce latency when performing a virtual to physical address translation,
+processors include a structure, called TLB, that caches recent translations.
+There are separate TLBs for instruction (iTLB) and data (dTLB).
+
+Under this errata, instructions are fetched from a linear address translated
+using a 4 KB translation cached in the iTLB. Privileged software modifies the
+paging structure so that the same linear address using large page size (2 MB, 4
+MB, 1 GB) with a different physical address or memory type.  After the page
+structure modification but before the software invalidates any iTLB entries for
+the linear address, a code fetch that happens on the same linear address may
+cause a machine-check error which can result in a system hang or shutdown.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the iTLB multihit erratum can be mounted from malicious
+guests in a virtualized system.
+
+
+iTLB multihit system information
+--------------------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current iTLB
+multihit status of the system:whether the system is vulnerable and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+     * - Not affected
+       - The processor is not vulnerable.
+     * - KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages
+       - Software changes mitigate this issue.
+     * - KVM: Vulnerable
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+
+
+Enumeration of the erratum
+--------------------------------
+
+A new bit has been allocated in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) msr
+and will be set on CPU's which are mitigated against this issue.
+
+   =======================================   ===========   ===============================
+   IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR                Not present   Possibly vulnerable,check model
+   IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[PSCHANGE_MC_NO]    '0'           Likely vulnerable,check model
+   IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[PSCHANGE_MC_NO]    '1'           Not vulnerable
+   =======================================   ===========   ===============================
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+This erratum can be mitigated by restricting the use of large page sizes to
+non-executable pages.  This forces all iTLB entries to be 4K, and removes
+the possibility of multiple hits.
+
+In order to mitigate the vulnerability, KVM initially marks all huge pages
+as non-executable. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages,
+the page is broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
+
+If EPT is disabled or not available on the host, KVM is in control of TLB
+flushes and the problematic situation cannot happen.  However, the shadow
+EPT paging mechanism used by nested virtualization is vulnerable, because
+the nested guest can trigger multiple iTLB hits by modifying its own
+(non-nested) page tables.  For simplicity, KVM will make large pages
+non-executable in all shadow paging modes.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line and KVM - module parameter
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism for marking huge pages as
+non-executable can be controlled with a module parameter "nx_huge_pages=".
+The kernel command line allows to control the iTLB multihit mitigations at
+boot time with the option "kvm.nx_huge_pages=".
+
+The valid arguments for these options are:
+
+  ==========  ================================================================
+  force       Mitigation is enabled. In this case, the mitigation implements
+              non-executable huge pages in Linux kernel KVM module. All huge
+              pages in the EPT are marked as non-executable.
+              If a guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
+              broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
+
+  off	      Mitigation is disabled.
+
+  auto        Enable mitigation only if the platform is affected and the kernel
+              was not booted with the "mitigations=off" command line parameter.
+	      This is the default option.
+  ==========  ================================================================
+
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. No virtualization in use
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
+   action is required.
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If the guest comes from a trusted source, you may assume that the guest will
+   not attempt to maliciously exploit these errata and no further action is
+   required.
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+   If the guest comes from an untrusted source, the guest host kernel will need
+   to apply iTLB multihit mitigation via the kernel command line or kvm
+   module parameter.
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+TAA - TSX Asynchronous Abort
+======================================
+
+TAA is a hardware vulnerability that allows unprivileged speculative access to
+data which is available in various CPU internal buffers by using asynchronous
+aborts within an Intel TSX transactional region.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability only affects Intel processors that support Intel
+Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) when the TAA_NO bit (bit 8)
+is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.  On processors where the MDS_NO bit
+(bit 5) is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR, the existing MDS mitigations
+also mitigate against TAA.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the TAA
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`tsx_async_abort_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this TAA issue:
+
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+   CVE-2019-11135  TAA    TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA) condition on some
+                          microprocessors utilizing speculative execution may
+                          allow an authenticated user to potentially enable
+                          information disclosure via a side channel with
+                          local access.
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+When performing store, load or L1 refill operations, processors write
+data into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in
+those buffers can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
+
+Intel TSX is an extension to the x86 instruction set architecture that adds
+hardware transactional memory support to improve performance of multi-threaded
+software. TSX lets the processor expose and exploit concurrency hidden in an
+application due to dynamically avoiding unnecessary synchronization.
+
+TSX supports atomic memory transactions that are either committed (success) or
+aborted. During an abort, operations that happened within the transactional region
+are rolled back. An asynchronous abort takes place, among other options, when a
+different thread accesses a cache line that is also used within the transactional
+region when that access might lead to a data race.
+
+Immediately after an uncompleted asynchronous abort, certain speculatively
+executed loads may read data from those internal buffers and pass it to dependent
+operations. This can be then used to infer the value via a cache side channel
+attack.
+
+Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
+Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
+
+The victim of a malicious actor does not need to make use of TSX. Only the
+attacker needs to begin a TSX transaction and raise an asynchronous abort
+which in turn potenitally leaks data stored in the buffers.
+
+More detailed technical information is available in the TAA specific x86
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst <tsx_async_abort>`.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the TAA vulnerability can be implemented from unprivileged
+applications running on hosts or guests.
+
+As for MDS, the attacker has no control over the memory addresses that can
+be leaked. Only the victim is responsible for bringing data to the CPU. As
+a result, the malicious actor has to sample as much data as possible and
