diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
 	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
 		 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR);
 
-	if (!no_nospec)
+	if (!no_nospec && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		enable_barrier_nospec(enable);
 }
 
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(ch
 early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2);
 void setup_spectre_v2(void)
 {
-	if (no_spectrev2)
+	if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off())
 		do_btb_flush_fixups();
 	else
 		btb_flush_enabled = true;
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ void setup_stf_barrier(void)
 
 	stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
 
-	if (!no_stf_barrier)
+	if (!no_stf_barrier && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		stf_barrier_enable(enable);
 }
 
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -958,7 +958,7 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type
 
 	enabled_flush_types = types;
 
-	if (!no_rfi_flush)
+	if (!no_rfi_flush && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		rfi_flush_enable(enable);
 }
 
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 static int __init nobp_setup_early(char *str)
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ early_param("nospectre_v2", nospectre_v2
 
 void __init nospec_auto_detect(void)
 {
-	if (test_facility(156)) {
+	if (test_facility(156) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		/*
 		 * The machine supports etokens.
 		 * Disable expolines and disable nobp.
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/entry/common.c linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/entry/common.c
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/entry/common.c	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/entry/common.c	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <asm/vdso.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
 #include <trace/events/syscalls.h>
@@ -212,6 +213,8 @@ __visible inline void prepare_exit_to_us
 #endif
 
 	user_enter_irqoff();
+
+	mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 }
 
 #define SYSCALL_EXIT_WORK_FLAGS				\
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -344,6 +344,7 @@
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW	(18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	(18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR		(18*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT	(18*32+13) /* "" TSX_FORCE_ABORT */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG		(18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
@@ -382,5 +383,7 @@
 #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2		X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
 #define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS	X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
 #define X86_BUG_L1TF			X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
+#define X86_BUG_MDS			X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
+#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY		X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the  MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+
 /* Provide __cpuidle; we can't safely include <linux/cpu.h> */
 #define __cpuidle __attribute__((__section__(".cpuidle.text")))
 
@@ -54,11 +56,13 @@ static inline void native_irq_enable(voi
 
 static inline __cpuidle void native_safe_halt(void)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	asm volatile("sti; hlt": : :"memory");
 }
 
 static inline __cpuidle void native_halt(void)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	asm volatile("hlt": : :"memory");
 }
 
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H
 #define _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H
 
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+
 /*
  * CPU model specific register (MSR) numbers.
  *
@@ -40,14 +42,14 @@
 /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL		0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS			BIT(0)	   /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT		1	   /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictor (STIBP) bit */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT)	/* STIBP mask */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT)	/* STIBP mask */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT		2	   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)	/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)	/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
-#define PRED_CMD_IBPB			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define PRED_CMD_IBPB			BIT(0)	   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
 
 #define MSR_PPIN_CTL			0x0000004e
 #define MSR_PPIN			0x0000004f
@@ -69,20 +71,25 @@
 #define MSR_MTRRcap			0x000000fe
 
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
-#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		(1 << 0)   /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
-#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		(1 << 1)   /* Enhanced IBRS support */
-#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH	(1 << 3)   /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
-#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO			(1 << 4)   /*
-						    * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
-						    * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
-						    * control required.
-						    */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		BIT(0)	/* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
+#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		BIT(1)	/* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH	BIT(3)	/* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
+#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO			BIT(4)	/*
+						 * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
+						 * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
+						 * control required.
+						 */
+#define ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO			BIT(5)   /*
+						  * Not susceptible to
+						  * Microarchitectural Data
+						  * Sampling (MDS) vulnerabilities.
+						  */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD		0x0000010b
-#define L1D_FLUSH			(1 << 0)   /*
-						    * Writeback and invalidate the
-						    * L1 data cache.
-						    */
+#define L1D_FLUSH			BIT(0)	/*
+						 * Writeback and invalidate the
+						 * L1 data cache.
+						 */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL		0x00000119
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3		0x0000011e
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched/idle.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #define MWAIT_SUBSTATE_MASK		0xf
 #define MWAIT_CSTATE_MASK		0xf
@@ -40,6 +41,8 @@ static inline void __monitorx(const void
 
 static inline void __mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
 	/* "mwait %eax, %ecx;" */
 	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc9;"
 		     :: "a" (eax), "c" (ecx));
@@ -74,6 +77,8 @@ static inline void __mwait(unsigned long
 static inline void __mwaitx(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ebx,
 			    unsigned long ecx)
 {
+	/* No MDS buffer clear as this is AMD/HYGON only */
+
 	/* "mwaitx %eax, %ebx, %ecx;" */
 	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xfb;"
 		     :: "a" (eax), "b" (ebx), "c" (ecx));
@@ -81,6 +86,8 @@ static inline void __mwaitx(unsigned lon
 
 static inline void __sti_mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
 	trace_hardirqs_on();
 	/* "mwait %eax, %ecx;" */
 	asm volatile("sti; .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc9;"
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -318,6 +318,56 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+
+#include <asm/segment.h>
+
+/**
+ * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ *
+ * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
+ * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
+ * instruction is executed.
+ */
+static inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+{
+	static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS;
+
+	/*
+	 * Has to be the memory-operand variant because only that
+	 * guarantees the CPU buffer flush functionality according to
+	 * documentation. The register-operand variant does not.
+	 * Works with any segment selector, but a valid writable
+	 * data segment is the fastest variant.
+	 *
+	 * "cc" clobber is required because VERW modifies ZF.
+	 */
+	asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc");
+}
+
+/**
+ * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ *
+ * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
+ */
+static inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear))
+		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+}
+
+/**
+ * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ *
+ * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
+ */
+static inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear))
+		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+}
+
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 /*
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -992,4 +992,10 @@ enum l1tf_mitigations {
 
 extern enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation;
 
+enum mds_mitigations {
+	MDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	MDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+	MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV,
+};
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
 
 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -63,6 +64,13 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_i
 /* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
+/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
+/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
+
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
 	identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -101,6 +109,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
 
+	mds_select_mitigation();
+
+	arch_smt_update();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 	/*
 	 * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -207,6 +219,61 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 }
 
 #undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"MDS: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
+static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
+
+static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_OFF]	= "Vulnerable",
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_FULL]	= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV]	= "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+};
+
+static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
+
+		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
+		    (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
+			cpu_smt_disable(false);
+	}
+
+	pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+		mds_nosmt = true;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
 
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
@@ -440,7 +507,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
@@ -574,9 +642,6 @@ specv2_set_mode:
 
 	/* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
 	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd);
-
-	/* Enable STIBP if appropriate */
-	arch_smt_update();
 }
 
 static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
@@ -610,6 +675,31 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(voi
 		static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
 }
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
+
+/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
+static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
+	 * affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
+	 *
+	 * The other variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so
+	 * clearing the buffers on idle just to prevent the Store Buffer
+	 * repartitioning leak would be a window dressing exercise.
+	 */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+		return;
+
+	if (sched_smt_active())
+		static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+}
+
+#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
+
 void arch_smt_update(void)
 {
 	/* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
@@ -631,6 +721,17 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	switch (mds_mitigation) {
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
+		if (sched_smt_active() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+			pr_warn_once(MDS_MSG_SMT);
+		update_mds_branch_idle();
+		break;
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		break;
+	}
+
 	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 }
 
@@ -672,7 +773,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ss
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 	} else {
 		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
@@ -996,6 +1098,11 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigatio
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
 		return;
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+
 	override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
 
 	switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
@@ -1024,7 +1131,7 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigatio
 		pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n",
 				half_pa);
 		pr_info("However, doing so will make a part of your RAM unusable.\n");
-		pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html might help you decide.\n");
+		pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html might help you decide.\n");
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -1057,6 +1164,7 @@ static int __init l1tf_cmdline(char *str
 early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
 
 #undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
 
@@ -1095,6 +1203,23 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf
 }
 #endif
 
+static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if (!hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_NATIVE)) {
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+			       mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+	}
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY)) {
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
+			       (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ? "vulnerable" :
+			        sched_smt_active() ? "mitigated" : "disabled"));
+	}
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
+		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
 static char *stibp_state(void)
 {
 	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
@@ -1161,6 +1286,10 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
 		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV))
 			return l1tf_show_state(buf);
 		break;
+
+	case X86_BUG_MDS:
+		return mds_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1192,4 +1321,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_L1TF);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MDS);
+}
 #endif
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -948,61 +948,77 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(s
 #endif
 }
 
