diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index db9d53b879f8..8f71a17ad544 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4298,6 +4298,18 @@
 
 	retain_initrd	[RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction
 
+	retbleed=	[X86] Control mitigation of RETBleed (Arbitrary
+			Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions)
+			vulnerability.
+
+			off         - unconditionally disable
+			auto        - automatically select a migitation
+
+			Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run
+			time according to the CPU.
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to retbleed=auto.
+
 	rfkill.default_state=
 		0	"airplane mode".  All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm,
 			etc. communication is blocked by default.
@@ -4541,6 +4553,7 @@
 			eibrs		  - enhanced IBRS
 			eibrs,retpoline   - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
 			eibrs,lfence      - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
+			ibrs		  - use IBRS to protect kernel
 
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			spectre_v2=auto.
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst
index e899f14a4ba2..4f8a06b00f60 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ the Technical Advisory Board (TAB) or other maintainers if you're
 uncertain how to handle situations that come up.  It will not be
 considered a violation report unless you want it to be.  If you are
 uncertain about approaching the TAB or any other maintainers, please
-reach out to our conflict mediator, Mishi Choudhary <mishi@linux.com>.
+reach out to our conflict mediator, Joanna Lee <joanna.lee@gesmer.com>.
 
 In the end, "be kind to each other" is really what the end goal is for
 everybody.  We know everyone is human and we all fail at times, but the
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/Makefile linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/Makefile
index fdeaf312cbf0..6a8afa0696b1 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/Makefile
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 5
 PATCHLEVEL = 4
-SUBLEVEL = 216
+SUBLEVEL = 217
 EXTRAVERSION = -gnu1
 NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus
 
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/calling.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index b3f121478738..29e5675c6d4f 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 #include <asm/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 /*
 
@@ -146,27 +148,19 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 
 .endm
 
-.macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1 skip_r11rcx=0
+.macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1
 	popq %r15
 	popq %r14
 	popq %r13
 	popq %r12
 	popq %rbp
 	popq %rbx
-	.if \skip_r11rcx
-	popq %rsi
-	.else
 	popq %r11
-	.endif
 	popq %r10
 	popq %r9
 	popq %r8
 	popq %rax
-	.if \skip_r11rcx
-	popq %rsi
-	.else
 	popq %rcx
-	.endif
 	popq %rdx
 	popq %rsi
 	.if \pop_rdi
@@ -316,6 +310,62 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * IBRS kernel mitigation for Spectre_v2.
+ *
+ * Assumes full context is established (PUSH_REGS, CR3 and GS) and it clobbers
+ * the regs it uses (AX, CX, DX). Must be called before the first RET
+ * instruction (NOTE! UNTRAIN_RET includes a RET instruction)
+ *
+ * The optional argument is used to save/restore the current value,
+ * which is used on the paranoid paths.
+ *
+ * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set.
+ */
+.macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
+	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
+
+.ifnb \save_reg
+	rdmsr
+	shl	$32, %rdx
+	or	%rdx, %rax
+	mov	%rax, \save_reg
+	test	$SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, %eax
+	jz	.Ldo_wrmsr_\@
+	lfence
+	jmp	.Lend_\@
+.Ldo_wrmsr_\@:
+.endif
+
+	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx
+	movl	%edx, %eax
+	shr	$32, %rdx
+	wrmsr
+.Lend_\@:
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * Similar to IBRS_ENTER, requires KERNEL GS,CR3 and clobbers (AX, CX, DX)
+ * regs. Must be called after the last RET.
+ */
+.macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
+	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
+
+.ifnb \save_reg
+	mov	\save_reg, %rdx
+.else
+	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx
+	andl	$(~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS), %edx
+.endif
+
+	movl	%edx, %eax
+	shr	$32, %rdx
+	wrmsr
+.Lend_\@:
+.endm
+
 /*
  * Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths.
  *
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
index bde3e0f85425..2d837fb54c31 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -750,7 +750,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	movl	%ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(stack_canary)+stack_canary_offset
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 	/*
 	 * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
 	 * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
@@ -759,7 +758,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	 * speculative execution to prevent attack.
 	 */
 	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
-#endif
 
 	/* restore callee-saved registers */
 	popfl
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 2ba3d53ac5b1..c82136030d58 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -172,6 +172,10 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe)
 	/* IRQs are off. */
 	movq	%rax, %rdi
 	movq	%rsp, %rsi
+
+	/* clobbers %rax, make sure it is after saving the syscall nr */
+	IBRS_ENTER
+
 	call	do_syscall_64		/* returns with IRQs disabled */
 
 	TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ		/* we're about to change IF */
@@ -248,8 +252,8 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe)
 	 * perf profiles. Nothing jumps here.
 	 */
 syscall_return_via_sysret:
-	/* rcx and r11 are already restored (see code above) */
-	POP_REGS pop_rdi=0 skip_r11rcx=1
+	IBRS_EXIT
+	POP_REGS pop_rdi=0
 
 	/*
 	 * Now all regs are restored except RSP and RDI.
@@ -301,7 +305,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	movq	%rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data) + stack_canary_offset
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 	/*
 	 * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
 	 * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
@@ -310,7 +313,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	 * speculative execution to prevent attack.
 	 */
 	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
-#endif
 
 	/* restore callee-saved registers */
 	popq	%r15
@@ -622,6 +624,7 @@ GLOBAL(retint_user)
 	TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
 
 GLOBAL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode)
+	IBRS_EXIT
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
 	/* Assert that pt_regs indicates user mode. */
 	testb	$3, CS(%rsp)
@@ -1248,7 +1251,13 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
 	 */
 	FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
 
-	ret
+	/*
+	 * Once we have CR3 and %GS setup save and set SPEC_CTRL. Just like
+	 * CR3 above, keep the old value in a callee saved register.
+	 */
+	IBRS_ENTER save_reg=%r15
+
+	RET
 END(paranoid_entry)
 
 /*
@@ -1276,12 +1285,20 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_exit)
 	jmp	.Lparanoid_exit_restore
 .Lparanoid_exit_no_swapgs:
 	TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ_DEBUG
+
+	/*
+	 * Must restore IBRS state before both CR3 and %GS since we need access
+	 * to the per-CPU x86_spec_ctrl_shadow variable.
+	 */
+	IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15
+
 	/* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */
 	RESTORE_CR3	scratch_reg=%rbx save_reg=%r14
 .Lparanoid_exit_restore:
 	jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
 END(paranoid_exit)
 
+
 /*
  * Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch GS if needed.
  */
@@ -1301,6 +1318,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
 	FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
 	/* We have user CR3.  Change to kernel CR3. */
 	SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
+	IBRS_ENTER
 
 .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs:
 	/* Put us onto the real thread stack. */
@@ -1356,6 +1374,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
 	SWAPGS
 	FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
 	SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
+	IBRS_ENTER
 
 	/*
 	 * Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
@@ -1461,6 +1480,8 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
 	PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rdx=(%rdx)
 	ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
 
+	IBRS_ENTER
+
 	/*
 	 * At this point we no longer need to worry about stack damage
 	 * due to nesting -- we're on the normal thread stack and we're
@@ -1684,6 +1705,9 @@ end_repeat_nmi:
 	movq	$-1, %rsi
 	call	do_nmi
 
+	/* Always restore stashed SPEC_CTRL value (see paranoid_entry) */
+	IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15
+
 	/* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */
 	RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%r15 save_reg=%r14
 
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
index 39913770a44d..c3c4ea4a6711 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
  *
  * Copyright 2000-2002 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs.
  */
-#include "calling.h"
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 #include <asm/current.h>
 #include <asm/errno.h>
@@ -17,6 +16,8 @@
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 
+#include "calling.h"
+
 	.section .entry.text, "ax"
 
 /*
@@ -106,6 +107,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
 	xorl	%r15d, %r15d		/* nospec   r15 */
 	cld
 