+then postprocess it to try to infer any useful information from it.
+
+A potential attacker only has read access to the data. Also, there is no direct
+privilege escalation by using this technique.
+
+
+.. _tsx_async_abort_sys_info:
+
+TAA system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current TAA status
+of mitigated systems. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+   * - 'Vulnerable'
+     - The CPU is affected by this vulnerability and the microcode and kernel mitigation are not applied.
+   * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
+     - The system tries to clear the buffers but the microcode might not support the operation.
+   * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
+     - The microcode has been updated to clear the buffers. TSX is still enabled.
+   * - 'Mitigation: TSX disabled'
+     - TSX is disabled.
+   * - 'Not affected'
+     - The CPU is not affected by this issue.
+
+.. _ucode_needed:
+
+Best effort mitigation mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode-based
+mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
+effort mitigation mode.  This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
+without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
+
+This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
+microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the
+CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection takes
+effect; otherwise a few CPU cycles are wasted pointlessly.
+
+The state in the tsx_async_abort sysfs file reflects this situation
+accordingly.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+--------------------
+
+The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode which is
+required. If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
+enables the mitigation by default.
+
+
+The mitigation can be controlled at boot time via a kernel command line option.
+See :ref:`taa_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+.. _virt_mechanism:
+
+Virtualization mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Affected systems where the host has TAA microcode and TAA is mitigated by
+having disabled TSX previously, are not vulnerable regardless of the status
+of the VMs.
+
+In all other cases, if the host either does not have the TAA microcode or
+the kernel is not mitigated, the system might be vulnerable.
+
+
+.. _taa_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the TAA mitigations at boot time with
+the option "tsx_async_abort=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  off		This option disables the TAA mitigation on affected platforms.
+                If the system has TSX enabled (see next parameter) and the CPU
+                is affected, the system is vulnerable.
+
+  full	        TAA mitigation is enabled. If TSX is enabled, on an affected
+                system it will clear CPU buffers on ring transitions. On
+                systems which are MDS-affected and deploy MDS mitigation,
+                TAA is also mitigated. Specifying this option on those
+                systems will have no effect.
+
+  full,nosmt    The same as tsx_async_abort=full, with SMT disabled on
+                vulnerable CPUs that have TSX enabled. This is the complete
+                mitigation. When TSX is disabled, SMT is not disabled because
+                CPU is not vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx_async_abort=full".
+
+The kernel command line also allows to control the TSX feature using the
+parameter "tsx=" on CPUs which support TSX control. MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is used
+to control the TSX feature and the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM
+and HLE) in CPUID.
+
+The valid options are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  off		Disables TSX on the system.
+
+                Note that this option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
+                not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1
+                and which get the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
+                update. This new MSR allows for the reliable deactivation of
+                the TSX functionality.
+
+  on		Enables TSX.
+
+                Although there are mitigations for all known security
+                vulnerabilities, TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
+                several previous speculation-related CVEs, and so there may be
+                unknown security risks associated with leaving it enabled.
+
+  auto		Disables TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enables TSX
+                on the system.
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx=off".
+
+The following combinations of the "tsx_async_abort" and "tsx" are possible. For
+affected platforms tsx=auto is equivalent to tsx=off and the result will be:
+
+  =========  ==========================   =========================================
+  tsx=on     tsx_async_abort=full         The system will use VERW to clear CPU
+                                          buffers. Cross-thread attacks are still
+					  possible on SMT machines.
+  tsx=on     tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt   As above, cross-thread attacks on SMT
+                                          mitigated.
+  tsx=on     tsx_async_abort=off          The system is vulnerable.
+  tsx=off    tsx_async_abort=full         TSX might be disabled if microcode
+                                          provides a TSX control MSR. If so,
+					  system is not vulnerable.
+  tsx=off    tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt   Ditto
+  tsx=off    tsx_async_abort=off          ditto
+  =========  ==========================   =========================================
+
+
+For unaffected platforms "tsx=on" and "tsx_async_abort=full" does not clear CPU
+buffers.  For platforms without TSX control (MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=0)
+"tsx" command line argument has no effect.
+
+For the affected platforms below table indicates the mitigation status for the
+combinations of CPUID bit MD_CLEAR and IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bits MDS_NO
+and TSX_CTRL_MSR.
+
+  =======  =========  =============  ========================================
+  MDS_NO   MD_CLEAR   TSX_CTRL_MSR   Status
+  =======  =========  =============  ========================================
+    0          0            0        Vulnerable (needs microcode)
+    0          1            0        MDS and TAA mitigated via VERW
+    1          1            0        MDS fixed, TAA vulnerable if TSX enabled
+                                     because MD_CLEAR has no meaning and
+                                     VERW is not guaranteed to clear buffers
+    1          X            1        MDS fixed, TAA can be mitigated by
+                                     VERW or TSX_CTRL_MSR
+  =======  =========  =============  ========================================
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace and guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If all user space applications are from a trusted source and do not execute
+untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation can be
+disabled. The same applies to virtualized environments with trusted guests.
+
+
+2. Untrusted userspace and guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If there are untrusted applications or guests on the system, enabling TSX
+might allow a malicious actor to leak data from the host or from other
+processes running on the same physical core.
+
+If the microcode is available and the TSX is disabled on the host, attacks
+are prevented in a virtualized environment as well, even if the VMs do not
+explicitly enable the mitigation.
+
+
+.. _taa_default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+The kernel's default action for vulnerable processors is:
+
+  - Deploy TSX disable mitigation (tsx_async_abort=full tsx=off).
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -1975,6 +1975,25 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 			KVM MMU at runtime.
 			Default is 0 (off)
 
