diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 0c3c72a0ba97..681d429c6426 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3526,6 +3526,18 @@
 	ramdisk_size=	[RAM] Sizes of RAM disks in kilobytes
 			See Documentation/blockdev/ramdisk.txt.
 
+	random.trust_cpu={on,off}
+			[KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of the
+			CPU's random number generator (if available) to
+			fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
+			by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU.
+
+	random.trust_bootloader={on,off}
+			[KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of a
+			seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to
+			fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
+			by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
+
 	ras=option[,option,...]	[KNL] RAS-specific options
 
 		cec_disable	[X86]
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 3c8f5bfdf6da..37b612a17c46 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -781,9 +781,40 @@ The kernel command line parameter printk.devkmsg= overrides this and is
 a one-time setting until next reboot: once set, it cannot be changed by
 this sysctl interface anymore.
 
-==============================================================
+pty
+===
+
+See Documentation/filesystems/devpts.rst.
+
+
+random
+======
+
+This is a directory, with the following entries:
+
+* ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and
+  unvarying after that;
+
+* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
+  thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
+
+* ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits;
+
+* ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits;
+
+* ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum
+  number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is
+  writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect
+  on any RNG behavior;
+
+* ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this
+  (as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random``
+  are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but
+  writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior.
+
 
-randomize_va_space:
+randomize_va_space
+==================
 
 This option can be used to select the type of process address
 space randomization that is used in the system, for architectures
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/MAINTAINERS linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/MAINTAINERS
index e2dd302345c2..b18207d0c744 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/MAINTAINERS
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/MAINTAINERS
@@ -11307,6 +11307,7 @@ F:	drivers/block/brd.c
 
 RANDOM NUMBER DRIVER
 M:	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
+M:	Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
 S:	Maintained
 F:	drivers/char/random.c
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/Makefile linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/Makefile
index 49d1d8ba3fdc..7e61ad36f6a4 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/Makefile
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 4
 PATCHLEVEL = 14
-SUBLEVEL = 284
+SUBLEVEL = 285
 EXTRAVERSION = -gnu1
 NAME = Petit Gorille
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
index b565cc6f408e..f89798da8a14 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -28,5 +28,6 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
 	__asm__ __volatile__ ("rpcc %0" : "=r"(ret));
 	return ret;
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 #endif
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
index f6fcc67ef06e..c06d38f0df8e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
 
 typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
 #define get_cycles()	({ cycles_t c; read_current_timer(&c) ? 0 : c; })
+#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
 
 #endif
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c
index 6eefd5873aef..cd0b2fc94d3b 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ int ftrace_make_call(struct dyn_ftrace *rec, unsigned long addr)
 {
 	unsigned long pc = rec->ip;
 	u32 old, new;
-	long offset = (long)pc - (long)addr;
+	long offset = (long)addr - (long)pc;
 
 	if (offset < -SZ_128M || offset >= SZ_128M) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_PLTS
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ int ftrace_make_nop(struct module *mod, struct dyn_ftrace *rec,
 	unsigned long pc = rec->ip;
 	bool validate = true;
 	u32 old = 0, new;
-	long offset = (long)pc - (long)addr;
+	long offset = (long)addr - (long)pc;
 
 	if (offset < -SZ_128M || offset >= SZ_128M) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_PLTS
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
index 869a3ac6bf23..7ccc077a60be 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ get_cycles (void)
 	ret = ia64_getreg(_IA64_REG_AR_ITC);
 	return ret;
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 extern void ia64_cpu_local_tick (void);
 extern unsigned long long ia64_native_sched_clock (void);
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
index 6a21d9358280..f4a7a340f4ca 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
 {
 	if (mach_random_get_entropy)
 		return mach_random_get_entropy();
-	return 0;
+	return random_get_entropy_fallback();
 }
 #define random_get_entropy	random_get_entropy
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
index 8026baf46e72..2e107886f97a 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -76,25 +76,24 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
 	else
 		return 0;	/* no usable counter */
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 /*
  * Like get_cycles - but where c0_count is not available we desperately
  * use c0_random in an attempt to get at least a little bit of entropy.
- *
- * R6000 and R6000A neither have a count register nor a random register.
- * That leaves no entropy source in the CPU itself.
  */
 static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
 {
-	unsigned int prid = read_c0_prid();
-	unsigned int imp = prid & PRID_IMP_MASK;
+	unsigned int c0_random;
 
-	if (can_use_mips_counter(prid))
+	if (can_use_mips_counter(read_c0_prid()))
 		return read_c0_count();
-	else if (likely(imp != PRID_IMP_R6000 && imp != PRID_IMP_R6000A))
-		return read_c0_random();
+
+	if (cpu_has_3kex)
+		c0_random = (read_c0_random() >> 8) & 0x3f;
 	else
-		return 0;	/* no usable register */
+		c0_random = read_c0_random() & 0x3f;
+	return (random_get_entropy_fallback() << 6) | (0x3f - c0_random);
 }
 #define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
index 2f2abb28ec2f..9c9b50599ea3 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -20,5 +20,8 @@
 typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
 
 extern cycles_t get_cycles(void);
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
+
+#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
 
 #endif
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
index 45537cd4d1d3..1cd2bd3eef33 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -12,9 +12,10 @@
 
 typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
 
-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
+static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
 {
 	return mfctl(16);
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 #endif
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h
index a09595f00cab..f0f16b4fc5ea 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -6,27 +6,28 @@
 
 #include <asm/machdep.h>
 
-static inline int arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
+static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
 {
-	return 0;
+	return false;
 }
 
-static inline int arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
+static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
 {
-	return 0;
+	return false;
 }
 
-static inline int arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
+static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
 {
 	if (ppc_md.get_random_seed)
 		return ppc_md.get_random_seed(v);
 
-	return 0;
+	return false;
 }
-static inline int arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
+
+static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
 {
 	unsigned long val;
-	int rc;
+	bool rc;
 
 	rc = arch_get_random_seed_long(&val);
 	if (rc)
@@ -34,16 +35,6 @@ static inline int arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
 
 	return rc;
 }
-
-static inline int arch_has_random(void)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int arch_has_random_seed(void)
-{
-	return !!ppc_md.get_random_seed;
-}
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
index 926b9f91a3ef..7401d6a684c5 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
 	return ret;
 #endif
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 #endif	/* __KERNEL__ */
 #endif	/* _ASM_POWERPC_TIMEX_H */
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h
index e9f7d7a57f99..ddf97715ee53 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -26,18 +26,6 @@ static void s390_arch_random_generate(u8 *buf, unsigned int nbytes)
 	atomic64_add(nbytes, &s390_arch_random_counter);
 }
 
-static inline bool arch_has_random(void)
-{
-	if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available))
-		return true;
-	return false;
-}
-
-static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void)
-{
-	return arch_has_random();
-}
-
 static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
 {
 	if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available)) {
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
index b6a4ce9dafaf..99a7e028232d 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
 {
 	return (cycles_t) get_tod_clock() >> 2;
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 int get_phys_clock(unsigned long *clock);
 void init_cpu_timer(void);
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c
index aa6b9487c8bb..783e07934a3d 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ void ptep_zap_key(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
 	pgste_val(pgste) |= PGSTE_GR_BIT | PGSTE_GC_BIT;
 	ptev = pte_val(*ptep);
 	if (!(ptev & _PAGE_INVALID) && (ptev & _PAGE_WRITE))
-		page_set_storage_key(ptev & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY, 1);
+		page_set_storage_key(ptev & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY, 0);
 	pgste_set_unlock(ptep, pgste);
 	preempt_enable();
 }
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
index 542915b46209..f86326a6f89e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@
 
 #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE	1193180 /* Underlying HZ */
 
-/* XXX Maybe do something better at some point... -DaveM */
-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
-#define get_cycles()	(0)
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
 
 #endif
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
index e392a9a5bc9b..9f27176adb26 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -2,13 +2,8 @@
 #ifndef __UM_TIMEX_H
 #define __UM_TIMEX_H
 
-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
-
-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE (HZ)
 
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
+
 #endif
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
index 3ac991d81e74..4d3cac3c9b25 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -86,10 +86,6 @@ static inline bool rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)
 	return ok;
 }
 
-/* Conditional execution based on CPU type */
-#define arch_has_random()	static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)
-#define arch_has_random_seed()	static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)
-
 /*
  * These are the generic interfaces; they must not be declared if the
  * stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked,
@@ -99,22 +95,22 @@ static inline bool rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)
 
 static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
 {
-	return arch_has_random() ? rdrand_long(v) : false;
+	return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ? rdrand_long(v) : false;
 }
 
 static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
 {
-	return arch_has_random() ? rdrand_int(v) : false;
+	return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ? rdrand_int(v) : false;
 }
 
 static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
 {
-	return arch_has_random_seed() ? rdseed_long(v) : false;
+	return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) ? rdseed_long(v) : false;
 }
 
 static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
 {
-	return arch_has_random_seed() ? rdseed_int(v) : false;
+	return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) ? rdseed_int(v) : false;
 }
 
 extern void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
index a4a8b1b16c0c..956e4145311b 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/tsc.h>
 
+static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
+	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+		return random_get_entropy_fallback();
+	return rdtsc();
+}
+#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
+
 /* Assume we use the PIT time source for the clock tick */
 #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE		PIT_TICK_RATE
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
index 8da0efb13544..036feaff46ed 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
@@ -22,13 +22,12 @@ extern void disable_TSC(void);
 
 static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
 {
-#ifndef CONFIG_X86_TSC
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
+	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
 		return 0;
-#endif
-
 	return rdtsc();
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_to_tsc(u64 art);
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
index f9b389d4e973..d866bc847d8d 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -30,10 +30,6 @@
 
 extern unsigned long ccount_freq;
 
-typedef unsigned long long cycles_t;
-
-#define get_cycles()	(0)
-
 void local_timer_setup(unsigned cpu);
 
 /*
@@ -69,4 +65,6 @@ static inline void set_linux_timer (unsigned long ccompare)
 	WSR_CCOMPARE(LINUX_TIMER, ccompare);
 }
 
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
+
 #endif	/* _XTENSA_TIMEX_H */
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/certs/blacklist_hashes.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/certs/blacklist_hashes.c
index 344892337be0..d5961aa3d338 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/certs/blacklist_hashes.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/certs/blacklist_hashes.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 #include "blacklist.h"
 
-const char __initdata *const blacklist_hashes[] = {
+const char __initconst *const blacklist_hashes[] = {
 #include CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
 	, NULL
 };
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/crypto/chacha20_generic.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/crypto/chacha20_generic.c
index 4a45fa4890c0..24827d00fb67 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/crypto/chacha20_generic.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/crypto/chacha20_generic.c
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ static inline u32 le32_to_cpuvp(const void *p)
 static void chacha20_docrypt(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
 			     unsigned int bytes)
 {
-	u8 stream[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	/* aligned to potentially speed up crypto_xor() */
+	u8 stream[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(sizeof(long));
 
 	if (dst != src)
 		memcpy(dst, src, bytes);
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/crypto/drbg.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/crypto/drbg.c
index 6c3221313753..1a555db4eef0 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/crypto/drbg.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -219,6 +219,57 @@ static inline unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags)
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * FIPS 140-2 continuous self test for the noise source
+ * The test is performed on the noise source input data. Thus, the function
+ * implicitly knows the size of the buffer to be equal to the security
+ * strength.
+ *
+ * Note, this function disregards the nonce trailing the entropy data during
+ * initial seeding.
+ *
+ * drbg->drbg_mutex must have been taken.
+ *
+ * @drbg DRBG handle
+ * @entropy buffer of seed data to be checked
+ *
+ * return:
+ *	0 on success
+ *	-EAGAIN on when the CTRNG is not yet primed
+ *	< 0 on error
+ */
+static int drbg_fips_continuous_test(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+				     const unsigned char *entropy)
+{
+	unsigned short entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* skip test if we test the overall system */
+	if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list))
+		return 0;
+	/* only perform test in FIPS mode */
+	if (!fips_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!drbg->fips_primed) {
+		/* Priming of FIPS test */
+		memcpy(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen);
+		drbg->fips_primed = true;
+		/* priming: another round is needed */
+		return -EAGAIN;
+	}
+	ret = memcmp(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen);
+	if (!ret)
+		panic("DRBG continuous self test failed\n");
+	memcpy(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen);
+
+	/* the test shall pass when the two values are not equal */
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Convert an integer into a byte representation of this integer.
  * The byte representation is big-endian
@@ -986,55 +1037,79 @@ static const struct drbg_state_ops drbg_hash_ops = {
  ******************************************************************/
 
 static inline int __drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed,
-			      int reseed)
+			      int reseed, enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state)
 {
 	int ret = drbg->d_ops->update(drbg, seed, reseed);
 
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	drbg->seeded = true;
+	drbg->seeded = new_seed_state;
 	/* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */
 	drbg->reseed_ctr = 1;
 
+	switch (drbg->seeded) {
+	case DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED:
+		/* Impossible, but handle it to silence compiler warnings. */
+	case DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL:
+		/*
+		 * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is
+		 * fully initialized.
+		 */
+		drbg->reseed_threshold = 50;
+		break;
+
+	case DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL:
+		/*
+		 * Seed source has become fully initialized, frequent
+		 * reseeds no longer required.
+		 */
+		drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
+		break;
+	}
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_struct *work)
+static inline int drbg_get_random_bytes(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+					unsigned char *entropy,
+					unsigned int entropylen)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	do {
+		get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
+		ret = drbg_fips_continuous_test(drbg, entropy);
+		if (ret && ret != -EAGAIN)
+			return ret;
+	} while (ret);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int drbg_seed_from_random(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
 	struct drbg_string data;
 	LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
-	struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(work, struct drbg_state,
-					       seed_work);
 	unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
 	unsigned char entropy[32];
+	int ret;
 
 	BUG_ON(!entropylen);
 	BUG_ON(entropylen > sizeof(entropy));
-	get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
 
 	drbg_string_fill(&data, entropy, entropylen);
 	list_add_tail(&data.list, &seedlist);
 
-	mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
-
-	/* If nonblocking pool is initialized, deactivate Jitter RNG */
-	crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
-	drbg->jent = NULL;
-
-	/* Set seeded to false so that if __drbg_seed fails the
-	 * next generate call will trigger a reseed.
-	 */
-	drbg->seeded = false;
-
-	__drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true);
-
-	if (drbg->seeded)
-		drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
+	ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
 
-	mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
+	ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true, DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL);
 
+out:
 	memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1056,6 +1131,7 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
 	unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
 	struct drbg_string data1;
 	LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
+	enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL;
 
 	/* 9.1 / 9.2 / 9.3.1 step 3 */
 	if (pers && pers->len > (drbg_max_addtl(drbg))) {
@@ -1083,7 +1159,12 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
 		BUG_ON((entropylen * 2) > sizeof(entropy));
 
 		/* Get seed from in-kernel /dev/urandom */
-		get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
+		if (!rng_is_initialized())
+			new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL;
+
+		ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
 
 		if (!drbg->jent) {
 			drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen);
@@ -1096,7 +1177,23 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
 						   entropylen);
 			if (ret) {
 				pr_devel("DRBG: jent failed with %d\n", ret);
-				return ret;
+
+				/*
+				 * Do not treat the transient failure of the
+				 * Jitter RNG as an error that needs to be
+				 * reported. The combined number of the
+				 * maximum reseed threshold times the maximum
+				 * number of Jitter RNG transient errors is
+				 * less than the reseed threshold required by
+				 * SP800-90A allowing us to treat the
+				 * transient errors as such.
+				 *
+				 * However, we mandate that at least the first
+				 * seeding operation must succeed with the
+				 * Jitter RNG.
+				 */
+				if (!reseed || ret != -EAGAIN)
+					goto out;
 			}
 
 			drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen * 2);
@@ -1121,8 +1218,9 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
 		memset(drbg->C, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
 	}
 
-	ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed);
+	ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed, new_seed_state);
 
+out:
 	memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen * 2);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -1144,6 +1242,11 @@ static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 	drbg->reseed_ctr = 0;
 	drbg->d_ops = NULL;
 	drbg->core = NULL;
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) {
+		kzfree(drbg->prev);
+		drbg->prev = NULL;
+		drbg->fips_primed = false;
+	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1213,6 +1316,14 @@ static inline int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 		drbg->scratchpad = PTR_ALIGN(drbg->scratchpadbuf, ret + 1);
 	}
 
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) {
+		drbg->prev = kzalloc(drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags),
+				     GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!drbg->prev)
+			goto fini;
+		drbg->fips_primed = false;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 
 fini:
@@ -1285,19 +1396,25 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
 	 * here. The spec is a bit convoluted here, we make it simpler.
 	 */
 	if (drbg->reseed_threshold < drbg->reseed_ctr)
-		drbg->seeded = false;
+		drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
 
-	if (drbg->pr || !drbg->seeded) {
+	if (drbg->pr || drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED) {
 		pr_devel("DRBG: reseeding before generation (prediction "
 			 "resistance: %s, state %s)\n",
 			 drbg->pr ? "true" : "false",
-			 drbg->seeded ? "seeded" : "unseeded");
+			 (drbg->seeded ==  DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL ?
+			  "seeded" : "unseeded"));
 		/* 9.3.1 steps 7.1 through 7.3 */
 		len = drbg_seed(drbg, addtl, true);
 		if (len)
 			goto err;
 		/* 9.3.1 step 7.4 */
 		addtl = NULL;
+	} else if (rng_is_initialized() &&
+		   drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL) {
+		len = drbg_seed_from_random(drbg);
+		if (len)
+			goto err;
 	}
 
 	if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len)
@@ -1390,51 +1507,15 @@ static int drbg_generate_long(struct drbg_state *drbg,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
-{
-	struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(rdy, struct drbg_state,
-					       random_ready);
-
-	schedule_work(&drbg->seed_work);
-}
-
 static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
-	int err;
-
 	/* We do not need an HRNG in test mode. */
 	if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list))
 		return 0;
 
-	INIT_WORK(&drbg->seed_work, drbg_async_seed);
-
-	drbg->random_ready.owner = THIS_MODULE;
-	drbg->random_ready.func = drbg_schedule_async_seed;
-
-	err = add_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
-
-	switch (err) {
-	case 0:
-		break;
-
-	case -EALREADY:
-		err = 0;
-		/* fall through */
-
-	default:
-		drbg->random_ready.func = NULL;
-		return err;
-	}
-
 	drbg->jent = crypto_alloc_rng("jitterentropy_rng", 0, 0);
 
-	/*
-	 * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is fully
-	 * initialized.
-	 */
-	drbg->reseed_threshold = 50;
-
-	return err;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1477,7 +1558,7 @@ static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
 	if (!drbg->core) {
 		drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
 		drbg->pr = pr;
-		drbg->seeded = false;
+		drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
 		drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
 
 		ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg);
@@ -1528,12 +1609,9 @@ free_everything:
  */
 static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
-	if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
-		del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
-		cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
+	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent))
 		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
-		drbg->jent = NULL;
-	}
+	drbg->jent = NULL;
 
 	if (drbg->d_ops)
 		drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg);
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/crypto/md4.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/crypto/md4.c
index 3515af425cc9..810fefb0a007 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/crypto/md4.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/crypto/md4.c
@@ -64,23 +64,6 @@ static inline u32 H(u32 x, u32 y, u32 z)
 #define ROUND2(a,b,c,d,k,s) (a = lshift(a + G(b,c,d) + k + (u32)0x5A827999,s))
 #define ROUND3(a,b,c,d,k,s) (a = lshift(a + H(b,c,d) + k + (u32)0x6ED9EBA1,s))
 
-/* XXX: this stuff can be optimized */
-static inline void le32_to_cpu_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
-{
-	while (words--) {
-		__le32_to_cpus(buf);
-		buf++;
-	}
-}
-
-static inline void cpu_to_le32_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
-{
-	while (words--) {
-		__cpu_to_le32s(buf);
-		buf++;
-	}
-}
-
 static void md4_transform(u32 *hash, u32 const *in)
 {
 	u32 a, b, c, d;
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/crypto/md5.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/crypto/md5.c
index f7ae1a48225b..f776ef43d621 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/crypto/md5.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/crypto/md5.c
@@ -32,23 +32,6 @@ const u8 md5_zero_message_hash[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE] = {
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(md5_zero_message_hash);
 
-/* XXX: this stuff can be optimized */
-static inline void le32_to_cpu_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
-{
-	while (words--) {
-		__le32_to_cpus(buf);
-		buf++;
-	}
-}
-
-static inline void cpu_to_le32_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
-{
-	while (words--) {
-		__cpu_to_le32s(buf);
-		buf++;
-	}
-}
-
 #define F1(x, y, z)	(z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
 #define F2(x, y, z)	F1(z, x, y)
 #define F3(x, y, z)	(x ^ y ^ z)
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/ata/libata-core.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
index d3a7b3bb5043..08dc37a62f5a 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
@@ -6180,7 +6180,7 @@ struct ata_host *ata_host_alloc_pinfo(struct device *dev,
 				      const struct ata_port_info * const * ppi,
 				      int n_ports)
 {
-	const struct ata_port_info *pi;
+	const struct ata_port_info *pi = &ata_dummy_port_info;
 	struct ata_host *host;
 	int i, j;
 
@@ -6188,7 +6188,7 @@ struct ata_host *ata_host_alloc_pinfo(struct device *dev,
 	if (!host)
 		return NULL;
 
-	for (i = 0, j = 0, pi = NULL; i < host->n_ports; i++) {
+	for (i = 0, j = 0; i < host->n_ports; i++) {
 		struct ata_port *ap = host->ports[i];
 
 		if (ppi[j])
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/char/Kconfig linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/char/Kconfig
index 88316f86cc95..e329d1cc019a 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/char/Kconfig
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/char/Kconfig
@@ -588,5 +588,41 @@ config TILE_SROM
 
 source "drivers/char/xillybus/Kconfig"
 
-endmenu
+config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
+	bool "Initialize RNG using CPU RNG instructions"
+	default y
+	depends on ARCH_RANDOM
+	help
+	  Initialize the RNG using random numbers supplied by the CPU's
+	  RNG instructions (e.g. RDRAND), if supported and available. These
+	  random numbers are never used directly, but are rather hashed into
+	  the main input pool, and this happens regardless of whether or not
+	  this option is enabled. Instead, this option controls whether the
+	  they are credited and hence can initialize the RNG. Additionally,
+	  other sources of randomness are always used, regardless of this
+	  setting.  Enabling this implies trusting that the CPU can supply high
+	  quality and non-backdoored random numbers.
+
+	  Say Y here unless you have reason to mistrust your CPU or believe
+	  its RNG facilities may be faulty. This may also be configured at
+	  boot time with "random.trust_cpu=on/off".
+
+config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER
+	bool "Initialize RNG using bootloader-supplied seed"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Initialize the RNG using a seed supplied by the bootloader or boot
+	  environment (e.g. EFI or a bootloader-generated device tree). This
+	  seed is not used directly, but is rather hashed into the main input
+	  pool, and this happens regardless of whether or not this option is
+	  enabled. Instead, this option controls whether the seed is credited
+	  and hence can initialize the RNG. Additionally, other sources of
+	  randomness are always used, regardless of this setting. Enabling
+	  this implies trusting that the bootloader can supply high quality and
+	  non-backdoored seeds.
+
+	  Say Y here unless you have reason to mistrust your bootloader or
+	  believe its RNG facilities may be faulty. This may also be configured
+	  at boot time with "random.trust_bootloader=on/off".
 
+endmenu
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index 21b98771312f..303fd55f9be0 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/hw_random.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/char/random.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/char/random.c
index 1eb0cdbe8786..1331571e2b12 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/char/random.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1,242 +1,29 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
 /*
- * random.c -- A strong random number generator
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All
- * Rights Reserved.
- *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
  * Copyright Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>, 2003, 2004, 2005
- *
- * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999.  All
- * rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
- *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
- *    products derived from this software without specific prior
- *    written permission.
- *
- * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
- * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
- * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
- * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
- * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
- * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
- * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
- * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
- * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
- * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
- * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
- * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
- * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
- * DAMAGE.
+ * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This driver produces cryptographically secure pseudorandom data. It is divided
+ * into roughly six sections, each with a section header:
+ *
+ *   - Initialization and readiness waiting.
+ *   - Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng".
+ *   - Entropy accumulation and extraction routines.
+ *   - Entropy collection routines.
+ *   - Userspace reader/writer interfaces.
+ *   - Sysctl interface.
+ *
+ * The high level overview is that there is one input pool, into which
+ * various pieces of data are hashed. Prior to initialization, some of that
+ * data is then "credited" as having a certain number of bits of entropy.
+ * When enough bits of entropy are available, the hash is finalized and
+ * handed as a key to a stream cipher that expands it indefinitely for
+ * various consumers. This key is periodically refreshed as the various
+ * entropy collectors, described below, add data to the input pool.
  */
 
-/*
- * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....)
- *
- * This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
- * and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
- * Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
- * for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is
- * desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
- * predict by an attacker.
- *
- * Theory of operation
- * ===================
- *
- * Computers are very predictable devices.  Hence it is extremely hard
- * to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to
- * pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a
- * algorithm.  Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess
- * the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some
- * applications this is not acceptable.  So instead, we must try to
- * gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which
- * must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to
- * generate random numbers.  In a Unix environment, this is best done
- * from inside the kernel.
- *
- * Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard
- * timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other
- * events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an
- * outside observer to measure.  Randomness from these sources are
- * added to an "entropy pool", which is mixed using a CRC-like function.
- * This is not cryptographically strong, but it is adequate assuming
- * the randomness is not chosen maliciously, and it is fast enough that
- * the overhead of doing it on every interrupt is very reasonable.
- * As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep
- * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into
- * the random number generator's internal state.
- *
- * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA
- * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool".  The SHA hash avoids
- * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool.  It is believed to
- * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information
- * about the input of SHA from its output.  Even if it is possible to
- * analyze SHA in some clever way, as long as the amount of data
- * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in
- * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable.  For this
- * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many
- * bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it
- * outputs random numbers.
- *
- * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate
- * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be
- * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior
- * outputs.  This requires successful cryptanalysis of SHA, which is
- * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility.
- * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority
- * of purposes.
- *
- * Exported interfaces ---- output
- * ===============================
- *
- * There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to
- * be used from within the kernel:
- *
- * 	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
- *
- * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
- * and place it in the requested buffer.
- *
- * The two other interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and
- * /dev/urandom.  /dev/random is suitable for use when very high
- * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or
- * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of
- * bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator)
- * contained in the entropy pool.
- *
- * The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return
- * as many bytes as are requested.  As more and more random bytes are
- * requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge,
- * this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically
- * strong.  For many applications, however, this is acceptable.
- *
- * Exported interfaces ---- input
- * ==============================
- *
- * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
- * from the devices are:
- *
- *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
- * 	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- *                                unsigned int value);
- *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);
- * 	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
- *
- * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that
- * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
- * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the
- * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual entropy to the
- * pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices
- * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
- * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
- *
- * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as
- * the event type information from the hardware.
- *
- * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
- * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
- * as inputs, it feeds the randomness roughly once a second.
- *
- * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
- * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
- * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
- * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
- * times are usually fairly consistent.
- *
- * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a
- * particular randomness source.  They do this by keeping track of the
- * first and second order deltas of the event timings.
- *
- * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup
- * ============================================
- *
- * When any operating system starts up, it will go through a sequence
- * of actions that are fairly predictable by an adversary, especially
- * if the start-up does not involve interaction with a human operator.
- * This reduces the actual number of bits of unpredictability in the
- * entropy pool below the value in entropy_count.  In order to
- * counteract this effect, it helps to carry information in the
- * entropy pool across shut-downs and start-ups.  To do this, put the
- * following lines an appropriate script which is run during the boot
- * sequence:
- *
- *	echo "Initializing random number generator..."
- *	random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
- *	# Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up
- *	# Load and then save the whole entropy pool
- *	if [ -f $random_seed ]; then
- *		cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom
- *	else
- *		touch $random_seed
- *	fi
- *	chmod 600 $random_seed
- *	dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
- *
- * and the following lines in an appropriate script which is run as
- * the system is shutdown:
- *
- *	# Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up
- *	# Save the whole entropy pool
- *	echo "Saving random seed..."
- *	random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
- *	touch $random_seed
- *	chmod 600 $random_seed
- *	dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
- *
- * For example, on most modern systems using the System V init
- * scripts, such code fragments would be found in
- * /etc/rc.d/init.d/random.  On older Linux systems, the correct script
- * location might be in /etc/rcb.d/rc.local or /etc/rc.d/rc.0.
- *
- * Effectively, these commands cause the contents of the entropy pool
- * to be saved at shut-down time and reloaded into the entropy pool at
- * start-up.  (The 'dd' in the addition to the bootup script is to
- * make sure that /etc/random-seed is different for every start-up,
- * even if the system crashes without executing rc.0.)  Even with
- * complete knowledge of the start-up activities, predicting the state
- * of the entropy pool requires knowledge of the previous history of
- * the system.
- *
- * Configuring the /dev/random driver under Linux
- * ==============================================
- *
- * The /dev/random driver under Linux uses minor numbers 8 and 9 of
- * the /dev/mem major number (#1).  So if your system does not have
- * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created
- * by using the commands:
- *
- * 	mknod /dev/random c 1 8
- * 	mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
- *
- * Acknowledgements:
- * =================
- *
- * Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived
- * from Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from private
- * discussions with Phil Karn.  Colin Plumb provided a faster random
- * number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy
- * pool, taken from PGPfone.  Dale Worley has also contributed many
- * useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver.
- *
- * Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should
- * not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP.
- *
- * Further background information on this topic may be obtained from
- * RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald
- * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller.
- */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
 