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_speculation[] = {
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL,	X86_FEATURE_ANY },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET,	X86_FEATURE_ANY },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL_MID,	X86_FEATURE_ANY },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_MID,	X86_FEATURE_ANY },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL,	X86_FEATURE_ANY },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR,	5 },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	5 },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_NSC,	5 },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_ANY,	4 },
-	{}
-};
+#define NO_SPECULATION	BIT(0)
+#define NO_MELTDOWN	BIT(1)
+#define NO_SSB		BIT(2)
+#define NO_L1TF		BIT(3)
+#define NO_MDS		BIT(4)
+#define MSBDS_ONLY	BIT(5)
 
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_meltdown[] = {
-	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_HYGON },
-	{}
-};
+#define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist)	\
+	{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
 
-/* Only list CPUs which speculate but are non susceptible to SSB */
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_spec_store_bypass[] = {
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_X	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x12,					},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x11,					},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x10,					},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0xf,					},
-	{}
-};
+#define VULNWL_INTEL(model, whitelist)		\
+	VULNWL(INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_##model, whitelist)
 
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_l1tf[] = {
-	/* in addition to cpu_no_speculation */
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_X	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT_MID	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_X	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM		},
+#define VULNWL_AMD(family, whitelist)		\
+	VULNWL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, whitelist)
+
+#define VULNWL_HYGON(family, whitelist)		\
+	VULNWL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, whitelist)
+
+static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
+	VULNWL(ANY,	4, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL(CENTAUR,	5, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL(INTEL,	5, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL(NSC,	5, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
+
+	/* Intel Family 6 */
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL,		NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET,	NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL,		NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION),
+
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID,	NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+
+	VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH,		NO_SSB),
+
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID,		NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+
+	/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x10,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x11,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+
+	/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
+	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+	VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
 	{}
 };
 
+static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+{
+	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
+
+	return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
+}
+
 static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 ia32_cap = 0;
 
-	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
+	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
@@ -1011,15 +1027,20 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
 
-	if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) &&
-	   !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
 
-	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
+		if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
 	/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1028,7 +1049,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
 
-	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_l1tf))
+	if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <asm/x86_init.h>
 #include <asm/reboot.h>
 #include <asm/cache.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
 #include <trace/events/nmi.h>
@@ -533,6 +534,9 @@ nmi_restart:
 		write_cr2(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2));
 	if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))
 		goto nmi_restart;
+
+	if (user_mode(regs))
+		mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_nmi);
 
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
 #include <asm/trace/mpx.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 #include <asm/mpx.h>
 #include <asm/vm86.h>
 #include <asm/umip.h>
@@ -366,6 +367,13 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struc
 		regs->ip = (unsigned long)general_protection;
 		regs->sp = (unsigned long)&gpregs->orig_ax;
 
+		/*
+		 * This situation can be triggered by userspace via
+		 * modify_ldt(2) and the return does not take the regular
+		 * user space exit, so a CPU buffer clear is required when
+		 * MDS mitigation is enabled.
+		 */
+		mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 		return;
 	}
 #endif
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -410,7 +410,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct
 	/* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
 	const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
 		F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) |
-		F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES) | F(INTEL_STIBP);
+		F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES) | F(INTEL_STIBP) |
+		F(MD_CLEAR);
 
 	/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
 	get_cpu();
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -6356,8 +6356,11 @@ static void __vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vc
 	evmcs_rsp = static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs) ?
 		(unsigned long)&current_evmcs->host_rsp : 0;
 
+	/* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */
 	if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
 		vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
+	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
+		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
 
 	asm(
 		/* Store host registers */
@@ -6797,8 +6800,8 @@ free_partial_vcpu:
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
-#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html for details.\n"
-#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html for details.\n"
+#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
+#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
 
 static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/mm/pti.c linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/arch/x86/mm/pti.c	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/arch/x86/mm/pti.c	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(v
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
 		pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
 		return;
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabi
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
@@ -496,8 +497,7 @@ Description:	Information about CPU vulne
 		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
 		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
 
-		Details about the l1tf file can be found in
-		Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+		See also: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
 