+	IBRS_ENTER
+
 	/*
 	 * SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT and AC
 	 * ourselves.  To save a few cycles, we can check whether
@@ -253,6 +256,8 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe)
 	 */
 	TRACE_IRQS_OFF
 
+	IBRS_ENTER
+
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi
 	call	do_fast_syscall_32
 	/* XEN PV guests always use IRET path */
@@ -267,6 +272,9 @@ sysret32_from_system_call:
 	 */
 	STACKLEAK_ERASE
 	TRACE_IRQS_ON			/* User mode traces as IRQs on. */
+
+	IBRS_EXIT
+
 	movq	RBX(%rsp), %rbx		/* pt_regs->rbx */
 	movq	RBP(%rsp), %rbp		/* pt_regs->rbp */
 	movq	EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11	/* pt_regs->flags (in r11) */
@@ -408,6 +416,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
 	 * gate turned them off.
 	 */
 	TRACE_IRQS_OFF
+	IBRS_ENTER
 
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi
 	call	do_int80_syscall_32
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
index 0c814cd9ea42..cdf39decf734 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
@@ -5,15 +5,22 @@
 /*
  * Declare drivers belonging to specific x86 CPUs
  * Similar in spirit to pci_device_id and related PCI functions
+ *
+ * The wildcard initializers are in mod_devicetable.h because
+ * file2alias needs them. Sigh.
  */
-
 #include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
+/* Get the INTEL_FAM* model defines */
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+/* And the X86_VENDOR_* ones */
+#include <asm/processor.h>
 
+/* Centaur FAM6 models */
+#define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_C7_A		0xa
 #define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_C7_D		0xd
 #define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_NANO		0xf
 
 #define X86_STEPPINGS(mins, maxs)    GENMASK(maxs, mins)
-
 /**
  * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching
  * @_vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
@@ -26,8 +33,11 @@
  *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
  *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
  *
- * Backport version to keep the SRBDS pile consistant. No shorter variants
- * required for this.
+ * Use only if you need all selectors. Otherwise use one of the shorter
+ * macros of the X86_MATCH_* family. If there is no matching shorthand
+ * macro, consider to add one. If you really need to wrap one of the macros
+ * into another macro at the usage site for good reasons, then please
+ * start this local macro with X86_MATCH to allow easy grepping.
  */
 #define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model, \
 						    _steppings, _feature, _data) { \
@@ -39,6 +49,120 @@
 	.driver_data	= (unsigned long) _data				\
 }
 
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE - Macro for CPU matching
+ * @_vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ *		The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@_vendor
+ * @_family:	The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
+ * @_model:	The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY
+ * @_feature:	A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY
+ * @_data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * The steppings arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE() is
+ * set to wildcards.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(vendor, family, model, feature, data) \
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(vendor, family, model, \
+						X86_STEPPING_ANY, feature, data)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_FEATURE - Macro for matching vendor, family and CPU feature
+ * @vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ *		The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@vendor
+ * @family:	The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
+ * @feature:	A X86_FEATURE bit
+ * @data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * All other missing arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are
+ * set to wildcards.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_FEATURE(vendor, family, feature, data)	\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(vendor, family,		\
+					   X86_MODEL_ANY, feature, data)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FEATURE - Macro for matching vendor and CPU feature
+ * @vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ *		The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@vendor
+ * @feature:	A X86_FEATURE bit
+ * @data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * All other missing arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are
+ * set to wildcards.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FEATURE(vendor, feature, data)			\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_FEATURE(vendor, X86_FAMILY_ANY, feature, data)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_FEATURE - Macro for matching a CPU feature
+ * @feature:	A X86_FEATURE bit
+ * @data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * All other missing arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are
+ * set to wildcards.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_FEATURE(feature, data)				\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FEATURE(ANY, feature, data)
+
+/* Transitional to keep the existing code working */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MATCH(feature)	X86_MATCH_FEATURE(feature, NULL)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL - Match vendor, family and model
+ * @vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ *		The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@vendor
+ * @family:	The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
+ * @model:	The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY
+ * @data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * All other missing arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are
+ * set to wildcards.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, data)		\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(vendor, family, model,	\
+					   X86_FEATURE_ANY, data)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM - Match vendor and family
+ * @vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ *		The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@vendor
+ * @family:	The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
+ * @data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * All other missing arguments to X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are
+ * set of wildcards.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM(vendor, family, data)			\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, data)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL - Match vendor INTEL, family 6 and model
+ * @model:	The model name without the INTEL_FAM6_ prefix or ANY
+ *		The model name is expanded to INTEL_FAM6_@model internally
+ * @data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * The vendor is set to INTEL, the family to 6 and all other missing
+ * arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are set to wildcards.
+ *
+ * See X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() for further information.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(model, data)				\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_##model, data)
+
 /*
  * Match specific microcode revisions.
  *
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 736b0e412344..2ec85d7bfdff 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -203,8 +203,8 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK	( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SME			( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PTI			( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE	( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS		( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT		( 7*32+13) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN		( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2		( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL	( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
@@ -286,7 +286,10 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL	(11*32+ 3) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER	(11*32+ 4) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL	(11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE	(11*32+ 6) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL		(11*32+11) /* "" RET prediction control */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		(11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE	(11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE	(11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16		(12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
@@ -303,6 +306,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD		(13*32+24) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD		(13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO		(13*32+26) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass is fixed in hardware. */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO		(13*32+29) /* "" Not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */
 
 /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM		(14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
@@ -407,7 +411,8 @@
 #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT		X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
 #define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
 #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA		X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
-#define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN		X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
+#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED		X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
 #define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB		X86_BUG(27) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
+#define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN		X86_BUG(28) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
index 5b07573c3bc8..c1d6d8bbb7da 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@
  * The #define line may optionally include a comment including platform names.
  */
 
+/* Wildcard match for FAM6 so X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ANY) works */
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ANY			X86_MODEL_ANY
+
 #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH		0x0E
 
 #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM		0x0F
@@ -126,6 +129,9 @@
 #define INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL		0x57 /* Knights Landing */
 #define INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM		0x85 /* Knights Mill */
 
+/* Family 5 */
+#define INTEL_FAM5_QUARK_X1000		0x09 /* Quark X1000 SoC */
+
 /* Useful macros */
 #define INTEL_CPU_FAM_ANY(_family, _model, _driver_data)	\
 {								\
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index cef4eba03ff3..713886d5493a 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@
 #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT)	/* STIBP mask */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT		2	   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)	/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT	6	   /* Disable RRSBA behavior */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S		BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT)
 
 #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
 #define PRED_CMD_IBPB			BIT(0)	   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
@@ -82,6 +84,7 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
 #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		BIT(0)	/* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
 #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		BIT(1)	/* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RSBA			BIT(2)	/* RET may use alternative branch predictors */
 #define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH	BIT(3)	/* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
 #define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO			BIT(4)	/*
 						 * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
@@ -129,6 +132,13 @@
 						 * bit available to control VERW
 						 * behavior.
 						 */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RRSBA			BIT(19)	/*
+						 * Indicates RET may use predictors
+						 * other than the RSB. With eIBRS
+						 * enabled predictions in kernel mode
+						 * are restricted to targets in
+						 * kernel.
+						 */
 #define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO		BIT(24)	/*
 						 * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier
 						 * Return Stack Buffer Predictions.
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index a1ee1a760c3e..8c898eed2894 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -4,11 +4,14 @@
 #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
 
 #include <linux/static_key.h>
+#include <linux/frame.h>
 
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
 #include <asm/msr-index.h>
+#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
+#include <asm/percpu.h>
 
 /*
  * This should be used immediately before a retpoline alternative. It tells
@@ -60,9 +63,9 @@
 	lfence;					\
 	jmp	775b;				\
 774:						\
+	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp;	\
 	dec	reg;				\
 	jnz	771b;				\
-	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;	\
 	/* barrier for jnz misprediction */	\
 	lfence;
 #else
@@ -79,13 +82,6 @@
 	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
 #endif
 