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
@@ -256,8 +43,6 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
-#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
-#include <linux/fips.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/irq.h>
@@ -265,1549 +50,1067 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/completion.h>
 #include <linux/uuid.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
 #include <crypto/chacha20.h>
-
+#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/irq.h>
 #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 
-#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
-#include <trace/events/random.h>
-
-/* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */
+/*********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Initialization and readiness waiting.
+ *
+ * Much of the RNG infrastructure is devoted to various dependencies
+ * being able to wait until the RNG has collected enough entropy and
+ * is ready for safe consumption.
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
 
 /*
- * Configuration information
+ * crng_init is protected by base_crng->lock, and only increases
+ * its value (from empty->early->ready).
  */
-#define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT	12
-#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS	(1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
-#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT	10
-#define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS	(1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
-#define SEC_XFER_SIZE		512
-#define EXTRACT_SIZE		10
-
+static enum {
+	CRNG_EMPTY = 0, /* Little to no entropy collected */
+	CRNG_EARLY = 1, /* At least POOL_EARLY_BITS collected */
+	CRNG_READY = 2  /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */
+} crng_init __read_mostly = CRNG_EMPTY;
+#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init >= CRNG_READY))
+/* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
+static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_chain_lock);
+static RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(random_ready_chain);
 
-#define LONGS(x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long))
+/* Control how we warn userspace. */
+static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
+	RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
+static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM);
+module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
 
 /*
- * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
- * denominated in units of 1/8th bits.
+ * Returns whether or not the input pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
+ * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
+ * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
+ * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
  *
- * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + log2(poolbits)) must <= 31, or the multiply in
- * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide.
+ * Returns: true if the input pool has been seeded.
+ *          false if the input pool has not been seeded.
  */
-#define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3
-#define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT)
+bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+{
+	return crng_ready();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
 
-/*
- * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on
- * /dev/random.  Should be enough to do a significant reseed.
- */
-static int random_read_wakeup_bits = 64;
+/* Used by wait_for_random_bytes(), and considered an entropy collector, below. */
+static void try_to_generate_entropy(void);
 
 /*
- * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
- * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
- * access to /dev/random.
+ * Wait for the input pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
+ * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
+ * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
+ * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
+ * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if the input pool has been seeded.
+ *          -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
  */
-static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS;
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+{
+	while (!crng_ready()) {
+		int ret;
+
+		try_to_generate_entropy();
+		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
 
 /*
- * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords
- * over GF(2).  The taps for various sizes are defined below.  They
- * were chosen to be evenly spaced except for the last tap, which is 1
- * to get the twisting happening as fast as possible.
- *
- * For the purposes of better mixing, we use the CRC-32 polynomial as
- * well to make a (modified) twisted Generalized Feedback Shift
- * Register.  (See M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992.  Twisted GFSR
- * generators.  ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation
- * 2(3):179-194.  Also see M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1994.  Twisted
- * GFSR generators II.  ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer
- * Simulation 4:254-266)
- *
- * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this.
- *
- * The mixing operation is much less sensitive than the output hash,
- * where we use SHA-1.  All that we want of mixing operation is that
- * it be a good non-cryptographic hash; i.e. it not produce collisions
- * when fed "random" data of the sort we expect to see.  As long as
- * the pool state differs for different inputs, we have preserved the
- * input entropy and done a good job.  The fact that an intelligent
- * attacker can construct inputs that will produce controlled
- * alterations to the pool's state is not important because we don't
- * consider such inputs to contribute any randomness.  The only
- * property we need with respect to them is that the attacker can't
- * increase his/her knowledge of the pool's state.  Since all
- * additions are reversible (knowing the final state and the input,
- * you can reconstruct the initial state), if an attacker has any
- * uncertainty about the initial state, he/she can only shuffle that
- * uncertainty about, but never cause any collisions (which would
- * decrease the uncertainty).
+ * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the input
+ * pool is initialised.
  *
- * Our mixing functions were analyzed by Lacharme, Roeck, Strubel, and
- * Videau in their paper, "The Linux Pseudorandom Number Generator
- * Revisited" (see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/251.pdf).  In their
- * paper, they point out that we are not using a true Twisted GFSR,
- * since Matsumoto & Kurita used a trinomial feedback polynomial (that
- * is, with only three taps, instead of the six that we are using).
- * As a result, the resulting polynomial is neither primitive nor
- * irreducible, and hence does not have a maximal period over
- * GF(2**32).  They suggest a slight change to the generator
- * polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be
- * irreducible, which we have made here.
+ * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
+ *	    -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
  */
-static struct poolinfo {
-	int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolbits, poolfracbits;
-#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x)*32, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5)
-	int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
-} poolinfo_table[] = {
-	/* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
-	/* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
-	{ S(128),	104,	76,	51,	25,	1 },
-	/* was: x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
-	/* x^32 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
-	{ S(32),	26,	19,	14,	7,	1 },
-#if 0
-	/* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1  -- 115 */
-	{ S(2048),	1638,	1231,	819,	411,	1 },
-
-	/* x^1024 + x^817 + x^615 + x^412 + x^204 + x + 1 -- 290 */
-	{ S(1024),	817,	615,	412,	204,	1 },
-
-	/* x^1024 + x^819 + x^616 + x^410 + x^207 + x^2 + 1 -- 115 */
-	{ S(1024),	819,	616,	410,	207,	2 },
-
-	/* x^512 + x^411 + x^308 + x^208 + x^104 + x + 1 -- 225 */
-	{ S(512),	411,	308,	208,	104,	1 },
-
-	/* x^512 + x^409 + x^307 + x^206 + x^102 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
-	{ S(512),	409,	307,	206,	102,	2 },
-	/* x^512 + x^409 + x^309 + x^205 + x^103 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
-	{ S(512),	409,	309,	205,	103,	2 },
-
-	/* x^256 + x^205 + x^155 + x^101 + x^52 + x + 1 -- 125 */
-	{ S(256),	205,	155,	101,	52,	1 },
-
-	/* x^128 + x^103 + x^78 + x^51 + x^27 + x^2 + 1 -- 70 */
-	{ S(128),	103,	78,	51,	27,	2 },
-
-	/* x^64 + x^52 + x^39 + x^26 + x^14 + x + 1 -- 15 */
-	{ S(64),	52,	39,	26,	14,	1 },
-#endif
-};
+int __cold register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int ret = -EALREADY;
+
+	if (crng_ready())
+		return ret;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+	if (!crng_ready())
+		ret = raw_notifier_chain_register(&random_ready_chain, nb);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+	return ret;
+}
 
 /*
- * Static global variables
+ * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
  */
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
-static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
-static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
+int __cold unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int ret;
 
-struct crng_state {
-	__u32		state[16];
-	unsigned long	init_time;
-	spinlock_t	lock;
-};
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+	ret = raw_notifier_chain_unregister(&random_ready_chain, nb);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+	return ret;
+}
 
-struct crng_state primary_crng = {
-	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock),
-};
+static void __cold process_random_ready_list(void)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
 
-/*
- * crng_init =  0 --> Uninitialized
- *		1 --> Initialized
- *		2 --> Initialized from input_pool
- *
- * crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, and only increases
- * its value (from 0->1->2).
- */
-static int crng_init = 0;
-#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
-static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
-static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
-#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
-			  __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]);
-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
-				    __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
-static void process_random_ready_list(void);
-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
-
-static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning =
-	RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3);
-static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
-	RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+	raw_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_chain, 0, NULL);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+}
 
-static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly;
+#define warn_unseeded_randomness() \
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready()) \
+		pr_notice("%s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", \
+			  __func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, crng_init)
 
-module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
 
-/**********************************************************************
+/*********************************************************************
  *
- * OS independent entropy store.   Here are the functions which handle
- * storing entropy in an entropy pool.
+ * Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng".
  *
- **********************************************************************/
+ * These functions expand entropy from the entropy extractor into
+ * long streams for external consumption using the "fast key erasure"
+ * RNG described at <https://blog.cr.yp.to/20170723-random.html>.
+ *
+ * There are a few exported interfaces for use by other drivers:
+ *
+ *	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
+ *	u32 get_random_u32()
+ *	u64 get_random_u64()
+ *	unsigned int get_random_int()
+ *	unsigned long get_random_long()
+ *
+ * These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes
+ * into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to
+ * a read from /dev/urandom. The u32, u64, int, and long family of
+ * functions may be higher performance for one-off random integers,
+ * because they do a bit of buffering and do not invoke reseeding
+ * until the buffer is emptied.
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
 
-struct entropy_store;
-struct entropy_store {
-	/* read-only data: */
-	const struct poolinfo *poolinfo;
-	__u32 *pool;
-	const char *name;
-	struct entropy_store *pull;
-	struct work_struct push_work;
-
-	/* read-write data: */
-	unsigned long last_pulled;
-	spinlock_t lock;
-	unsigned short add_ptr;
-	unsigned short input_rotate;
-	int entropy_count;
-	int entropy_total;
-	unsigned int initialized:1;
-	unsigned int last_data_init:1;
-	__u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+enum {
+	CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL = HZ,
+	CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 60 * HZ
 };
 
-static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
-			       size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd);
-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
-				size_t nbytes, int fips);
-
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r);
-static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work);
-static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
-static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
-
-static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
-	.poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],
-	.name = "input",
-	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
-	.pool = input_pool_data
+static struct {
+	u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
+	unsigned long birth;
+	unsigned long generation;
+	spinlock_t lock;
+} base_crng = {
+	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(base_crng.lock)
 };
 
-static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = {
-	.poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1],
-	.name = "blocking",
-	.pull = &input_pool,
-	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(blocking_pool.lock),
-	.pool = blocking_pool_data,
-	.push_work = __WORK_INITIALIZER(blocking_pool.push_work,
-					push_to_pool),
+struct crng {
+	u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE];
+	unsigned long generation;
 };
 
-static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
-	0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
-	0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
-
-/*
- * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool".  It does not
- * update the entropy estimate.  The caller should call
- * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate.
- *
- * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate
- * degree, and then twisted.  We twist by three bits at a time because
- * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
- * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
- */
-static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
-			    int nbytes)
-{
-	unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
-	int input_rotate;
-	int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
-	const char *bytes = in;
-	__u32 w;
-
-	tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1;
-	tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2;
-	tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3;
-	tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4;
-	tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5;
-
-	input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
-	i = r->add_ptr;
-
-	/* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */
-	while (nbytes--) {
-		w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate);
-		i = (i - 1) & wordmask;
-
-		/* XOR in the various taps */
-		w ^= r->pool[i];
-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask];
-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask];
-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask];
-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask];
-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask];
-
-		/* Mix the result back in with a twist */
-		r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
-
-		/*
-		 * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
-		 * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits
-		 * rotation, so that successive passes spread the
-		 * input bits across the pool evenly.
-		 */
-		input_rotate = (input_rotate + (i ? 7 : 14)) & 31;
-	}
-
-	r->input_rotate = input_rotate;
-	r->add_ptr = i;
-}
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = {
+	.generation = ULONG_MAX
+};
 
-static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
-			     int nbytes)
-{
-	trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
-}
+/* Used by crng_reseed() and crng_make_state() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len);
 
-static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
-			   int nbytes)
+/* This extracts a new crng key from the input pool. */
+static void crng_reseed(void)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
+	unsigned long next_gen;
+	u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE];
 
-	trace_mix_pool_bytes(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
-}
+	extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key));
 
-struct fast_pool {
-	__u32		pool[4];
-	unsigned long	last;
-	unsigned short	reg_idx;
-	unsigned char	count;
-};
+	/*
+	 * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one,
+	 * and update the generation counter. We avoid hitting ULONG_MAX,
+	 * because the per-cpu crngs are initialized to ULONG_MAX, so this
+	 * forces new CPUs that come online to always initialize.
+	 */
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+	memcpy(base_crng.key, key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+	next_gen = base_crng.generation + 1;
+	if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX)
+		++next_gen;
+	WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
+	WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies);
+	if (!crng_ready())
+		crng_init = CRNG_READY;
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+	memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key));
+}
 
 /*
- * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness
- * collector.  It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any
- * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller.
+ * This generates a ChaCha block using the provided key, and then
+ * immediately overwites that key with half the block. It returns
+ * the resultant ChaCha state to the user, along with the second
+ * half of the block containing 32 bytes of random data that may
+ * be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
+ *
+ * The returned ChaCha state contains within it a copy of the old
+ * key value, at index 4, so the state should always be zeroed out
+ * immediately after using in order to maintain forward secrecy.
+ * If the state cannot be erased in a timely manner, then it is
+ * safer to set the random_data parameter to &chacha_state[4] so
+ * that this function overwrites it before returning.
  */
-static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f)
+static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE],
+				  u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)],
+				  u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
 {
-	__u32 a = f->pool[0],	b = f->pool[1];
-	__u32 c = f->pool[2],	d = f->pool[3];
+	u8 first_block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
-	a += b;			c += d;
-	b = rol32(b, 6);	d = rol32(d, 27);
-	d ^= a;			b ^= c;
+	BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);
 
-	a += b;			c += d;
-	b = rol32(b, 16);	d = rol32(d, 14);
-	d ^= a;			b ^= c;
+	chacha_init_consts(chacha_state);
+	memcpy(&chacha_state[4], key, CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
+	memset(&chacha_state[12], 0, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+	chacha20_block(chacha_state, first_block);
 
-	a += b;			c += d;
-	b = rol32(b, 6);	d = rol32(d, 27);
-	d ^= a;			b ^= c;
-
-	a += b;			c += d;
-	b = rol32(b, 16);	d = rol32(d, 14);
-	d ^= a;			b ^= c;
-
-	f->pool[0] = a;  f->pool[1] = b;
-	f->pool[2] = c;  f->pool[3] = d;
-	f->count++;
+	memcpy(key, first_block, CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
+	memcpy(random_data, first_block + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, random_data_len);
+	memzero_explicit(first_block, sizeof(first_block));
 }
 
-static void process_random_ready_list(void)
+/*
+ * Return whether the crng seed is considered to be sufficiently old
+ * that a reseeding is needed. This happens if the last reseeding
+ * was CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL ago, or during early boot, at an interval
+ * proportional to the uptime.
+ */
+static bool crng_has_old_seed(void)
 {
-	unsigned long flags;
-	struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp;
-
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
-	list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &random_ready_list, list) {
-		struct module *owner = rdy->owner;
-
-		list_del_init(&rdy->list);
-		rdy->func(rdy);
-		module_put(owner);
+	static bool early_boot = true;
+	unsigned long interval = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+
+	if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(early_boot))) {
+		time64_t uptime = ktime_get_seconds();
+		if (uptime >= CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ * 2)
+			WRITE_ONCE(early_boot, false);
+		else
+			interval = max_t(unsigned int, CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL,
+					 (unsigned int)uptime / 2 * HZ);
 	}
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+	return time_is_before_jiffies(READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + interval);
 }
 
 /*
- * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy.
- * Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace
- * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values.
+ * This function returns a ChaCha state that you may use for generating
+ * random data. It also returns up to 32 bytes on its own of random data
+ * that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
  */
-static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)],
+			    u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
 {
-	int entropy_count, orig;
-	const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits;
-	int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT;
-
-	if (!nbits)
-		return;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct crng *crng;
 
-retry:
-	entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
-	if (nfrac < 0) {
-		/* Debit */
-		entropy_count += nfrac;
-	} else {
-		/*
-		 * Credit: we have to account for the possibility of
-		 * overwriting already present entropy.	 Even in the
-		 * ideal case of pure Shannon entropy, new contributions
-		 * approach the full value asymptotically:
-		 *
-		 * entropy <- entropy + (pool_size - entropy) *
-		 *	(1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size))
-		 *
-		 * For add_entropy <= pool_size/2 then
-		 * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) >=
-		 *    (add_entropy/pool_size)*0.7869...
-		 * so we can approximate the exponential with
-		 * 3/4*add_entropy/pool_size and still be on the
-		 * safe side by adding at most pool_size/2 at a time.
-		 *
-		 * The use of pool_size-2 in the while statement is to
-		 * prevent rounding artifacts from making the loop
-		 * arbitrarily long; this limits the loop to log2(pool_size)*2
-		 * turns no matter how large nbits is.
-		 */
-		int pnfrac = nfrac;
-		const int s = r->poolinfo->poolbitshift + ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2;
-		/* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */
-
-		do {
-			unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2);
-			unsigned int add =
-				((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s;
-
-			entropy_count += add;
-			pnfrac -= anfrac;
-		} while (unlikely(entropy_count < pool_size-2 && pnfrac));
-	}
+	BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);
 
-	if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) {
-		pr_warn("random: negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n",
-			r->name, entropy_count);
-		WARN_ON(1);
-		entropy_count = 0;
-	} else if (entropy_count > pool_size)
-		entropy_count = pool_size;
-	if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
-		goto retry;
-
-	r->entropy_total += nbits;
-	if (!r->initialized && r->entropy_total > 128) {
-		r->initialized = 1;
-		r->entropy_total = 0;
+	/*
+	 * For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and
+	 * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not
+	 * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, extracting
+	 * when crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY.
+	 */
+	if (!crng_ready()) {
+		bool ready;
+
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+		ready = crng_ready();
+		if (!ready) {
+			if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY)
+				extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+			crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
+					      random_data, random_data_len);
+		}
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+		if (!ready)
+			return;
 	}
 
-	trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits,
-				  entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT,
-				  r->entropy_total, _RET_IP_);
-
-	if (r == &input_pool) {
-		int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+	/*
+	 * If the base_crng is old enough, we reseed, which in turn bumps the
+	 * generation counter that we check below.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(crng_has_old_seed()))
+		crng_reseed();
 
-		if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128) {
-			crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r);
-			entropy_bits = r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
-		}
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+	crng = raw_cpu_ptr(&crngs);
 
-		/* should we wake readers? */
-		if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits) {
-			wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
-			kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
-		}
-		/* If the input pool is getting full, send some
-		 * entropy to the blocking pool until it is 75% full.
-		 */
-		if (entropy_bits > random_write_wakeup_bits &&
-		    r->initialized &&
-		    r->entropy_total >= 2*random_read_wakeup_bits) {
-			struct entropy_store *other = &blocking_pool;
-
-			if (other->entropy_count <=
-			    3 * other->poolinfo->poolfracbits / 4) {
-				schedule_work(&other->push_work);
-				r->entropy_total = 0;
-			}
-		}
+	/*
+	 * If our per-cpu crng is older than the base_crng, then it means
+	 * somebody reseeded the base_crng. In that case, we do fast key
+	 * erasure on the base_crng, and use its output as the new key
+	 * for our per-cpu crng. This brings us up to date with base_crng.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(crng->generation != READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation))) {
+		spin_lock(&base_crng.lock);
+		crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
+				      crng->key, sizeof(crng->key));
+		crng->generation = base_crng.generation;
+		spin_unlock(&base_crng.lock);
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Finally, when we've made it this far, our per-cpu crng has an up
+	 * to date key, and we can do fast key erasure with it to produce
+	 * some random data and a ChaCha state for the caller. All other
+	 * branches of this function are "unlikely", so most of the time we
+	 * should wind up here immediately.
+	 */
+	crng_fast_key_erasure(crng->key, chacha_state, random_data, random_data_len);
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 
-static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	const int nbits_max = r->poolinfo->poolwords * 32;
+	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
+	u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	size_t first_block_len;
 
-	if (nbits < 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	/* Cap the value to avoid overflows */
-	nbits = min(nbits,  nbits_max);
+	if (!len)
+		return;
 
-	credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits);
-	return 0;
-}
+	first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len);
+	crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len);
+	len -= first_block_len;
+	buf += first_block_len;
 
-/*********************************************************************
- *
- * CRNG using CHACHA20
- *
- *********************************************************************/
+	while (len) {
+		if (len < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+			chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp);
+			memcpy(buf, tmp, len);
+			memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+			break;
+		}
 
-#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300*HZ)
+		chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf);
+		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
+			++chacha_state[13];
+		len -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	}
 
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
+	memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
+}
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
 /*
- * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying
- * to access /dev/urandom in parallel.  The programs are almost
- * certainly doing something terribly wrong, but we'll work around
- * their brain damage.
+ * This function is the exported kernel interface.  It returns some
+ * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
+ * TCP sequence numbers, etc.  It does not rely on the hardware random
+ * number generator.  For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
+ * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
+ * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
+ * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
+ * at any point prior.
  */
-static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly;
-#endif
-
-static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
-
-static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	int		i;
-	unsigned long	rv;
-
-	memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16);
-	if (crng == &primary_crng)
-		_extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4],
-				 sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0);
-	else
-		_get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
-	for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
-		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
-		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
-			rv = random_get_entropy();
-		crng->state[i] ^= rv;
-	}
-	crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
+	warn_unseeded_randomness();
+	_get_random_bytes(buf, len);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
-static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work)
+static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(struct iov_iter *iter)
 {
-	int i;
-	struct crng_state *crng;
-	struct crng_state **pool;
-
-	pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
-	for_each_online_node(i) {
-		crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
-				    GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
-		spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
-		crng_initialize(crng);
-		pool[i] = crng;
-	}
-	/* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */
-	if (cmpxchg_release(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool) != NULL) {
-		for_each_node(i)
-			kfree(pool[i]);
-		kfree(pool);
-	}
-}
+	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
+	u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	size_t ret = 0, copied;
 
-static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work, do_numa_crng_init);
+	if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
+		return 0;
 
-static void numa_crng_init(void)
-{
-	schedule_work(&numa_crng_init_work);
-}
+	/*
+	 * Immediately overwrite the ChaCha key at index 4 with random
+	 * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_user() below to sleep
+	 * forever, so that we still retain forward secrecy in that case.
+	 */
+	crng_make_state(chacha_state, (u8 *)&chacha_state[4], CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
+	/*
+	 * However, if we're doing a read of len <= 32, we don't need to
+	 * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to
+	 * the user directly.
+	 */
+	if (iov_iter_count(iter) <= CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) {
+		ret = copy_to_iter(&chacha_state[4], CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, iter);
+		goto out_zero_chacha;
+	}
 
-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
-{
-	struct crng_state **pool;
-	int nid = numa_node_id();
+	for (;;) {
+		chacha20_block(chacha_state, block);
+		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
+			++chacha_state[13];
+
+		copied = copy_to_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter);
+		ret += copied;
+		if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block))
+			break;
 
-	/* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */
-	pool = READ_ONCE(crng_node_pool);
-	if (pool && pool[nid])
-		return pool[nid];
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0);
+		if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
+			if (signal_pending(current))
+				break;
+			cond_resched();
+		}
+	}
 
-	return &primary_crng;
+	memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
+out_zero_chacha:
+	memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
+	return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
 }
-#else
-static void numa_crng_init(void) {}
 
-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
+/*
+ * Batched entropy returns random integers. The quality of the random
+ * number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness
+ * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes()
+ * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior.
+ */
+
+#define DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(type)						\
+struct batch_ ##type {								\
+	/*									\
+	 * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the			\
+	 * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full		\
+	 * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase		\
+	 * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the		\
+	 * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE.		\
+	 */									\
+	type entropy[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(type))];		\
+	unsigned long generation;						\
+	unsigned int position;							\
+};										\
+										\
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batch_ ##type, batched_entropy_ ##type) = {	\
+	.position = UINT_MAX							\
+};										\
+										\
+type get_random_ ##type(void)							\
+{										\
+	type ret;								\
+	unsigned long flags;							\
+	struct batch_ ##type *batch;						\
+	unsigned long next_gen;							\
+										\
+	warn_unseeded_randomness();						\
+										\
+	if  (!crng_ready()) {							\
+		_get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret));				\
+		return ret;							\
+	}									\
+										\
+	local_irq_save(flags);		\
+	batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_##type);				\
+										\
+	next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation);				\
+	if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy) ||			\
+	    next_gen != batch->generation) {					\
+		_get_random_bytes(batch->entropy, sizeof(batch->entropy));	\
+		batch->position = 0;						\
+		batch->generation = next_gen;					\
+	}									\
+										\
+	ret = batch->entropy[batch->position];					\
+	batch->entropy[batch->position] = 0;					\
+	++batch->position;							\
+	local_irq_restore(flags);		\
+	return ret;								\
+}										\
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_ ##type);
+
+DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u64)
+DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u32)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+/*
+ * This function is called when the CPU is coming up, with entry
+ * CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE, which comes before CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP.
+ */
+int __cold random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
 {
-	return &primary_crng;
+	/*
+	 * When the cpu comes back online, immediately invalidate both
+	 * the per-cpu crng and all batches, so that we serve fresh
+	 * randomness.
+	 */
+	per_cpu_ptr(&crngs, cpu)->generation = ULONG_MAX;
+	per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
+	per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
+	return 0;
 }
 #endif
 
 /*
- * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
- * path.  So we can't afford to dilly-dally.
+ * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
+ * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for
+ * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of
+ * bytes filled in.
  */
-static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	unsigned long flags;
-	char *p;
+	size_t left = len;
+	u8 *p = buf;
 
-	if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
-		return 0;
-	if (crng_init != 0) {
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
-	while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
-		p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
-		cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--;
-	}
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
-	if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
-		invalidate_batched_entropy();
-		crng_init = 1;
-		wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
-		pr_notice("random: fast init done\n");
+	while (left) {
+		unsigned long v;
+		size_t block_len = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
+			break;
+
+		memcpy(p, &v, block_len);
+		p += block_len;
+		left -= block_len;
 	}
-	return 1;
+
+	return len - left;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
 