 What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+========================
+Hardware vulnerabilities
+========================
+
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
+possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
+are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   l1tf
+   mds
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -0,0 +1,615 @@
+L1TF - L1 Terminal Fault
+========================
+
+L1 Terminal Fault is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
+speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache
+when the page table entry controlling the virtual address, which is used
+for the access, has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
+vulnerability is not present on:
+
+   - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
+
+   - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
+
+   - A range of Intel ATOM processors (Cedarview, Cloverview, Lincroft,
+     Penwell, Pineview, Silvermont, Airmont, Merrifield)
+
+   - The Intel XEON PHI family
+
+   - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. If the bit is set the CPU is not affected
+     by the Meltdown vulnerability either. These CPUs should become
+     available by end of 2018.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the L1TF
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`l1tf_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries are related to the L1TF vulnerability:
+
+   =============  =================  ==============================
+   CVE-2018-3615  L1 Terminal Fault  SGX related aspects
+   CVE-2018-3620  L1 Terminal Fault  OS, SMM related aspects
+   CVE-2018-3646  L1 Terminal Fault  Virtualization related aspects
+   =============  =================  ==============================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant page
+table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set,
+then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads the referenced
+data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if the page referenced
+by the address bits in the PTE was still present and accessible.
+
+While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will raise
+a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of loading the
+data and making it available to other speculative instructions opens up the
+opportunity for side channel attacks to unprivileged malicious code,
+similar to the Meltdown attack.
+
+While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
+allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack
+works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also
+works from inside virtual machines because the speculation bypasses the
+extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+1. Malicious user space
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Operating Systems store arbitrary information in the address bits of a
+   PTE which is marked non present. This allows a malicious user space
+   application to attack the physical memory to which these PTEs resolve.
+   In some cases user-space can maliciously influence the information
+   encoded in the address bits of the PTE, thus making attacks more
+   deterministic and more practical.
+
+   The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
+   inversion, which is permanently enabled and has no performance
+   impact. The kernel ensures that the address bits of PTEs, which are not
+   marked present, never point to cacheable physical memory space.
+
+   A system with an up to date kernel is protected against attacks from
+   malicious user space applications.
+
+2. Malicious guest in a virtual machine
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The fact that L1TF breaks all domain protections allows malicious guest
+   OSes, which can control the PTEs directly, and malicious guest user
+   space applications, which run on an unprotected guest kernel lacking the
+   PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
+
+   A special aspect of L1TF in the context of virtualization is symmetric
+   multi threading (SMT). The Intel implementation of SMT is called
+   HyperThreading. The fact that Hyperthreads on the affected processors
+   share the L1 Data Cache (L1D) is important for this. As the flaw allows
+   only to attack data which is present in L1D, a malicious guest running
+   on one Hyperthread can attack the data which is brought into the L1D by
+   the context which runs on the sibling Hyperthread of the same physical
+   core. This context can be host OS, host user space or a different guest.
+
+   If the processor does not support Extended Page Tables, the attack is
+   only possible, when the hypervisor does not sanitize the content of the
+   effective (shadow) page tables.
+
+   While solutions exist to mitigate these attack vectors fully, these
+   mitigations are not enabled by default in the Linux kernel because they
+   can affect performance significantly. The kernel provides several
+   mechanisms which can be utilized to address the problem depending on the
+   deployment scenario. The mitigations, their protection scope and impact
+   are described in the next sections.
+
+   The default mitigations and the rationale for choosing them are explained
+   at the end of this document. See :ref:`default_mitigations`.
+
+.. _l1tf_sys_info:
+
+L1TF system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current L1TF
+status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  ===========================   ===============================
+  'Not affected'		The processor is not vulnerable
+  'Mitigation: PTE Inversion'	The host protection is active
+  ===========================   ===============================
+
+If KVM/VMX is enabled and the processor is vulnerable then the following
+information is appended to the 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' part:
+
+  - SMT status:
+
+    =====================  ================
+    'VMX: SMT vulnerable'  SMT is enabled
+    'VMX: SMT disabled'    SMT is disabled
+    =====================  ================
+
+  - L1D Flush mode:
+
+    ================================  ====================================
+    'L1D vulnerable'		      L1D flushing is disabled
+
+    'L1D conditional cache flushes'   L1D flush is conditionally enabled
+
+    'L1D cache flushes'		      L1D flush is unconditionally enabled
+    ================================  ====================================
+
+The resulting grade of protection is discussed in the following sections.
+
+
+Host mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+The kernel is unconditionally protected against L1TF attacks from malicious
+user space running on the host.
+
+
+Guest mitigation mechanisms
+---------------------------
+
+.. _l1d_flush:
+
+1. L1D flush on VMENTER
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   To make sure that a guest cannot attack data which is present in the L1D
+   the hypervisor flushes the L1D before entering the guest.
+
+   Flushing the L1D evicts not only the data which should not be accessed
+   by a potentially malicious guest, it also flushes the guest
+   data. Flushing the L1D has a performance impact as the processor has to
+   bring the flushed guest data back into the L1D. Depending on the
+   frequency of VMEXIT/VMENTER and the type of computations in the guest
+   performance degradation in the range of 1% to 50% has been observed. For
+   scenarios where guest VMEXIT/VMENTER are rare the performance impact is
+   minimal. Virtio and mechanisms like posted interrupts are designed to
+   confine the VMEXITs to a bare minimum, but specific configurations and
+   application scenarios might still suffer from a high VMEXIT rate.
+
+   The kernel provides two L1D flush modes:
+    - conditional ('cond')
+    - unconditional ('always')
+
+   The conditional mode avoids L1D flushing after VMEXITs which execute
+   only audited code paths before the corresponding VMENTER. These code
+   paths have been verified that they cannot expose secrets or other
+   interesting data to an attacker, but they can leak information about the
+   address space layout of the hypervisor.
+
+   Unconditional mode flushes L1D on all VMENTER invocations and provides
+   maximum protection. It has a higher overhead than the conditional
+   mode. The overhead cannot be quantified correctly as it depends on the
+   workload scenario and the resulting number of VMEXITs.
+
+   The general recommendation is to enable L1D flush on VMENTER. The kernel
+   defaults to conditional mode on affected processors.
+
+   **Note**, that L1D flush does not prevent the SMT problem because the
+   sibling thread will also bring back its data into the L1D which makes it
+   attackable again.
+
+   L1D flush can be controlled by the administrator via the kernel command
+   line and sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`
+   and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+.. _guest_confinement:
+
+2. Guest VCPU confinement to dedicated physical cores
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   To address the SMT problem, it is possible to make a guest or a group of
+   guests affine to one or more physical cores. The proper mechanism for
+   that is to utilize exclusive cpusets to ensure that no other guest or
+   host tasks can run on these cores.
+
+   If only a single guest or related guests run on sibling SMT threads on
+   the same physical core then they can only attack their own memory and
+   restricted parts of the host memory.
+
+   Host memory is attackable, when one of the sibling SMT threads runs in
+   host OS (hypervisor) context and the other in guest context. The amount
+   of valuable information from the host OS context depends on the context
+   which the host OS executes, i.e. interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel
+   threads. The amount of valuable data from these contexts cannot be
+   declared as non-interesting for an attacker without deep inspection of
+   the code.
+
+   **Note**, that assigning guests to a fixed set of physical cores affects
+   the ability of the scheduler to do load balancing and might have
+   negative effects on CPU utilization depending on the hosting
+   scenario. Disabling SMT might be a viable alternative for particular
+   scenarios.
+
+   For further information about confining guests to a single or to a group
+   of cores consult the cpusets documentation:
+
+   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/cgroup-v1/cpusets.txt
+
+.. _interrupt_isolation:
+
+3. Interrupt affinity
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Interrupts can be made affine to logical CPUs. This is not universally
+   true because there are types of interrupts which are truly per CPU
+   interrupts, e.g. the local timer interrupt. Aside of that multi queue
+   devices affine their interrupts to single CPUs or groups of CPUs per
+   queue without allowing the administrator to control the affinities.
+
+   Moving the interrupts, which can be affinity controlled, away from CPUs
+   which run untrusted guests, reduces the attack vector space.
+
+   Whether the interrupts with are affine to CPUs, which run untrusted
+   guests, provide interesting data for an attacker depends on the system
+   configuration and the scenarios which run on the system. While for some
+   of the interrupts it can be assumed that they won't expose interesting
+   information beyond exposing hints about the host OS memory layout, there
+   is no way to make general assumptions.
+
+   Interrupt affinity can be controlled by the administrator via the
+   /proc/irq/$NR/smp_affinity[_list] files. Limited documentation is
+   available at:
+
+   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/IRQ-affinity.txt
+
+.. _smt_control:
+