+	kvm.nx_huge_pages=
+			[KVM] Controls the software workaround for the
+			X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT bug.
+			force	: Always deploy workaround.
+			off	: Never deploy workaround.
+			auto    : Deploy workaround based on the presence of
+				  X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT.
+
+			Default is 'auto'.
+
+			If the software workaround is enabled for the host,
+			guests do need not to enable it for nested guests.
+
+	kvm.nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio=
+			[KVM] Controls how many 4KiB pages are periodically zapped
+			back to huge pages.  0 disables the recovery, otherwise if
+			the value is N KVM will zap 1/Nth of the 4KiB pages every
+			minute.  The default is 60.
+
 	kvm-amd.nested=	[KVM,AMD] Allow nested virtualization in KVM/SVM.
 			Default is 1 (enabled)
 
@@ -2490,6 +2509,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 					       mds=off [X86]
+					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
+					       kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
+
+				Exceptions:
+					       This does not have any effect on
+					       kvm.nx_huge_pages when
+					       kvm.nx_huge_pages=force.
 
 			auto (default)
 				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -2505,6 +2531,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
 				Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
 					       mds=full,nosmt [X86]
+					       tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt [X86]
 
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
@@ -4516,6 +4543,71 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 			platforms where RDTSC is slow and this accounting
 			can add overhead.
 