-/*
- * crng_slow_load() is called by add_device_randomness, which has two
- * attributes.  (1) We can't trust the buffer passed to it is
- * guaranteed to be unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at
- * all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of
- * crng_fast_load().
+
+/**********************************************************************
  *
- * So we do something more comprehensive which is guaranteed to touch
- * all of the primary_crng's state, and which uses a LFSR with a
- * period of 255 as part of the mixing algorithm.  Finally, we do
- * *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be something
- * like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very well be
- * unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying.
- */
-static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
-{
-	unsigned long		flags;
-	static unsigned char	lfsr = 1;
-	unsigned char		tmp;
-	unsigned		i, max = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE;
-	const char *		src_buf = cp;
-	char *			dest_buf = (char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
-
-	if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
-		return 0;
-	if (crng_init != 0) {
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	if (len > max)
-		max = len;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < max ; i++) {
-		tmp = lfsr;
-		lfsr >>= 1;
-		if (tmp & 1)
-			lfsr ^= 0xE1;
-		tmp = dest_buf[i % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE];
-		dest_buf[i % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr;
-		lfsr += (tmp << 3) | (tmp >> 5);
-	}
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
-	return 1;
-}
-
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
-{
-	unsigned long	flags;
-	int		i, num;
-	union {
-		__u8	block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
-		__u32	key[8];
-	} buf;
-
-	if (r) {
-		num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16, 0);
-		if (num == 0)
-			return;
-	} else {
-		_extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block);
-		_crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
-					CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
-	}
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
-	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
-		unsigned long	rv;
-		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
-		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
-			rv = random_get_entropy();
-		crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv;
-	}
-	memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
-	WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-	if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) {
-		invalidate_batched_entropy();
-		numa_crng_init();
-		crng_init = 2;
-		process_random_ready_list();
-		wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
-		pr_notice("random: crng init done\n");
-		if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
-			pr_notice("random: %d get_random_xx warning(s) missed "
-				  "due to ratelimiting\n",
-				  unseeded_warning.missed);
-			unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
-		}
-		if (urandom_warning.missed) {
-			pr_notice("random: %d urandom warning(s) missed "
-				  "due to ratelimiting\n",
-				  urandom_warning.missed);
-			urandom_warning.missed = 0;
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
-			  __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
-{
-	unsigned long v, flags, init_time;
-
-	if (crng_ready()) {
-		init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time);
-		if (time_after(READ_ONCE(crng_global_init_time), init_time) ||
-		    time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
-			crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ?
-				    &input_pool : NULL);
-	}
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
-	if (arch_get_random_long(&v))
-		crng->state[14] ^= v;
-	chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out);
-	if (crng->state[12] == 0)
-		crng->state[13]++;
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-}
-
-static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
-{
-	_extract_crng(select_crng(), out);
-}
-
-/*
- * Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is
- * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection.
- */
-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
-				    __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
-{
-	unsigned long	flags;
-	__u32		*s, *d;
-	int		i;
-
-	used = round_up(used, sizeof(__u32));
-	if (used + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-		extract_crng(tmp);
-		used = 0;
-	}
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
-	s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used];
-	d = &crng->state[4];
-	for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
-		*d++ ^= *s++;
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-}
-
-static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
-{
-	_crng_backtrack_protect(select_crng(), tmp, used);
-}
-
-static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
-{
-	ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
-	__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
-	int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
-
-	while (nbytes) {
-		if (large_request && need_resched()) {
-			if (signal_pending(current)) {
-				if (ret == 0)
-					ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
-				break;
-			}
-			schedule();
-		}
-
-		extract_crng(tmp);
-		i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
-			ret = -EFAULT;
-			break;
-		}
-
-		nbytes -= i;
-		buf += i;
-		ret += i;
-	}
-	crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, i);
-
-	/* Wipe data just written to memory */
-	memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-
-/*********************************************************************
+ * Entropy accumulation and extraction routines.
  *
- * Entropy input management
+ * Callers may add entropy via:
  *
- *********************************************************************/
+ *     static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
+ *
+ * After which, if added entropy should be credited:
+ *
+ *     static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
+ *
+ * Finally, extract entropy via:
+ *
+ *     static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
 
-/* There is one of these per entropy source */
-struct timer_rand_state {
-	cycles_t last_time;
-	long last_delta, last_delta2;
-	unsigned dont_count_entropy:1;
+enum {
+	POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
+	POOL_READY_BITS = POOL_BITS, /* When crng_init->CRNG_READY */
+	POOL_EARLY_BITS = POOL_READY_BITS / 2 /* When crng_init->CRNG_EARLY */
 };
 
-#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, };
+static struct {
+	struct blake2s_state hash;
+	spinlock_t lock;
+	unsigned int init_bits;
+} input_pool = {
+	.hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE),
+		    BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4,
+		    BLAKE2S_IV5, BLAKE2S_IV6, BLAKE2S_IV7 },
+	.hash.outlen = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE,
+	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
+};
+
+static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, buf, len);
+}
 
 /*
- * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
- * initialize it.
- *
- * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of
- * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
- * identical devices.
+ * This function adds bytes into the input pool. It does not
+ * update the initialization bit counter; the caller should call
+ * credit_init_bits if this is appropriate.
  */
-void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
+static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	if (!crng_ready() && size)
-		crng_slow_load(buf, size);
-
-	trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_);
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time));
+	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
-
-static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE;
 
 /*
- * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
- * delays.  It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
- * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
- *
- * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
- * the type of event which just happened.  This is currently 0-255 for
- * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
- *
+ * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
+ * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
  */
-static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	struct entropy_store	*r;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
 	struct {
-		long jiffies;
-		unsigned cycles;
-		unsigned num;
-	} sample;
-	long delta, delta2, delta3;
-
-	preempt_disable();
-
-	sample.jiffies = jiffies;
-	sample.cycles = random_get_entropy();
-	sample.num = num;
-	r = &input_pool;
-	mix_pool_bytes(r, &sample, sizeof(sample));
-
-	/*
-	 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
-	 * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
-	 * in order to make our estimate.
-	 */
-
-	if (!state->dont_count_entropy) {
-		delta = sample.jiffies - state->last_time;
-		state->last_time = sample.jiffies;
-
-		delta2 = delta - state->last_delta;
-		state->last_delta = delta;
-
-		delta3 = delta2 - state->last_delta2;
-		state->last_delta2 = delta2;
-
-		if (delta < 0)
-			delta = -delta;
-		if (delta2 < 0)
-			delta2 = -delta2;
-		if (delta3 < 0)
-			delta3 = -delta3;
-		if (delta > delta2)
-			delta = delta2;
-		if (delta > delta3)
-			delta = delta3;
-
-		/*
-		 * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
-		 * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
-		 * and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits.
-		 */
-		credit_entropy_bits(r, min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11));
+		unsigned long rdseed[32 / sizeof(long)];
+		size_t counter;
+	} block;
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdseed); ++i) {
+		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&block.rdseed[i]) &&
+		    !arch_get_random_long(&block.rdseed[i]))
+			block.rdseed[i] = random_get_entropy();
 	}
-	preempt_enable();
-}
 
-void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
-				 unsigned int value)
-{
-	static unsigned char last_value;
-
-	/* ignore autorepeat and the like */
-	if (value == last_value)
-		return;
-
-	last_value = value;
-	add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
-			     (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
-	trace_add_input_randomness(ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness);
+	/* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */
+	blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed);
 
-#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH
-static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation;
+	/* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || 0) */
+	block.counter = 0;
+	blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
+	blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key));
 
-#define AVG_SHIFT 8     /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */
-#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT-1))
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+	memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key));
+
+	while (len) {
+		i = min_t(size_t, len, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+		/* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */
+		++block.counter;
+		blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
+		len -= i;
+		buf += i;
+	}
 
-static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start)
-{
-        long delta = random_get_entropy() - start;
-
-        /* Use a weighted moving average */
-        delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
-        avg_cycles += delta;
-        /* And average deviation */
-        delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
-        avg_deviation += delta;
+	memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
+	memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
 }
-#else
-#define add_interrupt_bench(x)
-#endif
 
-static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
-	__u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs;
-	unsigned int idx;
-
-	if (regs == NULL)
-		return 0;
-	idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx);
-	if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32))
-		idx = 0;
-	ptr += idx++;
-	WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx);
-	return *ptr;
-}
+#define credit_init_bits(bits) if (!crng_ready()) _credit_init_bits(bits)
 
-void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
+static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
 {
-	struct entropy_store	*r;
-	struct fast_pool	*fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
-	struct pt_regs		*regs = get_irq_regs();
-	unsigned long		now = jiffies;
-	cycles_t		cycles = random_get_entropy();
-	__u32			c_high, j_high;
-	__u64			ip;
-	unsigned long		seed;
-	int			credit = 0;
-
-	if (cycles == 0)
-		cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
-	c_high = (sizeof(cycles) > 4) ? cycles >> 32 : 0;
-	j_high = (sizeof(now) > 4) ? now >> 32 : 0;
-	fast_pool->pool[0] ^= cycles ^ j_high ^ irq;
-	fast_pool->pool[1] ^= now ^ c_high;
-	ip = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
-	fast_pool->pool[2] ^= ip;
-	fast_pool->pool[3] ^= (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 :
-		get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
-
-	fast_mix(fast_pool);
-	add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
-
-	if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
-		if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
-		    crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool,
-				   sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) {
-			fast_pool->count = 0;
-			fast_pool->last = now;
-		}
-		return;
-	}
+	unsigned int new, orig, add;
+	unsigned long flags;
 
-	if ((fast_pool->count < 64) &&
-	    !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))
+	if (!bits)
 		return;
 
-	r = &input_pool;
-	if (!spin_trylock(&r->lock))
-		return;
+	add = min_t(size_t, bits, POOL_BITS);
 
-	fast_pool->last = now;
-	__mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
+	do {
+		orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.init_bits);
+		new = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
+	} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, new) != orig);
 
-	/*
-	 * If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and
-	 * add it to the pool.  For the sake of paranoia don't let the
-	 * architectural seed generator dominate the input from the
-	 * interrupt noise.
-	 */
-	if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&seed)) {
-		__mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed));
-		credit = 1;
+	if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) {
+		crng_reseed(); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
+		process_random_ready_list();
+		wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
+		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
+		pr_notice("crng init done\n");
+		if (urandom_warning.missed)
+			pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
+				  urandom_warning.missed);
+	} else if (orig < POOL_EARLY_BITS && new >= POOL_EARLY_BITS) {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+		/* Check if crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY, to avoid race with crng_reseed(). */
+		if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY) {
+			extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+			crng_init = CRNG_EARLY;
+		}
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
 	}
-	spin_unlock(&r->lock);
-
-	fast_pool->count = 0;
-
-	/* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */
-	credit_entropy_bits(r, credit + 1);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
-void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
-{
-	if (!disk || !disk->random)
-		return;
-	/* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */
-	add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
-	trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
-#endif
 
-/*********************************************************************
+/**********************************************************************
  *
- * Entropy extraction routines
+ * Entropy collection routines.
  *
- *********************************************************************/
-
-/*
- * This utility inline function is responsible for transferring entropy
- * from the primary pool to the secondary extraction pool. We make
- * sure we pull enough for a 'catastrophic reseed'.
- */
-static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes);
-static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
-{
-	if (!r->pull ||
-	    r->entropy_count >= (nbytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)) ||
-	    r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits)
-		return;
-
-	_xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
-}
-
-static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
-{
-	__u32	tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
-
-	int bytes = nbytes;
-
-	/* pull at least as much as a wakeup */
-	bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_bits / 8);
-	/* but never more than the buffer size */
-	bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp));
-
-	trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8,
-				  ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull));
-	bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
-				random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, 0);
-	mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes);
-	credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);
-}
+ * The following exported functions are used for pushing entropy into
+ * the above entropy accumulation routines:
+ *
+ *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+ *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
+ *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+ *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
+ *	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value);
+ *	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
+ *
+ * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that
+ * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
+ * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the
+ * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* credit any actual entropy to
+ * the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices
+ * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
+ * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
+ *
+ * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit
+ * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will
+ * block until more entropy is needed.
+ *
+ * add_bootloader_randomness() is called by bootloader drivers, such as EFI
+ * and device tree, and credits its input depending on whether or not the
+ * configuration option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
+ *
+ * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
+ * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
+ * as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64
+ * interrupts, crediting 1 bit of entropy for whichever comes first.
+ *
+ * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well
+ * as the event type information from the hardware.
+ *
+ * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
+ * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
+ * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
+ * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
+ * times are usually fairly consistent.
+ *
+ * The last two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy
+ * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second
+ * order deltas of the event timings.
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
 
-/*
- * Used as a workqueue function so that when the input pool is getting
- * full, we can "spill over" some entropy to the output pools.  That
- * way the output pools can store some of the excess entropy instead
- * of letting it go to waste.
- */
-static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work)
+static bool trust_cpu __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
+static bool trust_bootloader __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER);
+static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
 {
-	struct entropy_store *r = container_of(work, struct entropy_store,
-					      push_work);
-	BUG_ON(!r);
-	_xfer_secondary_pool(r, random_read_wakeup_bits/8);
-	trace_push_to_pool(r->name, r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT,
-			   r->pull->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT);
+	return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
 }
-
-/*
- * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the
- * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly.
- */
-static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min,
-		      int reserved)
+static int __init parse_trust_bootloader(char *arg)
 {
-	int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes;
-	size_t ibytes, nfrac;
-
-	BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits);
-
-	/* Can we pull enough? */
-retry:
-	entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
-	ibytes = nbytes;
-	/* never pull more than available */
-	have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
-
-	if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0)
-		have_bytes = 0;
-	ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes);
-	if (ibytes < min)
-		ibytes = 0;
-
-	if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) {
-		pr_warn("random: negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n",
-			r->name, entropy_count);
-		WARN_ON(1);
-		entropy_count = 0;
-	}
-	nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
-	if ((size_t) entropy_count > nfrac)
-		entropy_count -= nfrac;
-	else
-		entropy_count = 0;
-
-	if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
-		goto retry;
-
-	trace_debit_entropy(r->name, 8 * ibytes);
-	if (ibytes &&
-	    (r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) < random_write_wakeup_bits) {
-		wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
-		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
-	}
-
-	return ibytes;
+	return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_bootloader);
 }
+early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
+early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader);
 
 /*
- * This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy and
- * extract_entropy_user.
- *
- * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words.
+ * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts
+ * are still turned off. Here we push in latent entropy, RDSEED, a timestamp,
+ * utsname(), and the command line. Depending on the above configuration knob,
+ * RDSEED may be considered sufficient for initialization. Note that much
+ * earlier setup may already have pushed entropy into the input pool by the
+ * time we get here.
  */
-static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
+int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
 {
-	int i;
-	union {
-		__u32 w[5];
-		unsigned long l[LONGS(20)];
-	} hash;
-	__u32 workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
-	unsigned long flags;
-
-	/*
-	 * If we have an architectural hardware random number
-	 * generator, use it for SHA's initial vector
-	 */
-	sha_init(hash.w);
-	for (i = 0; i < LONGS(20); i++) {
-		unsigned long v;
-		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
-			break;
-		hash.l[i] = v;
-	}
-
-	/* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
-	for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16)
-		sha_transform(hash.w, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace);
-
-	/*
-	 * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking
-	 * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool
-	 * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous
-	 * ouputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By
-	 * mixing at least a SHA1 worth of hash data back, we make
-	 * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the
-	 * hash.
-	 */
-	__mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w));
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
-
-	memzero_explicit(workspace, sizeof(workspace));
-
-	/*
-	 * In case the hash function has some recognizable output
-	 * pattern, we fold it in half. Thus, we always feed back
-	 * twice as much data as we output.
-	 */
-	hash.w[0] ^= hash.w[3];
-	hash.w[1] ^= hash.w[4];
-	hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16);
-
-	memcpy(out, &hash, EXTRACT_SIZE);
-	memzero_explicit(&hash, sizeof(hash));
-}
-
-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
-				size_t nbytes, int fips)
-{
-	ssize_t ret = 0, i;
-	__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
-	unsigned long flags;
+	ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
+	unsigned int i, arch_bits;
+	unsigned long entropy;
 
-	while (nbytes) {
-		extract_buf(r, tmp);
+#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
+	static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy;
+	_mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed));
+#endif
 
-		if (fips) {
-			spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
-			if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE))
-				panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n");
-			memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE);
-			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+	for (i = 0, arch_bits = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
+	     i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) {
+		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) &&
+		    !arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) {
+			entropy = random_get_entropy();
+			arch_bits -= sizeof(entropy) * 8;
 		}
-		i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
-		memcpy(buf, tmp, i);
-		nbytes -= i;
-		buf += i;
-		ret += i;
+		_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
 	}
+	_mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
+	_mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
+	_mix_pool_bytes(command_line, strlen(command_line));
+	add_latent_entropy();
 
-	/* Wipe data just returned from memory */
-	memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+	if (crng_ready())
+		crng_reseed();
+	else if (trust_cpu)
+		_credit_init_bits(arch_bits);
 
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
- * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
- * returns it in a buffer.
+ * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
+ * initialize it.
  *
- * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before
- * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding while the
- * reserved parameter indicates how much entropy we must leave in the
- * pool after each pull to avoid starving other readers.
+ * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of
+ * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
+ * identical devices.
  */
-static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
-				 size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved)
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	/* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */
-	if (fips_enabled) {
-		spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
-		if (!r->last_data_init) {
-			r->last_data_init = 1;
-			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
-			trace_extract_entropy(r->name, EXTRACT_SIZE,
-					      ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
-			xfer_secondary_pool(r, EXTRACT_SIZE);
-			extract_buf(r, tmp);
-			spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
-			memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE);
-		}
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
-	}
-
-	trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
-	xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
-	nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved);
-
-	return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes, fips_enabled);
-}
-
-/*
- * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
- * returns it in a userspace buffer.
- */
-static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
-				    size_t nbytes)
-{
-	ssize_t ret = 0, i;
-	__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
-	int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
-
-	trace_extract_entropy_user(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
-	xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
-	nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0);
-
-	while (nbytes) {
-		if (large_request && need_resched()) {
-			if (signal_pending(current)) {
-				if (ret == 0)
-					ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
-				break;
-			}
-			schedule();
-		}
-
-		extract_buf(r, tmp);
-		i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
-		if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
-			ret = -EFAULT;
-			break;
-		}
-
-		nbytes -= i;
-		buf += i;
-		ret += i;
-	}
-
-	/* Wipe data just returned from memory */
-	memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
-	_warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *) _RET_IP_, (previous))
-
-static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller,
-				      void **previous)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
-	const bool print_once = false;
-#else
-	static bool print_once __read_mostly;
-#endif
-
-	if (print_once ||
-	    crng_ready() ||
-	    (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
-		return;
-	WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
-#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
-	print_once = true;
-#endif
-	if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning))
-		pr_notice("random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n",
-			  func_name, caller, crng_init);
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
 
 /*
- * This function is the exported kernel interface.  It returns some
- * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
- * TCP sequence numbers, etc.  It does not rely on the hardware random
- * number generator.  For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
- * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
- * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
- * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
- * at any point prior.
+ * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
+ * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
+ * when our pool is full.
  */
-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
-{
-	__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
-
-	trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
-
-	while (nbytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-		extract_crng(buf);
-		buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
-		nbytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
-	}
-
-	if (nbytes > 0) {
-		extract_crng(tmp);
-		memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes);
-		crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, nbytes);
-	} else
-		crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
-	memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
-}
-
-void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy)
 {
-	static void *previous;
+	mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+	credit_init_bits(entropy);
 
-	warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
-	_get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+	/*
+	 * Throttle writing to once every CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL, unless
+	 * we're not yet initialized.
+	 */
+	if (!kthread_should_stop() && crng_ready())
+		schedule_timeout_interruptible(CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
 
 /*
- * Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
- * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
- * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
- * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
- * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
- *
- * Returns: 0 if the urandom pool has been seeded.
- *          -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
+ * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if
+ * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
  */
-int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	if (likely(crng_ready()))
-		return 0;
-	return wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready());
+	mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+	if (trust_bootloader)
+		credit_init_bits(len * 8);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
 
-/*
- * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking
- * pool is initialised.
- *
- * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
- *	    -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
- *	    -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive
- */
-int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
-{
-	struct module *owner;
-	unsigned long flags;
-	int err = -EALREADY;
-
-	if (crng_ready())
-		return err;
-
-	owner = rdy->owner;
-	if (!try_module_get(owner))
-		return -ENOENT;
-
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
-	if (crng_ready())
-		goto out;
-
-	owner = NULL;
-
-	list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list);
-	err = 0;
-
-out:
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+struct fast_pool {
+	struct work_struct mix;
+	unsigned long pool[4];
+	unsigned long last;
+	unsigned int count;
+};
 
-	module_put(owner);
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#define FASTMIX_PERM SIPHASH_PERMUTATION
+	.pool = { SIPHASH_CONST_0, SIPHASH_CONST_1, SIPHASH_CONST_2, SIPHASH_CONST_3 }
+#else
+#define FASTMIX_PERM HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION
+	.pool = { HSIPHASH_CONST_0, HSIPHASH_CONST_1, HSIPHASH_CONST_2, HSIPHASH_CONST_3 }
+#endif
+};
 
-	return err;
+/*
+ * This is [Half]SipHash-1-x, starting from an empty key. Because
+ * the key is fixed, it assumes that its inputs are non-malicious,
+ * and therefore this has no security on its own. s represents the
+ * four-word SipHash state, while v represents a two-word input.
+ */
+static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], unsigned long v1, unsigned long v2)
+{
+	s[3] ^= v1;
+	FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
+	s[0] ^= v1;
+	s[3] ^= v2;
+	FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
+	s[0] ^= v2;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 /*
- * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
+ * This function is called when the CPU has just come online, with
+ * entry CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE, just after CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE.
  */
-void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+int __cold random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
 {
-	unsigned long flags;
-	struct module *owner = NULL;
+	/*
+	 * During CPU shutdown and before CPU onlining, add_interrupt_
+	 * randomness() may schedule mix_interrupt_randomness(), and
+	 * set the MIX_INFLIGHT flag. However, because the worker can
+	 * be scheduled on a different CPU during this period, that
+	 * flag will never be cleared. For that reason, we zero out
+	 * the flag here, which runs just after workqueues are onlined
+	 * for the CPU again. This also has the effect of setting the
+	 * irq randomness count to zero so that new accumulated irqs
+	 * are fresh.
+	 */
+	per_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness, cpu)->count = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct fast_pool *fast_pool = container_of(work, struct fast_pool, mix);
+	/*
+	 * The size of the copied stack pool is explicitly 2 longs so that we
+	 * only ever ingest half of the siphash output each time, retaining
+	 * the other half as the next "key" that carries over. The entropy is
+	 * supposed to be sufficiently dispersed between bits so on average
+	 * we don't wind up "losing" some.
+	 */
+	unsigned long pool[2];
+	unsigned int count;
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
-	if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) {
-		list_del_init(&rdy->list);
-		owner = rdy->owner;
+	/* Check to see if we're running on the wrong CPU due to hotplug. */
+	local_irq_disable();
+	if (fast_pool != this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)) {
+		local_irq_enable();
+		return;
 	}
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
 
-	module_put(owner);
+	/*
+	 * Copy the pool to the stack so that the mixer always has a
+	 * consistent view, before we reenable irqs again.
+	 */
+	memcpy(pool, fast_pool->pool, sizeof(pool));
+	count = fast_pool->count;
+	fast_pool->count = 0;
+	fast_pool->last = jiffies;
+	local_irq_enable();
+
+	mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
+	credit_init_bits(max(1u, (count & U16_MAX) / 64));
+
+	memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool));
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
 
-/*
- * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
- * number generator if it is available.  The arch-specific hw RNG will
- * almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it
- * is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as
- * opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a
- * key known by the NSA).  So it's useful if we need the speed, but
- * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to
- * have put in a back door.
- */
-void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
+void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 {
-	char *p = buf;
+	enum { MIX_INFLIGHT = 1U << 31 };
+	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
+	struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
+	struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
+	unsigned int new_count;
 
-	trace_get_random_bytes_arch(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
-	while (nbytes) {
-		unsigned long v;
-		int chunk = min(nbytes, (int)sizeof(unsigned long));
+	fast_mix(fast_pool->pool, entropy,
+		 (regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_) ^ swab(irq));
+	new_count = ++fast_pool->count;
 
-		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
-			break;
-		
-		memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
-		p += chunk;
-		nbytes -= chunk;
-	}
+	if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT)
+		return;
+
+	if (new_count < 64 && !time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ))
+		return;
 
-	if (nbytes)
-		get_random_bytes(p, nbytes);
+	if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func))
+		INIT_WORK(&fast_pool->mix, mix_interrupt_randomness);
+	fast_pool->count |= MIX_INFLIGHT;
+	queue_work_on(raw_smp_processor_id(), system_highpri_wq, &fast_pool->mix);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
 
+/* There is one of these per entropy source */
+struct timer_rand_state {
+	unsigned long last_time;
+	long last_delta, last_delta2;
+};
 
 /*
- * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
- *
- * @r: pool to initialize
- *
- * This function clears the pool's entropy count and mixes some system
- * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared
- * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool.
+ * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
+ * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
+ * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool. The
+ * value "num" is also added to the pool; it should somehow describe
+ * the type of event that just happened.
  */
-static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
+static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
 {
-	int i;
-	ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
-	unsigned long rv;
-
-	r->last_pulled = jiffies;
-	mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
-	for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
-		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
-		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
-			rv = random_get_entropy();
-		mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv));
+	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags;
+	long delta, delta2, delta3;
+	unsigned int bits;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness() will be called
+	 * sometime after, so mix into the fast pool.
+	 */
+	if (in_irq()) {
+		fast_mix(this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->pool, entropy, num);
+	} else {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+		_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+		_mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num));
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 	}
-	mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
+
+	if (crng_ready())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
+	 * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
+	 * in order to make our estimate.
+	 */
+	delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
+	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now);
+
+	delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
+	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
+
+	delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
+	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
+
+	if (delta < 0)
+		delta = -delta;
+	if (delta2 < 0)
+		delta2 = -delta2;
+	if (delta3 < 0)
+		delta3 = -delta3;
+	if (delta > delta2)
+		delta = delta2;
+	if (delta > delta3)
+		delta = delta3;
+
+	/*
+	 * delta is now minimum absolute delta. Round down by 1 bit
+	 * on general principles, and limit entropy estimate to 11 bits.
+	 */
+	bits = min(fls(delta >> 1), 11);
+
+	/*
+	 * As mentioned above, if we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness()
+	 * will run after this, which uses a different crediting scheme of 1 bit
+	 * per every 64 interrupts. In order to let that function do accounting
+	 * close to the one in this function, we credit a full 64/64 bit per bit,
+	 * and then subtract one to account for the extra one added.
+	 */
+	if (in_irq())
+		this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->count += max(1u, bits * 64) - 1;
+	else
+		_credit_init_bits(bits);
 }
 
-/*
- * Note that setup_arch() may call add_device_randomness()
- * long before we get here. This allows seeding of the pools
- * with some platform dependent data very early in the boot
- * process. But it limits our options here. We must use
- * statically allocated structures that already have all
- * initializations complete at compile time. We should also
- * take care not to overwrite the precious per platform data
- * we were given.
- */
-static int rand_initialize(void)
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value)
 {
-	init_std_data(&input_pool);
-	init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
-	crng_initialize(&primary_crng);
-	crng_global_init_time = jiffies;
-	if (ratelimit_disable) {
-		urandom_warning.interval = 0;
-		unseeded_warning.interval = 0;
-	}
-	return 0;
+	static unsigned char last_value;
+	static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES };
+
+	/* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */
+	if (value == last_value)
+		return;
+
+	last_value = value;
+	add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
+			     (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
 }
-early_initcall(rand_initialize);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
-void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
+void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
+{
+	if (!disk || !disk->random)
+		return;
+	/* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */
+	add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
+
+void __cold rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
 {
 	struct timer_rand_state *state;
 
@@ -1823,134 +1126,189 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
 }
 #endif
 
-static ssize_t
-_random_read(int nonblock, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
+/*
+ * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
+ * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
+ * CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is
+ * generating entropy..
+ *
+ * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are
+ * happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more
+ * complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the
+ * entropy loop is running.
+ *
+ * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
+ */
+static void __cold entropy_timer(unsigned long data)
 {
-	ssize_t n;
+	credit_init_bits(1);
+}
 
-	if (nbytes == 0)
-		return 0;
+/*
+ * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
+ * generate enough entropy with timing noise
+ */
+static void __cold try_to_generate_entropy(void)
+{
+	struct {
+		unsigned long entropy;
+		struct timer_list timer;
+	} stack;
 
-	nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, SEC_XFER_SIZE);
-	while (1) {
-		n = extract_entropy_user(&blocking_pool, buf, nbytes);
-		if (n < 0)
-			return n;
-		trace_random_read(n*8, (nbytes-n)*8,
-				  ENTROPY_BITS(&blocking_pool),
-				  ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
-		if (n > 0)
-			return n;
-
-		/* Pool is (near) empty.  Maybe wait and retry. */
-		if (nonblock)
-			return -EAGAIN;
+	stack.entropy = random_get_entropy();
 