+4. SMT control
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   To prevent the SMT issues of L1TF it might be necessary to disable SMT
+   completely. Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but
+   the impact depends on the hosting scenario and the type of workloads.
+   The impact of disabling SMT needs also to be weighted against the impact
+   of other mitigation solutions like confining guests to dedicated cores.
+
+   The kernel provides a sysfs interface to retrieve the status of SMT and
+   to control it. It also provides a kernel command line interface to
+   control SMT.
+
+   The kernel command line interface consists of the following options:
+
+     =========== ==========================================================
+     nosmt	 Affects the bring up of the secondary CPUs during boot. The
+		 kernel tries to bring all present CPUs online during the
+		 boot process. "nosmt" makes sure that from each physical
+		 core only one - the so called primary (hyper) thread is
+		 activated. Due to a design flaw of Intel processors related
+		 to Machine Check Exceptions the non primary siblings have
+		 to be brought up at least partially and are then shut down
+		 again.  "nosmt" can be undone via the sysfs interface.
+
+     nosmt=force Has the same effect as "nosmt" but it does not allow to
+		 undo the SMT disable via the sysfs interface.
+     =========== ==========================================================
+
+   The sysfs interface provides two files:
+
+   - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
+   - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control:
+
+     This file allows to read out the SMT control state and provides the
+     ability to disable or (re)enable SMT. The possible states are:
+
+	==============  ===================================================
+	on		SMT is supported by the CPU and enabled. All
+			logical CPUs can be onlined and offlined without
+			restrictions.
+
+	off		SMT is supported by the CPU and disabled. Only
+			the so called primary SMT threads can be onlined
+			and offlined without restrictions. An attempt to
+			online a non-primary sibling is rejected
+
+	forceoff	Same as 'off' but the state cannot be controlled.
+			Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
+
+	notsupported	The processor does not support SMT. It's therefore
+			not affected by the SMT implications of L1TF.
+			Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
+	==============  ===================================================
+
+     The possible states which can be written into this file to control SMT
+     state are:
+
+     - on
+     - off
+     - forceoff
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active:
+
+     This file reports whether SMT is enabled and active, i.e. if on any
+     physical core two or more sibling threads are online.
+
+   SMT control is also possible at boot time via the l1tf kernel command
+   line parameter in combination with L1D flush control. See
+   :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+5. Disabling EPT
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  Disabling EPT for virtual machines provides full mitigation for L1TF even
+  with SMT enabled, because the effective page tables for guests are
+  managed and sanitized by the hypervisor. Though disabling EPT has a
+  significant performance impact especially when the Meltdown mitigation
+  KPTI is enabled.
+
+  EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
+
+There is ongoing research and development for new mitigation mechanisms to
+address the performance impact of disabling SMT or EPT.
+
+.. _mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the L1TF mitigations at boot
+time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  full		Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF
+		vulnerability. Disables SMT and enables all mitigations in
+		the hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flushing
+
+		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
+		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+		disabled.
+
+  full,force	Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D flush runtime
+		control. Implies the 'nosmt=force' command line option.
+		(i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
+
+  flush		Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default hypervisor
+		mitigation, i.e. conditional L1D flushing
+
+		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
+		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+		disabled.
+
+  flush,nosmt	Disables SMT and enables the default hypervisor mitigation,
+		i.e. conditional L1D flushing.
+
+		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
+		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+		disabled.
+
+  flush,nowarn	Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when a VM is
+		started in a potentially insecure configuration.
+
+  off		Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
+		warnings.
+		It also drops the swap size and available RAM limit restrictions
+		on both hypervisor and bare metal.
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
+
+
+.. _mitigation_control_kvm:
+
+Mitigation control for KVM - module parameter
+-------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism, flushing the L1D cache when
+entering a guest, can be controlled with a module parameter.
+
+The option/parameter is "kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=". It takes the
+following arguments:
+
+  ============  ==============================================================
+  always	L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
+
+  cond		Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between VMEXIT and
+		VMENTER can leak host memory which is considered
+		interesting for an attacker. This still can leak host memory
+		which allows e.g. to determine the hosts address space layout.
+
+  never		Disables the mitigation
+  ============  ==============================================================
+
+The parameter can be provided on the kernel command line, as a module
+parameter when loading the modules and at runtime modified via the sysfs
+file:
+
+/sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/vmentry_l1d_flush
+
+The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,force' is given on the kernel command
+line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
+module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
+
+.. _mitigation_selection:
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. No virtualization in use
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
+   action is required.
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If the guest comes from a trusted source and the guest OS kernel is
+   guaranteed to have the L1TF mitigations in place the system is fully
+   protected against L1TF and no further action is required.
+
+   To avoid the overhead of the default L1D flushing on VMENTER the
+   administrator can disable the flushing via the kernel command line and
+   sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
+   :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+3.1. SMT not supported or disabled
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+  If SMT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the BIOS or by
+  the kernel, it's only required to enforce L1D flushing on VMENTER.
+
+  Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
+  :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+3.2. EPT not supported or disabled
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+  If EPT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the hypervisor,
+  the system is fully protected. SMT can stay enabled and L1D flushing on
+  VMENTER is not required.
+
+  EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
+
+3.3. SMT and EPT supported and active
+"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+  If SMT and EPT are supported and active then various degrees of
+  mitigations can be employed:
+
+  - L1D flushing on VMENTER:
+
+    L1D flushing on VMENTER is the minimal protection requirement, but it
+    is only potent in combination with other mitigation methods.
+
+    Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
+    :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+  - Guest confinement:
+
+    Confinement of guests to a single or a group of physical cores which
+    are not running any other processes, can reduce the attack surface
+    significantly, but interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel threads can
+    still expose valuable data to a potential attacker. See
+    :ref:`guest_confinement`.
+
+  - Interrupt isolation:
+
+    Isolating the guest CPUs from interrupts can reduce the attack surface
+    further, but still allows a malicious guest to explore a limited amount
+    of host physical memory. This can at least be used to gain knowledge
+    about the host address space layout. The interrupts which have a fixed
+    affinity to the CPUs which run the untrusted guests can depending on
+    the scenario still trigger soft interrupts and schedule kernel threads
+    which might expose valuable information. See
+    :ref:`interrupt_isolation`.
+
+The above three mitigation methods combined can provide protection to a
+certain degree, but the risk of the remaining attack surface has to be
+carefully analyzed. For full protection the following methods are
+available:
+
+  - Disabling SMT:
+
+    Disabling SMT and enforcing the L1D flushing provides the maximum
+    amount of protection. This mitigation is not depending on any of the
+    above mitigation methods.
+
+    SMT control and L1D flushing can be tuned by the command line
+    parameters 'nosmt', 'l1tf', 'kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush' and at run
+    time with the matching sysfs control files. See :ref:`smt_control`,
+    :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
+    :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+  - Disabling EPT:
+
+    Disabling EPT provides the maximum amount of protection as well. It is
+    not depending on any of the above mitigation methods. SMT can stay
+    enabled and L1D flushing is not required, but the performance impact is
+    significant.
+
+    EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept'
+    parameter.
+
+3.4. Nested virtual machines
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+When nested virtualization is in use, three operating systems are involved:
+the bare metal hypervisor, the nested hypervisor and the nested virtual
+machine.  VMENTER operations from the nested hypervisor into the nested
+guest will always be processed by the bare metal hypervisor. If KVM is the
+bare metal hypervisor it will:
+
+ - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested hypervisor to the
+   nested virtual machine, so that the nested hypervisor's secrets are not
+   exposed to the nested virtual machine;
+
+ - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested virtual machine to
+   the nested hypervisor; this is a complex operation, and flushing the L1D
+   cache avoids that the bare metal hypervisor's secrets are exposed to the
+   nested virtual machine;
+
+ - Instruct the nested hypervisor to not perform any L1D cache flush. This
+   is an optimization to avoid double L1D flushing.
+
+
+.. _default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+  The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
+
+  - PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
+    unconditionally and cannot be controlled. The swap storage is limited
+    to ~16TB.
+
+  - L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
+    a guest.
+
+  The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