+	tsx=		[X86] Control Transactional Synchronization
+			Extensions (TSX) feature in Intel processors that
+			support TSX control.
+
+			This parameter controls the TSX feature. The options are:
+
+			on	- Enable TSX on the system. Although there are
+				mitigations for all known security vulnerabilities,
+				TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
+				several previous speculation-related CVEs, and
+				so there may be unknown	security risks associated
+				with leaving it enabled.
+
+			off	- Disable TSX on the system. (Note that this
+				option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
+				not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have
+				MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1 and which get
+				the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
+				update. This new MSR allows for the reliable
+				deactivation of the TSX functionality.)
+
+			auto	- Disable TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present,
+				  otherwise enable TSX on the system.
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to tsx=off.
+
+			See Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+			for more details.
+
+	tsx_async_abort= [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the TSX Async
+			Abort (TAA) vulnerability.
+
+			Similar to Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS)
+			certain CPUs that support Transactional
+			Synchronization Extensions (TSX) are vulnerable to an
+			exploit against CPU internal buffers which can forward
+			information to a disclosure gadget under certain
+			conditions.
+
+			In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded
+			data can be used in a cache side channel attack, to
+			access data to which the attacker does not have direct
+			access.
+
+			This parameter controls the TAA mitigation.  The
+			options are:
+
+			full       - Enable TAA mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+				     if TSX is enabled.
+
+			full,nosmt - Enable TAA mitigation and disable SMT on
+				     vulnerable CPUs. If TSX is disabled, SMT
+				     is not disabled because CPU is not
+				     vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
+			off        - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			tsx_async_abort=full.  On CPUs which are MDS affected
+			and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not
+			required and doesn't provide any additional
+			mitigation.
+
+			For details see:
+			Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+
 	turbografx.map[2|3]=	[HW,JOY]
 			TurboGraFX parallel port interface
 			Format:
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/virtual/kvm/locking.txt linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/virtual/kvm/locking.txt
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/virtual/kvm/locking.txt	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/virtual/kvm/locking.txt	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ The acquisition orders for mutexes are a
 - kvm->slots_lock is taken outside kvm->irq_lock, though acquiring
   them together is quite rare.
 
-For spinlocks, kvm_lock is taken outside kvm->mmu_lock.  Everything
-else is a leaf: no other lock is taken inside the critical sections.
+Everything else is a leaf: no other lock is taken inside the critical
+sections.
 
 2: Exception
 ------------
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ See the comments in spte_has_volatile_bi
 ------------
 
 Name:		kvm_lock
-Type:		spinlock_t
+Type:		mutex
 Arch:		any
 Protects:	- vm_list
 
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/x86/index.rst linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/x86/index.rst
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/x86/index.rst	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/x86/index.rst	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -6,3 +6,4 @@ x86 architecture specifics
    :maxdepth: 1
 