-		wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait,
-			ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >=
-			random_read_wakeup_bits);
-		if (signal_pending(current))
-			return -ERESTARTSYS;
+	/* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
+	if (stack.entropy == random_get_entropy())
+		return;
+
+	__setup_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0, 0);
+	while (!crng_ready() && !signal_pending(current)) {
+		if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
+			mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1);
+		mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy));
+		schedule();
+		stack.entropy = random_get_entropy();
 	}
-}
 
-static ssize_t
-random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
-{
-	return _random_read(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, buf, nbytes);
+	del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
+	destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
+	mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy));
 }
 
-static ssize_t
-urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+
+/**********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Userspace reader/writer interfaces.
+ *
+ * getrandom(2) is the primary modern interface into the RNG and should
+ * be used in preference to anything else.
+ *
+ * Reading from /dev/random has the same functionality as calling
+ * getrandom(2) with flags=0. In earlier versions, however, it had
+ * vastly different semantics and should therefore be avoided, to
+ * prevent backwards compatibility issues.
+ *
+ * Reading from /dev/urandom has the same functionality as calling
+ * getrandom(2) with flags=GRND_INSECURE. Because it does not block
+ * waiting for the RNG to be ready, it should not be used.
+ *
+ * Writing to either /dev/random or /dev/urandom adds entropy to
+ * the input pool but does not credit it.
+ *
+ * Polling on /dev/random indicates when the RNG is initialized, on
+ * the read side, and when it wants new entropy, on the write side.
+ *
+ * Both /dev/random and /dev/urandom have the same set of ioctls for
+ * adding entropy, getting the entropy count, zeroing the count, and
+ * reseeding the crng.
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, ubuf, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags)
 {
-	unsigned long flags;
-	static int maxwarn = 10;
+	struct iov_iter iter;
+	struct iovec iov;
 	int ret;
 
-	if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) {
-		maxwarn--;
-		if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning))
-			printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s: uninitialized "
-			       "urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n",
-			       current->comm, nbytes);
-		spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
-		crng_init_cnt = 0;
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+	if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes
+	 * no sense.
+	 */
+	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
+		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
+			return -EAGAIN;
+		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+		if (unlikely(ret))
+			return ret;
 	}
-	nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3));
-	ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes);
-	trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
-	return ret;
+
+	ret = import_single_range(READ, ubuf, len, &iov, &iter);
+	if (unlikely(ret))
+		return ret;
+	return get_random_bytes_user(&iter);
 }
 
-static unsigned int
-random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
+static unsigned int random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 {
-	unsigned int mask;
-
-	poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait);
-	poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
-	mask = 0;
-	if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_bits)
-		mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
-	if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_bits)
-		mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
-	return mask;
+	poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
+	return crng_ready() ? POLLIN | POLLRDNORM : POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
 }
 
-static int
-write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
+static ssize_t write_pool_user(struct iov_iter *iter)
 {
-	size_t bytes;
-	__u32 t, buf[16];
-	const char __user *p = buffer;
+	u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	ssize_t ret = 0;
+	size_t copied;
 
-	while (count > 0) {
-		int b, i = 0;
+	if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
+		return 0;
 
-		bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf));
-		if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes))
-			return -EFAULT;
+	for (;;) {
+		copied = copy_from_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter);
+		ret += copied;
+		mix_pool_bytes(block, copied);
+		if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block))
+			break;
 
-		for (b = bytes ; b > 0 ; b -= sizeof(__u32), i++) {
-			if (!arch_get_random_int(&t))
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0);
+		if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
+			if (signal_pending(current))
 				break;
-			buf[i] ^= t;
+			cond_resched();
 		}
+	}
+
+	memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
+	return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
+}
+
+static ssize_t random_write_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
+{
+	return write_pool_user(iter);
+}
 
-		count -= bytes;
-		p += bytes;
+static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
+{
+	static int maxwarn = 10;
 
-		mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes);
-		cond_resched();
+	if (!crng_ready()) {
+		if (!ratelimit_disable && maxwarn <= 0)
+			++urandom_warning.missed;
+		else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) {
+			--maxwarn;
+			pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zu bytes read)\n",
+				  current->comm, iov_iter_count(iter));
+		}
 	}
 
-	return 0;
+	return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
 }
 
-static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
-			    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t random_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
 {
-	size_t ret;
+	int ret;
 
-	ret = write_pool(&input_pool, buffer, count);
-	if (ret)
+	ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+	if (ret != 0)
 		return ret;
-
-	return (ssize_t)count;
+	return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
 }
 
 static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
-	int size, ent_count;
 	int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
-	int retval;
+	int ent_count;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case RNDGETENTCNT:
-		/* inherently racy, no point locking */
-		ent_count = ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool);
-		if (put_user(ent_count, p))
+		/* Inherently racy, no point locking. */
+		if (put_user(input_pool.init_bits, p))
 			return -EFAULT;
 		return 0;
 	case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
@@ -1958,39 +1316,48 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 			return -EPERM;
 		if (get_user(ent_count, p))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
-	case RNDADDENTROPY:
+		if (ent_count < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		credit_init_bits(ent_count);
+		return 0;
+	case RNDADDENTROPY: {
+		struct iov_iter iter;
+		struct iovec iov;
+		ssize_t ret;
+		int len;
+
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
 		if (get_user(ent_count, p++))
 			return -EFAULT;
 		if (ent_count < 0)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		if (get_user(size, p++))
+		if (get_user(len, p++))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		ret = import_single_range(WRITE, p, len, &iov, &iter);
+		if (unlikely(ret))
+			return ret;
+		ret = write_pool_user(&iter);
+		if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+			return ret;
+		/* Since we're crediting, enforce that it was all written into the pool. */
+		if (unlikely(ret != len))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		retval = write_pool(&input_pool, (const char __user *)p,
-				    size);
-		if (retval < 0)
-			return retval;
-		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
+		credit_init_bits(ent_count);
+		return 0;
+	}
 	case RNDZAPENTCNT:
 	case RNDCLEARPOOL:
-		/*
-		 * Clear the entropy pool counters. We no longer clear
-		 * the entropy pool, as that's silly.
-		 */
+		/* No longer has any effect. */
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
-		input_pool.entropy_count = 0;
-		blocking_pool.entropy_count = 0;
 		return 0;
 	case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
-		if (crng_init < 2)
+		if (!crng_ready())
 			return -ENODATA;
-		crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool);
-		WRITE_ONCE(crng_global_init_time, jiffies - 1);
+		crng_reseed();
 		return 0;
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -2003,49 +1370,54 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
 }
 
 const struct file_operations random_fops = {
-	.read  = random_read,
-	.write = random_write,
-	.poll  = random_poll,
+	.read_iter = random_read_iter,
+	.write_iter = random_write_iter,
+	.poll = random_poll,
 	.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
 	.fasync = random_fasync,
 	.llseek = noop_llseek,
+	.splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
+	.splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
 };
 
 const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
-	.read  = urandom_read,
-	.write = random_write,
+	.read_iter = urandom_read_iter,
+	.write_iter = random_write_iter,
 	.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
 	.fasync = random_fasync,
 	.llseek = noop_llseek,
+	.splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
+	.splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
 };
 
-SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
-		unsigned int, flags)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (count > INT_MAX)
-		count = INT_MAX;
-
-	if (flags & GRND_RANDOM)
-		return _random_read(flags & GRND_NONBLOCK, buf, count);
-
-	if (!crng_ready()) {
-		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
-			return -EAGAIN;
-		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
-		if (unlikely(ret))
-			return ret;
-	}
-	return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL);
-}
 
 /********************************************************************
  *
- * Sysctl interface
+ * Sysctl interface.
+ *
+ * These are partly unused legacy knobs with dummy values to not break
+ * userspace and partly still useful things. They are usually accessible
+ * in /proc/sys/kernel/random/ and are as follows:
+ *
+ * - boot_id - a UUID representing the current boot.
+ *
+ * - uuid - a random UUID, different each time the file is read.
+ *
+ * - poolsize - the number of bits of entropy that the input pool can
+ *   hold, tied to the POOL_BITS constant.
+ *
+ * - entropy_avail - the number of bits of entropy currently in the
+ *   input pool. Always <= poolsize.
+ *
+ * - write_wakeup_threshold - the amount of entropy in the input pool
+ *   below which write polls to /dev/random will unblock, requesting
+ *   more entropy, tied to the POOL_READY_BITS constant. It is writable
+ *   to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing to it does not
+ *   change any behavior of the RNG.
+ *
+ * - urandom_min_reseed_secs - fixed to the value CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL.
+ *   It is writable to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing
+ *   to it does not change any behavior of the RNG.
  *
  ********************************************************************/
 
@@ -2053,26 +1425,28 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
 
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 
-static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh;
-static int max_read_thresh = OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
-static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
-static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60;
-static char sysctl_bootid[16];
+static int sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ;
+static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_READY_BITS;
+static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
+static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE];
 
 /*
  * This function is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
- * UUID.  The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
+ * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
  * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
- *
- * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, the UUID will be
- * returned as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format; if via the
- * sysctl system call, as 16 bytes of binary data.
  */
-static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
-			void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf,
+			size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	struct ctl_table fake_table;
-	unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
+	u8 tmp_uuid[UUID_SIZE], *uuid;
+	char uuid_string[UUID_STRING_LEN + 1];
+	struct ctl_table fake_table = {
+		.data = uuid_string,
+		.maxlen = UUID_STRING_LEN
+	};
+
+	if (write)
+		return -EPERM;
 
 	uuid = table->data;
 	if (!uuid) {
@@ -2087,32 +1461,17 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 		spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock);
 	}
 
-	sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
-
-	fake_table.data = buf;
-	fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf);
-
-	return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+	snprintf(uuid_string, sizeof(uuid_string), "%pU", uuid);
+	return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
 }
 
-/*
- * Return entropy available scaled to integral bits
- */
-static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
-			   void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+/* The same as proc_dointvec, but writes don't change anything. */
+static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf,
+			    size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	struct ctl_table fake_table;
-	int entropy_count;
-
-	entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
-
-	fake_table.data = &entropy_count;
-	fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count);
-
-	return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+	return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
 }
 
-static int sysctl_poolsize = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
 extern struct ctl_table random_table[];
 struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
 	{
@@ -2124,213 +1483,36 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
 	},
 	{
 		.procname	= "entropy_avail",
+		.data		= &input_pool.init_bits,
 		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
 		.mode		= 0444,
-		.proc_handler	= proc_do_entropy,
-		.data		= &input_pool.entropy_count,
-	},
-	{
-		.procname	= "read_wakeup_threshold",
-		.data		= &random_read_wakeup_bits,
-		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
-		.mode		= 0644,
-		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
-		.extra1		= &min_read_thresh,
-		.extra2		= &max_read_thresh,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
 	{
 		.procname	= "write_wakeup_threshold",
-		.data		= &random_write_wakeup_bits,
+		.data		= &sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits,
 		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
 		.mode		= 0644,
-		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
-		.extra1		= &min_write_thresh,
-		.extra2		= &max_write_thresh,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_do_rointvec,
 	},
 	{
 		.procname	= "urandom_min_reseed_secs",
-		.data		= &random_min_urandom_seed,
+		.data		= &sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed,
 		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
 		.mode		= 0644,
-		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_do_rointvec,
 	},
 	{
 		.procname	= "boot_id",
 		.data		= &sysctl_bootid,
-		.maxlen		= 16,
 		.mode		= 0444,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_do_uuid,
 	},
 	{
 		.procname	= "uuid",
-		.maxlen		= 16,
 		.mode		= 0444,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_do_uuid,
 	},
-#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH
-	{
-		.procname	= "add_interrupt_avg_cycles",
-		.data		= &avg_cycles,
-		.maxlen		= sizeof(avg_cycles),
-		.mode		= 0444,
-		.proc_handler	= proc_doulongvec_minmax,
-	},
-	{
-		.procname	= "add_interrupt_avg_deviation",
-		.data		= &avg_deviation,
-		.maxlen		= sizeof(avg_deviation),
-		.mode		= 0444,
-		.proc_handler	= proc_doulongvec_minmax,
-	},
-#endif
 	{ }
 };
-#endif 	/* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
-
-struct batched_entropy {
-	union {
-		u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];
-		u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
-	};
-	unsigned int position;
-	spinlock_t batch_lock;
-};
-
-/*
- * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
- * number is good as /dev/urandom, but there is no backtrack protection, with
- * the goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. In order to ensure
- * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
- * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once at any
- * point prior.
- */
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
-	.batch_lock	= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
-};
-
-u64 get_random_u64(void)
-{
-	u64 ret;
-	unsigned long flags;
-	struct batched_entropy *batch;
-	static void *previous;
-
-	warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
-
-	batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
-	if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) {
-		extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64);
-		batch->position = 0;
-	}
-	ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
-	return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
-
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
-	.batch_lock	= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
-};
-u32 get_random_u32(void)
-{
-	u32 ret;
-	unsigned long flags;
-	struct batched_entropy *batch;
-	static void *previous;
-
-	warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
-
-	batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
-	if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) {
-		extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32);
-		batch->position = 0;
-	}
-	ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
-	return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
-
-/* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might
- * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by
- * simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the
- * next usage. */
-static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void)
-{
-	int cpu;
-	unsigned long flags;
-
-	for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) {
-		struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy;
-
-		batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu);
-		spin_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
-		batched_entropy->position = 0;
-		spin_unlock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
-
-		batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu);
-		spin_lock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
-		batched_entropy->position = 0;
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
-	}
-}
-
-/**
- * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
- * @start:	The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
- * @range:	The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
- *		random address must fall.
- *
- * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
- *
- * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
- * @start was already page aligned.  We now align it regardless.
- *
- * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range).  On error,
- * @start is returned.
- */
-unsigned long
-randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
-{
-	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
-		range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
-		start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
-	}
-
-	if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
-		range = ULONG_MAX - start;
-
-	range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
-
-	if (range == 0)
-		return start;
-
-	return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
-}
-
-/* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
- * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
- * when our pool is full.
- */
-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
-				size_t entropy)
-{
-	struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool;
-
-	if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
-		crng_fast_load(buffer, count);
-		return;
-	}
-
-	/* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold.
-	 * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh,
-	 * or when the calling thread is about to terminate.
-	 */
-	wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, kthread_should_stop() ||
-			ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits);
-	mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count);
-	credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
index 45b8ccdfb085..cdf7d39362fd 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
@@ -1064,7 +1064,7 @@ static void vmbus_isr(void)
 			tasklet_schedule(&hv_cpu->msg_dpc);
 	}
 
-	add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR, 0);
+	add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR);
 }
 
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c
index b4c1924f0255..38fab02ffe9d 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ realview_gic_of_init(struct device_node *node, struct device_node *parent)
 
 	/* The PB11MPCore GIC needs to be configured in the syscon */
 	map = syscon_node_to_regmap(np);
+	of_node_put(np);
 	if (!IS_ERR(map)) {
 		/* new irq mode with no DCC */
 		regmap_write(map, REALVIEW_SYS_LOCK_OFFSET,
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c
index f9caf233e2cc..48521861beb5 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c
@@ -235,9 +235,9 @@ static int ssc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	clk_disable_unprepare(ssc->clk);
 
 	ssc->irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
-	if (!ssc->irq) {
+	if (ssc->irq < 0) {
 		dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "could not get irq\n");
-		return -ENXIO;
+		return ssc->irq;
 	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&user_lock);
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c
index 6322594ab260..98f1057650da 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c
@@ -317,7 +317,6 @@ static void bgmac_remove(struct bcma_device *core)
 	bcma_mdio_mii_unregister(bgmac->mii_bus);
 	bgmac_enet_remove(bgmac);
 	bcma_set_drvdata(core, NULL);
-	kfree(bgmac);
 }
 
 static struct bcma_driver bgmac_bcma_driver = {
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c
index 751ac5616884..21648dab13e0 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c
@@ -1874,15 +1874,16 @@ static void i40e_diag_test(struct net_device *netdev,
 
 		set_bit(__I40E_TESTING, pf->state);
 
+		if (test_bit(__I40E_RESET_RECOVERY_PENDING, pf->state) ||
+		    test_bit(__I40E_RESET_INTR_RECEIVED, pf->state)) {
+			dev_warn(&pf->pdev->dev,
+				 "Cannot start offline testing when PF is in reset state.\n");
+			goto skip_ol_tests;
+		}
+
 		if (i40e_active_vfs(pf) || i40e_active_vmdqs(pf)) {
 			dev_warn(&pf->pdev->dev,
 				 "Please take active VFs and Netqueues offline and restart the adapter before running NIC diagnostics\n");
-			data[I40E_ETH_TEST_REG]		= 1;
-			data[I40E_ETH_TEST_EEPROM]	= 1;
-			data[I40E_ETH_TEST_INTR]	= 1;
-			data[I40E_ETH_TEST_LINK]	= 1;
-			eth_test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
-			clear_bit(__I40E_TESTING, pf->state);
 			goto skip_ol_tests;
 		}
 
@@ -1929,9 +1930,17 @@ static void i40e_diag_test(struct net_device *netdev,
 		data[I40E_ETH_TEST_INTR] = 0;
 	}
 
-skip_ol_tests:
-
 	netif_info(pf, drv, netdev, "testing finished\n");
+	return;
+
+skip_ol_tests:
+	data[I40E_ETH_TEST_REG]		= 1;
+	data[I40E_ETH_TEST_EEPROM]	= 1;
+	data[I40E_ETH_TEST_INTR]	= 1;
+	data[I40E_ETH_TEST_LINK]	= 1;
+	eth_test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
+	clear_bit(__I40E_TESTING, pf->state);
+	netif_info(pf, drv, netdev, "testing failed\n");
 }
 
 static void i40e_get_wol(struct net_device *netdev,
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c
index ade72b46e93c..fb48efa70797 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c
@@ -596,6 +596,17 @@ static inline void mtk_rx_get_desc(struct mtk_rx_dma *rxd,
 	rxd->rxd4 = READ_ONCE(dma_rxd->rxd4);
 }
 
+static void *mtk_max_lro_buf_alloc(gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	unsigned int size = mtk_max_frag_size(MTK_MAX_LRO_RX_LENGTH);
+	unsigned long data;
+
+	data = __get_free_pages(gfp_mask | __GFP_COMP | __GFP_NOWARN,
+				get_order(size));
+
+	return (void *)data;
+}
+
 /* the qdma core needs scratch memory to be setup */
 static int mtk_init_fq_dma(struct mtk_eth *eth)
 {
@@ -1005,7 +1016,10 @@ static int mtk_poll_rx(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget,
 			goto release_desc;
 
 		/* alloc new buffer */
-		new_data = napi_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
+		if (ring->frag_size <= PAGE_SIZE)
+			new_data = napi_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
+		else
+			new_data = mtk_max_lro_buf_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (unlikely(!new_data)) {
 			netdev->stats.rx_dropped++;
 			goto release_desc;
@@ -1315,7 +1329,10 @@ static int mtk_rx_alloc(struct mtk_eth *eth, int ring_no, int rx_flag)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < rx_dma_size; i++) {
-		ring->data[i] = netdev_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
+		if (ring->frag_size <= PAGE_SIZE)
+			ring->data[i] = netdev_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
+		else
+			ring->data[i] = mtk_max_lro_buf_alloc(GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!ring->data[i])
 			return -ENOMEM;
 	}
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c
index deb953290f8f..e88147c47c17 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c
@@ -400,13 +400,25 @@ static void nfcmrvl_play_deferred(struct nfcmrvl_usb_drv_data *drv_data)
 	int err;
 
 	while ((urb = usb_get_from_anchor(&drv_data->deferred))) {
+		usb_anchor_urb(urb, &drv_data->tx_anchor);
+
 		err = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
-		if (err)
+		if (err) {
+			kfree(urb->setup_packet);
+			usb_unanchor_urb(urb);
+			usb_free_urb(urb);
 			break;
+		}
 
 		drv_data->tx_in_flight++;
+		usb_free_urb(urb);
+	}
+
+	/* Cleanup the rest deferred urbs. */
+	while ((urb = usb_get_from_anchor(&drv_data->deferred))) {
+		kfree(urb->setup_packet);
+		usb_free_urb(urb);
 	}
-	usb_scuttle_anchored_urbs(&drv_data->deferred);
 }
 
 static int nfcmrvl_resume(struct usb_interface *intf)
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/of/fdt.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/of/fdt.c
index b0bf2cb4f548..1d4090d2b91e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/of/fdt.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/of/fdt.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
 #include <linux/serial_core.h>
 #include <linux/sysfs.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 
 #include <asm/setup.h>  /* for COMMAND_LINE_SIZE */
 #include <asm/page.h>
@@ -1117,6 +1118,7 @@ int __init early_init_dt_scan_chosen(unsigned long node, const char *uname,
 {
 	int l;
 	const char *p;
+	const void *rng_seed;
 
 	pr_debug("search \"chosen\", depth: %d, uname: %s\n", depth, uname);
 
@@ -1151,6 +1153,14 @@ int __init early_init_dt_scan_chosen(unsigned long node, const char *uname,
 
 	pr_debug("Command line is: %s\n", (char*)data);
 
+	rng_seed = of_get_flat_dt_prop(node, "rng-seed", &l);
+	if (rng_seed && l > 0) {
+		add_bootloader_randomness(rng_seed, l);
+
+		/* try to clear seed so it won't be found. */
+		fdt_nop_property(initial_boot_params, node, "rng-seed");
+	}
+
 	/* break now */
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -1262,8 +1272,6 @@ bool __init early_init_dt_verify(void *params)
 
 	/* Setup flat device-tree pointer */
 	initial_boot_params = params;
-	of_fdt_crc32 = crc32_be(~0, initial_boot_params,
-				fdt_totalsize(initial_boot_params));
 	return true;
 }
 
@@ -1289,6 +1297,8 @@ bool __init early_init_dt_scan(void *params)
 		return false;
 
 	early_init_dt_scan_nodes();
+	of_fdt_crc32 = crc32_be(~0, initial_boot_params,
+				fdt_totalsize(initial_boot_params));
 	return true;
 }
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/scsi/ipr.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/scsi/ipr.c
index b172f0a02083..99b37e19feca 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/scsi/ipr.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/scsi/ipr.c
@@ -9788,7 +9788,7 @@ static int ipr_alloc_mem(struct ipr_ioa_cfg *ioa_cfg)
 					GFP_KERNEL);
 
 		if (!ioa_cfg->hrrq[i].host_rrq)  {
-			while (--i > 0)
+			while (--i >= 0)
 				dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev,
 					sizeof(u32) * ioa_cfg->hrrq[i].size,
 					ioa_cfg->hrrq[i].host_rrq,
@@ -10060,7 +10060,7 @@ static int ipr_request_other_msi_irqs(struct ipr_ioa_cfg *ioa_cfg,
 			ioa_cfg->vectors_info[i].desc,
 			&ioa_cfg->hrrq[i]);
 		if (rc) {
-			while (--i >= 0)
+			while (--i > 0)
 				free_irq(pci_irq_vector(pdev, i),
 					&ioa_cfg->hrrq[i]);
 			return rc;
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c
index da6685700b04..70733d751bb8 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c
@@ -662,7 +662,8 @@ lpfc_rcv_logo(struct lpfc_vport *vport, struct lpfc_nodelist *ndlp,
 	else
 		lpfc_els_rsp_acc(vport, ELS_CMD_ACC, cmdiocb, ndlp, NULL);
 	if (ndlp->nlp_DID == Fabric_DID) {
-		if (vport->port_state <= LPFC_FDISC)
+		if (vport->port_state <= LPFC_FDISC ||
+		    vport->fc_flag & FC_PT2PT)
 			goto out;
 		lpfc_linkdown_port(vport);
 		spin_lock_irq(shost->host_lock);
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c
index b4d6cd8cd1ad..d27ae937ff68 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c
@@ -4601,7 +4601,7 @@ pmcraid_register_interrupt_handler(struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance)
 	return 0;
 
 out_unwind:
-	while (--i > 0)
+	while (--i >= 0)
 		free_irq(pci_irq_vector(pdev, i), &pinstance->hrrq_vector[i]);
 	pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev);
 	return rc;
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h
index 75966d3f326e..d87c12324c03 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h
@@ -333,8 +333,8 @@ struct PVSCSIRingReqDesc {
 	u8	tag;
 	u8	bus;
 	u8	target;
-	u8	vcpuHint;
-	u8	unused[59];
+	u16	vcpuHint;
+	u8	unused[58];
 } __packed;
 
 /*
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c
index 36470ee06596..6010c047f4f8 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static int vmk80xx_alloc_usb_buffers(struct comedi_device *dev)
 	if (!devpriv->usb_rx_buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	size = max(usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_rx), MIN_BUF_SIZE);
+	size = max(usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_tx), MIN_BUF_SIZE);
 	devpriv->usb_tx_buf = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!devpriv->usb_tx_buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/tty/goldfish.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/tty/goldfish.c
index 1b72321f2d0b..9f0b6b185be7 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/tty/goldfish.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/tty/goldfish.c
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ static int goldfish_tty_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	tty_unregister_device(goldfish_tty_driver, qtty->console.index);
 	iounmap(qtty->base);
 	qtty->base = NULL;
-	free_irq(qtty->irq, pdev);
+	free_irq(qtty->irq, qtty);
 	tty_port_destroy(&qtty->port);
 	goldfish_tty_current_line_count--;
 	if (goldfish_tty_current_line_count == 0)
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
index bbfcb220e1eb..1aca30a3f716 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
@@ -1524,6 +1524,8 @@ static inline void __stop_tx(struct uart_8250_port *p)
 
 	if (em485) {
 		unsigned char lsr = serial_in(p, UART_LSR);
+		p->lsr_saved_flags |= lsr & LSR_SAVE_FLAGS;
+
 		/*
 		 * To provide required timeing and allow FIFO transfer,
 		 * __stop_tx_rs485() must be called only when both FIFO and
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c
index ba7528916da4..50ec2cd36db0 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c
@@ -5231,7 +5231,7 @@ int dwc2_hcd_init(struct dwc2_hsotg *hsotg)
 	res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
 	if (!res) {
 		retval = -EINVAL;
-		goto error1;
+		goto error2;
 	}
 	hcd->rsrc_start = res->start;
 	hcd->rsrc_len = resource_size(res);
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
index f59c20457e65..2d45233ba027 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
@@ -776,9 +776,13 @@ struct eth_dev *gether_setup_name(struct usb_gadget *g,
 	dev->qmult = qmult;
 	snprintf(net->name, sizeof(net->name), "%s%%d", netname);
 
-	if (get_ether_addr(dev_addr, net->dev_addr))
+	if (get_ether_addr(dev_addr, net->dev_addr)) {
+		net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM;
 		dev_warn(&g->dev,
 			"using random %s ethernet address\n", "self");
+	} else {
+		net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_SET;
+	}
 	if (get_ether_addr(host_addr, dev->host_mac))
 		dev_warn(&g->dev,
 			"using random %s ethernet address\n", "host");
@@ -835,6 +839,9 @@ struct net_device *gether_setup_name_default(const char *netname)
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->tx_reqs);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->rx_reqs);
 
+	/* by default we always have a random MAC address */
+	net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM;
+
 	skb_queue_head_init(&dev->rx_frames);
 
 	/* network device setup */
@@ -872,7 +879,6 @@ int gether_register_netdev(struct net_device *net)
 	g = dev->gadget;
 
 	memcpy(net->dev_addr, dev->dev_mac, ETH_ALEN);
-	net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM;
 
 	status = register_netdev(net);
 	if (status < 0) {
@@ -912,6 +918,7 @@ int gether_set_dev_addr(struct net_device *net, const char *dev_addr)
 	if (get_ether_addr(dev_addr, new_addr))
 		return -EINVAL;
 	memcpy(dev->dev_mac, new_addr, ETH_ALEN);
+	net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_SET;
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gether_set_dev_addr);
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c
index 710793161795..498a44ae2b92 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c
@@ -3034,6 +3034,7 @@ static int lpc32xx_udc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	}
 
 	udc->isp1301_i2c_client = isp1301_get_client(isp1301_node);
+	of_node_put(isp1301_node);
 	if (!udc->isp1301_i2c_client) {
 		retval = -EPROBE_DEFER;
 		goto phy_fail;
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c
index 5f60c189f27a..9a3845c2af5e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id edgeport_2port_id_table[] = {
 	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_8S) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416B) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A) },
 	{ }
 };
 