+  SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted guests with EPT enabled.
+
+  The rationale for this choice is:
+
+  - Force disabling SMT can break existing setups, especially with
+    unattended updates.
+
+  - If regular users run untrusted guests on their machine, then L1TF is
+    just an add on to other malware which might be embedded in an untrusted
+    guest, e.g. spam-bots or attacks on the local network.
+
+    There is no technical way to prevent a user from running untrusted code
+    on their machines blindly.
+
+  - It's technically extremely unlikely and from today's knowledge even
+    impossible that L1TF can be exploited via the most popular attack
+    mechanisms like JavaScript because these mechanisms have no way to
+    control PTEs. If this would be possible and not other mitigation would
+    be possible, then the default might be different.
+
+  - The administrators of cloud and hosting setups have to carefully
+    analyze the risk for their scenarios and make the appropriate
+    mitigation choices, which might even vary across their deployed
+    machines and also result in other changes of their overall setup.
+    There is no way for the kernel to provide a sensible default for this
+    kind of scenarios.
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+MDS - Microarchitectural Data Sampling
+======================================
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows
+unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in various CPU
+internal buffers.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
+vulnerability is not present on:
+
+   - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
+
+   - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
+
+   - Some Atoms (Bonnell, Saltwell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus)
+
+   - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the MDS
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`mds_sys_info`.
+
+Not all processors are affected by all variants of MDS, but the mitigation
+is identical for all of them so the kernel treats them as a single
+vulnerability.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries are related to the MDS vulnerability:
+
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+   CVE-2018-12126  MSBDS  Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
+   CVE-2018-12130  MFBDS  Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
+   CVE-2018-12127  MLPDS  Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
+   CVE-2019-11091  MDSUM  Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+When performing store, load, L1 refill operations, processors write data
+into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in the
+buffer can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
+
+Under certain conditions, usually a fault/assist caused by a load
+operation, data unrelated to the load memory address can be speculatively
+forwarded from the buffers. Because the load operation causes a fault or
+assist and its result will be discarded, the forwarded data will not cause
+incorrect program execution or state changes. But a malicious operation
+may be able to forward this speculative data to a disclosure gadget which
+allows in turn to infer the value via a cache side channel attack.
+
+Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
+Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
+
+Deeper technical information is available in the MDS specific x86
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/mds.rst <mds>`.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the MDS vulnerabilities can be mounted from malicious non
+priviledged user space applications running on hosts or guest. Malicious
+guest OSes can obviously mount attacks as well.
+
+Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS vulnerability
+does not allow the attacker to control the memory target address. As a
+consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but as demonstrated with
+the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully.
+
+Web-Browsers
+^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  It's unclear whether attacks through Web-Browsers are possible at
+  all. The exploitation through Java-Script is considered very unlikely,
+  but other widely used web technologies like Webassembly could possibly be
+  abused.
+
+
+.. _mds_sys_info:
+
+MDS system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current MDS
+status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  .. list-table::
+
+     * - 'Not affected'
+       - The processor is not vulnerable
+     * - 'Vulnerable'
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+     * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
+       - The processor is vulnerable but microcode is not updated.
+
+         The mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis. See :ref:`vmwerv`
+     * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
+       - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
+         enabled.
+
+If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended
+to the above information:
+
+    ========================  ============================================
+    'SMT vulnerable'          SMT is enabled
+    'SMT mitigated'           SMT is enabled and mitigated
+    'SMT disabled'            SMT is disabled
+    'SMT Host state unknown'  Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown
+    ========================  ============================================
+
+.. _vmwerv:
+
+Best effort mitigation mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode based
+  mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
+  effort mitigation mode.  This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
+  without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
+
+  This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
+  microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose
+  the CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection
+  takes effect otherwise a few cpu cycles are wasted pointlessly.
+
+  The state in the mds sysfs file reflects this situation accordingly.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode
+which is required.
+
+If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
+enables the mitigation by default. The mitigation can be controlled at boot
+time via a kernel command line option. See
+:ref:`mds_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+.. _cpu_buffer_clear:
+
+CPU buffer clearing
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The mitigation for MDS clears the affected CPU buffers on return to user
+  space and when entering a guest.
+
+  If SMT is enabled it also clears the buffers on idle entry when the CPU
+  is only affected by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant, because the
+  other variants cannot be protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks.
+
+  For CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS the user space, guest and idle
+  transition mitigations are sufficient and SMT is not affected.
+
+.. _virt_mechanism:
+
+Virtualization mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The protection for host to guest transition depends on the L1TF
+  vulnerability of the CPU:
+
+  - CPU is affected by L1TF:
+
+    If the L1D flush mitigation is enabled and up to date microcode is
+    available, the L1D flush mitigation is automatically protecting the
+    guest transition.
+
+    If the L1D flush mitigation is disabled then the MDS mitigation is
+    invoked explicit when the host MDS mitigation is enabled.
+
+    For details on L1TF and virtualization see:
+    :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <mitigation_control_kvm>`.
+
+  - CPU is not affected by L1TF:
+
+    CPU buffers are flushed before entering the guest when the host MDS
+    mitigation is enabled.
+
+  The resulting MDS protection matrix for the host to guest transition:
+
+  ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+   L1TF         MDS   VMX-L1FLUSH   Host MDS     MDS-State
+
+   Don't care   No    Don't care    N/A          Not affected
+
+   Yes          Yes   Disabled      Off          Vulnerable
+
+   Yes          Yes   Disabled      Full         Mitigated
+
+   Yes          Yes   Enabled       Don't care   Mitigated
+
+   No           Yes   N/A           Off          Vulnerable
+
+   No           Yes   N/A           Full         Mitigated
+  ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+
+  This only covers the host to guest transition, i.e. prevents leakage from
+  host to guest, but does not protect the guest internally. Guests need to
+  have their own protections.
+
+.. _xeon_phi:
+
+XEON PHI specific considerations
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The XEON PHI processor family is affected by MSBDS which can be exploited
+  cross Hyper-Threads when entering idle states. Some XEON PHI variants allow
+  to use MWAIT in user space (Ring 3) which opens an potential attack vector
+  for malicious user space. The exposure can be disabled on the kernel
+  command line with the 'ring3mwait=disable' command line option.
+
+  XEON PHI is not affected by the other MDS variants and MSBDS is mitigated
+  before the CPU enters a idle state. As XEON PHI is not affected by L1TF
+  either disabling SMT is not required for full protection.
+
+.. _mds_smt_control:
+
+SMT control
+^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  All MDS variants except MSBDS can be attacked cross Hyper-Threads. That
+  means on CPUs which are affected by MFBDS or MLPDS it is necessary to
+  disable SMT for full protection. These are most of the affected CPUs; the
+  exception is XEON PHI, see :ref:`xeon_phi`.
+
+  Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but the impact
+  depends on the type of workloads.
+
+  See the relevant chapter in the L1TF mitigation documentation for details:
+  :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst <smt_control>`.
+
+
+.. _mds_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the MDS mitigations at boot
+time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  full		If the CPU is vulnerable, enable all available mitigations
+		for the MDS vulnerability, CPU buffer clearing on exit to
+		userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are
+		protected as well if SMT is enabled.
+
+		It does not automatically disable SMT.
+
+  full,nosmt	The same as mds=full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable
+		CPUs.  This is the complete mitigation.
+
+  off		Disables MDS mitigations completely.
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full".
+
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If all userspace applications are from a trusted source and do not
+   execute untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation
+   can be disabled.
+
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The same considerations as above versus trusted user space apply.
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The protection depends on the state of the L1TF mitigations.
+   See :ref:`virt_mechanism`.
+
+   If the MDS mitigation is enabled and SMT is disabled, guest to host and
+   guest to guest attacks are prevented.
+
+.. _mds_default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+  The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
+
+  - Enable CPU buffer clearing
+
+  The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
+  SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted code. The same rationale as
+  for L1TF applies.
+  See :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <default_mitigations>`.
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -17,14 +17,12 @@ etc.
    kernel-parameters
    devices
 