-#define __ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD(sp)	\
-	call	881f;				\
-	int3;					\
-881:						\
-	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8), sp;		\
-	lfence;
-
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
 
 /*
@@ -155,26 +151,28 @@
 #endif
 .endm
 
-.macro ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD ftr:req
-	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
-	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_pbrsb_\@",				\
-		__stringify(__ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD(%_ASM_SP))	\
-		\ftr
-.Lskip_pbrsb_\@:
+.macro ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD
+	call .Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@
+	int3
+.Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@:
+	add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP
+	lfence
 .endm
 
  /*
   * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
   * monstrosity above, manually.
   */
-.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
-	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@",				\
-		__stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP))	\
-		\ftr
+.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req ftr2
+.ifb \ftr2
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr
+.else
+	ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr, "jmp .Lunbalanced_\@", \ftr2
+.endif
+	__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)
+.Lunbalanced_\@:
+	ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD
 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
-#endif
 .endm
 
 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
@@ -249,6 +247,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS,
 	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
 	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
 };
 
 /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
@@ -312,6 +311,9 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 
 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force);
+extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void);
 
 /*
  * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
@@ -321,18 +323,16 @@ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
  */
 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start()			\
 do {									\
-	u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;			\
-									\
 	preempt_disable();						\
-	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,			\
+	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,			\
+			      spec_ctrl_current() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS,	\
 			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);			\
 } while (0)
 
 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end()			\
 do {									\
-	u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base;					\
-									\
-	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,			\
+	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,			\
+			      spec_ctrl_current(),			\
 			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);			\
 	preempt_enable();						\
 } while (0)
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 88cef978380b..5571b28d35b6 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -894,12 +894,21 @@ static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	node_reclaim_distance = 32;
 #endif
 
-	/*
-	 * Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID.
-	 * Always set it, except when running under a hypervisor.
-	 */
-	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB))
-		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
+	/* Fix up CPUID bits, but only if not virtualised. */
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+
+		/* Erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. */
+		if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB))
+			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
+
+		/*
+		 * Zen3 (Fam19 model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to
+		 * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the
+		 * BTC_NO bit.
+		 */
+		if (c->x86 == 0x19 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO))
+			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO);
+	}
 }
 
 static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index c90d91cb1434..cf5a18e261e3 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
 
 static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -46,16 +48,40 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
 
-/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
+/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+/* The current value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR with task-specific bits set */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
 
 /*
- * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
- * x86_spec_ctrl_base.
+ * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ
+ * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update().
  */
-static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force)
+{
+	if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val)
+		return;
+
+	this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val);
+
+	/*
+	 * When KERNEL_IBRS this MSR is written on return-to-user, unless
+	 * forced the update can be delayed until that time.
+	 */
+	if (force || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS))
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val);
+}
+
+u64 spec_ctrl_current(void)
+{
+	return this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current);
 
 /*
  * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
@@ -105,13 +131,21 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 
-	/* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
-		x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
-
 	/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
 	spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
 	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+	/*
+	 * retbleed_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
+	 * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about
+	 * spectre_v2=ibrs.
+	 */
+	retbleed_select_mitigation();
+	/*
+	 * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
+	 * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is
+	 * forced for UNRET.
+	 */
+	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
 	ssb_select_mitigation();
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
 	md_clear_select_mitigation();
@@ -151,31 +185,17 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 #endif
 }
 
+/*
+ * NOTE: For VMX, this function is not called in the vmexit path.
+ * It uses vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() instead.
+ */
 void
 x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
 {
-	u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+	u64 msrval, guestval = guest_spec_ctrl, hostval = spec_ctrl_current();
 	struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
 
-	/* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
 	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
-		/*
-		 * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the
-		 * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the
-		 * modifiable bits from the guest value.
-		 */
-		guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
-		guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
-
-		/* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
-		if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
-		    static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
-			hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
-
-		/* Conditional STIBP enabled? */
-		if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
-			hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
-
 		if (hostval != guestval) {
 			msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
 			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
@@ -705,12 +725,103 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str)
 }
 early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
 
-#undef pr_fmt
-#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
-
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
 	SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "RETBleed: " fmt
+
+enum retbleed_mitigation {
+	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE,
+	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS,
+	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS,
+};
+
+enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
+	RETBLEED_CMD_OFF,
+	RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO,
+};
+
+const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
+	[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE]	= "Vulnerable",
+	[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS]	= "Mitigation: IBRS",
+	[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS]	= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+};
+
+static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
+static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init =
+	RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
+
+static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "auto"))
+		retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
+	else
+		pr_err("Unknown retbleed option (%s). Defaulting to 'auto'\n", str);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline);
+
+#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n"
+#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n"
+#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n"
+
+static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off())
+		return;
+
+	switch (retbleed_cmd) {
+	case RETBLEED_CMD_OFF:
+		return;
+
+	case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
+	default:
+		/*
+		 * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in
+		 * spectre_v2_select_mitigation().
+		 */
+
+		break;
+	}
+
+	switch (retbleed_mitigation) {
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the
+	 * retbleed= cmdline option.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+		switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
+		case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS;
+			break;
+		case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG);
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
+
 static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init =
 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
 static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init =
@@ -740,6 +851,7 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
 #define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n"
 #define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
 #define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS+LFENCE mitigation and SMT, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_PERF_MSG "WARNING: IBRS mitigation selected on Enhanced IBRS CPU, this may cause unnecessary performance loss\n"
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
 void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
@@ -781,6 +893,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
 	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,
 	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
 	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS,
 };
 
 enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
@@ -821,13 +934,15 @@ static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
 		pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason);
 }
 
+static __ro_after_init enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd;
+
 static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init
-spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
+spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
 {
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	switch (v2_cmd) {
+	switch (spectre_v2_cmd) {
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
 		return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
@@ -853,15 +968,16 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 	return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
 }
 
-static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
 {
-	return (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
-		mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
-		mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE);
+	return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ||
+	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
 }
 
 static void __init
-spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
+spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
 	bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP);
@@ -874,7 +990,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 	    cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
 		smt_possible = false;
 
-	cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd);
+	cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline();
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE:
 		goto set_mode;
@@ -922,12 +1038,12 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
-	 * required.
+	 * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible,
+	 * STIBP is not required.
 	 */
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
 	    !smt_possible ||
-	    spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+	    spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
 		return;
 
 	/*
@@ -952,6 +1068,7 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
 	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS]			= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
 	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
 	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_IBRS]			= "Mitigation: IBRS",
 };
 
 static const struct {
@@ -969,6 +1086,7 @@ static const struct {
 	{ "eibrs,lfence",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,	  false },
 	{ "eibrs,retpoline",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,	  false },
 	{ "auto",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,		  false },
+	{ "ibrs",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS,              false },
 };
 
 static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
@@ -1031,6 +1149,24 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	}
 
+	if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+		pr_err("%s selected but not Intel CPU. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
+
+	if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
+		pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
+
+	if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
+		pr_err("%s selected but running as XenPV guest. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
+
 	spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option,
 			   mitigation_options[i].secure);
 	return cmd;
@@ -1046,6 +1182,22 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
 	return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
 }
 
+/* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */
+static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL))
+		return;
+
+	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) {
+		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S;
+		write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
+	}
+}
+
 static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
 {
 	/*
@@ -1070,10 +1222,6 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_
 	 */
 	switch (mode) {
 	case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
-	/* These modes already fill RSB at vmexit */
-	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
-	case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
-	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
 		return;
 
 	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
@@ -1083,6 +1231,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_
 			pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n");
 		}
 		return;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
+		pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n");
+		return;
 	}
 
 	pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation at VM exit");
@@ -1113,6 +1269,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 			break;
 		}
 
+		if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
+		    retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF &&
+		    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
+		    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+			mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+			break;
+		}
+
 		mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
 		break;
 
@@ -1129,6 +1293,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 		mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
 		break;
 
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+		break;
+
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS:
 		mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
 		break;
@@ -1145,10 +1313,9 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
 		pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
 