@@ -210,6 +211,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table_combined[] = {
 	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_8S) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416B) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A) },
 	{ }
 };
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h
index 6f6a856bc37c..a470262dcf48 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@
 //
 // Definitions for other product IDs
 #define ION_DEVICE_ID_MT4X56USB			0x1403	// OEM device
+#define ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A			0x1A01  // OEM device (rebranded Edgeport/4)
 
 
 #define	GENERATION_ID_FROM_USB_PRODUCT_ID(ProductId)				\
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/usb/serial/option.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
index 6facdd77c138..bbd20defaae6 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
@@ -435,6 +435,8 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struct urb *urb);
 #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_CLS8			0x00b0
 #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_MBIM		0x00b3
 #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_RMNET		0x00b7
+#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_MBIM		0x00b8
+#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_RMNET		0x00b9
 #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WA		0x00f1
 #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WB		0x00f2
 
@@ -1982,6 +1984,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = {
 	  .driver_info = RSVD(3)},
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_RMNET, 0xff),
 	  .driver_info = RSVD(0)},
+	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_MBIM, 0xff),
+	  .driver_info = RSVD(3)},
+	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_RMNET, 0xff),
+	  .driver_info = RSVD(0)},
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WA, 0xff),
 	  .driver_info = RSVD(3)},
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WB, 0xff),
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c
index 74dc7170fd35..181386e06cb7 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c
@@ -635,6 +635,7 @@ static int vm_cmdline_set(const char *device,
 	if (!vm_cmdline_parent_registered) {
 		err = device_register(&vm_cmdline_parent);
 		if (err) {
+			put_device(&vm_cmdline_parent);
 			pr_err("Failed to register parent device!\n");
 			return err;
 		}
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
index b9c06885de6a..924554b7010d 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
@@ -256,8 +256,7 @@ void vp_del_vqs(struct virtio_device *vdev)
 
 	if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks) {
 		for (i = 0; i < vp_dev->msix_vectors; i++)
-			if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i])
-				free_cpumask_var(vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i]);
+			free_cpumask_var(vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i]);
 	}
 
 	if (vp_dev->msix_enabled) {
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c
index 3446ab1f44e7..309d69c7ae5c 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c
@@ -657,14 +657,10 @@ v9fs_stat2inode_dotl(struct p9_stat_dotl *stat, struct inode *inode,
 		if (stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_NLINK)
 			set_nlink(inode, stat->st_nlink);
 		if (stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_MODE) {
-			inode->i_mode = stat->st_mode;
-			if ((S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) ||
-						(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode)))
-				init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode,
-								inode->i_rdev);
+			mode = stat->st_mode & S_IALLUGO;
+			mode |= inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO;
+			inode->i_mode = mode;
 		}
-		if (stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_RDEV)
-			inode->i_rdev = new_decode_dev(stat->st_rdev);
 		if (!(flags & V9FS_STAT2INODE_KEEP_ISIZE) &&
 		    stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_SIZE)
 			v9fs_i_size_write(inode, stat->st_size);
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/fs/ext4/mballoc.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
index 28bee66c5fbf..a93bd342e0ae 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
@@ -3197,6 +3197,15 @@ ext4_mb_normalize_request(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac,
 	size = size >> bsbits;
 	start = start_off >> bsbits;
 
+	/*
+	 * For tiny groups (smaller than 8MB) the chosen allocation
+	 * alignment may be larger than group size. Make sure the
+	 * alignment does not move allocation to a different group which
+	 * makes mballoc fail assertions later.
+	 */
+	start = max(start, rounddown(ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical,
+			(ext4_lblk_t)EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(ac->ac_sb)));
+
 	/* don't cover already allocated blocks in selected range */
 	if (ar->pleft && start <= ar->lleft) {
 		size -= ar->lleft + 1 - start;
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/fs/ext4/namei.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/fs/ext4/namei.c
index eb4de706cc9c..c5f289737d0f 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/fs/ext4/namei.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/fs/ext4/namei.c
@@ -1724,7 +1724,8 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir,
 			struct dx_hash_info *hinfo)
 {
 	unsigned blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize;
-	unsigned count, continued;
+	unsigned continued;
+	int count;
 	struct buffer_head *bh2;
 	ext4_lblk_t newblock;
 	u32 hash2;
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/fs/ext4/resize.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/fs/ext4/resize.c
index e0f4a9e3114e..721a00767d0e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/fs/ext4/resize.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/fs/ext4/resize.c
@@ -52,6 +52,16 @@ int ext4_resize_begin(struct super_block *sb)
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	/*
+	 * If the reserved GDT blocks is non-zero, the resize_inode feature
+	 * should always be set.
+	 */
+	if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks &&
+	    !ext4_has_feature_resize_inode(sb)) {
+		ext4_error(sb, "resize_inode disabled but reserved GDT blocks non-zero");
+		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * If we are not using the primary superblock/GDT copy don't resize,
          * because the user tools have no way of handling this.  Probably a
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/fs/nfs/pnfs.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
index 18bbdaefd940..962585e00c86 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
@@ -1878,6 +1878,12 @@ lookup_again:
 			/* Fallthrough */
 		case -EAGAIN:
 			break;
+		case -ENODATA:
+			/* The server returned NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE */
+			pnfs_layout_set_fail_bit(
+				lo, pnfs_iomode_to_fail_bit(iomode));
+			lseg = NULL;
+			goto out_put_layout_hdr;
 		default:
 			if (!nfs_error_is_fatal(PTR_ERR(lseg))) {
 				pnfs_layout_clear_fail_bit(lo, pnfs_iomode_to_fail_bit(iomode));
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/crypto/blake2s.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/crypto/blake2s.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d439496fa6ba
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/crypto/blake2s.h
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H
+#define _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H
+
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+enum blake2s_lengths {
+	BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE = 64,
+	BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE = 32,
+	BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE = 32,
+
+	BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE = 16,
+	BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE = 20,
+	BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE = 28,
+	BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE = 32,
+};
+
+struct blake2s_state {
+	u32 h[8];
+	u32 t[2];
+	u32 f[2];
+	u8 buf[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	unsigned int buflen;
+	unsigned int outlen;
+};
+
+enum blake2s_iv {
+	BLAKE2S_IV0 = 0x6A09E667UL,
+	BLAKE2S_IV1 = 0xBB67AE85UL,
+	BLAKE2S_IV2 = 0x3C6EF372UL,
+	BLAKE2S_IV3 = 0xA54FF53AUL,
+	BLAKE2S_IV4 = 0x510E527FUL,
+	BLAKE2S_IV5 = 0x9B05688CUL,
+	BLAKE2S_IV6 = 0x1F83D9ABUL,
+	BLAKE2S_IV7 = 0x5BE0CD19UL,
+};
+
+void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen);
+void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out);
+
+static inline void blake2s_init_param(struct blake2s_state *state,
+				      const u32 param)
+{
+	*state = (struct blake2s_state){{
+		BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ param,
+		BLAKE2S_IV1,
+		BLAKE2S_IV2,
+		BLAKE2S_IV3,
+		BLAKE2S_IV4,
+		BLAKE2S_IV5,
+		BLAKE2S_IV6,
+		BLAKE2S_IV7,
+	}};
+}
+
+static inline void blake2s_init(struct blake2s_state *state,
+				const size_t outlen)
+{
+	blake2s_init_param(state, 0x01010000 | outlen);
+	state->outlen = outlen;
+}
+
+static inline void blake2s_init_key(struct blake2s_state *state,
+				    const size_t outlen, const void *key,
+				    const size_t keylen)
+{
+	WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && (!outlen || outlen > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ||
+		!key || !keylen || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE));
+
+	blake2s_init_param(state, 0x01010000 | keylen << 8 | outlen);
+	memcpy(state->buf, key, keylen);
+	state->buflen = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	state->outlen = outlen;
+}
+
+static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key,
+			   const size_t outlen, const size_t inlen,
+			   const size_t keylen)
+{
+	struct blake2s_state state;
+
+	WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && ((!in && inlen > 0) || !out || !outlen ||
+		outlen > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE ||
+		(!key && keylen)));
+
+	if (keylen)
+		blake2s_init_key(&state, outlen, key, keylen);
+	else
+		blake2s_init(&state, outlen);
+
+	blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
+	blake2s_final(&state, out);
+}
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H */
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/crypto/chacha20.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/crypto/chacha20.h
index caaa470389e0..3dd5ab189543 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/crypto/chacha20.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/crypto/chacha20.h
@@ -18,10 +18,25 @@ struct chacha20_ctx {
 	u32 key[8];
 };
 
-void chacha20_block(u32 *state, void *stream);
+void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream);
 void crypto_chacha20_init(u32 *state, struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv);
 int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 			   unsigned int keysize);
 int crypto_chacha20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req);
 
+enum chacha_constants { /* expand 32-byte k */
+	CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA = 0x61707865U,
+	CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 = 0x3320646eU,
+	CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY = 0x79622d32U,
+	CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K = 0x6b206574U
+};
+
+static inline void chacha_init_consts(u32 *state)
+{
+	state[0]  = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA;
+	state[1]  = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3;
+	state[2]  = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY;
+	state[3]  = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K;
+}
+
 #endif
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/crypto/drbg.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/crypto/drbg.h
index 22f884c97387..19b44179bb7c 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/crypto/drbg.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/crypto/drbg.h
@@ -105,6 +105,12 @@ struct drbg_test_data {
 	struct drbg_string *testentropy; /* TEST PARAMETER: test entropy */
 };
 
+enum drbg_seed_state {
+	DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED,
+	DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL, /* Seeded with !rng_is_initialized() */
+	DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL,
+};
+
 struct drbg_state {
 	struct mutex drbg_mutex;	/* lock around DRBG */
 	unsigned char *V;	/* internal state 10.1.1.1 1a) */
@@ -129,14 +135,14 @@ struct drbg_state {
 	struct completion ctr_completion;	/* CTR mode async handler */
 	int ctr_async_err;			/* CTR mode async error */
 
-	bool seeded;		/* DRBG fully seeded? */
+	enum drbg_seed_state seeded;		/* DRBG fully seeded? */
 	bool pr;		/* Prediction resistance enabled? */
-	struct work_struct seed_work;	/* asynchronous seeding support */
+	bool fips_primed;	/* Continuous test primed? */
+	unsigned char *prev;	/* FIPS 140-2 continuous test value */
 	struct crypto_rng *jent;
 	const struct drbg_state_ops *d_ops;
 	const struct drbg_core *core;
 	struct drbg_string test_data;
-	struct random_ready_callback random_ready;
 };
 
 static inline __u8 drbg_statelen(struct drbg_state *drbg)
@@ -184,11 +190,7 @@ static inline size_t drbg_max_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 static inline size_t drbg_max_requests(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
 	/* SP800-90A requires 2**48 maximum requests before reseeding */
-#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
-	return SIZE_MAX;
-#else
-	return (1UL<<48);
-#endif
+	return (1<<20);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3ba066845b69
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H
+#define _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H
+
+#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
+
+void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
+			      size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
+
+void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
+			   size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
+
+static inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(struct blake2s_state *state)
+{
+	state->f[0] = -1;
+}
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H */
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/byteorder/generic.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/byteorder/generic.h
index 133b76d0d2c0..802f433e5a71 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/byteorder/generic.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/byteorder/generic.h
@@ -156,6 +156,23 @@ static inline void le64_add_cpu(__le64 *var, u64 val)
 	*var = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(*var) + val);
 }
 
+/* XXX: this stuff can be optimized */
+static inline void le32_to_cpu_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
+{
+	while (words--) {
+		__le32_to_cpus(buf);
+		buf++;
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void cpu_to_le32_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
+{
+	while (words--) {
+		__cpu_to_le32s(buf);
+		buf++;
+	}
+}
+
 static inline void be16_add_cpu(__be16 *var, u16 val)
 {
 	*var = cpu_to_be16(be16_to_cpu(*var) + val);
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
index 0834eb5ea9e6..17a8a65f325f 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
 	CPUHP_PCI_XGENE_DEAD,
 	CPUHP_IOMMU_INTEL_DEAD,
 	CPUHP_LUSTRE_CFS_DEAD,
+	CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE,
 	CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP,
 	CPUHP_POWER_NUMA_PREPARE,
 	CPUHP_HRTIMERS_PREPARE,
@@ -162,6 +163,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
 	CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_CORE_IMC_ONLINE,
 	CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_THREAD_IMC_ONLINE,
 	CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE,
+	CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE,
 	CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE,
 	CPUHP_AP_BASE_CACHEINFO_ONLINE,
 	CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN,
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/hw_random.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/hw_random.h
index bee0827766a3..31587f36c06e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/hw_random.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/hw_random.h
@@ -59,7 +59,5 @@ extern int devm_hwrng_register(struct device *dev, struct hwrng *rng);
 /** Unregister a Hardware Random Number Generator driver. */
 extern void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng);
 extern void devm_hwrng_unregister(struct device *dve, struct hwrng *rng);
-/** Feed random bits into the pool. */
-extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy);
 
 #endif /* LINUX_HWRANDOM_H_ */
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/mm.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/mm.h
index 94b138e4c840..794f52e2540e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/mm.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2164,6 +2164,8 @@ extern int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				   unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
 				   unsigned long flags, struct page **pages);
 
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
+
 extern unsigned long get_unmapped_area(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
 
 extern unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/prandom.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/prandom.h
index e20339c78a84..709e8e69fb39 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/prandom.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/prandom.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
 
 u32 prandom_u32(void);
 void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
@@ -21,15 +22,10 @@ void prandom_reseed_late(void);
  * The core SipHash round function.  Each line can be executed in
  * parallel given enough CPU resources.
  */
-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
-	v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13),  v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
-	v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32),  v3 ^= v2,                     \
-	v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21),  v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
-	v3 ^= v0,                      v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32)  \
-)
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
 
-#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
-#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
+#define PRND_K0 (SIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_2)
+#define PRND_K1 (SIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_3)
 
 #elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
 /*
@@ -37,14 +33,9 @@ void prandom_reseed_late(void);
  * This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
  * applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
  */
-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
-	v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1,  5),  v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3,  8), \
-	v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16),  v3 ^= v2,                     \
-	v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3,  7),  v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
-	v3 ^= v0,                      v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16)  \
-)
-#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
-#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
+#define PRND_K0 (HSIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_2)
+#define PRND_K1 (HSIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_3)
 
 #else
 #error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/random.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/random.h
index 8eda8c0cbba7..3feafab498ad 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/random.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/random.h
@@ -1,49 +1,35 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-/*
- * include/linux/random.h
- *
- * Include file for the random number generator.
- */
+
 #ifndef _LINUX_RANDOM_H
 #define _LINUX_RANDOM_H
 
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/once.h>
 
 #include <uapi/linux/random.h>
 
-struct random_ready_callback {
-	struct list_head list;
-	void (*func)(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-	struct module *owner;
-};
+struct notifier_block;
 
-extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+			  unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
+void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
+#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
 static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
 {
-	add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy,
-			      sizeof(latent_entropy));
+	add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy));
 }
 #else
-static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {}
-#endif
-
-extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
-				 unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
-extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;
-
-extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
-extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
-extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
-
-#ifndef MODULE
-extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
+static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { }
 #endif
 
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len);
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len);
 u32 get_random_u32(void);
 u64 get_random_u64(void);
 static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)
@@ -75,38 +61,38 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
 
 static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void)
 {
-	unsigned long val = get_random_long();
-
-	return val & CANARY_MASK;
+	return get_random_long() & CANARY_MASK;
 }
 
+int __init random_init(const char *command_line);
+bool rng_is_initialized(void);
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
+int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
+int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
+
 /* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes).
  * Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */
-static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, int nbytes)
+static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
 	int ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
-	if (unlikely(ret))
-		return ret;
 	get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
-	return 0;
+	return ret;
 }
 
-#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \
-	static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \
+#define declare_get_random_var_wait(name, ret_type) \
+	static inline int get_random_ ## name ## _wait(ret_type *out) { \
 		int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \
 		if (unlikely(ret)) \
 			return ret; \
-		*out = get_random_ ## var(); \
+		*out = get_random_ ## name(); \
 		return 0; \
 	}
-declare_get_random_var_wait(u32)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(u64)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(int)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(long)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u32, u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u64, u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(int, unsigned int)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)
 #undef declare_get_random_var
 
-unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
-
 /*
  * This is designed to be standalone for just prandom
  * users, but for now we include it from <linux/random.h>
@@ -117,30 +103,39 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
 # include <asm/archrandom.h>
 #else
-static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-static inline bool arch_has_random(void)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Called from the boot CPU during startup; not valid to call once
+ * secondary CPUs are up and preemption is possible.
+ */
+#ifndef arch_get_random_seed_long_early
+static inline bool __init arch_get_random_seed_long_early(unsigned long *v)
 {
-	return 0;
+	WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);
+	return arch_get_random_seed_long(v);
 }
-static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef arch_get_random_long_early
+static inline bool __init arch_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v)
 {
-	return 0;
+	WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);
+	return arch_get_random_long(v);
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
+int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MODULE
+extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/siphash.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/siphash.h
index 0cda61855d90..0bb5ecd507be 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/siphash.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/siphash.h
@@ -136,4 +136,32 @@ static inline u32 hsiphash(const void *data, size_t len,
 	return ___hsiphash_aligned(data, len, key);
 }
 
+/*
+ * These macros expose the raw SipHash and HalfSipHash permutations.
+ * Do not use them directly! If you think you have a use for them,
+ * be sure to CC the maintainer of this file explaining why.
+ */
+
+#define SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
+	(a) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 13), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol64((a), 32), \
+	(c) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 16), (d) ^= (c), \
+	(a) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 21), (d) ^= (a), \
+	(c) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 17), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol64((c), 32))
+
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_0 0x736f6d6570736575ULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_1 0x646f72616e646f6dULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c7967656e657261ULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_3 0x7465646279746573ULL
+
+#define HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
+	(a) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 5), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol32((a), 16), \
+	(c) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 8), (d) ^= (c), \
+	(a) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 7), (d) ^= (a), \
+	(c) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 13), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol32((c), 16))
+
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_0 0U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_1 0U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c796765U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_3 0x74656462U
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_SIPHASH_H */
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/timex.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/timex.h
index 39c25dbebfe8..c7616cfb48d2 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/linux/timex.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/linux/timex.h
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/param.h>
 
+unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void);
+
 #include <asm/timex.h>
 
 #ifndef random_get_entropy
@@ -74,8 +76,14 @@
  *
  * By default we use get_cycles() for this purpose, but individual
  * architectures may override this in their asm/timex.h header file.
+ * If a given arch does not have get_cycles(), then we fallback to
+ * using random_get_entropy_fallback().
  */
-#define random_get_entropy()	get_cycles()
+#ifdef get_cycles
+#define random_get_entropy()	((unsigned long)get_cycles())
+#else
+#define random_get_entropy()	random_get_entropy_fallback()
+#endif
 #endif
 
 /*
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/trace/events/random.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/trace/events/random.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 0560dfc33f1c..000000000000
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/trace/events/random.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,316 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
-#define TRACE_SYSTEM random
-
-#if !defined(_TRACE_RANDOM_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
-#define _TRACE_RANDOM_H
-
-#include <linux/writeback.h>
-#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
-
-TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness,
-	TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(bytes, IP),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	bytes			)
-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->bytes		= bytes;
-		__entry->IP		= IP;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("bytes %d caller %pS",
-		__entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
-		__field(	  int,	bytes			)
-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
-		__entry->bytes		= bytes;
-		__entry->IP		= IP;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("%s pool: bytes %d caller %pS",
-		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes_nolock,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bits, int entropy_count,
-		 int entropy_total, unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bits, entropy_count, entropy_total, IP),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
-		__field(	  int,	bits			)
-		__field(	  int,	entropy_count		)
-		__field(	  int,	entropy_total		)
-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
-		__entry->bits		= bits;
-		__entry->entropy_count	= entropy_count;
-		__entry->entropy_total	= entropy_total;
-		__entry->IP		= IP;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("%s pool: bits %d entropy_count %d entropy_total %d "
-		  "caller %pS", __entry->pool_name, __entry->bits,
-		  __entry->entropy_count, __entry->entropy_total,
-		  (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(push_to_pool,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int pool_bits, int input_bits),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, pool_bits, input_bits),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
-		__field(	  int,	pool_bits		)
-		__field(	  int,	input_bits		)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
-		__entry->pool_bits	= pool_bits;
-		__entry->input_bits	= input_bits;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("%s: pool_bits %d input_pool_bits %d",
-		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->pool_bits,
-		  __entry->input_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(debit_entropy,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int debit_bits),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, debit_bits),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
-		__field(	  int,	debit_bits		)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
-		__entry->debit_bits	= debit_bits;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("%s: debit_bits %d", __entry->pool_name,
-		  __entry->debit_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness,
-	TP_PROTO(int input_bits),
-
-	TP_ARGS(input_bits),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	input_bits		)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->input_bits	= input_bits;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("input_pool_bits %d", __entry->input_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness,
-	TP_PROTO(dev_t dev, int input_bits),
-
-	TP_ARGS(dev, input_bits),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	dev_t,	dev			)
-		__field(	  int,	input_bits		)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->dev		= dev;
-		__entry->input_bits	= input_bits;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("dev %d,%d input_pool_bits %d", MAJOR(__entry->dev),
-		  MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->input_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(xfer_secondary_pool,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int xfer_bits, int request_bits,
-		 int pool_entropy, int input_entropy),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, xfer_bits, request_bits, pool_entropy,
-		input_entropy),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
-		__field(	  int,	xfer_bits		)
-		__field(	  int,	request_bits		)
-		__field(	  int,	pool_entropy		)
-		__field(	  int,	input_entropy		)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
-		__entry->xfer_bits	= xfer_bits;
-		__entry->request_bits	= request_bits;
-		__entry->pool_entropy	= pool_entropy;
-		__entry->input_entropy	= input_entropy;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("pool %s xfer_bits %d request_bits %d pool_entropy %d "
-		  "input_entropy %d", __entry->pool_name, __entry->xfer_bits,
-		  __entry->request_bits, __entry->pool_entropy,
-		  __entry->input_entropy)
-);
-
-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes,
-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	nbytes			)
-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->nbytes		= nbytes;
-		__entry->IP		= IP;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("nbytes %d caller %pS", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes,
-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch,
-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
-);
-
-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
-		 unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
-		__field(	  int,	nbytes			)
-		__field(	  int,	entropy_count		)
-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
-		__entry->nbytes		= nbytes;
-		__entry->entropy_count	= entropy_count;
-		__entry->IP		= IP;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("%s pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
-		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count,
-		  (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
-		 unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy_user,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
-		 unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(random_read,
-	TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int need_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
-
-	TP_ARGS(got_bits, need_bits, pool_left, input_left),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	got_bits		)
-		__field(	  int,	need_bits		)
-		__field(	  int,	pool_left		)
-		__field(	  int,	input_left		)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->got_bits	= got_bits;
-		__entry->need_bits	= need_bits;
-		__entry->pool_left	= pool_left;
-		__entry->input_left	= input_left;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("got_bits %d still_needed_bits %d "
-		  "blocking_pool_entropy_left %d input_entropy_left %d",
-		  __entry->got_bits, __entry->got_bits, __entry->pool_left,
-		  __entry->input_left)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read,
-	TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
-
-	TP_ARGS(got_bits, pool_left, input_left),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	got_bits		)
-		__field(	  int,	pool_left		)
-		__field(	  int,	input_left		)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->got_bits	= got_bits;
-		__entry->pool_left	= pool_left;
-		__entry->input_left	= input_left;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("got_bits %d nonblocking_pool_entropy_left %d "
-		  "input_entropy_left %d", __entry->got_bits,
-		  __entry->pool_left, __entry->input_left)
-);
-
-#endif /* _TRACE_RANDOM_H */
-
-/* This part must be outside protection */
-#include <trace/define_trace.h>
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/uapi/linux/random.h linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/uapi/linux/random.h
index 26ee91300e3e..dcc1b3e6106f 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/include/uapi/linux/random.h
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/include/uapi/linux/random.h
@@ -48,9 +48,11 @@ struct rand_pool_info {
  * Flags for getrandom(2)
  *
  * GRND_NONBLOCK	Don't block and return EAGAIN instead
- * GRND_RANDOM		Use the /dev/random pool instead of /dev/urandom
+ * GRND_RANDOM		No effect
+ * GRND_INSECURE	Return non-cryptographic random bytes
  */
 #define GRND_NONBLOCK	0x0001
 #define GRND_RANDOM	0x0002
+#define GRND_INSECURE	0x0004
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_RANDOM_H */
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/init/main.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/init/main.c
index 621cedd9173a..bf27f802d0a1 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/init/main.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/init/main.c
@@ -531,13 +531,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
 	page_address_init();
 	pr_notice("%s", linux_banner);
 	setup_arch(&command_line);
-	/*
-	 * Set up the the initial canary and entropy after arch
-	 * and after adding latent and command line entropy.
-	 */
-	add_latent_entropy();
-	add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
-	boot_init_stack_canary();
 	mm_init_cpumask(&init_mm);
 	setup_command_line(command_line);
 	setup_nr_cpu_ids();
@@ -615,6 +608,17 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
 	softirq_init();
 	timekeeping_init();
 	time_init();
+
+	/*
+	 * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after:
+	 * - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access
+	 * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in random_init()
+	 * - time_init() for making random_get_entropy() work on some platforms
+	 * - random_init() to initialize the RNG from from early entropy sources
+	 */
+	random_init(command_line);
+	boot_init_stack_canary();
+
 	sched_clock_postinit();
 	printk_safe_init();
 	perf_event_init();
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/kernel/cpu.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/kernel/cpu.c
index f3b231cb6b65..281efe4b6cb0 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/kernel/cpu.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/percpu-rwsem.h>
 #include <linux/cpuset.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 
 #include <trace/events/power.h>
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -1404,6 +1405,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_bp_states[] = {
 		.startup.single		= perf_event_init_cpu,
 		.teardown.single	= perf_event_exit_cpu,
 	},
+	[CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE] = {
+		.name			= "random:prepare",
+		.startup.single		= random_prepare_cpu,
+		.teardown.single	= NULL,
+	},
 	[CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP] = {
 		.name			= "workqueue:prepare",
 		.startup.single		= workqueue_prepare_cpu,
@@ -1523,6 +1529,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_ap_states[] = {
 		.startup.single		= workqueue_online_cpu,
 		.teardown.single	= workqueue_offline_cpu,
 	},
+	[CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE] = {
+		.name			= "random:online",
+		.startup.single		= random_online_cpu,
+		.teardown.single	= NULL,
+	},
 	[CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE] = {
 		.name			= "RCU/tree:online",
 		.startup.single		= rcutree_online_cpu,
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/kernel/irq/handle.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/kernel/irq/handle.c
index 79f987b942b8..1bc4dcc489d0 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/kernel/irq/handle.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/kernel/irq/handle.c
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ irqreturn_t handle_irq_event_percpu(struct irq_desc *desc)
 
 	retval = __handle_irq_event_percpu(desc, &flags);
 
-	add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq, flags);
+	add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq);
 
 	if (!noirqdebug)
 		note_interrupt(desc, retval);
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/kernel/time/timekeeping.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
index 602b476627dd..1d6a476fdfba 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/clocksource.h>
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
 #include <linux/time.h>
+#include <linux/timex.h>
 #include <linux/tick.h>
 #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
 #include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h>
@@ -2247,6 +2248,21 @@ ktime_t ktime_get_update_offsets_now(unsigned int *cwsseq, ktime_t *offs_real,
 	return base;
 }
 
+/**
+ * random_get_entropy_fallback - Returns the raw clock source value,
+ * used by random.c for platforms with no valid random_get_entropy().
+ */
+unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void)
+{
+	struct tk_read_base *tkr = &tk_core.timekeeper.tkr_mono;
+	struct clocksource *clock = READ_ONCE(tkr->clock);
+
+	if (unlikely(timekeeping_suspended || !clock))
+		return 0;
+	return clock->read(clock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(random_get_entropy_fallback);
+
 /**
  * do_adjtimex() - Accessor function to NTP __do_adjtimex function
  */
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/Kconfig.debug linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/Kconfig.debug
index f63a4faf244e..a152e907e813 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -1267,9 +1267,8 @@ config WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
 	  time.  This is really bad from a security perspective, and
 	  so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can
 	  to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted.
-	  However, since users can not do anything actionble to
-	  address this, by default the kernel will issue only a single
-	  warning for the first use of unseeded randomness.
+	  However, since users cannot do anything actionable to
+	  address this, by default this option is disabled.
 