-This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
-possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
-are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and their mitigations.
 
 .. toctree::
    :maxdepth: 1
 
-   l1tf
+   hw-vuln/index
 
 Here is a set of documents aimed at users who are trying to track down
 problems and bugs in particular.
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -2114,7 +2114,7 @@
 
 			Default is 'flush'.
 
-			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
 
 	l2cr=		[PPC]
 
@@ -2356,6 +2356,32 @@
 			Format: <first>,<last>
 			Specifies range of consoles to be captured by the MDA.
 
+	mds=		[X86,INTEL]
+			Control mitigation for the Micro-architectural Data
+			Sampling (MDS) vulnerability.
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU
+			internal buffers which can forward information to a
+			disclosure gadget under certain conditions.
+
+			In vulnerable processors, the speculatively
+			forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel
+			attack, to access data to which the attacker does
+			not have direct access.
+
+			This parameter controls the MDS mitigation. The
+			options are:
+
+			full       - Enable MDS mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+			full,nosmt - Enable MDS mitigation and disable
+				     SMT on vulnerable CPUs
+			off        - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			mds=full.
+
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
+
 	mem=nn[KMG]	[KNL,BOOT] Force usage of a specific amount of memory
 			Amount of memory to be used when the kernel is not able
 			to see the whole system memory or for test.
@@ -2513,6 +2539,40 @@
 			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
+	mitigations=
+			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			arch-independent options, each of which is an
+			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
+
+			off
+				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
+				improves system performance, but it may also
+				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
+					       nobp=0 [S390]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       l1tf=off [X86]
+					       mds=off [X86]
+
+			auto (default)
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
+				enabled, even if it's vulnerable.  This is for
+				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
+				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
+				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
+				Equivalent to: (default behavior)
+
+			auto,nosmt
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
+				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
+				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+				Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
+					       mds=full,nosmt [X86]
+
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
 			parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
@@ -1,614 +0,0 @@
-L1TF - L1 Terminal Fault
-========================
-
-L1 Terminal Fault is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
-speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache
-when the page table entry controlling the virtual address, which is used
-for the access, has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set.
-
-Affected processors
--------------------
-
-This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
-vulnerability is not present on:
-
-   - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
-
-   - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
-
-   - A range of Intel ATOM processors (Cedarview, Cloverview, Lincroft,
-     Penwell, Pineview, Silvermont, Airmont, Merrifield)
-
-   - The Intel XEON PHI family
-
-   - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO bit set in the
-     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. If the bit is set the CPU is not affected
-     by the Meltdown vulnerability either. These CPUs should become
-     available by end of 2018.
-
-Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the L1TF
-vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`l1tf_sys_info`.
-
-Related CVEs
-------------
-
-The following CVE entries are related to the L1TF vulnerability:
-
-   =============  =================  ==============================
-   CVE-2018-3615  L1 Terminal Fault  SGX related aspects
-   CVE-2018-3620  L1 Terminal Fault  OS, SMM related aspects
-   CVE-2018-3646  L1 Terminal Fault  Virtualization related aspects
-   =============  =================  ==============================
-
-Problem
--------
-
-If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant page
-table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set,
-then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads the referenced
-data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if the page referenced
-by the address bits in the PTE was still present and accessible.
-
-While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will raise
-a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of loading the
-data and making it available to other speculative instructions opens up the
-opportunity for side channel attacks to unprivileged malicious code,
-similar to the Meltdown attack.
-
-While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
-allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack
-works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also
-works from inside virtual machines because the speculation bypasses the
-extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.
-
-
-Attack scenarios
-----------------
-
-1. Malicious user space
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   Operating Systems store arbitrary information in the address bits of a
-   PTE which is marked non present. This allows a malicious user space
-   application to attack the physical memory to which these PTEs resolve.
-   In some cases user-space can maliciously influence the information
-   encoded in the address bits of the PTE, thus making attacks more
-   deterministic and more practical.
-
-   The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
-   inversion, which is permanently enabled and has no performance
-   impact. The kernel ensures that the address bits of PTEs, which are not
-   marked present, never point to cacheable physical memory space.
-
-   A system with an up to date kernel is protected against attacks from
-   malicious user space applications.
-
-2. Malicious guest in a virtual machine
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   The fact that L1TF breaks all domain protections allows malicious guest
-   OSes, which can control the PTEs directly, and malicious guest user
-   space applications, which run on an unprotected guest kernel lacking the
-   PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
-
-   A special aspect of L1TF in the context of virtualization is symmetric
-   multi threading (SMT). The Intel implementation of SMT is called
-   HyperThreading. The fact that Hyperthreads on the affected processors
-   share the L1 Data Cache (L1D) is important for this. As the flaw allows
-   only to attack data which is present in L1D, a malicious guest running
-   on one Hyperthread can attack the data which is brought into the L1D by
-   the context which runs on the sibling Hyperthread of the same physical
-   core. This context can be host OS, host user space or a different guest.
-
-   If the processor does not support Extended Page Tables, the attack is
-   only possible, when the hypervisor does not sanitize the content of the
-   effective (shadow) page tables.
-
-   While solutions exist to mitigate these attack vectors fully, these
-   mitigations are not enabled by default in the Linux kernel because they
-   can affect performance significantly. The kernel provides several
-   mechanisms which can be utilized to address the problem depending on the
-   deployment scenario. The mitigations, their protection scope and impact
-   are described in the next sections.
-
-   The default mitigations and the rationale for choosing them are explained
-   at the end of this document. See :ref:`default_mitigations`.
-
-.. _l1tf_sys_info:
-
-L1TF system information
------------------------
-
-The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current L1TF
-status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
-mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
-
-/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
-
-The possible values in this file are:
-
-  ===========================   ===============================
-  'Not affected'		The processor is not vulnerable
-  'Mitigation: PTE Inversion'	The host protection is active
-  ===========================   ===============================
-
-If KVM/VMX is enabled and the processor is vulnerable then the following
-information is appended to the 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' part:
-
-  - SMT status:
-
-    =====================  ================
-    'VMX: SMT vulnerable'  SMT is enabled
-    'VMX: SMT disabled'    SMT is disabled
-    =====================  ================
-
-  - L1D Flush mode:
-
-    ================================  ====================================
-    'L1D vulnerable'		      L1D flushing is disabled
-
-    'L1D conditional cache flushes'   L1D flush is conditionally enabled
-
-    'L1D cache flushes'		      L1D flush is unconditionally enabled
-    ================================  ====================================
-
-The resulting grade of protection is discussed in the following sections.
-
-
-Host mitigation mechanism
--------------------------
-
-The kernel is unconditionally protected against L1TF attacks from malicious
-user space running on the host.
-
-
-Guest mitigation mechanisms
----------------------------
-
-.. _l1d_flush:
-
-1. L1D flush on VMENTER
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   To make sure that a guest cannot attack data which is present in the L1D
-   the hypervisor flushes the L1D before entering the guest.
-
-   Flushing the L1D evicts not only the data which should not be accessed
-   by a potentially malicious guest, it also flushes the guest
-   data. Flushing the L1D has a performance impact as the processor has to
-   bring the flushed guest data back into the L1D. Depending on the
-   frequency of VMEXIT/VMENTER and the type of computations in the guest
-   performance degradation in the range of 1% to 50% has been observed. For
-   scenarios where guest VMEXIT/VMENTER are rare the performance impact is
-   minimal. Virtio and mechanisms like posted interrupts are designed to
-   confine the VMEXITs to a bare minimum, but specific configurations and
-   application scenarios might still suffer from a high VMEXIT rate.
-
-   The kernel provides two L1D flush modes:
-    - conditional ('cond')
-    - unconditional ('always')
-
-   The conditional mode avoids L1D flushing after VMEXITs which execute
-   only audited code paths before the corresponding VMENTER. These code
-   paths have been verified that they cannot expose secrets or other
-   interesting data to an attacker, but they can leak information about the
-   address space layout of the hypervisor.
-
-   Unconditional mode flushes L1D on all VMENTER invocations and provides
-   maximum protection. It has a higher overhead than the conditional
-   mode. The overhead cannot be quantified correctly as it depends on the
-   workload scenario and the resulting number of VMEXITs.
-
-   The general recommendation is to enable L1D flush on VMENTER. The kernel
-   defaults to conditional mode on affected processors.
-
-   **Note**, that L1D flush does not prevent the SMT problem because the
-   sibling thread will also bring back its data into the L1D which makes it
-   attackable again.
-
-   L1D flush can be controlled by the administrator via the kernel command
-   line and sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`
-   and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
-
-.. _guest_confinement:
-
-2. Guest VCPU confinement to dedicated physical cores
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   To address the SMT problem, it is possible to make a guest or a group of
-   guests affine to one or more physical cores. The proper mechanism for
-   that is to utilize exclusive cpusets to ensure that no other guest or
-   host tasks can run on these cores.
-
-   If only a single guest or related guests run on sibling SMT threads on
-   the same physical core then they can only attack their own memory and
-   restricted parts of the host memory.
-
-   Host memory is attackable, when one of the sibling SMT threads runs in
-   host OS (hypervisor) context and the other in guest context. The amount
-   of valuable information from the host OS context depends on the context
-   which the host OS executes, i.e. interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel
-   threads. The amount of valuable data from these contexts cannot be
-   declared as non-interesting for an attacker without deep inspection of
-   the code.
-
-   **Note**, that assigning guests to a fixed set of physical cores affects
-   the ability of the scheduler to do load balancing and might have
-   negative effects on CPU utilization depending on the hosting
-   scenario. Disabling SMT might be a viable alternative for particular
-   scenarios.
-
-   For further information about confining guests to a single or to a group
-   of cores consult the cpusets documentation:
-
-   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/cgroup-v1/cpusets.txt
-
-.. _interrupt_isolation:
-
-3. Interrupt affinity
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   Interrupts can be made affine to logical CPUs. This is not universally
-   true because there are types of interrupts which are truly per CPU
-   interrupts, e.g. the local timer interrupt. Aside of that multi queue
-   devices affine their interrupts to single CPUs or groups of CPUs per
-   queue without allowing the administrator to control the affinities.
-
-   Moving the interrupts, which can be affinity controlled, away from CPUs
-   which run untrusted guests, reduces the attack vector space.
-
-   Whether the interrupts with are affine to CPUs, which run untrusted
-   guests, provide interesting data for an attacker depends on the system
-   configuration and the scenarios which run on the system. While for some
-   of the interrupts it can be assumed that they won't expose interesting
-   information beyond exposing hints about the host OS memory layout, there