-	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
-		/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
+	if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
 		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+		write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
 	}
 
 	switch (mode) {
@@ -1156,6 +1323,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
 		break;
 
+	case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS);
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED))
+			pr_warn(SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_PERF_MSG);
+		break;
+
 	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE);
@@ -1167,16 +1340,56 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Disable alternate RSB predictions in kernel when indirect CALLs and
+	 * JMPs gets protection against BHI and Intramode-BTI, but RET
+	 * prediction from a non-RSB predictor is still a risk.
+	 */
+	if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+	    mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+	    mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE)
+		spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
+
 	spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
 	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
 
 	/*
-	 * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill
-	 * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent
-	 * issues:
+	 * If Spectre v2 protection has been enabled, fill the RSB during a
+	 * context switch.  In general there are two types of RSB attacks
+	 * across context switches, for which the CALLs/RETs may be unbalanced.
+	 *
+	 * 1) RSB underflow
+	 *
+	 *    Some Intel parts have "bottomless RSB".  When the RSB is empty,
+	 *    speculated return targets may come from the branch predictor,
+	 *    which could have a user-poisoned BTB or BHB entry.
+	 *
+	 *    AMD has it even worse: *all* returns are speculated from the BTB,
+	 *    regardless of the state of the RSB.
+	 *
+	 *    When IBRS or eIBRS is enabled, the "user -> kernel" attack
+	 *    scenario is mitigated by the IBRS branch prediction isolation
+	 *    properties, so the RSB buffer filling wouldn't be necessary to
+	 *    protect against this type of attack.
+	 *
+	 *    The "user -> user" attack scenario is mitigated by RSB filling.
 	 *
-	 *	- RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+
-	 *	- SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs
+	 * 2) Poisoned RSB entry
+	 *
+	 *    If the 'next' in-kernel return stack is shorter than 'prev',
+	 *    'next' could be tricked into speculating with a user-poisoned RSB
+	 *    entry.
+	 *
+	 *    The "user -> kernel" attack scenario is mitigated by SMEP and
+	 *    eIBRS.
+	 *
+	 *    The "user -> user" scenario, also known as SpectreBHB, requires
+	 *    RSB clearing.
+	 *
+	 * So to mitigate all cases, unconditionally fill RSB on context
+	 * switches.
+	 *
+	 * FIXME: Is this pointless for retbleed-affected AMD?
 	 */
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
 	pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
@@ -1184,28 +1397,29 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(mode);
 
 	/*
-	 * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
-	 * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted
-	 * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't
-	 * supported.
+	 * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware.  IBRS
+	 * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around
+	 * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise
+	 * enabled.
 	 *
 	 * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
 	 * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
 	 * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
 	 * enable IBRS around firmware calls.
 	 */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
 		pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
 	}
 
 	/* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
-	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd);
+	spectre_v2_cmd = cmd;
 }
 
 static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
 {
-	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+	u64 val = spec_ctrl_current() | (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP);
+	write_spec_ctrl_current(val, true);
 }
 
 /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */
@@ -1421,16 +1635,6 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper
-	 * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the
-	 * case where the host does not enable it.
-	 */
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
-	    static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
-		x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
 	 *  - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
@@ -1448,7 +1652,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 			x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 		} else {
 			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
-			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+			write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -1665,7 +1869,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
 void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+		write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
 
 	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
 		x86_amd_ssb_disable();
@@ -1900,7 +2104,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
 
 static char *stibp_state(void)
 {
-	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+	if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
 		return "";
 
 	switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
@@ -1934,7 +2138,7 @@ static char *pbrsb_eibrs_state(void)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
 		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE) ||
-		    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE))
+		    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT))
 			return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence";
 		else
 			return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable";
@@ -1970,6 +2174,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
 	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
 }
 
+static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
+}
+
 static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 {
@@ -2016,6 +2225,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 	case X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN:
 		return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
 
+	case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
+		return retbleed_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -2075,4 +2287,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *at
 	else
 		return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+}
 #endif
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 59413e741ecf..5e1e32f1086b 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1102,48 +1102,60 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	{}
 };
 
+#define VULNBL(vendor, family, model, blacklist)	\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, blacklist)
+
 #define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues)		   \
 	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6,		   \
 					    INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
 					    X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
 
+#define VULNBL_AMD(family, blacklist)		\
+	VULNBL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)
+
+#define VULNBL_HYGON(family, blacklist)		\
+	VULNBL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)
+
 #define SRBDS		BIT(0)
 /* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
 #define MMIO		BIT(1)
 /* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
 #define MMIO_SBDS	BIT(2)
+/* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */
+#define RETBLEED	BIT(3)
 
 static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X,	BIT(2) | BIT(4),		MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5),	MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3),	SRBDS | MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X,	BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) |
-						BIT(7) | BIT(0xB),              MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3),	SRBDS | MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC),	SRBDS | MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8),	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD),	SRBDS | MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8),	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6),	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE,	BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED),
 	{}
 };
 
@@ -1251,6 +1263,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
 	}
 
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) {
+		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA))
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+	}
+
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) &&
 	    !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
 	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
index 2f163e6646b6..ad6776081e60 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
@@ -16,12 +16,17 @@
  * respective wildcard entries.
  *
  * A typical table entry would be to match a specific CPU
- * { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, 0x12 }
- * or to match a specific CPU feature
- * { X86_FEATURE_MATCH(X86_FEATURE_FOOBAR) }
+ *
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL,
+ *				      X86_FEATURE_ANY, NULL);
  *
  * Fields can be wildcarded with %X86_VENDOR_ANY, %X86_FAMILY_ANY,
- * %X86_MODEL_ANY, %X86_FEATURE_ANY or 0 (except for vendor)
+ * %X86_MODEL_ANY, %X86_FEATURE_ANY (except for vendor)
+ *
+ * asm/cpu_device_id.h contains a set of useful macros which are shortcuts
+ * for various common selections. The above can be shortened to:
+ *
+ * X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(BROADWELL, NULL);
  *
  * Arrays used to match for this should also be declared using
  * MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, ...)
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index 53004dbd55c4..a03e309a0ac5 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ struct cpuid_bit {
 static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF,       CPUID_ECX,  0, 0x00000006, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_EPB,		CPUID_ECX,  3, 0x00000006, 0 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL,	CPUID_EDX,  2, 0x00000007, 2 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC,		CPUID_EDX,  1, 0x0000000f, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC,	CPUID_EDX,  0, 0x0000000f, 1 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL,	CPUID_EDX,  1, 0x0000000f, 1 },
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/process.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 068715a52ac1..87cfd2ee9ca0 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp,
 	}
 
 	if (updmsr)
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+		write_spec_ctrl_current(msr, false);
 }
 
 static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 1efcc7d4bc88..3db407e3c416 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
 #include <asm/kvm_para.h>
 #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
 #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 
 #include <asm/virtext.h>
 #include "trace.h"
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 34ee4835b017..a7b62a00913e 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include "mmu.h"
 #include "nested.h"
 #include "trace.h"
+#include "vmx.h"
 #include "x86.h"
 
 static bool __read_mostly enable_shadow_vmcs = 1;
@@ -2863,35 +2864,8 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
 	}
 