 	  Say Y here if you want to receive warnings for all uses of
 	  unseeded randomness.  This will be of use primarily for
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/Makefile linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/Makefile
index ae2d261daec9..4b74298a3aec 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/Makefile
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/Makefile
@@ -262,3 +262,5 @@ CFLAGS_ubsan.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector) $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PL
 obj-$(CONFIG_SBITMAP) += sbitmap.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_PARMAN) += parman.o
+
+obj-y += crypto/
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/chacha20.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/chacha20.c
index 250ceed9ec9a..5f6c222e939a 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/chacha20.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/chacha20.c
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ static inline u32 rotl32(u32 v, u8 n)
 	return (v << n) | (v >> (sizeof(v) * 8 - n));
 }
 
-extern void chacha20_block(u32 *state, void *stream)
+void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream)
 {
-	u32 x[16], *out = stream;
+	u32 x[16];
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(x); i++)
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ extern void chacha20_block(u32 *state, void *stream)
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(x); i++)
-		out[i] = cpu_to_le32(x[i] + state[i]);
+		put_unaligned_le32(x[i] + state[i], &stream[i * sizeof(u32)]);
 
 	state[12]++;
 }
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/crypto/Makefile linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/crypto/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d0bca68618f0
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/crypto/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+obj-y += libblake2s.o
+libblake2s-y += blake2s.o blake2s-generic.o
+ifneq ($(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS),y)
+libblake2s-y += blake2s-selftest.o
+endif
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..04ff8df24513
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * This is an implementation of the BLAKE2s hash and PRF functions.
+ *
+ * Information: https://blake2.net/
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+static const u8 blake2s_sigma[10][16] = {
+	{ 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 },
+	{ 14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3 },
+	{ 11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4 },
+	{ 7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14, 2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8 },
+	{ 9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13 },
+	{ 2, 12, 6, 10, 0, 11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9 },
+	{ 12, 5, 1, 15, 14, 13, 4, 10, 0, 7, 6, 3, 9, 2, 8, 11 },
+	{ 13, 11, 7, 14, 12, 1, 3, 9, 5, 0, 15, 4, 8, 6, 2, 10 },
+	{ 6, 15, 14, 9, 11, 3, 0, 8, 12, 2, 13, 7, 1, 4, 10, 5 },
+	{ 10, 2, 8, 4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 15, 11, 9, 14, 3, 12, 13, 0 },
+};
+
+static inline void blake2s_increment_counter(struct blake2s_state *state,
+					     const u32 inc)
+{
+	state->t[0] += inc;
+	state->t[1] += (state->t[0] < inc);
+}
+
+void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
+			      size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
+{
+	u32 m[16];
+	u32 v[16];
+	int i;
+
+	WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) &&
+		(nblocks > 1 && inc != BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE));
+
+	while (nblocks > 0) {
+		blake2s_increment_counter(state, inc);
+		memcpy(m, block, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		le32_to_cpu_array(m, ARRAY_SIZE(m));
+		memcpy(v, state->h, 32);
+		v[ 8] = BLAKE2S_IV0;
+		v[ 9] = BLAKE2S_IV1;
+		v[10] = BLAKE2S_IV2;
+		v[11] = BLAKE2S_IV3;
+		v[12] = BLAKE2S_IV4 ^ state->t[0];
+		v[13] = BLAKE2S_IV5 ^ state->t[1];
+		v[14] = BLAKE2S_IV6 ^ state->f[0];
+		v[15] = BLAKE2S_IV7 ^ state->f[1];
+
+#define G(r, i, a, b, c, d) do { \
+	a += b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2 * i + 0]]; \
+	d = ror32(d ^ a, 16); \
+	c += d; \
+	b = ror32(b ^ c, 12); \
+	a += b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2 * i + 1]]; \
+	d = ror32(d ^ a, 8); \
+	c += d; \
+	b = ror32(b ^ c, 7); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define ROUND(r) do { \
+	G(r, 0, v[0], v[ 4], v[ 8], v[12]); \
+	G(r, 1, v[1], v[ 5], v[ 9], v[13]); \
+	G(r, 2, v[2], v[ 6], v[10], v[14]); \
+	G(r, 3, v[3], v[ 7], v[11], v[15]); \
+	G(r, 4, v[0], v[ 5], v[10], v[15]); \
+	G(r, 5, v[1], v[ 6], v[11], v[12]); \
+	G(r, 6, v[2], v[ 7], v[ 8], v[13]); \
+	G(r, 7, v[3], v[ 4], v[ 9], v[14]); \
+} while (0)
+		ROUND(0);
+		ROUND(1);
+		ROUND(2);
+		ROUND(3);
+		ROUND(4);
+		ROUND(5);
+		ROUND(6);
+		ROUND(7);
+		ROUND(8);
+		ROUND(9);
+
+#undef G
+#undef ROUND
+
+		for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
+			state->h[i] ^= v[i] ^ v[i + 8];
+
+		block += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		--nblocks;
+	}
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_generic);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s hash function");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>");
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7a9edc96dddd
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,591 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+/*
+ * blake2s_testvecs[] generated with the program below (using libb2-dev and
+ * libssl-dev [OpenSSL])
+ *
+ * #include <blake2.h>
+ * #include <stdint.h>
+ * #include <stdio.h>
+ *
+ * #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ *
+ * #define BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT	256
+ *
+ * static void print_vec(const uint8_t vec[], int len)
+ * {
+ *	int i;
+ *
+ *	printf("  { ");
+ *	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ *		if (i && (i % 12) == 0)
+ *			printf("\n    ");
+ *		printf("0x%02x, ", vec[i]);
+ *	}
+ *	printf("},\n");
+ * }
+ *
+ * int main(void)
+ * {
+ *	uint8_t key[BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES];
+ *	uint8_t buf[BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT];
+ *	uint8_t hash[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES];
+ *	int i, j;
+ *
+ *	key[0] = key[1] = 1;
+ *	for (i = 2; i < BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES; ++i)
+ *		key[i] = key[i - 2] + key[i - 1];
+ *
+ *	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT; ++i)
+ *		buf[i] = (uint8_t)i;
+ *
+ *	printf("static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {\n");
+ *
+ *	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT; ++i) {
+ *		int outlen = 1 + i % BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES;
+ *		int keylen = (13 * i) % (BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES + 1);
+ *
+ *		blake2s(hash, buf, key + BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES - keylen, outlen, i,
+ *			keylen);
+ *		print_vec(hash, outlen);
+ *	}
+ *	printf("};\n\n");
+ *
+ *	return 0;
+ *}
+ */
+static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
+  { 0xa1, },
+  { 0x7c, 0x89, },
+  { 0x74, 0x0e, 0xd4, },
+  { 0x47, 0x0c, 0x21, 0x15, },
+  { 0x18, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0xa6, 0xc4, },
+  { 0x13, 0x5d, 0x16, 0x63, 0x2e, 0xf9, },
+  { 0x2c, 0xb5, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x99, 0xe2, 0x73, },
+  { 0x9a, 0x0f, 0xd2, 0x39, 0xd6, 0x68, 0x1b, 0x92, },
+  { 0xc8, 0xde, 0x7a, 0xea, 0x2f, 0xf4, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0x2b, },
+  { 0x5b, 0xf9, 0x43, 0x52, 0x0c, 0x12, 0xba, 0xb5, 0x93, 0x9f, },
+  { 0xc6, 0x2c, 0x4e, 0x80, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x5b, 0x33, 0xb8, 0xb8, 0x0a, },
+  { 0xa7, 0x5c, 0xfd, 0x3a, 0xcc, 0xbf, 0x90, 0xca, 0xb7, 0x97, 0xde, 0xd8, },
+  { 0x66, 0xca, 0x3c, 0xc4, 0x19, 0xef, 0x92, 0x66, 0x3f, 0x21, 0x8f, 0xda,
+    0xb7, },
+  { 0xba, 0xe5, 0xbb, 0x30, 0x25, 0x94, 0x6d, 0xc3, 0x89, 0x09, 0xc4, 0x25,
+    0x52, 0x3e, },
+  { 0xa2, 0xef, 0x0e, 0x52, 0x0b, 0x5f, 0xa2, 0x01, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x25, 0xbc,
+    0x57, 0xe2, 0x27, },
+  { 0x4f, 0xe0, 0xf9, 0x52, 0x12, 0xda, 0x84, 0xb7, 0xab, 0xae, 0xb0, 0xa6,
+    0x47, 0x2a, 0xc7, 0xf5, },
+  { 0x56, 0xe7, 0xa8, 0x1c, 0x4c, 0xca, 0xed, 0x90, 0x31, 0xec, 0x87, 0x43,
+    0xe7, 0x72, 0x08, 0xec, 0xbe, },
+  { 0x7e, 0xdf, 0x80, 0x1c, 0x93, 0x33, 0xfd, 0x53, 0x44, 0xba, 0xfd, 0x96,
+    0xe1, 0xbb, 0xb5, 0x65, 0xa5, 0x00, },
+  { 0xec, 0x6b, 0xed, 0xf7, 0x7b, 0x62, 0x1d, 0x7d, 0xf4, 0x82, 0xf3, 0x1e,
+    0x18, 0xff, 0x2b, 0xc4, 0x06, 0x20, 0x2a, },
+  { 0x74, 0x98, 0xd7, 0x68, 0x63, 0xed, 0x87, 0xe4, 0x5d, 0x8d, 0x9e, 0x1d,
+    0xfd, 0x2a, 0xbb, 0x86, 0xac, 0xe9, 0x2a, 0x89, },
+  { 0x89, 0xc3, 0x88, 0xce, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x1e, 0x10, 0xd1, 0x37, 0x20, 0x86,
+    0x28, 0x43, 0x70, 0xd9, 0xfb, 0x96, 0xd9, 0xb5, 0xd3, },
+  { 0xcb, 0x56, 0x74, 0x41, 0x8d, 0x80, 0x01, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x38, 0xe1, 0x41,
+    0xad, 0x9c, 0x62, 0x74, 0xce, 0x35, 0xd5, 0x6c, 0x89, 0x6e, },
+  { 0x79, 0xaf, 0x94, 0x59, 0x99, 0x26, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0x34, 0xfe, 0x7c, 0x22,
+    0xf7, 0x43, 0xd7, 0x65, 0xd4, 0x48, 0x18, 0xac, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0x93, },
+  { 0x85, 0x0d, 0xff, 0xb8, 0x3e, 0x87, 0x41, 0xb0, 0x95, 0xd3, 0x3d, 0x00,
+    0x47, 0x55, 0x9e, 0xd2, 0x69, 0xea, 0xbf, 0xe9, 0x7a, 0x2d, 0x61, 0x45, },
+  { 0x03, 0xe0, 0x85, 0xec, 0x54, 0xb5, 0x16, 0x53, 0xa8, 0xc4, 0x71, 0xe9,
+    0x6a, 0xe7, 0xcb, 0xc4, 0x15, 0x02, 0xfc, 0x34, 0xa4, 0xa4, 0x28, 0x13,
+    0xd1, },
+  { 0xe3, 0x34, 0x4b, 0xe1, 0xd0, 0x4b, 0x55, 0x61, 0x8f, 0xc0, 0x24, 0x05,
+    0xe6, 0xe0, 0x3d, 0x70, 0x24, 0x4d, 0xda, 0xb8, 0x91, 0x05, 0x29, 0x07,
+    0x01, 0x3e, },
+  { 0x61, 0xff, 0x01, 0x72, 0xb1, 0x4d, 0xf6, 0xfe, 0xd1, 0xd1, 0x08, 0x74,
+    0xe6, 0x91, 0x44, 0xeb, 0x61, 0xda, 0x40, 0xaf, 0xfc, 0x8c, 0x91, 0x6b,
+    0xec, 0x13, 0xed, },
+  { 0xd4, 0x40, 0xd2, 0xa0, 0x7f, 0xc1, 0x58, 0x0c, 0x85, 0xa0, 0x86, 0xc7,
+    0x86, 0xb9, 0x61, 0xc9, 0xea, 0x19, 0x86, 0x1f, 0xab, 0x07, 0xce, 0x37,
+    0x72, 0x67, 0x09, 0xfc, },
+  { 0x9e, 0xf8, 0x18, 0x67, 0x93, 0x10, 0x9b, 0x39, 0x75, 0xe8, 0x8b, 0x38,
+    0x82, 0x7d, 0xb8, 0xb7, 0xa5, 0xaf, 0xe6, 0x6a, 0x22, 0x5e, 0x1f, 0x9c,
+    0x95, 0x29, 0x19, 0xf2, 0x4b, },
+  { 0xc8, 0x62, 0x25, 0xf5, 0x98, 0xc9, 0xea, 0xe5, 0x29, 0x3a, 0xd3, 0x22,
+    0xeb, 0xeb, 0x07, 0x7c, 0x15, 0x07, 0xee, 0x15, 0x61, 0xbb, 0x05, 0x30,
+    0x99, 0x7f, 0x11, 0xf6, 0x0a, 0x1d, },
+  { 0x68, 0x70, 0xf7, 0x90, 0xa1, 0x8b, 0x1f, 0x0f, 0xbb, 0xce, 0xd2, 0x0e,
+    0x33, 0x1f, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x78, 0xa8, 0xa6, 0x81, 0x66, 0xab, 0x8d, 0xcd,
+    0x58, 0x55, 0x3a, 0x0b, 0x7a, 0xdb, 0xb5, },
+  { 0xdd, 0x35, 0xd2, 0xb4, 0xf6, 0xc7, 0xea, 0xab, 0x64, 0x24, 0x4e, 0xfe,
+    0xe5, 0x3d, 0x4e, 0x95, 0x8b, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0xbc, 0xb0, 0xf8, 0x88, 0x61,
+    0x09, 0xb7, 0x78, 0xa3, 0x31, 0xfe, 0xd9, 0x2f, },
+  { 0x0a, },
+  { 0x6e, 0xd4, },
+  { 0x64, 0xe9, 0xd1, },
+  { 0x30, 0xdd, 0x71, 0xef, },
+  { 0x11, 0xb5, 0x0c, 0x87, 0xc9, },
+  { 0x06, 0x1c, 0x6d, 0x04, 0x82, 0xd0, },
+  { 0x5c, 0x42, 0x0b, 0xee, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0xb2, },
+  { 0xe8, 0x29, 0xd6, 0xb4, 0x5d, 0xf7, 0x2b, 0x93, },
+  { 0x18, 0xca, 0x27, 0x72, 0x43, 0x39, 0x16, 0xbc, 0x6a, },
+  { 0x39, 0x8f, 0xfd, 0x64, 0xf5, 0x57, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x45, 0xf8, },
+  { 0xbb, 0x3a, 0x78, 0x6b, 0x02, 0x1d, 0x0b, 0x16, 0xe3, 0xb2, 0x9a, },
+  { 0xb8, 0xb4, 0x0b, 0xe5, 0xd4, 0x1d, 0x0d, 0x85, 0x49, 0x91, 0x35, 0xfa, },
+  { 0x6d, 0x48, 0x2a, 0x0c, 0x42, 0x08, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x78, 0x6f, 0x18, 0xaf,
+    0xe2, },
+  { 0x10, 0x45, 0xd4, 0x58, 0x88, 0xec, 0x4e, 0x1e, 0xf6, 0x14, 0x92, 0x64,
+    0x7e, 0xb0, },
+  { 0x8b, 0x0b, 0x95, 0xee, 0x92, 0xc6, 0x3b, 0x91, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xeb, 0x51,
+    0x98, 0x0a, 0x8d, },
+  { 0xa3, 0x50, 0x4d, 0xa5, 0x1d, 0x03, 0x68, 0xe9, 0x57, 0x78, 0xd6, 0x04,
+    0xf1, 0xc3, 0x94, 0xd8, },
+  { 0xb8, 0x66, 0x6e, 0xdd, 0x46, 0x15, 0xae, 0x3d, 0x83, 0x7e, 0xcf, 0xe7,
+    0x2c, 0xe8, 0x8f, 0xc7, 0x34, },
+  { 0x2e, 0xc0, 0x1f, 0x29, 0xea, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xe2, 0xc2, 0x93, 0xeb, 0x41,
+    0x0d, 0xf0, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x0e, 0xa2, },
+  { 0x71, 0xb8, 0x33, 0xa9, 0x1b, 0xac, 0xf1, 0xb5, 0x42, 0x8f, 0x5e, 0x81,
+    0x34, 0x43, 0xb7, 0xa4, 0x18, 0x5c, 0x47, },
+  { 0xda, 0x45, 0xb8, 0x2e, 0x82, 0x1e, 0xc0, 0x59, 0x77, 0x9d, 0xfa, 0xb4,
+    0x1c, 0x5e, 0xa0, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x96, 0x5a, 0x58, },
+  { 0xe3, 0x09, 0x05, 0xa9, 0xeb, 0x48, 0x13, 0xad, 0x71, 0x88, 0x81, 0x9a,
+    0x3e, 0x2c, 0xe1, 0x23, 0x99, 0x13, 0x35, 0x9f, 0xb5, },
+  { 0xb7, 0x86, 0x2d, 0x16, 0xe1, 0x04, 0x00, 0x47, 0x47, 0x61, 0x31, 0xfb,
+    0x14, 0xac, 0xd8, 0xe9, 0xe3, 0x49, 0xbd, 0xf7, 0x9c, 0x3f, },
+  { 0x7f, 0xd9, 0x95, 0xa8, 0xa7, 0xa0, 0xcc, 0xba, 0xef, 0xb1, 0x0a, 0xa9,
+    0x21, 0x62, 0x08, 0x0f, 0x1b, 0xff, 0x7b, 0x9d, 0xae, 0xb2, 0x95, },
+  { 0x85, 0x99, 0xea, 0x33, 0xe0, 0x56, 0xff, 0x13, 0xc6, 0x61, 0x8c, 0xf9,
+    0x57, 0x05, 0x03, 0x11, 0xf9, 0xfb, 0x3a, 0xf7, 0xce, 0xbb, 0x52, 0x30, },
+  { 0xb2, 0x72, 0x9c, 0xf8, 0x77, 0x4e, 0x8f, 0x6b, 0x01, 0x6c, 0xff, 0x4e,
+    0x4f, 0x02, 0xd2, 0xbc, 0xeb, 0x51, 0x28, 0x99, 0x50, 0xab, 0xc4, 0x42,
+    0xe3, },
+  { 0x8b, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x90, 0x8f, 0xf5, 0x7b, 0xdd, 0xba, 0x47, 0x37, 0xc9,
+    0x2a, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x25, 0x08, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x17, 0xa7, 0x9e, 0x6b, 0x6e,
+    0xe3, 0x90, },
+  { 0x90, 0xdd, 0xf7, 0x75, 0xa7, 0xa3, 0x99, 0x5e, 0x5b, 0x7d, 0x75, 0xc3,
+    0x39, 0x6b, 0xa0, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x53, 0xb1, 0x9e, 0xc8, 0xf1, 0x77, 0x10,
+    0x58, 0x06, 0x9a, },
+  { 0x99, 0x52, 0xf0, 0x49, 0xa8, 0x8c, 0xec, 0xa6, 0x97, 0x32, 0x13, 0xb5,
+    0xf7, 0xa3, 0x8e, 0xfb, 0x4b, 0x59, 0x31, 0x3d, 0x01, 0x59, 0x98, 0x5d,
+    0x53, 0x03, 0x1a, 0x39, },
+  { 0x9f, 0xe0, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x5d, 0x93, 0xd6, 0x9b, 0x47, 0x8f, 0x9b, 0xe0,
+    0x26, 0x35, 0x84, 0x20, 0x1d, 0xc5, 0x53, 0x10, 0x0f, 0x22, 0xb9, 0xb5,
+    0xd4, 0x36, 0xb1, 0xac, 0x73, },
+  { 0x30, 0x32, 0x20, 0x3b, 0x10, 0x28, 0xec, 0x1f, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x47, 0x59,
+    0xeb, 0x7b, 0xee, 0x45, 0xfb, 0x0c, 0x49, 0xd8, 0x3d, 0x69, 0xbd, 0x90,
+    0x2c, 0xf0, 0x9e, 0x8d, 0xbf, 0xd5, },
+  { 0x2a, 0x37, 0x73, 0x7f, 0xf9, 0x96, 0x19, 0xaa, 0x25, 0xd8, 0x13, 0x28,
+    0x01, 0x29, 0x89, 0xdf, 0x6e, 0x0c, 0x9b, 0x43, 0x44, 0x51, 0xe9, 0x75,
+    0x26, 0x0c, 0xb7, 0x87, 0x66, 0x0b, 0x5f, },
+  { 0x23, 0xdf, 0x96, 0x68, 0x91, 0x86, 0xd0, 0x93, 0x55, 0x33, 0x24, 0xf6,
+    0xba, 0x08, 0x75, 0x5b, 0x59, 0x11, 0x69, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xe5, 0x2c, 0x77,
+    0x02, 0xf6, 0x47, 0xee, 0x81, 0xdd, 0xb9, 0x06, },
+  { 0x9d, },
+  { 0x9d, 0x7d, },
+  { 0xfd, 0xc3, 0xda, },
+  { 0xe8, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x21, },
+  { 0xc3, 0x1d, 0x42, 0x4c, 0x74, },
+  { 0xe9, 0xda, 0xf1, 0xa2, 0xe5, 0x7c, },
+  { 0x52, 0xb8, 0x6f, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x3a, 0x4c, },
+  { 0x5b, 0x39, 0x26, 0xfc, 0x92, 0x5e, 0xe0, 0x49, },
+  { 0x59, 0xe4, 0x7c, 0x93, 0x1c, 0xf9, 0x28, 0x93, 0xde, },
+  { 0xde, 0xdf, 0xb2, 0x43, 0x61, 0x0b, 0x86, 0x16, 0x4c, 0x2e, },
+  { 0x14, 0x8f, 0x75, 0x51, 0xaf, 0xb9, 0xee, 0x51, 0x5a, 0xae, 0x23, },
+  { 0x43, 0x5f, 0x50, 0xd5, 0x70, 0xb0, 0x5b, 0x87, 0xf5, 0xd9, 0xb3, 0x6d, },
+  { 0x66, 0x0a, 0x64, 0x93, 0x79, 0x71, 0x94, 0x40, 0xb7, 0x68, 0x2d, 0xd3,
+    0x63, },
+  { 0x15, 0x00, 0xc4, 0x0c, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0x10, 0xa9, 0x73, 0x1b, 0x90, 0x6f,
+    0xe6, 0xa9, },
+  { 0x34, 0x75, 0xf3, 0x86, 0x8f, 0x56, 0xcf, 0x2a, 0x0a, 0xf2, 0x62, 0x0a,
+    0xf6, 0x0e, 0x20, },
+  { 0xb1, 0xde, 0xc9, 0xf5, 0xdb, 0xf3, 0x2f, 0x4c, 0xd6, 0x41, 0x7d, 0x39,
+    0x18, 0x3e, 0xc7, 0xc3, },
+  { 0xc5, 0x89, 0xb2, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0xc0, 0xa3, 0xb9, 0x3b, 0x10, 0x6d, 0x7c,
+    0x92, 0xfc, 0x7f, 0x34, 0x41, },
+  { 0xc4, 0xd8, 0xef, 0xba, 0xef, 0xd2, 0xaa, 0xc5, 0x6c, 0x8e, 0x3e, 0xbb,
+    0x12, 0xfc, 0x0f, 0x72, 0xbf, 0x0f, },
+  { 0xdd, 0x91, 0xd1, 0x15, 0x9e, 0x7d, 0xf8, 0xc1, 0xb9, 0x14, 0x63, 0x96,
+    0xb5, 0xcb, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x35, 0x1c, 0xec, },
+  { 0xa9, 0xf8, 0x52, 0xc9, 0x67, 0x76, 0x2b, 0xad, 0xfb, 0xd8, 0x3a, 0xa6,
+    0x74, 0x02, 0xae, 0xb8, 0x25, 0x2c, 0x63, 0x49, },
+  { 0x77, 0x1f, 0x66, 0x70, 0xfd, 0x50, 0x29, 0xaa, 0xeb, 0xdc, 0xee, 0xba,
+    0x75, 0x98, 0xdc, 0x93, 0x12, 0x3f, 0xdc, 0x7c, 0x38, },
+  { 0xe2, 0xe1, 0x89, 0x5c, 0x37, 0x38, 0x6a, 0xa3, 0x40, 0xac, 0x3f, 0xb0,
+    0xca, 0xfc, 0xa7, 0xf3, 0xea, 0xf9, 0x0f, 0x5d, 0x8e, 0x39, },
+  { 0x0f, 0x67, 0xc8, 0x38, 0x01, 0xb1, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0x0a, 0x6d,
+    0xd2, 0x63, 0x69, 0x9e, 0xcc, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0xbe, 0x9b, 0x98, 0xdd, },
+  { 0x13, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x30, 0xfe, 0xc6, 0x01, 0x8a, 0xa1, 0x63, 0x96, 0x59,
+    0xc2, 0xa9, 0x68, 0x3f, 0x58, 0xd4, 0x19, 0x0c, 0x40, 0xf3, 0xde, 0x02, },
+  { 0xa3, 0x9e, 0xce, 0xda, 0x42, 0xee, 0x8c, 0x6c, 0x5a, 0x7d, 0xdc, 0x89,
+    0x02, 0x77, 0xdd, 0xe7, 0x95, 0xbb, 0xff, 0x0d, 0xa4, 0xb5, 0x38, 0x1e,
+    0xaf, },
+  { 0x9a, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0x9a, 0x4f, 0xa9, 0x4f, 0x2c, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x24, 0xdc,
+    0x97, 0x6f, 0xd9, 0xa1, 0x7d, 0x1a, 0x85, 0x0b, 0xf5, 0xda, 0x2e, 0xe7,
+    0xb1, 0x1d, },
+  { 0x84, 0x1e, 0x8e, 0x3d, 0x45, 0xa5, 0xf2, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x31, 0xfe, 0xb9,
+    0xfb, 0xc5, 0x45, 0x99, 0x99, 0xdd, 0x93, 0x43, 0x02, 0xee, 0x58, 0xaf,
+    0xee, 0x6a, 0xbe, },
+  { 0x07, 0x2f, 0xc0, 0xa2, 0x04, 0xc4, 0xab, 0x7c, 0x26, 0xbb, 0xa8, 0xd8,
+    0xe3, 0x1c, 0x75, 0x15, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x02, 0x6a, 0xf0, 0x86, 0xe9, 0xcd,
+    0x5c, 0xef, 0xa3, 0x25, },
+  { 0x2f, 0x3b, 0x1f, 0xb5, 0x91, 0x8f, 0x86, 0xe0, 0xdc, 0x31, 0x48, 0xb6,
+    0xa1, 0x8c, 0xfd, 0x75, 0xbb, 0x7d, 0x3d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x10, 0x9a, 0xd8,
+    0x4b, 0x0e, 0xe3, 0x94, 0x9f, },
+  { 0x29, 0xbb, 0x8f, 0x6c, 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xb6, 0xaf, 0xe5, 0xe3, 0x2d, 0xdc,
+    0x6f, 0xa4, 0x53, 0x88, 0xd8, 0xcf, 0x4d, 0x45, 0x42, 0x62, 0xdb, 0xdf,
+    0xf8, 0x45, 0xc2, 0x13, 0xec, 0x35, },
+  { 0x06, 0x3c, 0xe3, 0x2c, 0x15, 0xc6, 0x43, 0x03, 0x81, 0xfb, 0x08, 0x76,
+    0x33, 0xcb, 0x02, 0xc1, 0xba, 0x33, 0xe5, 0xe0, 0xd1, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x46,
+    0x28, 0x3f, 0x3e, 0x9d, 0x2c, 0x44, 0x54, },
+  { 0xea, 0xbb, 0x96, 0xf8, 0xd1, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x11, 0x40, 0x78, 0x42, 0x02,
+    0x19, 0xd1, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x92, 0xd3, 0xc3, 0xd6, 0xd9, 0x19, 0xe7, 0xc3,
+    0x40, 0x97, 0xbd, 0xd4, 0xed, 0xfa, 0x5e, 0x28, },
+  { 0x02, },
+  { 0x52, 0xa8, },
+  { 0x38, 0x25, 0x0d, },
+  { 0xe3, 0x04, 0xd4, 0x92, },
+  { 0x97, 0xdb, 0xf7, 0x81, 0xca, },
+  { 0x8a, 0x56, 0x9d, 0x62, 0x56, 0xcc, },
+  { 0xa1, 0x8e, 0x3c, 0x72, 0x8f, 0x63, 0x03, },
+  { 0xf7, 0xf3, 0x39, 0x09, 0x0a, 0xa1, 0xbb, 0x23, },
+  { 0x6b, 0x03, 0xc0, 0xe9, 0xd9, 0x83, 0x05, 0x22, 0x01, },
+  { 0x1b, 0x4b, 0xf5, 0xd6, 0x4f, 0x05, 0x75, 0x91, 0x4c, 0x7f, },
+  { 0x4c, 0x8c, 0x25, 0x20, 0x21, 0xcb, 0xc2, 0x4b, 0x3a, 0x5b, 0x8d, },
+  { 0x56, 0xe2, 0x77, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0x9f, 0x81, 0xec, 0x83, 0x75, 0xc4, 0xf9, },
+  { 0x71, 0x70, 0x0f, 0xad, 0x4d, 0x35, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x88, 0x69, 0xf9, 0xaa,
+    0xd3, },
+  { 0x50, 0x6e, 0x86, 0x6e, 0x43, 0xc0, 0xc2, 0x44, 0xc2, 0xe2, 0xa0, 0x1c,
+    0xb7, 0x9a, },
+  { 0xe4, 0x7e, 0x72, 0xc6, 0x12, 0x8e, 0x7c, 0xfc, 0xbd, 0xe2, 0x08, 0x31,
+    0x3d, 0x47, 0x3d, },
+  { 0x08, 0x97, 0x5b, 0x80, 0xae, 0xc4, 0x1d, 0x50, 0x77, 0xdf, 0x1f, 0xd0,
+    0x24, 0xf0, 0x17, 0xc0, },
+  { 0x01, 0xb6, 0x29, 0xf4, 0xaf, 0x78, 0x5f, 0xb6, 0x91, 0xdd, 0x76, 0x76,
+    0xd2, 0xfd, 0x0c, 0x47, 0x40, },
+  { 0xa1, 0xd8, 0x09, 0x97, 0x7a, 0xa6, 0xc8, 0x94, 0xf6, 0x91, 0x7b, 0xae,
+    0x2b, 0x9f, 0x0d, 0x83, 0x48, 0xf7, },
+  { 0x12, 0xd5, 0x53, 0x7d, 0x9a, 0xb0, 0xbe, 0xd9, 0xed, 0xe9, 0x9e, 0xee,
+    0x61, 0x5b, 0x42, 0xf2, 0xc0, 0x73, 0xc0, },
+  { 0xd5, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x5c, 0x6e, 0xa5, 0x69, 0x2b, 0x3b, 0x8c, 0xd6, 0x7d,
+    0x1d, 0xbe, 0x2c, 0xa1, 0x02, 0x21, 0xcd, 0x29, },
+  { 0xa4, 0x98, 0x80, 0xca, 0x22, 0xcf, 0x6a, 0xab, 0x5e, 0x40, 0x0d, 0x61,
+    0x08, 0x21, 0xef, 0xc0, 0x6c, 0x52, 0xb4, 0xb0, 0x53, },
+  { 0xbf, 0xaf, 0x8f, 0x3b, 0x7a, 0x97, 0x33, 0xe5, 0xca, 0x07, 0x37, 0xfd,
+    0x15, 0xdf, 0xce, 0x26, 0x2a, 0xb1, 0xa7, 0x0b, 0xb3, 0xac, },
+  { 0x16, 0x22, 0xe1, 0xbc, 0x99, 0x4e, 0x01, 0xf0, 0xfa, 0xff, 0x8f, 0xa5,
+    0x0c, 0x61, 0xb0, 0xad, 0xcc, 0xb1, 0xe1, 0x21, 0x46, 0xfa, 0x2e, },
+  { 0x11, 0x5b, 0x0b, 0x2b, 0xe6, 0x14, 0xc1, 0xd5, 0x4d, 0x71, 0x5e, 0x17,
+    0xea, 0x23, 0xdd, 0x6c, 0xbd, 0x1d, 0xbe, 0x12, 0x1b, 0xee, 0x4c, 0x1a, },
+  { 0x40, 0x88, 0x22, 0xf3, 0x20, 0x6c, 0xed, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x34, 0x62, 0x2c,
+    0x98, 0x83, 0x52, 0xe2, 0x25, 0xee, 0xe9, 0xf5, 0xe1, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x5c,
+    0xae, },