    mds
+   tsx_async_abort
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+TSX Async Abort (TAA) mitigation
+================================
+
+.. _tsx_async_abort:
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel attack on internal buffers in some
+Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data Sampling (MDS).  In this
+case certain loads may speculatively pass invalid data to dependent operations
+when an asynchronous abort condition is pending in a Transactional
+Synchronization Extensions (TSX) transaction.  This includes loads with no
+fault or assist condition. Such loads may speculatively expose stale data from
+the same uarch data structures as in MDS, with same scope of exposure i.e.
+same-thread and cross-thread. This issue affects all current processors that
+support TSX.
+
+Mitigation strategy
+-------------------
+
+a) TSX disable - one of the mitigations is to disable TSX. A new MSR
+IA32_TSX_CTRL will be available in future and current processors after
+microcode update which can be used to disable TSX. In addition, it
+controls the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM and HLE) in CPUID.
+
+b) Clear CPU buffers - similar to MDS, clearing the CPU buffers mitigates this
+vulnerability. More details on this approach can be found in
+:ref:`Documentation/hw-vuln/mds.rst <mds>`.
+
+Kernel internal mitigation modes
+--------------------------------
+
+ =============    ============================================================
+ off              Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or
+                  tsx_async_abort=off is supplied on the kernel command line.
+
+ tsx disabled     Mitigation is enabled. TSX feature is disabled by default at
+                  bootup on processors that support TSX control.
+
+ verw             Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is
+                  advertised in CPUID.
+
+ ucode needed     Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not
+                  advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization
+                  scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the
+                  hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best
+                  effort approach without guarantee.
+ =============    ============================================================
+
+If the CPU is affected and the "tsx_async_abort" kernel command line parameter is
+not provided then the kernel selects an appropriate mitigation depending on the
+status of RTM and MD_CLEAR CPUID bits.
+
+Below tables indicate the impact of tsx=on|off|auto cmdline options on state of
+TAA mitigation, VERW behavior and TSX feature for various combinations of
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits.
+
+1. "tsx=off"
+
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits     Result with cmdline tsx=off
+----------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO     MDS_NO     TSX_CTRL_MSR  TSX state     VERW can clear  TAA mitigation       TAA mitigation
+                                    after bootup  CPU buffers     tsx_async_abort=off  tsx_async_abort=full
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+    0          0           0         HW default         Yes           Same as MDS           Same as MDS
+    0          0           1        Invalid case   Invalid case       Invalid case          Invalid case
+    0          1           0         HW default         No         Need ucode update     Need ucode update
+    0          1           1          Disabled          Yes           TSX disabled          TSX disabled
+    1          X           1          Disabled           X             None needed           None needed
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+
+2. "tsx=on"
+
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits     Result with cmdline tsx=on
+----------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO     MDS_NO     TSX_CTRL_MSR  TSX state     VERW can clear  TAA mitigation       TAA mitigation
+                                    after bootup  CPU buffers     tsx_async_abort=off  tsx_async_abort=full
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+    0          0           0         HW default        Yes            Same as MDS          Same as MDS
+    0          0           1        Invalid case   Invalid case       Invalid case         Invalid case
+    0          1           0         HW default        No          Need ucode update     Need ucode update
+    0          1           1          Enabled          Yes               None              Same as MDS
+    1          X           1          Enabled          X              None needed          None needed
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+
+3. "tsx=auto"
+
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits     Result with cmdline tsx=auto
+----------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO     MDS_NO     TSX_CTRL_MSR  TSX state     VERW can clear  TAA mitigation       TAA mitigation
+                                    after bootup  CPU buffers     tsx_async_abort=off  tsx_async_abort=full
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+    0          0           0         HW default    Yes                Same as MDS           Same as MDS
+    0          0           1        Invalid case  Invalid case        Invalid case          Invalid case
+    0          1           0         HW default    No              Need ucode update     Need ucode update
+    0          1           1          Disabled      Yes               TSX disabled          TSX disabled
+    1          X           1          Enabled       X                 None needed           None needed
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+
+In the tables, TSX_CTRL_MSR is a new bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES that
+indicates whether MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is supported.
+
+There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:
+
+      Bit 0: When set it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
+             sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
+             XBEGIN instruction).
+
+      Bit 1: When set it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
+             (i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
+             CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/drivers/base/cpu.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/drivers/base/cpu.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/drivers/base/cpu.c	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/drivers/base/cpu.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -537,12 +537,27 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mds(struct devic
 	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev,
+					struct device_attribute *attr,
+					char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_store_bypass, 0444, cpu_show_spec_store_bypass, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -551,6 +566,8 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner
 	&dev_attr_spec_store_bypass.attr,
 	&dev_attr_l1tf.attr,
 	&dev_attr_mds.attr,
+	&dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr,
+	&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -653,15 +653,14 @@ static int hci_uart_set_proto(struct hci
 		return err;
 
 	hu->proto = p;
-	set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
 
 	err = hci_uart_register_dev(hu);
 	if (err) {
-		clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
 		p->close(hu);
 		return err;
 	}
 
+	set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -817,6 +817,8 @@ int usb_gadget_map_request_by_dev(struct
 			dev_err(dev, "failed to map buffer\n");
 			return -EFAULT;
 		}
+
+		req->dma_mapped = 1;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -841,9 +843,10 @@ void usb_gadget_unmap_request_by_dev(str
 				is_in ? DMA_TO_DEVICE : DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
 
 		req->num_mapped_sgs = 0;
-	} else {
+	} else if (req->dma_mapped) {
 		dma_unmap_single(dev, req->dma, req->length,
 				is_in ? DMA_TO_DEVICE : DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+		req->dma_mapped = 0;
 	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_gadget_unmap_request_by_dev);
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/include/linux/cpu.h linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/include/linux/cpu.h
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/include/linux/cpu.h	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/include/linux/cpu.h	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct devi
 			     struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev,
 			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev,
+					struct device_attribute *attr,
+					char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev,
+				      struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
@@ -282,28 +287,7 @@ static inline int cpuhp_smt_enable(void)
 static inline int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval) { return 0; }
 #endif
 
-/*
- * These are used for a global "mitigations=" cmdline option for toggling
- * optional CPU mitigations.
- */
-enum cpu_mitigations {
-	CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF,
-	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO,
-	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT,
-};
-
-extern enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations;
-
-/* mitigations=off */
-static inline bool cpu_mitigations_off(void)
-{
-	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
-}
-
-/* mitigations=auto,nosmt */
-static inline bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void)
-{
-	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
-}
+extern bool cpu_mitigations_off(void);
+extern bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void);
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/include/linux/kvm_host.h linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/include/linux/kvm_host.h
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/include/linux/kvm_host.h	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/include/linux/kvm_host.h	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static inline bool is_error_page(struct
 
 extern struct kmem_cache *kvm_vcpu_cache;
 