-	asm(
-		"sub $%c[wordsize], %%" _ASM_SP "\n\t" /* temporarily adjust RSP for CALL */
-		"cmp %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_state_rsp](%[loaded_vmcs]) \n\t"
-		"je 1f \n\t"
-		__ex("vmwrite %%" _ASM_SP ", %[HOST_RSP]") "\n\t"
-		"mov %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_state_rsp](%[loaded_vmcs]) \n\t"
-		"1: \n\t"
-		"add $%c[wordsize], %%" _ASM_SP "\n\t" /* un-adjust RSP */
-
-		/* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */
-		"cmpb $0, %c[launched](%[loaded_vmcs])\n\t"
-
-		/*
-		 * VMLAUNCH and VMRESUME clear RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} on VM-Exit, set
-		 * RFLAGS.CF on VM-Fail Invalid and set RFLAGS.ZF on VM-Fail
-		 * Valid.  vmx_vmenter() directly "returns" RFLAGS, and so the
-		 * results of VM-Enter is captured via CC_{SET,OUT} to vm_fail.
-		 */
-		"call vmx_vmenter\n\t"
-
-		CC_SET(be)
-	      : ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, CC_OUT(be) (vm_fail)
-	      :	[HOST_RSP]"r"((unsigned long)HOST_RSP),
-		[loaded_vmcs]"r"(vmx->loaded_vmcs),
-		[launched]"i"(offsetof(struct loaded_vmcs, launched)),
-		[host_state_rsp]"i"(offsetof(struct loaded_vmcs, host_state.rsp)),
-		[wordsize]"i"(sizeof(ulong))
-	      : "memory"
-	);
+	vm_fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs,
+				 __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
 
 	if (vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr)
 		vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr);
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..edc3f16cc189
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H
+
+#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME	(1 << 0)
+#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL	(1 << 1)
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index 946d9205c3b6..2850670c38bb 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include <asm/bitsperlong.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_vcpu_regs.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include "run_flags.h"
 
 #define WORD_SIZE (BITS_PER_LONG / 8)
 
@@ -29,78 +30,12 @@
 
 	.text
 
-/**
- * vmx_vmenter - VM-Enter the current loaded VMCS
- *
- * %RFLAGS.ZF:	!VMCS.LAUNCHED, i.e. controls VMLAUNCH vs. VMRESUME
- *
- * Returns:
- *	%RFLAGS.CF is set on VM-Fail Invalid
- *	%RFLAGS.ZF is set on VM-Fail Valid
- *	%RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} are cleared on VM-Success, i.e. VM-Exit
- *
- * Note that VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH fall-through and return directly if
- * they VM-Fail, whereas a successful VM-Enter + VM-Exit will jump
- * to vmx_vmexit.
- */
-ENTRY(vmx_vmenter)
-	/* EFLAGS.ZF is set if VMCS.LAUNCHED == 0 */
-	je 2f
-
-1:	vmresume
-	ret
-
-2:	vmlaunch
-	ret
-
-3:	cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting
-	je 4f
-	ret
-4:	ud2
-
-	.pushsection .fixup, "ax"
-5:	jmp 3b
-	.popsection
-
-	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 5b)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 5b)
-
-ENDPROC(vmx_vmenter)
-
-/**
- * vmx_vmexit - Handle a VMX VM-Exit
- *
- * Returns:
- *	%RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} are cleared on VM-Success, i.e. VM-Exit
- *
- * This is vmx_vmenter's partner in crime.  On a VM-Exit, control will jump
- * here after hardware loads the host's state, i.e. this is the destination
- * referred to by VMCS.HOST_RIP.
- */
-ENTRY(vmx_vmexit)
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lvmexit_skip_rsb", "", X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
-	/* Preserve guest's RAX, it's used to stuff the RSB. */
-	push %_ASM_AX
-
-	/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
-	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
-
-	/* Clear RFLAGS.CF and RFLAGS.ZF to preserve VM-Exit, i.e. !VM-Fail. */
-	or $1, %_ASM_AX
-
-	pop %_ASM_AX
-.Lvmexit_skip_rsb:
-#endif
-	ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
-	ret
-ENDPROC(vmx_vmexit)
-
 /**
  * __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode
- * @vmx:	struct vcpu_vmx * (forwarded to vmx_update_host_rsp)
+ * @vmx:	struct vcpu_vmx *
  * @regs:	unsigned long * (to guest registers)
- * @launched:	%true if the VMCS has been launched
+ * @flags:	VMX_RUN_VMRESUME:	use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH
+ *		VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL: save guest SPEC_CTRL into vmx->spec_ctrl
  *
  * Returns:
  *	0 on VM-Exit, 1 on VM-Fail
@@ -119,24 +54,29 @@ ENTRY(__vmx_vcpu_run)
 #endif
 	push %_ASM_BX
 
+	/* Save @vmx for SPEC_CTRL handling */
+	push %_ASM_ARG1
+
+	/* Save @flags for SPEC_CTRL handling */
+	push %_ASM_ARG3
+
 	/*
 	 * Save @regs, _ASM_ARG2 may be modified by vmx_update_host_rsp() and
 	 * @regs is needed after VM-Exit to save the guest's register values.
 	 */
 	push %_ASM_ARG2
 
-	/* Copy @launched to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */
+	/* Copy @flags to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */
 	mov %_ASM_ARG3B, %bl
 
-	/* Adjust RSP to account for the CALL to vmx_vmenter(). */
-	lea -WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2
+	lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2
 	call vmx_update_host_rsp
 
 	/* Load @regs to RAX. */
 	mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX
 
 	/* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */
-	cmpb $0, %bl
+	testb $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME, %bl
 
 	/* Load guest registers.  Don't clobber flags. */
 	mov VCPU_RBX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_BX
@@ -158,11 +98,25 @@ ENTRY(__vmx_vcpu_run)
 	/* Load guest RAX.  This kills the @regs pointer! */
 	mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
 
-	/* Enter guest mode */
-	call vmx_vmenter
+	/* Check EFLAGS.ZF from 'testb' above */
+	jz .Lvmlaunch
 
-	/* Jump on VM-Fail. */
-	jbe 2f
+/*
+ * If VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH and corresponding vmexit succeed, execution resumes at
+ * the 'vmx_vmexit' label below.
+ */
+.Lvmresume:
+	vmresume
+	jmp .Lvmfail
+
+.Lvmlaunch:
+	vmlaunch
+	jmp .Lvmfail
+
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmresume, .Lfixup)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmlaunch, .Lfixup)
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 
 	/* Temporarily save guest's RAX. */
 	push %_ASM_AX
@@ -189,19 +143,21 @@ ENTRY(__vmx_vcpu_run)
 	mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX)
 #endif
 
-	/* Clear RAX to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */
-	xor %eax, %eax
+	/* Clear return value to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */
+	xor %ebx, %ebx
 
+.Lclear_regs:
 	/*
-	 * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent
+	 * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RBX to prevent
 	 * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded
 	 * via the stack.  In theory, an L1 cache miss when restoring registers
 	 * could lead to speculative execution with the guest's values.
 	 * Zeroing XORs are dirt cheap, i.e. the extra paranoia is essentially
 	 * free.  RSP and RAX are exempt as RSP is restored by hardware during
-	 * VM-Exit and RAX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to return VM-Fail.
+	 * VM-Exit and RBX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to hold the return
+	 * value.
 	 */
-1:	xor %ebx, %ebx
+	xor %eax, %eax
 	xor %ecx, %ecx
 	xor %edx, %edx
 	xor %esi, %esi
@@ -220,8 +176,32 @@ ENTRY(__vmx_vcpu_run)
 
 	/* "POP" @regs. */
 	add $WORD_SIZE, %_ASM_SP
-	pop %_ASM_BX
 
+	/*
+	 * IMPORTANT: RSB filling and SPEC_CTRL handling must be done before
+	 * the first unbalanced RET after vmexit!
+	 *
+	 * For retpoline or IBRS, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB
+	 * entries and (in some cases) RSB underflow.
+	 *
+	 * eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't
+	 * need the RSB filling sequence.  But it does need to be enabled, and a
+	 * single call to retire, before the first unbalanced RET.
+         */
+
+	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT,\
+			   X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
+
+
+	pop %_ASM_ARG2	/* @flags */
+	pop %_ASM_ARG1	/* @vmx */
+
+	call vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host
+
+	/* Put return value in AX */
+	mov %_ASM_BX, %_ASM_AX
+
+	pop %_ASM_BX
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	pop %r12
 	pop %r13
@@ -234,11 +214,20 @@ ENTRY(__vmx_vcpu_run)
 	pop %_ASM_BP
 	ret
 