+  { 0xc3, 0x76, 0x37, 0xde, 0x95, 0x8c, 0xca, 0x2b, 0x0c, 0x23, 0xe7, 0xb5,
+    0x38, 0x70, 0x61, 0xcc, 0xff, 0xd3, 0x95, 0x7b, 0xf3, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x9d,
+    0x59, 0x00, },
+  { 0x0c, 0x19, 0x52, 0x05, 0x22, 0x53, 0xcb, 0x48, 0xd7, 0x10, 0x0e, 0x7e,
+    0x14, 0x69, 0xb5, 0xa2, 0x92, 0x43, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x4b, 0x8f, 0x51, 0x2c,
+    0x5a, 0x2c, 0x3b, },
+  { 0xe1, 0x9d, 0x70, 0x70, 0x28, 0xec, 0x86, 0x40, 0x55, 0x33, 0x56, 0xda,
+    0x88, 0xca, 0xee, 0xc8, 0x6a, 0x20, 0xb1, 0xe5, 0x3d, 0x57, 0xf8, 0x3c,
+    0x10, 0x07, 0x2a, 0xc4, },
+  { 0x0b, 0xae, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0x79, 0xee, 0x1b, 0x3d, 0x27, 0x35, 0x8d, 0x14,
+    0xd6, 0xae, 0x4e, 0x3c, 0xe9, 0x53, 0x50, 0xb5, 0xcc, 0x0c, 0xf7, 0xdf,
+    0xee, 0xa1, 0x74, 0xd6, 0x71, },
+  { 0xe6, 0xa4, 0xf4, 0x99, 0x98, 0xb9, 0x80, 0xea, 0x96, 0x7f, 0x4f, 0x33,
+    0xcf, 0x74, 0x25, 0x6f, 0x17, 0x6c, 0xbf, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x38, 0xd0, 0xff,
+    0x96, 0xcb, 0x13, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0xfd, },
+  { 0xbe, 0x92, 0xeb, 0xba, 0x44, 0x2c, 0x24, 0x74, 0xd4, 0x03, 0x27, 0x3c,
+    0x5d, 0x5b, 0x03, 0x30, 0x87, 0x63, 0x69, 0xe0, 0xb8, 0x94, 0xf4, 0x44,
+    0x7e, 0xad, 0xcd, 0x20, 0x12, 0x16, 0x79, },
+  { 0x30, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x05, 0x90, 0x2a, 0x97, 0x63, 0x94, 0x46, 0xff,
+    0xce, 0xd8, 0x67, 0xa7, 0xac, 0x33, 0x8c, 0x95, 0xb7, 0xcd, 0xa3, 0x23,
+    0x98, 0x9d, 0x76, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xa8, 0xd6, 0x8a, },
+  { 0xbe, },
+  { 0x17, 0x6c, },
+  { 0x1a, 0x42, 0x4f, },
+  { 0xba, 0xaf, 0xb7, 0x65, },
+  { 0xc2, 0x63, 0x43, 0x6a, 0xea, },
+  { 0xe4, 0x4d, 0xad, 0xf2, 0x0b, 0x02, },
+  { 0x04, 0xc7, 0xc4, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x2b, 0xce, },
+  { 0x66, 0xf6, 0x67, 0xcb, 0x03, 0x53, 0xc8, 0xf1, },
+  { 0x56, 0xa3, 0x60, 0x78, 0xc9, 0x5f, 0x70, 0x1b, 0x5e, },
+  { 0x99, 0xff, 0x81, 0x7c, 0x13, 0x3c, 0x29, 0x79, 0x4b, 0x65, },
+  { 0x51, 0x10, 0x50, 0x93, 0x01, 0x93, 0xb7, 0x01, 0xc9, 0x18, 0xb7, },
+  { 0x8e, 0x3c, 0x42, 0x1e, 0x5e, 0x7d, 0xc1, 0x50, 0x70, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x98, },
+  { 0x5f, 0xd9, 0x9b, 0xc8, 0xd7, 0xb2, 0x72, 0x62, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0xba, 0x92,
+    0xe9, },
+  { 0x70, 0x2b, 0xba, 0xfe, 0xad, 0x5d, 0x96, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xc2, 0x41, 0x6d,
+    0xc4, 0xb3, },
+  { 0xae, 0xe0, 0xd5, 0xd4, 0xc7, 0xae, 0x15, 0x5e, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0x33, 0x60,
+    0xd7, 0xd3, 0x5e, },
+  { 0x79, 0x8e, 0xbc, 0x9e, 0x20, 0xb9, 0x19, 0x4b, 0x63, 0x80, 0xf3, 0x16,
+    0xaf, 0x39, 0xbd, 0x92, },
+  { 0xc2, 0x0e, 0x85, 0xa0, 0x0b, 0x9a, 0xb0, 0xec, 0xde, 0x38, 0xd3, 0x10,
+    0xd9, 0xa7, 0x66, 0x27, 0xcf, },
+  { 0x0e, 0x3b, 0x75, 0x80, 0x67, 0x14, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x90, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x02,
+    0x81, 0xf6, 0xa6, 0x87, 0xce, 0x58, },
+  { 0x79, 0xb5, 0xe9, 0x5d, 0x52, 0x4d, 0xf7, 0x59, 0xf4, 0x2e, 0x27, 0xdd,
+    0xb3, 0xed, 0x57, 0x5b, 0x82, 0xea, 0x6f, },
+  { 0xa2, 0x97, 0xf5, 0x80, 0x02, 0x3d, 0xde, 0xa3, 0xf9, 0xf6, 0xab, 0xe3,
+    0x57, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x9b, 0x10, 0x42, 0x6f, 0xf2, },
+  { 0x12, 0x7a, 0xfc, 0xb7, 0x67, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x1a, 0xfe, 0x88, 0x4f,
+    0xc6, 0xac, 0x52, 0x96, 0x64, 0x28, 0x97, 0x84, 0x06, },
+  { 0xc5, 0x04, 0x44, 0x6b, 0xb2, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0x66, 0xe1, 0x76, 0xa2, 0x51,
+    0xf9, 0x59, 0x69, 0x97, 0x56, 0x0b, 0xbf, 0x50, 0xb3, 0x34, },
+  { 0x21, 0x32, 0x6b, 0x42, 0xb5, 0xed, 0x71, 0x8d, 0xf7, 0x5a, 0x35, 0xe3,
+    0x90, 0xe2, 0xee, 0xaa, 0x89, 0xf6, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0x4d, 0x73, 0xf4, },
+  { 0x4c, 0xa6, 0x09, 0xf4, 0x48, 0xe7, 0x46, 0xbc, 0x49, 0xfc, 0xe5, 0xda,
+    0xd1, 0x87, 0x13, 0x17, 0x4c, 0x59, 0x71, 0x26, 0x5b, 0x2c, 0x42, 0xb7, },
+  { 0x13, 0x63, 0xf3, 0x40, 0x02, 0xe5, 0xa3, 0x3a, 0x5e, 0x8e, 0xf8, 0xb6,
+    0x8a, 0x49, 0x60, 0x76, 0x34, 0x72, 0x94, 0x73, 0xf6, 0xd9, 0x21, 0x6a,
+    0x26, },
+  { 0xdf, 0x75, 0x16, 0x10, 0x1b, 0x5e, 0x81, 0xc3, 0xc8, 0xde, 0x34, 0x24,
+    0xb0, 0x98, 0xeb, 0x1b, 0x8f, 0xa1, 0x9b, 0x05, 0xee, 0xa5, 0xe9, 0x35,
+    0xf4, 0x1d, },
+  { 0xcd, 0x21, 0x93, 0x6e, 0x5b, 0xa0, 0x26, 0x2b, 0x21, 0x0e, 0xa0, 0xb9,
+    0x1c, 0xb5, 0xbb, 0xb8, 0xf8, 0x1e, 0xff, 0x5c, 0xa8, 0xf9, 0x39, 0x46,
+    0x4e, 0x29, 0x26, },
+  { 0x73, 0x7f, 0x0e, 0x3b, 0x0b, 0x5c, 0xf9, 0x60, 0xaa, 0x88, 0xa1, 0x09,
+    0xb1, 0x5d, 0x38, 0x7b, 0x86, 0x8f, 0x13, 0x7a, 0x8d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x98,
+    0x1a, 0x5b, 0xff, 0xc9, },
+  { 0xd3, 0x3c, 0x61, 0x71, 0x44, 0x7e, 0x31, 0x74, 0x98, 0x9d, 0x9a, 0xd2,
+    0x27, 0xf3, 0x46, 0x43, 0x42, 0x51, 0xd0, 0x5f, 0xe9, 0x1c, 0x5c, 0x69,
+    0xbf, 0xf6, 0xbe, 0x3c, 0x40, },
+  { 0x31, 0x99, 0x31, 0x9f, 0xaa, 0x43, 0x2e, 0x77, 0x3e, 0x74, 0x26, 0x31,
+    0x5e, 0x61, 0xf1, 0x87, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x9b, 0xcd, 0xd0, 0x3a, 0xee, 0x20,
+    0x7e, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x7e, 0xfa, },
+  { 0xa4, 0x27, 0x80, 0x67, 0x81, 0x2a, 0xa7, 0x62, 0xf7, 0x6e, 0xda, 0xd4,
+    0x5c, 0x39, 0x74, 0xad, 0x7e, 0xbe, 0xad, 0xa5, 0x84, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x30,
+    0x5d, 0xdb, 0xe2, 0x05, 0x43, 0xf7, 0x1b, },
+  { 0x0b, 0x37, 0xd8, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x83, 0xd6, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x35, 0xc2, 0xb0,
+    0x37, 0xef, 0xef, 0x5e, 0x43, 0x93, 0xf0, 0x49, 0x45, 0x0a, 0xef, 0xb5,
+    0x76, 0x70, 0x12, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xdb, 0xf5, 0x7a, },
+  { 0x1f, },
+  { 0x82, 0x60, },
+  { 0xcc, 0xe3, 0x08, },
+  { 0x56, 0x17, 0xe4, 0x59, },
+  { 0xe2, 0xd7, 0x9e, 0xc4, 0x4c, },
+  { 0xb2, 0xad, 0xd3, 0x78, 0x58, 0x5a, },
+  { 0xce, 0x43, 0xb4, 0x02, 0x96, 0xab, 0x3c, },
+  { 0xe6, 0x05, 0x1a, 0x73, 0x22, 0x32, 0xbb, 0x77, },
+  { 0x23, 0xe7, 0xda, 0xfe, 0x2c, 0xef, 0x8c, 0x22, 0xec, },
+  { 0xe9, 0x8e, 0x55, 0x38, 0xd1, 0xd7, 0x35, 0x23, 0x98, 0xc7, },
+  { 0xb5, 0x81, 0x1a, 0xe5, 0xb5, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0x4d, 0xca, 0x41, 0xe7, },
+  { 0x41, 0x16, 0x16, 0x95, 0x8d, 0x9e, 0x0c, 0xea, 0x8c, 0x71, 0x9a, 0xc1, },
+  { 0x7c, 0x33, 0xc0, 0xa4, 0x00, 0x62, 0xea, 0x60, 0x67, 0xe4, 0x20, 0xbc,
+    0x5b, },
+  { 0xdb, 0xb1, 0xdc, 0xfd, 0x08, 0xc0, 0xde, 0x82, 0xd1, 0xde, 0x38, 0xc0,
+    0x90, 0x48, },
+  { 0x37, 0x18, 0x2e, 0x0d, 0x61, 0xaa, 0x61, 0xd7, 0x86, 0x20, 0x16, 0x60,
+    0x04, 0xd9, 0xd5, },
+  { 0xb0, 0xcf, 0x2c, 0x4c, 0x5e, 0x5b, 0x4f, 0x2a, 0x23, 0x25, 0x58, 0x47,
+    0xe5, 0x31, 0x06, 0x70, },
+  { 0x91, 0xa0, 0xa3, 0x86, 0x4e, 0xe0, 0x72, 0x38, 0x06, 0x67, 0x59, 0x5c,
+    0x70, 0x25, 0xdb, 0x33, 0x27, },
+  { 0x44, 0x58, 0x66, 0xb8, 0x58, 0xc7, 0x13, 0xed, 0x4c, 0xc0, 0xf4, 0x9a,
+    0x1e, 0x67, 0x75, 0x33, 0xb6, 0xb8, },
+  { 0x7f, 0x98, 0x4a, 0x8e, 0x50, 0xa2, 0x5c, 0xcd, 0x59, 0xde, 0x72, 0xb3,
+    0x9d, 0xc3, 0x09, 0x8a, 0xab, 0x56, 0xf1, },
+  { 0x80, 0x96, 0x49, 0x1a, 0x59, 0xa2, 0xc5, 0xd5, 0xa7, 0x20, 0x8a, 0xb7,
+    0x27, 0x62, 0x84, 0x43, 0xc6, 0xe1, 0x1b, 0x5d, },
+  { 0x6b, 0xb7, 0x2b, 0x26, 0x62, 0x14, 0x70, 0x19, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xac, 0xac,
+    0x63, 0x58, 0x5e, 0x94, 0xb5, 0xb7, 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xa2, },
+  { 0x20, 0xa8, 0xc0, 0xfd, 0x63, 0x3d, 0x6e, 0x98, 0xcf, 0x0c, 0x49, 0x98,
+    0xe4, 0x5a, 0xfe, 0x8c, 0xaa, 0x70, 0x82, 0x1c, 0x7b, 0x74, },
+  { 0xc8, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0xdf, 0x69, 0x30, 0x01, 0xc2, 0x0f, 0x7e, 0x2f, 0x11,
+    0xcc, 0x3e, 0x17, 0xa5, 0x69, 0x40, 0x3f, 0x0e, 0x79, 0x7f, 0xcf, },
+  { 0xdb, 0x61, 0xc0, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x49, 0x07, 0x31, 0x1d, 0x91, 0x42, 0x8a,
+    0xfc, 0x5e, 0xd3, 0xf8, 0x56, 0x1f, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xfd, 0x9f, 0xb2, 0x8e, },
+  { 0x0c, 0x89, 0x55, 0x0c, 0x1f, 0x59, 0x2c, 0x9d, 0x1b, 0x29, 0x1d, 0x41,
+    0x1d, 0xe6, 0x47, 0x8f, 0x8c, 0x2b, 0xea, 0x8f, 0xf0, 0xff, 0x21, 0x70,
+    0x88, },
+  { 0x12, 0x18, 0x95, 0xa6, 0x59, 0xb1, 0x31, 0x24, 0x45, 0x67, 0x55, 0xa4,
+    0x1a, 0x2d, 0x48, 0x67, 0x1b, 0x43, 0x88, 0x2d, 0x8e, 0xa0, 0x70, 0xb3,
+    0xc6, 0xbb, },
+  { 0xe7, 0xb1, 0x1d, 0xb2, 0x76, 0x4d, 0x68, 0x68, 0x68, 0x23, 0x02, 0x55,
+    0x3a, 0xe2, 0xe5, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x43, 0xf9, 0x34, 0x77, 0x5c, 0xa1, 0xf5,
+    0x55, 0xfd, 0x4f, },
+  { 0x8c, 0x87, 0x5a, 0x08, 0x3a, 0x73, 0xad, 0x61, 0xe1, 0xe7, 0x99, 0x7e,
+    0xf0, 0x5d, 0xe9, 0x5d, 0x16, 0x43, 0x80, 0x2f, 0xd0, 0x66, 0x34, 0xe2,
+    0x42, 0x64, 0x3b, 0x1a, },
+  { 0x39, 0xc1, 0x99, 0xcf, 0x22, 0xbf, 0x16, 0x8f, 0x9f, 0x80, 0x7f, 0x95,
+    0x0a, 0x05, 0x67, 0x27, 0xe7, 0x15, 0xdf, 0x9d, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x1c, 0xb5,
+    0x1d, 0x60, 0x8f, 0x8a, 0x1d, },
+  { 0x9b, 0x6e, 0x08, 0x09, 0x06, 0x73, 0xab, 0x68, 0x02, 0x62, 0x1a, 0xe4,
+    0xd4, 0xdf, 0xc7, 0x02, 0x4c, 0x6a, 0x5f, 0xfd, 0x23, 0xac, 0xae, 0x6d,
+    0x43, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x50, 0x60, 0x3c, },
+  { 0x1d, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x4b, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0xe2, 0x1a, 0x73, 0x1b,
+    0xa0, 0x92, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0xff, 0x8f, 0x8b, 0x5d, 0xdf, 0xa8, 0x04, 0xb3,
+    0xb0, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x12, 0xfa, 0x35, 0x46, },
+  { 0x49, 0x45, 0x97, 0x11, 0x0f, 0x1c, 0x60, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x47, 0x30, 0xcf,
+    0x60, 0xa8, 0x71, 0xc5, 0x1b, 0xe9, 0x39, 0x4d, 0x49, 0xb6, 0x12, 0x1f,
+    0x24, 0xab, 0x37, 0xff, 0x83, 0xc2, 0xe1, 0x3a, },
+  { 0x60, },
+  { 0x24, 0x26, },
+  { 0x47, 0xeb, 0xc9, },
+  { 0x4a, 0xd0, 0xbc, 0xf0, },
+  { 0x8e, 0x2b, 0xc9, 0x85, 0x3c, },
+  { 0xa2, 0x07, 0x15, 0xb8, 0x12, 0x74, },
+  { 0x0f, 0xdb, 0x5b, 0x33, 0x69, 0xfe, 0x4b, },
+  { 0xa2, 0x86, 0x54, 0xf4, 0xfd, 0xb2, 0xd4, 0xe6, },
+  { 0xbb, 0x84, 0x78, 0x49, 0x27, 0x8e, 0x61, 0xda, 0x60, },
+  { 0x04, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0xaa, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x03, 0xc9, 0xf9, 0xb6, },
+  { 0xf8, 0x27, 0x1d, 0x61, 0xdc, 0x21, 0x42, 0xdd, 0xad, 0x92, 0x40, },
+  { 0x12, 0x87, 0xdf, 0xc2, 0x41, 0x45, 0x5a, 0x36, 0x48, 0x5b, 0x51, 0x2b, },
+  { 0xbb, 0x37, 0x5d, 0x1f, 0xf1, 0x68, 0x7a, 0xc4, 0xa5, 0xd2, 0xa4, 0x91,
+    0x8d, },
+  { 0x5b, 0x27, 0xd1, 0x04, 0x54, 0x52, 0x9f, 0xa3, 0x47, 0x86, 0x33, 0x33,
+    0xbf, 0xa0, },
+  { 0xcf, 0x04, 0xea, 0xf8, 0x03, 0x2a, 0x43, 0xff, 0xa6, 0x68, 0x21, 0x4c,
+    0xd5, 0x4b, 0xed, },
+  { 0xaf, 0xb8, 0xbc, 0x63, 0x0f, 0x18, 0x4d, 0xe2, 0x7a, 0xdd, 0x46, 0x44,
+    0xc8, 0x24, 0x0a, 0xb7, },
+  { 0x3e, 0xdc, 0x36, 0xe4, 0x89, 0xb1, 0xfa, 0xc6, 0x40, 0x93, 0x2e, 0x75,
+    0xb2, 0x15, 0xd1, 0xb1, 0x10, },
+  { 0x6c, 0xd8, 0x20, 0x3b, 0x82, 0x79, 0xf9, 0xc8, 0xbc, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0x35,
+    0xbe, 0x1b, 0x49, 0x1a, 0xbc, 0x3a, },
+  { 0x78, 0x65, 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x35, 0x67, 0xdc, 0x78, 0xd4, 0x41, 0xf6, 0xc9,
+    0xde, 0xde, 0x1f, 0x18, 0x13, 0x31, 0x11, },
+  { 0x8a, 0x7f, 0xb1, 0x33, 0x8f, 0x0c, 0x3c, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x61, 0xf0, 0x47,
+    0x29, 0x1b, 0x29, 0xbc, 0x1c, 0x47, 0xef, 0x7a, },
+  { 0x65, 0x91, 0xf1, 0xe6, 0xb3, 0x96, 0xd3, 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x4a, 0x59, 0x35,
+    0x72, 0x8e, 0x0b, 0x9a, 0x87, 0xca, 0x34, 0x7b, 0x63, },
+  { 0x5f, 0x08, 0x87, 0x80, 0x56, 0x25, 0x89, 0x77, 0x61, 0x8c, 0x64, 0xa1,
+    0x59, 0x6d, 0x59, 0x62, 0xe8, 0x4a, 0xc8, 0x58, 0x99, 0xd1, },
+  { 0x23, 0x87, 0x1d, 0xed, 0x6f, 0xf2, 0x91, 0x90, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x43, 0x21,
+    0xaf, 0x97, 0xc6, 0xbc, 0xd7, 0x15, 0xc7, 0x2d, 0x08, 0x77, 0x91, },
+  { 0x90, 0x47, 0x9a, 0x9e, 0x3a, 0xdf, 0xf3, 0xc9, 0x4c, 0x1e, 0xa7, 0xd4,
+    0x6a, 0x32, 0x90, 0xfe, 0xb7, 0xb6, 0x7b, 0xfa, 0x96, 0x61, 0xfb, 0xa4, },
+  { 0xb1, 0x67, 0x60, 0x45, 0xb0, 0x96, 0xc5, 0x15, 0x9f, 0x4d, 0x26, 0xd7,
+    0x9d, 0xf1, 0xf5, 0x6d, 0x21, 0x00, 0x94, 0x31, 0x64, 0x94, 0xd3, 0xa7,
+    0xd3, },
+  { 0x02, 0x3e, 0xaf, 0xf3, 0x79, 0x73, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xcc, 0x7a, 0x7f, 0xfb,
+    0x79, 0x2b, 0x85, 0x8c, 0x88, 0x72, 0x06, 0xbe, 0xfe, 0xaf, 0xc1, 0x16,
+    0xa6, 0xd6, },
+  { 0x2a, 0xb0, 0x1a, 0xe5, 0xaa, 0x6e, 0xb3, 0xae, 0x53, 0x85, 0x33, 0x80,
+    0x75, 0xae, 0x30, 0xe6, 0xb8, 0x72, 0x42, 0xf6, 0x25, 0x4f, 0x38, 0x88,
+    0x55, 0xd1, 0xa9, },
+  { 0x90, 0xd8, 0x0c, 0xc0, 0x93, 0x4b, 0x4f, 0x9e, 0x65, 0x6c, 0xa1, 0x54,
+    0xa6, 0xf6, 0x6e, 0xca, 0xd2, 0xbb, 0x7e, 0x6a, 0x1c, 0xd3, 0xce, 0x46,
+    0xef, 0xb0, 0x00, 0x8d, },
+  { 0xed, 0x9c, 0x49, 0xcd, 0xc2, 0xde, 0x38, 0x0e, 0xe9, 0x98, 0x6c, 0xc8,
+    0x90, 0x9e, 0x3c, 0xd4, 0xd3, 0xeb, 0x88, 0x32, 0xc7, 0x28, 0xe3, 0x94,
+    0x1c, 0x9f, 0x8b, 0xf3, 0xcb, },
+  { 0xac, 0xe7, 0x92, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x14, 0xa0, 0xe4, 0x04, 0x79, 0xa2, 0xf4,
+    0x31, 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x26, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0x2f, 0x69, 0x1b, 0x55, 0x94, 0x67,
+    0xda, 0x0c, 0xd7, 0x32, 0x1f, 0xef, },
+  { 0x68, 0x63, 0x85, 0x57, 0x95, 0x9e, 0x42, 0x27, 0x41, 0x43, 0x42, 0x02,
+    0xa5, 0x78, 0xa7, 0xc6, 0x43, 0xc1, 0x6a, 0xba, 0x70, 0x80, 0xcd, 0x04,
+    0xb6, 0x78, 0x76, 0x29, 0xf3, 0xe8, 0xa0, },
+  { 0xe6, 0xac, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0xf0, 0xc0, 0xf7, 0xf7, 0xe3, 0x3e, 0x4e, 0x28,
+    0x0f, 0x59, 0xb2, 0x67, 0x9e, 0x84, 0x34, 0x42, 0x96, 0x30, 0x2b, 0xca,
+    0x49, 0xb6, 0xc5, 0x9a, 0x84, 0x59, 0xa7, 0x81, },
+  { 0x7e, },
+  { 0x1e, 0x21, },
+  { 0x26, 0xd3, 0xdd, },
+  { 0x2c, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x3d, },
+  { 0x86, 0x7b, 0x76, 0x3c, 0xf0, },
+  { 0x12, 0xc3, 0x70, 0x1d, 0x55, 0x18, },
+  { 0x96, 0xc2, 0xbd, 0x61, 0x55, 0xf4, 0x24, },
+  { 0x20, 0x51, 0xf7, 0x86, 0x58, 0x8f, 0x07, 0x2a, },
+  { 0x93, 0x15, 0xa8, 0x1d, 0xda, 0x97, 0xee, 0x0e, 0x6c, },
+  { 0x39, 0x93, 0xdf, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0xca, 0xdc, 0x7a, 0x92, 0xce, },
+  { 0x60, 0xd5, 0xfd, 0xf5, 0x1b, 0x26, 0x82, 0x26, 0x73, 0x02, 0xbc, },
+  { 0x98, 0xf2, 0x34, 0xe1, 0xf5, 0xfb, 0x00, 0xac, 0x10, 0x4a, 0x38, 0x9f, },
+  { 0xda, 0x3a, 0x92, 0x8a, 0xd0, 0xcd, 0x12, 0xcd, 0x15, 0xbb, 0xab, 0x77,
+    0x66, },
+  { 0xa2, 0x92, 0x1a, 0xe5, 0xca, 0x0c, 0x30, 0x75, 0xeb, 0xaf, 0x00, 0x31,
+    0x55, 0x66, },
+  { 0x06, 0xea, 0xfd, 0x3e, 0x86, 0x38, 0x62, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x12, 0xa4, 0x12,
+    0x43, 0xbf, 0xa1, },
+  { 0xe4, 0x71, 0x7b, 0x94, 0xdb, 0xa0, 0xd2, 0xff, 0x9b, 0xeb, 0xad, 0x8e,
+    0x95, 0x8a, 0xc5, 0xed, },
+  { 0x25, 0x5a, 0x77, 0x71, 0x41, 0x0e, 0x7a, 0xe9, 0xed, 0x0c, 0x10, 0xef,
+    0xf6, 0x2b, 0x3a, 0xba, 0x60, },
+  { 0xee, 0xe2, 0xa3, 0x67, 0x64, 0x1d, 0xc6, 0x04, 0xc4, 0xe1, 0x68, 0xd2,
+    0x6e, 0xd2, 0x91, 0x75, 0x53, 0x07, },
+  { 0xe0, 0xf6, 0x4d, 0x8f, 0x68, 0xfc, 0x06, 0x7e, 0x18, 0x79, 0x7f, 0x2b,
+    0x6d, 0xef, 0x46, 0x7f, 0xab, 0xb2, 0xad, },
+  { 0x3d, 0x35, 0x88, 0x9f, 0x2e, 0xcf, 0x96, 0x45, 0x07, 0x60, 0x71, 0x94,
+    0x00, 0x8d, 0xbf, 0xf4, 0xef, 0x46, 0x2e, 0x3c, },
+  { 0x43, 0xcf, 0x98, 0xf7, 0x2d, 0xf4, 0x17, 0xe7, 0x8c, 0x05, 0x2d, 0x9b,
+    0x24, 0xfb, 0x4d, 0xea, 0x4a, 0xec, 0x01, 0x25, 0x29, },
+  { 0x8e, 0x73, 0x9a, 0x78, 0x11, 0xfe, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, 0x1a, 0x26, 0xdf,
+    0x25, 0xe9, 0x59, 0x1c, 0x70, 0x07, 0x9f, 0xdc, 0xa0, 0xa6, },
+  { 0xe8, 0x47, 0x71, 0xc7, 0x3e, 0xdf, 0xb5, 0x13, 0xb9, 0x85, 0x13, 0xa8,
+    0x54, 0x47, 0x6e, 0x59, 0x96, 0x09, 0x13, 0x5f, 0x82, 0x16, 0x0b, },
+  { 0xfb, 0xc0, 0x8c, 0x03, 0x21, 0xb3, 0xc4, 0xb5, 0x43, 0x32, 0x6c, 0xea,
+    0x7f, 0xa8, 0x43, 0x91, 0xe8, 0x4e, 0x3f, 0xbf, 0x45, 0x58, 0x6a, 0xa3, },
+  { 0x55, 0xf8, 0xf3, 0x00, 0x76, 0x09, 0xef, 0x69, 0x5d, 0xd2, 0x8a, 0xf2,
+    0x65, 0xc3, 0xcb, 0x9b, 0x43, 0xfd, 0xb1, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0xa1, 0x94, 0xb0,
+    0xd7, },
+  { 0xaa, 0x13, 0xc1, 0x51, 0x40, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x95, 0x64, 0x7b,
+    0xd1, 0x96, 0xb6, 0x56, 0xb4, 0x5b, 0xcf, 0xd6, 0xd9, 0x15, 0x97, 0xdd,
+    0xb6, 0xef, },
+  { 0xaf, 0xb7, 0x36, 0xb0, 0x04, 0xdb, 0xd7, 0x9c, 0x9a, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xf6,
+    0x1f, 0x12, 0x21, 0x2d, 0x59, 0x30, 0x54, 0xab, 0x27, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x57,
+    0xef, 0xf8, 0x53, },
+  { 0x97, 0x34, 0x45, 0x3e, 0xce, 0x7c, 0x35, 0xa2, 0xda, 0x9f, 0x4b, 0x46,
+    0x6c, 0x11, 0x67, 0xff, 0x2f, 0x76, 0x58, 0x15, 0x71, 0xfa, 0x44, 0x89,
+    0x89, 0xfd, 0xf7, 0x99, },
+  { 0x1f, 0xb1, 0x62, 0xeb, 0x83, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0x89, 0xf9, 0x2c, 0xd2, 0x03,
+    0x61, 0xbc, 0xbb, 0xa5, 0x74, 0x0e, 0x9b, 0x7e, 0x82, 0x3e, 0x70, 0x0a,
+    0xa9, 0x8f, 0x2b, 0x59, 0xfb, },
+  { 0xf8, 0xca, 0x5e, 0x3a, 0x4f, 0x9e, 0x10, 0x69, 0x10, 0xd5, 0x4c, 0xeb,
+    0x1a, 0x0f, 0x3c, 0x6a, 0x98, 0xf5, 0xb0, 0x97, 0x5b, 0x37, 0x2f, 0x0d,
+    0xbd, 0x42, 0x4b, 0x69, 0xa1, 0x82, },
+  { 0x12, 0x8c, 0x6d, 0x52, 0x08, 0xef, 0x74, 0xb2, 0xe6, 0xaa, 0xd3, 0xb0,
+    0x26, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x94, 0xb6, 0x11, 0x45, 0x0e, 0x36, 0x71, 0x14, 0x2d,
+    0x41, 0x8c, 0x21, 0x53, 0x31, 0xe9, 0x68, },
+  { 0xee, 0xea, 0x0d, 0x89, 0x47, 0x7e, 0x72, 0xd1, 0xd8, 0xce, 0x58, 0x4c,
+    0x94, 0x1f, 0x0d, 0x51, 0x08, 0xa3, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xe7, 0x82, 0x46, 0x92,
+    0xd6, 0x98, 0x6b, 0x07, 0x10, 0x65, 0x52, 0x65, },
+};
+
+bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
+{
+	u8 key[BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE];
+	u8 buf[ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_testvecs)];
+	u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
+	struct blake2s_state state;
+	bool success = true;
+	int i, l;
+
+	key[0] = key[1] = 1;
+	for (i = 2; i < sizeof(key); ++i)
+		key[i] = key[i - 2] + key[i - 1];
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); ++i)
+		buf[i] = (u8)i;
+
+	for (i = l = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_testvecs); l = (l + 37) % ++i) {
+		int outlen = 1 + i % BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE;
+		int keylen = (13 * i) % (BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE + 1);
+
+		blake2s(hash, buf, key + BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE - keylen, outlen, i,
+			keylen);
+		if (memcmp(hash, blake2s_testvecs[i], outlen)) {
+			pr_err("blake2s self-test %d: FAIL\n", i + 1);
+			success = false;
+		}
+
+		if (!keylen)
+			blake2s_init(&state, outlen);
+		else
+			blake2s_init_key(&state, outlen,
+					 key + BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE - keylen,
+					 keylen);
+
+		blake2s_update(&state, buf, l);
+		blake2s_update(&state, buf + l, i - l);
+		blake2s_final(&state, hash);
+		if (memcmp(hash, blake2s_testvecs[i], outlen)) {
+			pr_err("blake2s init/update/final self-test %d: FAIL\n",
+			       i + 1);
+			success = false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return success;
+}
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/crypto/blake2s.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..536fce87555b
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * This is an implementation of the BLAKE2s hash and PRF functions.
+ *
+ * Information: https://blake2.net/
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+bool blake2s_selftest(void);
+
+void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+	const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
+
+	if (unlikely(!inlen))
+		return;
+	if (inlen > fill) {
+		memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
+		blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1,
+					 BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		state->buflen = 0;
+		in += fill;
+		inlen -= fill;
+	}
+	if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		/* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
+		blake2s_compress_generic(state, in, nblocks - 1,
+					 BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+		inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+	}
+	memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
+	state->buflen += inlen;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_update);
+
+void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out)
+{
+	WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && !out);
+	blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
+	memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
+	       BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
+	blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
+	cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
+	memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
+	memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_final);
+
+static int __init mod_init(void)
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) &&
+	    WARN_ON(!blake2s_selftest()))
+		return -ENODEV;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit mod_exit(void)
+{
+}
+
+module_init(mod_init);
+module_exit(mod_exit);
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s hash function");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>");
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/random32.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/random32.c
index f5e967f4adfa..357b1ae563ce 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/random32.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/random32.c
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
 