-   is no way to make general assumptions.
-
-   Interrupt affinity can be controlled by the administrator via the
-   /proc/irq/$NR/smp_affinity[_list] files. Limited documentation is
-   available at:
-
-   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/IRQ-affinity.txt
-
-.. _smt_control:
-
-4. SMT control
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   To prevent the SMT issues of L1TF it might be necessary to disable SMT
-   completely. Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but
-   the impact depends on the hosting scenario and the type of workloads.
-   The impact of disabling SMT needs also to be weighted against the impact
-   of other mitigation solutions like confining guests to dedicated cores.
-
-   The kernel provides a sysfs interface to retrieve the status of SMT and
-   to control it. It also provides a kernel command line interface to
-   control SMT.
-
-   The kernel command line interface consists of the following options:
-
-     =========== ==========================================================
-     nosmt	 Affects the bring up of the secondary CPUs during boot. The
-		 kernel tries to bring all present CPUs online during the
-		 boot process. "nosmt" makes sure that from each physical
-		 core only one - the so called primary (hyper) thread is
-		 activated. Due to a design flaw of Intel processors related
-		 to Machine Check Exceptions the non primary siblings have
-		 to be brought up at least partially and are then shut down
-		 again.  "nosmt" can be undone via the sysfs interface.
-
-     nosmt=force Has the same effect as "nosmt" but it does not allow to
-		 undo the SMT disable via the sysfs interface.
-     =========== ==========================================================
-
-   The sysfs interface provides two files:
-
-   - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
-   - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
-
-   /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control:
-
-     This file allows to read out the SMT control state and provides the
-     ability to disable or (re)enable SMT. The possible states are:
-
-	==============  ===================================================
-	on		SMT is supported by the CPU and enabled. All
-			logical CPUs can be onlined and offlined without
-			restrictions.
-
-	off		SMT is supported by the CPU and disabled. Only
-			the so called primary SMT threads can be onlined
-			and offlined without restrictions. An attempt to
-			online a non-primary sibling is rejected
-
-	forceoff	Same as 'off' but the state cannot be controlled.
-			Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
-
-	notsupported	The processor does not support SMT. It's therefore
-			not affected by the SMT implications of L1TF.
-			Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
-	==============  ===================================================
-
-     The possible states which can be written into this file to control SMT
-     state are:
-
-     - on
-     - off
-     - forceoff
-
-   /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active:
-
-     This file reports whether SMT is enabled and active, i.e. if on any
-     physical core two or more sibling threads are online.
-
-   SMT control is also possible at boot time via the l1tf kernel command
-   line parameter in combination with L1D flush control. See
-   :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`.
-
-5. Disabling EPT
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-  Disabling EPT for virtual machines provides full mitigation for L1TF even
-  with SMT enabled, because the effective page tables for guests are
-  managed and sanitized by the hypervisor. Though disabling EPT has a
-  significant performance impact especially when the Meltdown mitigation
-  KPTI is enabled.
-
-  EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
-
-There is ongoing research and development for new mitigation mechanisms to
-address the performance impact of disabling SMT or EPT.
-
-.. _mitigation_control_command_line:
-
-Mitigation control on the kernel command line
----------------------------------------------
-
-The kernel command line allows to control the L1TF mitigations at boot
-time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
-
-  ============  =============================================================
-  full		Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF
-		vulnerability. Disables SMT and enables all mitigations in
-		the hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flushing
-
-		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
-		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
-		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
-		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
-		disabled.
-
-  full,force	Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D flush runtime
-		control. Implies the 'nosmt=force' command line option.
-		(i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
-
-  flush		Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default hypervisor
-		mitigation, i.e. conditional L1D flushing
-
-		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
-		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
-		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
-		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
-		disabled.
-
-  flush,nosmt	Disables SMT and enables the default hypervisor mitigation,
-		i.e. conditional L1D flushing.
-
-		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
-		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
-		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
-		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
-		disabled.
-
-  flush,nowarn	Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when a VM is
-		started in a potentially insecure configuration.
-
-  off		Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
-		warnings.
-		It also drops the swap size and available RAM limit restrictions
-		on both hypervisor and bare metal.
-
-  ============  =============================================================
-
-The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
-
-
-.. _mitigation_control_kvm:
-
-Mitigation control for KVM - module parameter
--------------------------------------------------------------
-
-The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism, flushing the L1D cache when
-entering a guest, can be controlled with a module parameter.
-
-The option/parameter is "kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=". It takes the
-following arguments:
-
-  ============  ==============================================================
-  always	L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
-
-  cond		Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between VMEXIT and
-		VMENTER can leak host memory which is considered
-		interesting for an attacker. This still can leak host memory
-		which allows e.g. to determine the hosts address space layout.
-
-  never		Disables the mitigation
-  ============  ==============================================================
-
-The parameter can be provided on the kernel command line, as a module
-parameter when loading the modules and at runtime modified via the sysfs
-file:
-
-/sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/vmentry_l1d_flush
-
-The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,force' is given on the kernel command
-line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
-module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
-
-
-Mitigation selection guide
---------------------------
-
-1. No virtualization in use
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
-   action is required.
-
-2. Virtualization with trusted guests
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   If the guest comes from a trusted source and the guest OS kernel is
-   guaranteed to have the L1TF mitigations in place the system is fully
-   protected against L1TF and no further action is required.
-
-   To avoid the overhead of the default L1D flushing on VMENTER the
-   administrator can disable the flushing via the kernel command line and
-   sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
-   :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
-
-
-3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-3.1. SMT not supported or disabled
-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
-
-  If SMT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the BIOS or by
-  the kernel, it's only required to enforce L1D flushing on VMENTER.
-
-  Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
-  :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
-
-3.2. EPT not supported or disabled
-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
-
-  If EPT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the hypervisor,
-  the system is fully protected. SMT can stay enabled and L1D flushing on
-  VMENTER is not required.
-
-  EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
-
-3.3. SMT and EPT supported and active
-"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
-
-  If SMT and EPT are supported and active then various degrees of
-  mitigations can be employed:
-
-  - L1D flushing on VMENTER:
-
-    L1D flushing on VMENTER is the minimal protection requirement, but it
-    is only potent in combination with other mitigation methods.
-
-    Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
-    :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
-
-  - Guest confinement:
-
-    Confinement of guests to a single or a group of physical cores which
-    are not running any other processes, can reduce the attack surface
-    significantly, but interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel threads can
-    still expose valuable data to a potential attacker. See
-    :ref:`guest_confinement`.
-
-  - Interrupt isolation:
-
-    Isolating the guest CPUs from interrupts can reduce the attack surface
-    further, but still allows a malicious guest to explore a limited amount
-    of host physical memory. This can at least be used to gain knowledge
-    about the host address space layout. The interrupts which have a fixed
-    affinity to the CPUs which run the untrusted guests can depending on
-    the scenario still trigger soft interrupts and schedule kernel threads
-    which might expose valuable information. See
-    :ref:`interrupt_isolation`.
-
-The above three mitigation methods combined can provide protection to a
-certain degree, but the risk of the remaining attack surface has to be
-carefully analyzed. For full protection the following methods are
-available:
-
-  - Disabling SMT:
-
-    Disabling SMT and enforcing the L1D flushing provides the maximum
-    amount of protection. This mitigation is not depending on any of the
-    above mitigation methods.
-
-    SMT control and L1D flushing can be tuned by the command line
-    parameters 'nosmt', 'l1tf', 'kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush' and at run
-    time with the matching sysfs control files. See :ref:`smt_control`,
-    :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
-    :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
-
-  - Disabling EPT:
-
-    Disabling EPT provides the maximum amount of protection as well. It is
-    not depending on any of the above mitigation methods. SMT can stay
-    enabled and L1D flushing is not required, but the performance impact is
-    significant.
-
-    EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept'
-    parameter.
-
-3.4. Nested virtual machines
-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
-
-When nested virtualization is in use, three operating systems are involved:
-the bare metal hypervisor, the nested hypervisor and the nested virtual
-machine.  VMENTER operations from the nested hypervisor into the nested
-guest will always be processed by the bare metal hypervisor. If KVM is the
-bare metal hypervisor it will:
-
- - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested hypervisor to the
-   nested virtual machine, so that the nested hypervisor's secrets are not
-   exposed to the nested virtual machine;
-
- - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested virtual machine to
-   the nested hypervisor; this is a complex operation, and flushing the L1D
-   cache avoids that the bare metal hypervisor's secrets are exposed to the
-   nested virtual machine;
-
- - Instruct the nested hypervisor to not perform any L1D cache flush. This
-   is an optimization to avoid double L1D flushing.
-
-
-.. _default_mitigations:
-
-Default mitigations
--------------------
-
-  The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
-
-  - PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
-    unconditionally and cannot be controlled. The swap storage is limited
-    to ~16TB.
-
-  - L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
-    a guest.
-
-  The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
-  SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted guests with EPT enabled.
-
-  The rationale for this choice is:
-
-  - Force disabling SMT can break existing setups, especially with
-    unattended updates.
-
-  - If regular users run untrusted guests on their machine, then L1TF is
-    just an add on to other malware which might be embedded in an untrusted
-    guest, e.g. spam-bots or attacks on the local network.
-
-    There is no technical way to prevent a user from running untrusted code
-    on their machines blindly.
-
-  - It's technically extremely unlikely and from today's knowledge even
-    impossible that L1TF can be exploited via the most popular attack
-    mechanisms like JavaScript because these mechanisms have no way to
-    control PTEs. If this would be possible and not other mitigation would
-    be possible, then the default might be different.
-
-  - The administrators of cloud and hosting setups have to carefully
-    analyze the risk for their scenarios and make the appropriate
-    mitigation choices, which might even vary across their deployed
-    machines and also result in other changes of their overall setup.
-    There is no way for the kernel to provide a sensible default for this
-    kind of scenarios.
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/index.rst linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/index.rst
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/index.rst	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/index.rst	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ implementation.
    :maxdepth: 2
 