-	/* VM-Fail.  Out-of-line to avoid a taken Jcc after VM-Exit. */
-2:	mov $1, %eax
-	jmp 1b
+.Lfixup:
+	cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting
+	jne .Lvmfail
+	ud2
+.Lvmfail:
+	/* VM-Fail: set return value to 1 */
+	mov $1, %_ASM_BX
+	jmp .Lclear_regs
+
 ENDPROC(__vmx_vcpu_run)
 
+
+.section .text, "ax"
+
 /**
  * vmread_error_trampoline - Trampoline from inline asm to vmread_error()
  * @field:	VMCS field encoding that failed
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 4bd1bf6214ee..d522c9de41df 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 #include <asm/debugreg.h>
 #include <asm/desc.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
@@ -358,9 +359,9 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 	if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
 		return;
 
-	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
+	msr = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL);
 	msr |= FB_CLEAR_DIS;
-	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
+	native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
 	/* Cache the MSR value to avoid reading it later */
 	vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl = msr;
 }
@@ -371,7 +372,7 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 		return;
 
 	vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~FB_CLEAR_DIS;
-	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl);
+	native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl);
 }
 
 static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
@@ -862,6 +863,24 @@ static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr)
 	return true;
 }
 
+unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	unsigned int flags = 0;
+
+	if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched)
+		flags |= VMX_RUN_VMRESUME;
+
+	/*
+	 * If writes to the SPEC_CTRL MSR aren't intercepted, the guest is free
+	 * to change it directly without causing a vmexit.  In that case read
+	 * it after vmexit and store it in vmx->spec_ctrl.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
+		flags |= VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL;
+
+	return flags;
+}
+
 static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
 		unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit)
 {
@@ -6539,7 +6558,30 @@ void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp)
 	}
 }
 
-bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, bool launched);
+void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+					unsigned int flags)
+{
+	u64 hostval = this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
+		return;
+
+	if (flags & VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL)
+		vmx->spec_ctrl = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the guest/host SPEC_CTRL values differ, restore the host value.
+	 *
+	 * For legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit always needs to be written after
+	 * transitioning from a less privileged predictor mode, regardless of
+	 * whether the guest/host values differ.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) ||
+	    vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval)
+		native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval);
+
+	barrier_nospec();
+}
 
 static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
@@ -6628,32 +6670,12 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2);
 
 	vmx->fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs,
-				   vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched);
+				   __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
 
 	vcpu->arch.cr2 = read_cr2();
 
 	vmx_enable_fb_clear(vmx);
 
-	/*
-	 * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
-	 * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
-	 * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding
-	 * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former
-	 * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM.
-	 *
-	 * For non-nested case:
-	 * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
-	 * save it.
-	 *
-	 * For nested case:
-	 * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
-	 * save it.
-	 */
-	if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
-		vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
-
-	x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
-
 	/* All fields are clean at this point */
 	if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
 		current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields |=
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index 7a3362ab5986..4d5be4610af8 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include "capabilities.h"
 #include "ops.h"
 #include "vmcs.h"
+#include "run_flags.h"
 
 extern const u32 vmx_msr_index[];
 extern u64 host_efer;
@@ -336,6 +337,10 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 struct shared_msr_entry *find_msr_entry(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr);
 void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
 void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp);
+void vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned int flags);
+unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
+bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs,
+		    unsigned int flags);
 
 #define POSTED_INTR_ON  0
 #define POSTED_INTR_SN  1
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index d0b297583df8..c431a34522d6 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -10329,9 +10329,9 @@ void kvm_arch_end_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_end_assignment);
 
-bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm)
+bool noinstr kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
-	return atomic_read(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count);
+	return arch_atomic_read(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_has_assigned_device);
 
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/drivers/base/cpu.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/drivers/base/cpu.c
index 9b5edf1dfe9e..7000c836951c 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -574,6 +574,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev,
 	return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -584,6 +590,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -596,6 +603,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
 	&dev_attr_srbds.attr,
 	&dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr,
+	&dev_attr_retbleed.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c
index 4195834a4591..cf7ebe3bd1ad 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Paul Diefenbaugh, Dominik Brodowski");
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ACPI Processor P-States Driver");
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/drivers/cpufreq/amd_freq_sensitivity.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/drivers/cpufreq/amd_freq_sensitivity.c
index e2df9d112106..5107cbe2d64d 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/drivers/cpufreq/amd_freq_sensitivity.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/drivers/cpufreq/amd_freq_sensitivity.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 
 #include "cpufreq_ondemand.h"
 
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_display.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_display.c
index d8687868407d..b588e0e409e7 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_display.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_display.c
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@
 #include <linux/pci.h>
 #include <linux/pm_runtime.h>
 #include <drm/drm_crtc_helper.h>
-#include <drm/drm_damage_helper.h>
 #include <drm/drm_edid.h>
 #include <drm/drm_gem_framebuffer_helper.h>
 #include <drm/drm_fb_helper.h>
@@ -496,7 +495,6 @@ bool amdgpu_display_ddc_probe(struct amdgpu_connector *amdgpu_connector,
 static const struct drm_framebuffer_funcs amdgpu_fb_funcs = {
 	.destroy = drm_gem_fb_destroy,
 	.create_handle = drm_gem_fb_create_handle,
-	.dirty = drm_atomic_helper_dirtyfb,
 };
 
 uint32_t amdgpu_display_supported_domains(struct amdgpu_device *adev,
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c
index 347b08b56042..63b221226261 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c
@@ -46,11 +46,13 @@
 #include <linux/tick.h>
 #include <trace/events/power.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
 #include <linux/notifier.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 #include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 #include <asm/mwait.h>
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 
@@ -97,6 +99,12 @@ static struct cpuidle_state *cpuidle_state_table;
  */
 #define CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED	0x10000
 
+/*
+ * Disable IBRS across idle (when KERNEL_IBRS), is exclusive vs IRQ_ENABLE
+ * above.
+ */
+#define CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS		BIT(16)
+
 /*
  * MWAIT takes an 8-bit "hint" in EAX "suggesting"
  * the C-state (top nibble) and sub-state (bottom nibble)
@@ -107,6 +115,24 @@ static struct cpuidle_state *cpuidle_state_table;
 #define flg2MWAIT(flags) (((flags) >> 24) & 0xFF)
 #define MWAIT2flg(eax) ((eax & 0xFF) << 24)
 
+static __cpuidle int intel_idle_ibrs(struct cpuidle_device *dev,
+				     struct cpuidle_driver *drv, int index)
+{
+	bool smt_active = sched_smt_active();
+	u64 spec_ctrl = spec_ctrl_current();
+	int ret;
+
+	if (smt_active)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+
+	ret = intel_idle(dev, drv, index);
+
+	if (smt_active)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, spec_ctrl);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /*
  * States are indexed by the cstate number,
  * which is also the index into the MWAIT hint array.
@@ -605,7 +631,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] = {
 	{
 		.name = "C6",
 		.desc = "MWAIT 0x20",
-		.flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED,
+		.flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS,
 		.exit_latency = 85,
 		.target_residency = 200,
 		.enter = &intel_idle,
@@ -613,7 +639,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] = {
 	{
 		.name = "C7s",
 		.desc = "MWAIT 0x33",
-		.flags = MWAIT2flg(0x33) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED,
+		.flags = MWAIT2flg(0x33) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS,
 		.exit_latency = 124,
 		.target_residency = 800,
 		.enter = &intel_idle,
@@ -621,7 +647,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] = {
 	{
 		.name = "C8",
 		.desc = "MWAIT 0x40",
-		.flags = MWAIT2flg(0x40) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED,
+		.flags = MWAIT2flg(0x40) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS,
 		.exit_latency = 200,
 		.target_residency = 800,
 		.enter = &intel_idle,
@@ -629,7 +655,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] = {
 	{
 		.name = "C9",
 		.desc = "MWAIT 0x50",
-		.flags = MWAIT2flg(0x50) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED,
+		.flags = MWAIT2flg(0x50) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS,
 		.exit_latency = 480,
 		.target_residency = 5000,
 		.enter = &intel_idle,
@@ -637,7 +663,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] = {
 	{
 		.name = "C10",
 		.desc = "MWAIT 0x60",
-		.flags = MWAIT2flg(0x60) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED,
+		.flags = MWAIT2flg(0x60) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS,
 		.exit_latency = 890,
 		.target_residency = 5000,
 		.enter = &intel_idle,
@@ -666,7 +692,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skx_cstates[] = {
 	{
 		.name = "C6",
 		.desc = "MWAIT 0x20",
-		.flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED,
+		.flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS,
 		.exit_latency = 133,
 		.target_residency = 600,
 		.enter = &intel_idle,
@@ -1370,6 +1396,11 @@ static void __init intel_idle_cpuidle_driver_init(void)
 		drv->states[drv->state_count] =	/* structure copy */
 			cpuidle_state_table[cstate];
 