 /**
@@ -544,9 +547,11 @@ static void prandom_reseed(unsigned long dontcare)
  * To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
  * long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
  */
-static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+static int prandom_timer_start(struct notifier_block *nb,
+			       unsigned long action, void *data)
 {
 	mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -555,13 +560,13 @@ static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
  */
 static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
 {
-	static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
-		.func = prandom_timer_start
+	static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
+		.notifier_call = prandom_timer_start
 	};
-	int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+	int ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
 
 	if (ret == -EALREADY) {
-		prandom_timer_start(&random_ready);
+		prandom_timer_start(&random_ready, 0, NULL);
 		ret = 0;
 	}
 	return ret;
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/sha1.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/sha1.c
index 1d96d2c02b82..bad46695476b 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/sha1.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/sha1.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
 #include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
 
 /*
@@ -55,7 +56,8 @@
 #define SHA_ROUND(t, input, fn, constant, A, B, C, D, E) do { \
 	__u32 TEMP = input(t); setW(t, TEMP); \
 	E += TEMP + rol32(A,5) + (fn) + (constant); \
-	B = ror32(B, 2); } while (0)
+	B = ror32(B, 2); \
+	TEMP = E; E = D; D = C; C = B; B = A; A = TEMP; } while (0)
 
 #define T_0_15(t, A, B, C, D, E)  SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_SRC, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
 #define T_16_19(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_MIX, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
@@ -82,6 +84,7 @@
 void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
 {
 	__u32 A, B, C, D, E;
+	unsigned int i = 0;
 
 	A = digest[0];
 	B = digest[1];
@@ -90,94 +93,24 @@ void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
 	E = digest[4];
 
 	/* Round 1 - iterations 0-16 take their input from 'data' */
-	T_0_15( 0, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_0_15( 1, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_0_15( 2, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_0_15( 3, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_0_15( 4, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_0_15( 5, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_0_15( 6, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_0_15( 7, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_0_15( 8, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_0_15( 9, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_0_15(10, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_0_15(11, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_0_15(12, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_0_15(13, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_0_15(14, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_0_15(15, A, B, C, D, E);
+	for (; i < 16; ++i)
+		T_0_15(i, A, B, C, D, E);
 
 	/* Round 1 - tail. Input from 512-bit mixing array */
-	T_16_19(16, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_16_19(17, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_16_19(18, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_16_19(19, B, C, D, E, A);
+	for (; i < 20; ++i)
+		T_16_19(i, A, B, C, D, E);
 
 	/* Round 2 */
-	T_20_39(20, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_20_39(21, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_20_39(22, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_20_39(23, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_20_39(24, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_20_39(25, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_20_39(26, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_20_39(27, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_20_39(28, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_20_39(29, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_20_39(30, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_20_39(31, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_20_39(32, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_20_39(33, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_20_39(34, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_20_39(35, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_20_39(36, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_20_39(37, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_20_39(38, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_20_39(39, B, C, D, E, A);
+	for (; i < 40; ++i)
+		T_20_39(i, A, B, C, D, E);
 
 	/* Round 3 */
-	T_40_59(40, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_40_59(41, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_40_59(42, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_40_59(43, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_40_59(44, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_40_59(45, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_40_59(46, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_40_59(47, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_40_59(48, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_40_59(49, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_40_59(50, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_40_59(51, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_40_59(52, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_40_59(53, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_40_59(54, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_40_59(55, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_40_59(56, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_40_59(57, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_40_59(58, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_40_59(59, B, C, D, E, A);
+	for (; i < 60; ++i)
+		T_40_59(i, A, B, C, D, E);
 
 	/* Round 4 */
-	T_60_79(60, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_60_79(61, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_60_79(62, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_60_79(63, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_60_79(64, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_60_79(65, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_60_79(66, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_60_79(67, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_60_79(68, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_60_79(69, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_60_79(70, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_60_79(71, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_60_79(72, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_60_79(73, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_60_79(74, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_60_79(75, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_60_79(76, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_60_79(77, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_60_79(78, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_60_79(79, B, C, D, E, A);
+	for (; i < 80; ++i)
+		T_60_79(i, A, B, C, D, E);
 
 	digest[0] += A;
 	digest[1] += B;
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/siphash.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/siphash.c
index e632ee40aac1..5b34b5c83988 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/lib/siphash.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/lib/siphash.c
@@ -18,19 +18,13 @@
 #include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
 #endif
 
-#define SIPROUND \
-	do { \
-	v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol64(v0, 32); \
-	v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; \
-	v0 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0; \
-	v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); \
-	} while (0)
+#define SIPROUND SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
 
 #define PREAMBLE(len) \
-	u64 v0 = 0x736f6d6570736575ULL; \
-	u64 v1 = 0x646f72616e646f6dULL; \
-	u64 v2 = 0x6c7967656e657261ULL; \
-	u64 v3 = 0x7465646279746573ULL; \
+	u64 v0 = SIPHASH_CONST_0; \
+	u64 v1 = SIPHASH_CONST_1; \
+	u64 v2 = SIPHASH_CONST_2; \
+	u64 v3 = SIPHASH_CONST_3; \
 	u64 b = ((u64)(len)) << 56; \
 	v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
 	v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
@@ -389,19 +383,13 @@ u32 hsiphash_4u32(const u32 first, const u32 second, const u32 third,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(hsiphash_4u32);
 #else
-#define HSIPROUND \
-	do { \
-	v0 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 5); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol32(v0, 16); \
-	v2 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 8); v3 ^= v2; \
-	v0 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 7); v3 ^= v0; \
-	v2 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 13); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol32(v2, 16); \
-	} while (0)
+#define HSIPROUND HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
 
 #define HPREAMBLE(len) \
-	u32 v0 = 0; \
-	u32 v1 = 0; \
-	u32 v2 = 0x6c796765U; \
-	u32 v3 = 0x74656462U; \
+	u32 v0 = HSIPHASH_CONST_0; \
+	u32 v1 = HSIPHASH_CONST_1; \
+	u32 v2 = HSIPHASH_CONST_2; \
+	u32 v3 = HSIPHASH_CONST_3; \
 	u32 b = ((u32)(len)) << 24; \
 	v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
 	v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/mm/util.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/mm/util.c
index f0d773c719a1..84e775f5216f 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/mm/util.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/mm/util.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/userfaultfd_k.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 
 #include <asm/sections.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -264,6 +265,38 @@ int vma_is_stack_for_current(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	return (vma->vm_start <= KSTK_ESP(t) && vma->vm_end >= KSTK_ESP(t));
 }
 
+/**
+ * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
+ * @start:	The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
+ * @range:	The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
+ *		random address must fall.
+ *
+ * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
+ * @start was already page aligned.  We now align it regardless.
+ *
+ * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range).  On error,
+ * @start is returned.
+ */
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
+{
+	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
+		range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
+		start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
+	}
+
+	if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
+		range = ULONG_MAX - start;
+
+	range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	if (range == 0)
+		return start;
+
+	return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_MMU) && !defined(HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT)
 void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
index 1ebad5a024a7..19369fc9bcda 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -591,12 +591,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
  * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers')
  * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this
  * property might be used by clever attacker.
- * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement,
- * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and
- * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory.
+ * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, though
+ * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 instead to really
+ * give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB of kernel
+ * memory.
  */
-#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8
-static u32 table_perturb[1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT];
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 16
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT)
+static u32 *table_perturb;
 
 int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
 		struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
@@ -636,10 +638,11 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
 	if (likely(remaining > 1))
 		remaining &= ~1U;
 
-	net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb));
-	index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT);
+	net_get_random_once(table_perturb,
+			    INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE * sizeof(*table_perturb));
+	index = port_offset & (INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE - 1);
 
-	offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + port_offset;
+	offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + (port_offset >> 32);
 	offset %= remaining;
 
 	/* In first pass we try ports of @low parity.
@@ -694,6 +697,12 @@ next_port:
 	return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
 
 ok:
+	/* Here we want to add a little bit of randomness to the next source
+	 * port that will be chosen. We use a max() with a random here so that
+	 * on low contention the randomness is maximal and on high contention
+	 * it may be inexistent.
+	 */
+	i = max_t(int, i, (prandom_u32() & 7) * 2);
 	WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2);
 
 	/* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */
@@ -735,6 +744,15 @@ void inet_hashinfo_init(struct inet_hashinfo *h)
 		INIT_HLIST_NULLS_HEAD(&h->listening_hash[i].nulls_head,
 				      i + LISTENING_NULLS_BASE);
 	}
+
+	if (h != &tcp_hashinfo)
+		return;
+
+	/* this one is used for source ports of outgoing connections */
+	table_perturb = kmalloc_array(INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE,
+				      sizeof(*table_perturb), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!table_perturb)
+		panic("TCP: failed to alloc table_perturb");
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_hashinfo_init);
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
index 9c4670fb29d7..7b0963712c22 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
@@ -526,14 +526,15 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 	struct ipcm6_cookie ipc6;
 	int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
 	int transhdrlen = 4; /* zero session-id */
-	int ulen = len + transhdrlen;
+	int ulen;
 	int err;
 
 	/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
 	   better check is made in ip6_append_data().
 	 */
-	if (len > INT_MAX)
+	if (len > INT_MAX - transhdrlen)
 		return -EMSGSIZE;
+	ulen = len + transhdrlen;
 
 	/* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */
 	if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
index ad07b7cb6558..332fa7ec8a3d 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
@@ -435,20 +435,28 @@ abort:
  * Session (and tunnel control) socket create/destroy.
  *****************************************************************************/
 
+static void pppol2tp_put_sk(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
+
+	ps = container_of(head, typeof(*ps), rcu);
+	sock_put(ps->__sk);
+}
+
 /* Called by l2tp_core when a session socket is being closed.
  */
 static void pppol2tp_session_close(struct l2tp_session *session)
 {
-	struct sock *sk;
-
-	BUG_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC);
+	struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
 
-	sk = pppol2tp_session_get_sock(session);
-	if (sk) {
-		if (sk->sk_socket)
-			inet_shutdown(sk->sk_socket, SEND_SHUTDOWN);
-		sock_put(sk);
-	}
+	ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
+	mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
+	ps->__sk = rcu_dereference_protected(ps->sk,
+					     lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock));
+	RCU_INIT_POINTER(ps->sk, NULL);
+	if (ps->__sk)
+		call_rcu(&ps->rcu, pppol2tp_put_sk);
+	mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
 }
 
 /* Really kill the session socket. (Called from sock_put() if
@@ -468,14 +476,6 @@ static void pppol2tp_session_destruct(struct sock *sk)
 	}
 }
 
-static void pppol2tp_put_sk(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
-	struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
-
-	ps = container_of(head, typeof(*ps), rcu);
-	sock_put(ps->__sk);
-}
-
 /* Called when the PPPoX socket (session) is closed.
  */
 static int pppol2tp_release(struct socket *sock)
@@ -499,26 +499,17 @@ static int pppol2tp_release(struct socket *sock)
 	sock_orphan(sk);
 	sock->sk = NULL;
 
+	/* If the socket is associated with a session,
+	 * l2tp_session_delete will call pppol2tp_session_close which
+	 * will drop the session's ref on the socket.
+	 */
 	session = pppol2tp_sock_to_session(sk);
-
-	if (session != NULL) {
-		struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
-
+	if (session) {
 		l2tp_session_delete(session);
-
-		ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
-		mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
-		ps->__sk = rcu_dereference_protected(ps->sk,
-						     lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock));
-		RCU_INIT_POINTER(ps->sk, NULL);
-		mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
-		call_rcu(&ps->rcu, pppol2tp_put_sk);
-
-		/* Rely on the sock_put() call at the end of the function for
-		 * dropping the reference held by pppol2tp_sock_to_session().
-		 * The last reference will be dropped by pppol2tp_put_sk().
-		 */
+		/* drop the ref obtained by pppol2tp_sock_to_session */
+		sock_put(sk);
 	}
+
 	release_sock(sk);
 
 	/* This will delete the session context via
@@ -830,6 +821,7 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
 
 out_no_ppp:
 	/* This is how we get the session context from the socket. */
+	sock_hold(sk);
 	sk->sk_user_data = session;
 	rcu_assign_pointer(ps->sk, sk);
 	mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c
index 030bf17a20b6..0dae9260ba3c 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static unsigned int rpcrdma_max_call_header_size(unsigned int maxsegs)
 
 	/* Maximum Read list size */
 	maxsegs += 2;	/* segment for head and tail buffers */
-	size = maxsegs * sizeof(struct rpcrdma_read_chunk);
+	size += maxsegs * sizeof(struct rpcrdma_read_chunk);
 
 	/* Minimal Read chunk size */
 	size += sizeof(__be32);	/* segment count */
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static unsigned int rpcrdma_max_reply_header_size(unsigned int maxsegs)
 
 	/* Maximum Write list size */
 	maxsegs += 2;	/* segment for head and tail buffers */
-	size = sizeof(__be32);		/* segment count */
+	size += sizeof(__be32);		/* segment count */
 	size += maxsegs * sizeof(struct rpcrdma_segment);
 	size += sizeof(__be32);	/* list discriminator */
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c
index 0d9c4a57301b..47f2439fd7b0 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c
@@ -141,7 +141,9 @@ static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mic_tlv, 1600, 100, 0);
 
 static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(pga_tlv, -600, 50, 0);
 
-static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mix_tlv, -50, 50, 0);
+static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(pass_tlv, -6000, 50, 0);
+
+static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mix_tlv, -5150, 50, 0);
 
 static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(beep_tlv, -56, 200, 0);
 
@@ -355,7 +357,7 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l52_snd_controls[] = {
 			      CS42L52_SPKB_VOL, 0, 0x40, 0xC0, hl_tlv),
 
 	SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("Bypass Volume", CS42L52_PASSTHRUA_VOL,
-			      CS42L52_PASSTHRUB_VOL, 0, 0x88, 0x90, pga_tlv),
+			      CS42L52_PASSTHRUB_VOL, 0, 0x88, 0x90, pass_tlv),
 
 	SOC_DOUBLE("Bypass Mute", CS42L52_MISC_CTL, 4, 5, 1, 0),
 
@@ -368,7 +370,7 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l52_snd_controls[] = {
 			      CS42L52_ADCB_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x78, ipd_tlv),
 	SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("ADC Mixer Volume",
 			     CS42L52_ADCA_MIXER_VOL, CS42L52_ADCB_MIXER_VOL,
-				0, 0x19, 0x7F, ipd_tlv),
+				0, 0x19, 0x7F, mix_tlv),
 
 	SOC_DOUBLE("ADC Switch", CS42L52_ADC_MISC_CTL, 0, 1, 1, 0),
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c
index 52858b6c95a6..9274b52edc44 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c
@@ -403,9 +403,9 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l56_snd_controls[] = {
 	SOC_DOUBLE("ADC Boost Switch", CS42L56_GAIN_BIAS_CTL, 3, 2, 1, 1),
 
 	SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("Headphone Volume", CS42L56_HPA_VOLUME,
-			      CS42L56_HPB_VOLUME, 0, 0x84, 0x48, hl_tlv),
+			      CS42L56_HPB_VOLUME, 0, 0x44, 0x48, hl_tlv),
 	SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("LineOut Volume", CS42L56_LOA_VOLUME,
-			      CS42L56_LOB_VOLUME, 0, 0x84, 0x48, hl_tlv),
+			      CS42L56_LOB_VOLUME, 0, 0x44, 0x48, hl_tlv),
 
 	SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Bass Shelving Volume", CS42L56_TONE_CTL,
 			0, 0x00, 1, tone_tlv),
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c
index c7edf2df5e36..f30807b3705d 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c
@@ -351,22 +351,22 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs53l30_snd_controls[] = {
 	SOC_ENUM("ADC2 NG Delay", adc2_ng_delay_enum),
 
 	SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1A PGA Volume",
-		    CS53L30_ADC1A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
+		    CS53L30_ADC1A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
 	SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1B PGA Volume",
-		    CS53L30_ADC1B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
+		    CS53L30_ADC1B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
 	SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2A PGA Volume",
-		    CS53L30_ADC2A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
+		    CS53L30_ADC2A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
 	SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2B PGA Volume",
-		    CS53L30_ADC2B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
+		    CS53L30_ADC2B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
 
 	SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1A Digital Volume",
-		    CS53L30_ADC1A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
+		    CS53L30_ADC1A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
 	SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1B Digital Volume",
-		    CS53L30_ADC1B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
+		    CS53L30_ADC1B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
 	SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2A Digital Volume",
-		    CS53L30_ADC2A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
+		    CS53L30_ADC2A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
 	SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2B Digital Volume",
-		    CS53L30_ADC2B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
+		    CS53L30_ADC2B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
 };
 
 static const struct snd_soc_dapm_widget cs53l30_dapm_widgets[] = {
diff --git linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c
index 0e8008d38161..d46881f96c16 100644
--- linux-libre-4.14.284-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c
+++ linux-libre-4.14.285-gnu1/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c
@@ -3861,6 +3861,7 @@ static int wm8962_runtime_suspend(struct device *dev)
 #endif
 
 static const struct dev_pm_ops wm8962_pm = {
+	SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(pm_runtime_force_suspend, pm_runtime_force_resume)
 	SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS(wm8962_runtime_suspend, wm8962_runtime_resume, NULL)
 };
 