-extern spinlock_t kvm_lock;
+extern struct mutex kvm_lock;
 extern struct list_head vm_list;
 
 struct kvm_io_range {
@@ -1208,4 +1208,10 @@ static inline bool vcpu_valid_wakeup(str
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_INVALID_WAKEUPS */
 
+typedef int (*kvm_vm_thread_fn_t)(struct kvm *kvm, uintptr_t data);
+
+int kvm_vm_create_worker_thread(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_vm_thread_fn_t thread_fn,
+				uintptr_t data, const char *name,
+				struct task_struct **thread_ptr);
+
 #endif
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/include/linux/usb/gadget.h linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/include/linux/usb/gadget.h
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/include/linux/usb/gadget.h	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/include/linux/usb/gadget.h	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct usb_ep;
  *     by adding a zero length packet as needed;
  * @short_not_ok: When reading data, makes short packets be
  *     treated as errors (queue stops advancing till cleanup).
+ * @dma_mapped: Indicates if request has been mapped to DMA (internal)
  * @complete: Function called when request completes, so this request and
  *	its buffer may be re-used.  The function will always be called with
  *	interrupts disabled, and it must not sleep.
@@ -103,6 +104,7 @@ struct usb_request {
 	unsigned		no_interrupt:1;
 	unsigned		zero:1;
 	unsigned		short_not_ok:1;
+	unsigned		dma_mapped:1;
 
 	void			(*complete)(struct usb_ep *ep,
 					struct usb_request *req);
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/kernel/cpu.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/kernel/cpu.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/kernel/cpu.c	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/kernel/cpu.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -2235,7 +2235,18 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
 	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);
 }
 
-enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+/*
+ * These are used for a global "mitigations=" cmdline option for toggling
+ * optional CPU mitigations.
+ */
+enum cpu_mitigations {
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT,
+};
+
+static enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init =
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
 
 static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
 {
@@ -2252,3 +2263,17 @@ static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdl
 	return 0;
 }
 early_param("mitigations", mitigations_parse_cmdline);
+
+/* mitigations=off */
+bool cpu_mitigations_off(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_mitigations_off);
+
+/* mitigations=auto,nosmt */
+bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt);
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Makefile linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Makefile
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/Makefile	2019-11-12 19:38:39.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/Makefile	2019-11-16 09:13:53.000000000 -0500
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 VERSION = 4
 PATCHLEVEL = 9
-SUBLEVEL = 201
+SUBLEVEL = 202
 EXTRAVERSION = -gnu
 NAME = Roaring Lionus
 
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
--- linux-libre-4.9.201-gnu/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c	2019-11-12 13:16:25.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-4.9.202-gnu/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c	2019-11-16 04:29:58.000000000 -0500
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/sort.h>
 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
 
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
@@ -87,7 +88,7 @@ module_param(halt_poll_ns_shrink, uint,
  *	kvm->lock --> kvm->slots_lock --> kvm->irq_lock
  */
 
-DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kvm_lock);
+DEFINE_MUTEX(kvm_lock);
 static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(kvm_count_lock);
 LIST_HEAD(vm_list);
 
@@ -612,6 +613,23 @@ static int kvm_create_vm_debugfs(struct
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Called after the VM is otherwise initialized, but just before adding it to
+ * the vm_list.
+ */
+int __weak kvm_arch_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called just after removing the VM from the vm_list, but before doing any
+ * other destruction.
+ */
+void __weak kvm_arch_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+}
+
 static struct kvm *kvm_create_vm(unsigned long type)
 {
 	int r, i;
@@ -659,22 +677,31 @@ static struct kvm *kvm_create_vm(unsigne
 		kvm->buses[i] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_io_bus),
 					GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!kvm->buses[i])
-			goto out_err;
+			goto out_err_no_mmu_notifier;
 	}
 
 	r = kvm_init_mmu_notifier(kvm);
 	if (r)
+		goto out_err_no_mmu_notifier;
+
+	r = kvm_arch_post_init_vm(kvm);
+	if (r)
 		goto out_err;
 