+		if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) &&
+		    cpuidle_state_table[cstate].flags & CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS) {
+			drv->states[drv->state_count].enter = intel_idle_ibrs;
+		}
+
 		drv->state_count += 1;
 	}
 
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c
index 510ca6974604..c83ff610ecb6 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c
@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ restart:
 		 * The INCOMPLETE flag means that we will find the "old"
 		 * attr, not the "new" one.
 		 */
-		args->flags |= XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE;
+		args->op_flags |= XFS_DA_OP_INCOMPLETE;
 		state = xfs_da_state_alloc();
 		state->args = args;
 		state->mp = mp;
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c
index 0c23127347ac..c86ddbf6d105 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c
@@ -2345,8 +2345,8 @@ xfs_attr3_leaf_lookup_int(
 		 * If we are looking for INCOMPLETE entries, show only those.
 		 * If we are looking for complete entries, show only those.
 		 */
-		if ((args->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE) !=
-		    (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE)) {
+		if (!!(args->op_flags & XFS_DA_OP_INCOMPLETE) !=
+		    !!(entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE)) {
 			continue;
 		}
 		if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) {
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.h
index 7b74e18becff..38c05d6ae2aa 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.h
@@ -17,13 +17,27 @@ struct xfs_inode;
 struct xfs_trans;
 
 /*
- * Used to keep a list of "remote value" extents when unlinking an inode.
+ * Incore version of the attribute leaf header.
  */
-typedef struct xfs_attr_inactive_list {
-	xfs_dablk_t	valueblk;	/* block number of value bytes */
-	int		valuelen;	/* number of bytes in value */
-} xfs_attr_inactive_list_t;
-
+struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr {
+	uint32_t	forw;
+	uint32_t	back;
+	uint16_t	magic;
+	uint16_t	count;
+	uint16_t	usedbytes;
+	/*
+	 * Firstused is 32-bit here instead of 16-bit like the on-disk variant
+	 * to support maximum fsb size of 64k without overflow issues throughout
+	 * the attr code. Instead, the overflow condition is handled on
+	 * conversion to/from disk.
+	 */
+	uint32_t	firstused;
+	__u8		holes;
+	struct {
+		uint16_t	base;
+		uint16_t	size;
+	} freemap[XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAPSIZE];
+};
 
 /*========================================================================
  * Function prototypes for the kernel.
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c
index 3e39b7d40f25..de9096b8a47c 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c
@@ -24,6 +24,23 @@
 
 #define ATTR_RMTVALUE_MAPSIZE	1	/* # of map entries at once */
 
+/*
+ * Remote Attribute Values
+ * =======================
+ *
+ * Remote extended attribute values are conceptually simple -- they're written
+ * to data blocks mapped by an inode's attribute fork, and they have an upper
+ * size limit of 64k.  Setting a value does not involve the XFS log.
+ *
+ * However, on a v5 filesystem, maximally sized remote attr values require one
+ * block more than 64k worth of space to hold both the remote attribute value
+ * header (64 bytes).  On a 4k block filesystem this results in a 68k buffer;
+ * on a 64k block filesystem, this would be a 128k buffer.  Note that the log
+ * format can only handle a dirty buffer of XFS_MAX_BLOCKSIZE length (64k).
+ * Therefore, we /must/ ensure that remote attribute value buffers never touch
+ * the logging system and therefore never have a log item.
+ */
+
 /*
  * Each contiguous block has a header, so it is not just a simple attribute
  * length to FSB conversion.
@@ -400,17 +417,25 @@ xfs_attr_rmtval_get(
 			       (map[i].br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK));
 			dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map[i].br_startblock);
 			dblkcnt = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, map[i].br_blockcount);
-			error = xfs_trans_read_buf(mp, args->trans,
-						   mp->m_ddev_targp,
-						   dblkno, dblkcnt, 0, &bp,
-						   &xfs_attr3_rmt_buf_ops);
-			if (error)
+			bp = xfs_buf_read(mp->m_ddev_targp, dblkno, dblkcnt, 0,
+					&xfs_attr3_rmt_buf_ops);
+			if (!bp)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+			error = bp->b_error;
+			if (error) {
+				xfs_buf_ioerror_alert(bp, __func__);
+				xfs_buf_relse(bp);
+
+				/* bad CRC means corrupted metadata */
+				if (error == -EFSBADCRC)
+					error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
 				return error;
+			}
 
 			error = xfs_attr_rmtval_copyout(mp, bp, args->dp->i_ino,
 							&offset, &valuelen,
 							&dst);
-			xfs_trans_brelse(args->trans, bp);
+			xfs_buf_relse(bp);
 			if (error)
 				return error;
 
@@ -551,6 +576,32 @@ xfs_attr_rmtval_set(
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/* Mark stale any incore buffers for the remote value. */
+int
+xfs_attr_rmtval_stale(
+	struct xfs_inode	*ip,
+	struct xfs_bmbt_irec	*map,
+	xfs_buf_flags_t		incore_flags)
+{
+	struct xfs_mount	*mp = ip->i_mount;
+	struct xfs_buf		*bp;
+
+	ASSERT(xfs_isilocked(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL));
+
+	ASSERT((map->br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) &&
+	       (map->br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK));
+
+	bp = xfs_buf_incore(mp->m_ddev_targp,
+			XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map->br_startblock),
+			XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, map->br_blockcount), incore_flags);
+	if (bp) {
+		xfs_buf_stale(bp);
+		xfs_buf_relse(bp);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Remove the value associated with an attribute by deleting the
  * out-of-line buffer that it is stored on.
@@ -559,7 +610,6 @@ int
 xfs_attr_rmtval_remove(
 	struct xfs_da_args	*args)
 {
-	struct xfs_mount	*mp = args->dp->i_mount;
 	xfs_dablk_t		lblkno;
 	int			blkcnt;
 	int			error;
@@ -574,9 +624,6 @@ xfs_attr_rmtval_remove(
 	blkcnt = args->rmtblkcnt;
 	while (blkcnt > 0) {
 		struct xfs_bmbt_irec	map;
-		struct xfs_buf		*bp;
-		xfs_daddr_t		dblkno;
-		int			dblkcnt;
 		int			nmap;
 
 		/*
@@ -588,21 +635,9 @@ xfs_attr_rmtval_remove(
 		if (error)
 			return error;
 		ASSERT(nmap == 1);
-		ASSERT((map.br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) &&
-		       (map.br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK));
-
-		dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map.br_startblock),
-		dblkcnt = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, map.br_blockcount);
-
-		/*
-		 * If the "remote" value is in the cache, remove it.
-		 */
-		bp = xfs_buf_incore(mp->m_ddev_targp, dblkno, dblkcnt, XBF_TRYLOCK);
-		if (bp) {
-			xfs_buf_stale(bp);
-			xfs_buf_relse(bp);
-			bp = NULL;
-		}
+		error = xfs_attr_rmtval_stale(args->dp, &map, XBF_TRYLOCK);
+		if (error)
+			return error;
 
 		lblkno += map.br_blockcount;
 		blkcnt -= map.br_blockcount;
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.h
index 9d20b66ad379..6fb4572845ce 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.h
@@ -11,5 +11,7 @@ int xfs_attr3_rmt_blocks(struct xfs_mount *mp, int attrlen);
 int xfs_attr_rmtval_get(struct xfs_da_args *args);
 int xfs_attr_rmtval_set(struct xfs_da_args *args);
 int xfs_attr_rmtval_remove(struct xfs_da_args *args);
+int xfs_attr_rmtval_stale(struct xfs_inode *ip, struct xfs_bmbt_irec *map,
+		xfs_buf_flags_t incore_flags);
 