    sh/index
+   x86/index
 
 Filesystem Documentation
 ------------------------
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/x86/conf.py linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/x86/conf.py
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/x86/conf.py	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/x86/conf.py	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8; mode: python -*-
+
+project = "X86 architecture specific documentation"
+
+tags.add("subproject")
+
+latex_documents = [
+    ('index', 'x86.tex', project,
+     'The kernel development community', 'manual'),
+]
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/x86/index.rst linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/x86/index.rst
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/x86/index.rst	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/x86/index.rst	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+==========================
+x86 architecture specifics
+==========================
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   mds
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/x86/mds.rst linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Documentation/x86/mds.rst	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Documentation/x86/mds.rst	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) mitigation
+=================================================
+
+.. _mds:
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a family of side channel attacks
+on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are:
+
+ - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126)
+ - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130)
+ - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127)
+ - Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory (MDSUM) (CVE-2019-11091)
+
+MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a
+dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward
+can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different
+memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store
+buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is
+not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store
+buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other.
+
+MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage
+L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response
+to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load
+operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is
+deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which
+can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can
+be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between
+Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible.
+
+MLPDS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations
+from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register
+file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can
+contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to
+faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be
+exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross
+thread leakage is possible.
+
+MDSUM is a special case of MSBDS, MFBDS and MLPDS. An uncacheable load from
+memory that takes a fault or assist can leave data in a microarchitectural
+structure that may later be observed using one of the same methods used by
+MSBDS, MFBDS or MLPDS.
+
+Exposure assumptions
+--------------------
+
+It is assumed that attack code resides in user space or in a guest with one
+exception. The rationale behind this assumption is that the code construct
+needed for exploiting MDS requires:
+
+ - to control the load to trigger a fault or assist
+
+ - to have a disclosure gadget which exposes the speculatively accessed
+   data for consumption through a side channel.
+
+ - to control the pointer through which the disclosure gadget exposes the
+   data
+
+The existence of such a construct in the kernel cannot be excluded with
+100% certainty, but the complexity involved makes it extremly unlikely.
+
+There is one exception, which is untrusted BPF. The functionality of
+untrusted BPF is limited, but it needs to be thoroughly investigated
+whether it can be used to create such a construct.
+
+
+Mitigation strategy
+-------------------
+
+All variants have the same mitigation strategy at least for the single CPU
+thread case (SMT off): Force the CPU to clear the affected buffers.
+
+This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW
+instruction in combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears
+the affected CPU buffers when the VERW instruction is executed.
+
+For virtualization there are two ways to achieve CPU buffer
+clearing. Either the modified VERW instruction or via the L1D Flush
+command. The latter is issued when L1TF mitigation is enabled so the extra
+VERW can be avoided. If the CPU is not affected by L1TF then VERW needs to
+be issued.
+
+If the VERW instruction with the supplied segment selector argument is
+executed on a CPU without the microcode update there is no side effect
+other than a small number of pointlessly wasted CPU cycles.
+
+This does not protect against cross Hyper-Thread attacks except for MSBDS
+which is only exploitable cross Hyper-thread when one of the Hyper-Threads
+enters a C-state.
+
+The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing:
+
+    mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+
+The mitigation is invoked on kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state
+(idle) transitions.
+
+As a special quirk to address virtualization scenarios where the host has
+the microcode updated, but the hypervisor does not (yet) expose the
+MD_CLEAR CPUID bit to guests, the kernel issues the VERW instruction in the
+hope that it might actually clear the buffers. The state is reflected
+accordingly.
+
+According to current knowledge additional mitigations inside the kernel
+itself are not required because the necessary gadgets to expose the leaked
+data cannot be controlled in a way which allows exploitation from malicious
+user space or VM guests.
+
+Kernel internal mitigation modes
+--------------------------------
+
+ ======= ============================================================
+ off      Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or
+          mds=off is supplied on the kernel command line
+
+ full     Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is
+          advertised in CPUID.
+
+ vmwerv	  Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not
+	  advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization
+	  scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the
+	  hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best
+	  effort approach without guarantee.
+ ======= ============================================================
+
+If the CPU is affected and mds=off is not supplied on the kernel command
+line then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation mode depending on
+the availability of the MD_CLEAR CPUID bit.
+
+Mitigation points
+-----------------
+
+1. Return to user space
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   When transitioning from kernel to user space the CPU buffers are flushed
+   on affected CPUs when the mitigation is not disabled on the kernel
+   command line. The migitation is enabled through the static key
+   mds_user_clear.
+
+   The mitigation is invoked in prepare_exit_to_usermode() which covers
+   most of the kernel to user space transitions. There are a few exceptions
+   which are not invoking prepare_exit_to_usermode() on return to user
+   space. These exceptions use the paranoid exit code.
+
+   - Non Maskable Interrupt (NMI):
+
+     Access to sensible data like keys, credentials in the NMI context is
+     mostly theoretical: The CPU can do prefetching or execute a
+     misspeculated code path and thereby fetching data which might end up
+     leaking through a buffer.
+
+     But for mounting other attacks the kernel stack address of the task is
+     already valuable information. So in full mitigation mode, the NMI is
+     mitigated on the return from do_nmi() to provide almost complete
+     coverage.
+
+   - Double fault (#DF):
+
+     A double fault is usually fatal, but the ESPFIX workaround, which can
+     be triggered from user space through modify_ldt(2) is a recoverable
+     double fault. #DF uses the paranoid exit path, so explicit mitigation
+     in the double fault handler is required.
+
+   - Machine Check Exception (#MC):
+
+     Another corner case is a #MC which hits between the CPU buffer clear
+     invocation and the actual return to user. As this still is in kernel
+     space it takes the paranoid exit path which does not clear the CPU
+     buffers. So the #MC handler repopulates the buffers to some
+     extent. Machine checks are not reliably controllable and the window is
+     extremly small so mitigation would just tick a checkbox that this
+     theoretical corner case is covered. To keep the amount of special
+     cases small, ignore #MC.
+
+   - Debug Exception (#DB):
+
+     This takes the paranoid exit path only when the INT1 breakpoint is in
+     kernel space. #DB on a user space address takes the regular exit path,
+     so no extra mitigation required.
+
+
+2. C-State transition
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   When a CPU goes idle and enters a C-State the CPU buffers need to be
+   cleared on affected CPUs when SMT is active. This addresses the
+   repartitioning of the store buffer when one of the Hyper-Threads enters
+   a C-State.
+
+   When SMT is inactive, i.e. either the CPU does not support it or all
+   sibling threads are offline CPU buffer clearing is not required.
+
+   The idle clearing is enabled on CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS
+   and not by any other MDS variant. The other MDS variants cannot be
+   protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks because the Fill Buffer and
+   the Load Ports are shared. So on CPUs affected by other variants, the
+   idle clearing would be a window dressing exercise and is therefore not
+   activated.
+
+   The invocation is controlled by the static key mds_idle_clear which is
+   switched depending on the chosen mitigation mode and the SMT state of
+   the system.
+
+   The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
+   that stale data from the idling CPU from spilling to the Hyper-Thread
+   sibling after the store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are
+   available to the non idle sibling.
+
+   When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each
+   sibling has half of it available. The back from idle CPU could be then
+   speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling. The buffers are
+   flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER so malicious code
+   in user space or the guest cannot speculatively access them.
+
+   The mitigation is hooked into all variants of halt()/mwait(), but does
+   not cover the legacy ACPI IO-Port mechanism because the ACPI idle driver
+   has been superseded by the intel_idle driver around 2010 and is
+   preferred on all affected CPUs which are expected to gain the MD_CLEAR
+   functionality in microcode. Aside of that the IO-Port mechanism is a
+   legacy interface which is only used on older systems which are either
+   not affected or do not receive microcode updates anymore.
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/drivers/base/cpu.c linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/drivers/base/cpu.c
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/drivers/base/cpu.c	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/drivers/base/cpu.c	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -546,11 +546,18 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_l1tf(struct devi
 	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_store_bypass, 0444, cpu_show_spec_store_bypass, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -558,6 +565,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner
 	&dev_attr_spectre_v2.attr,
 	&dev_attr_spec_store_bypass.attr,
 	&dev_attr_l1tf.attr,
+	&dev_attr_mds.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/include/linux/cpu.h linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/include/linux/cpu.h
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/include/linux/cpu.h	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/include/linux/cpu.h	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypas
 					  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev,
 			     struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
@@ -187,4 +189,28 @@ static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool
 static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology(void) { }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * These are used for a global "mitigations=" cmdline option for toggling
+ * optional CPU mitigations.
+ */
+enum cpu_mitigations {
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT,
+};
+
+extern enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations;
+
+/* mitigations=off */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_off(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+}
+
+/* mitigations=auto,nosmt */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+}
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/kernel/cpu.c linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/kernel/cpu.c
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/kernel/cpu.c	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/kernel/cpu.c	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -2304,3 +2304,18 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
 #endif
 	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);
 }
+
+enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+
+static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto,nosmt"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("mitigations", mitigations_parse_cmdline);
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Makefile linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Makefile
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/Makefile	2019-05-10 13:13:57.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/Makefile	2019-05-15 00:56:56.000000000 -0400
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 5
 PATCHLEVEL = 0
-SUBLEVEL = 15
+SUBLEVEL = 16
 EXTRAVERSION = -gnu
 NAME = Shy Crocodile
 
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ ifeq ("$(origin O)", "command line")
 endif
 
 turbostat : turbostat.c
-override CFLAGS +=	-Wall
+override CFLAGS +=	-Wall -I../../../include
 override CFLAGS +=	-DMSRHEADER='"../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h"'
 override CFLAGS +=	-DINTEL_FAMILY_HEADER='"../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h"'
 
diff -druNp --no-dereference linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile
--- linux-libre-5.0.15-gnu/tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile	2019-05-10 12:36:14.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-libre-5.0.16-gnu/tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile	2019-05-14 13:17:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ ifeq ("$(origin O)", "command line")
 endif
 
 x86_energy_perf_policy : x86_energy_perf_policy.c
-override CFLAGS +=	-Wall
+override CFLAGS +=	-Wall -I../../../include
 override CFLAGS +=	-DMSRHEADER='"../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h"'
 
 %: %.c