-	spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
 	list_add(&kvm->vm_list, &vm_list);
-	spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
 
 	preempt_notifier_inc();
 
 	return kvm;
 
 out_err:
+#if defined(CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER) && defined(KVM_ARCH_WANT_MMU_NOTIFIER)
+	if (kvm->mmu_notifier.ops)
+		mmu_notifier_unregister(&kvm->mmu_notifier, current->mm);
+#endif
+out_err_no_mmu_notifier:
 	cleanup_srcu_struct(&kvm->irq_srcu);
 out_err_no_irq_srcu:
 	cleanup_srcu_struct(&kvm->srcu);
@@ -724,9 +751,11 @@ static void kvm_destroy_vm(struct kvm *k
 
 	kvm_destroy_vm_debugfs(kvm);
 	kvm_arch_sync_events(kvm);
-	spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
 	list_del(&kvm->vm_list);
-	spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	kvm_arch_pre_destroy_vm(kvm);
+
 	kvm_free_irq_routing(kvm);
 	for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_BUSES; i++) {
 		if (kvm->buses[i])
@@ -3752,13 +3781,13 @@ static int vm_stat_get(void *_offset, u6
 	u64 tmp_val;
 
 	*val = 0;
-	spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
 		stat_tmp.kvm = kvm;
 		vm_stat_get_per_vm((void *)&stat_tmp, &tmp_val);
 		*val += tmp_val;
 	}
-	spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -3772,13 +3801,13 @@ static int vcpu_stat_get(void *_offset,
 	u64 tmp_val;
 
 	*val = 0;
-	spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
 		stat_tmp.kvm = kvm;
 		vcpu_stat_get_per_vm((void *)&stat_tmp, &tmp_val);
 		*val += tmp_val;
 	}
-	spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -3987,3 +4016,86 @@ void kvm_exit(void)
 	kvm_vfio_ops_exit();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_exit);
+
+struct kvm_vm_worker_thread_context {
+	struct kvm *kvm;
+	struct task_struct *parent;
+	struct completion init_done;
+	kvm_vm_thread_fn_t thread_fn;
+	uintptr_t data;
+	int err;
+};
+
+static int kvm_vm_worker_thread(void *context)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The init_context is allocated on the stack of the parent thread, so
+	 * we have to locally copy anything that is needed beyond initialization
+	 */
+	struct kvm_vm_worker_thread_context *init_context = context;
+	struct kvm *kvm = init_context->kvm;
+	kvm_vm_thread_fn_t thread_fn = init_context->thread_fn;
+	uintptr_t data = init_context->data;
+	int err;
+
+	err = kthread_park(current);
+	/* kthread_park(current) is never supposed to return an error */
+	WARN_ON(err != 0);
+	if (err)
+		goto init_complete;
+
+	err = cgroup_attach_task_all(init_context->parent, current);
+	if (err) {
+		kvm_err("%s: cgroup_attach_task_all failed with err %d\n",
+			__func__, err);
+		goto init_complete;
+	}
+
+	set_user_nice(current, task_nice(init_context->parent));
+
+init_complete:
+	init_context->err = err;
+	complete(&init_context->init_done);
+	init_context = NULL;
+
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* Wait to be woken up by the spawner before proceeding. */
+	kthread_parkme();
+
+	if (!kthread_should_stop())
+		err = thread_fn(kvm, data);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+int kvm_vm_create_worker_thread(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_vm_thread_fn_t thread_fn,
+				uintptr_t data, const char *name,
+				struct task_struct **thread_ptr)
+{
+	struct kvm_vm_worker_thread_context init_context = {};
+	struct task_struct *thread;
+
+	*thread_ptr = NULL;
+	init_context.kvm = kvm;
+	init_context.parent = current;
+	init_context.thread_fn = thread_fn;
+	init_context.data = data;
+	init_completion(&init_context.init_done);
+
+	thread = kthread_run(kvm_vm_worker_thread, &init_context,
+			     "%s-%d", name, task_pid_nr(current));
+	if (IS_ERR(thread))
+		return PTR_ERR(thread);
+
+	/* kthread_run is never supposed to return NULL */
+	WARN_ON(thread == NULL);
+
+	wait_for_completion(&init_context.init_done);
+
+	if (!init_context.err)
+		*thread_ptr = thread;
+
+	return init_context.err;
+}