 #endif /* __XFS_ATTR_REMOTE_H__ */
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_btree.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_btree.h
index ae0bbd20d9ca..588e4674e931 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_btree.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_btree.h
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ typedef struct xfs_da_args {
 #define XFS_DA_OP_OKNOENT	0x0008	/* lookup/add op, ENOENT ok, else die */
 #define XFS_DA_OP_CILOOKUP	0x0010	/* lookup to return CI name if found */
 #define XFS_DA_OP_ALLOCVAL	0x0020	/* lookup to alloc buffer if found  */
+#define XFS_DA_OP_INCOMPLETE	0x0040	/* lookup INCOMPLETE attr keys */
 
 #define XFS_DA_OP_FLAGS \
 	{ XFS_DA_OP_JUSTCHECK,	"JUSTCHECK" }, \
@@ -89,7 +90,8 @@ typedef struct xfs_da_args {
 	{ XFS_DA_OP_ADDNAME,	"ADDNAME" }, \
 	{ XFS_DA_OP_OKNOENT,	"OKNOENT" }, \
 	{ XFS_DA_OP_CILOOKUP,	"CILOOKUP" }, \
-	{ XFS_DA_OP_ALLOCVAL,	"ALLOCVAL" }
+	{ XFS_DA_OP_ALLOCVAL,	"ALLOCVAL" }, \
+	{ XFS_DA_OP_INCOMPLETE,	"INCOMPLETE" }
 
 /*
  * Storage for holding state during Btree searches and split/join ops.
@@ -124,6 +126,19 @@ typedef struct xfs_da_state {
 						/* for dirv2 extrablk is data */
 } xfs_da_state_t;
 
+/*
+ * In-core version of the node header to abstract the differences in the v2 and
+ * v3 disk format of the headers. Callers need to convert to/from disk format as
+ * appropriate.
+ */
+struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr {
+	uint32_t		forw;
+	uint32_t		back;
+	uint16_t		magic;
+	uint16_t		count;
+	uint16_t		level;
+};
+
 /*
  * Utility macros to aid in logging changed structure fields.
  */
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.c
index b1ae572496b6..31bb250c1899 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include "xfs_mount.h"
 #include "xfs_inode.h"
 #include "xfs_dir2.h"
+#include "xfs_dir2_priv.h"
 
 /*
  * Shortform directory ops
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.h
index ae654e06b2fb..222ee48da5e8 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.h
@@ -93,19 +93,6 @@ struct xfs_da3_intnode {
 	struct xfs_da_node_entry __btree[];
 };
 
-/*
- * In-core version of the node header to abstract the differences in the v2 and
- * v3 disk format of the headers. Callers need to convert to/from disk format as
- * appropriate.
- */
-struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr {
-	uint32_t	forw;
-	uint32_t	back;
-	uint16_t	magic;
-	uint16_t	count;
-	uint16_t	level;
-};
-
 /*
  * Directory version 2.
  *
@@ -434,14 +421,6 @@ struct xfs_dir3_leaf_hdr {
 	__be32			pad;		/* 64 bit alignment */
 };
 
-struct xfs_dir3_icleaf_hdr {
-	uint32_t		forw;
-	uint32_t		back;
-	uint16_t		magic;
-	uint16_t		count;
-	uint16_t		stale;
-};
-
 /*
  * Leaf block entry.
  */
@@ -520,19 +499,6 @@ struct xfs_dir3_free {
 
 #define XFS_DIR3_FREE_CRC_OFF  offsetof(struct xfs_dir3_free, hdr.hdr.crc)
 
-/*
- * In core version of the free block header, abstracted away from on-disk format
- * differences. Use this in the code, and convert to/from the disk version using
- * xfs_dir3_free_hdr_from_disk/xfs_dir3_free_hdr_to_disk.
- */
-struct xfs_dir3_icfree_hdr {
-	uint32_t	magic;
-	uint32_t	firstdb;
-	uint32_t	nvalid;
-	uint32_t	nused;
-
-};
-
 /*
  * Single block format.
  *
@@ -709,29 +675,6 @@ struct xfs_attr3_leafblock {
 	 */
 };
 
-/*
- * incore, neutral version of the attribute leaf header
- */
-struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr {
-	uint32_t	forw;
-	uint32_t	back;
-	uint16_t	magic;
-	uint16_t	count;
-	uint16_t	usedbytes;
-	/*
-	 * firstused is 32-bit here instead of 16-bit like the on-disk variant
-	 * to support maximum fsb size of 64k without overflow issues throughout
-	 * the attr code. Instead, the overflow condition is handled on
-	 * conversion to/from disk.
-	 */
-	uint32_t	firstused;
-	__u8		holes;
-	struct {
-		uint16_t	base;
-		uint16_t	size;
-	} freemap[XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAPSIZE];
-};
-
 /*
  * Special value to represent fs block size in the leaf header firstused field.
  * Only used when block size overflows the 2-bytes available on disk.
@@ -740,8 +683,6 @@ struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr {
 
 /*
  * Flags used in the leaf_entry[i].flags field.
- * NOTE: the INCOMPLETE bit must not collide with the flags bits specified
- * on the system call, they are "or"ed together for various operations.
  */
 #define	XFS_ATTR_LOCAL_BIT	0	/* attr is stored locally */
 #define	XFS_ATTR_ROOT_BIT	1	/* limit access to trusted attrs */
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2.h
index f54244779492..e170792c0acc 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ struct xfs_dir2_sf_entry;
 struct xfs_dir2_data_hdr;
 struct xfs_dir2_data_entry;
 struct xfs_dir2_data_unused;
+struct xfs_dir3_icfree_hdr;
+struct xfs_dir3_icleaf_hdr;
 
 extern struct xfs_name	xfs_name_dotdot;
 
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2_priv.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2_priv.h
index 59f9fb2241a5..d2eaea663e7f 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2_priv.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2_priv.h
@@ -8,6 +8,25 @@
 
 struct dir_context;
 
+/*
+ * In-core version of the leaf and free block headers to abstract the
+ * differences in the v2 and v3 disk format of the headers.
+ */
+struct xfs_dir3_icleaf_hdr {
+	uint32_t		forw;
+	uint32_t		back;
+	uint16_t		magic;
+	uint16_t		count;
+	uint16_t		stale;
+};
+
+struct xfs_dir3_icfree_hdr {
+	uint32_t		magic;
+	uint32_t		firstdb;
+	uint32_t		nvalid;
+	uint32_t		nused;
+};
+
 /* xfs_dir2.c */
 extern int xfs_dir2_grow_inode(struct xfs_da_args *args, int space,
 				xfs_dir2_db_t *dbp);
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_format.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_format.h
index c968b60cee15..28203b626f6a 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_format.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_format.h
@@ -1540,6 +1540,13 @@ typedef struct xfs_bmdr_block {
 #define BMBT_BLOCKCOUNT_BITLEN	21
 
 #define BMBT_STARTOFF_MASK	((1ULL << BMBT_STARTOFF_BITLEN) - 1)
+#define BMBT_BLOCKCOUNT_MASK	((1ULL << BMBT_BLOCKCOUNT_BITLEN) - 1)
+
+/*
+ * bmbt records have a file offset (block) field that is 54 bits wide, so this
+ * is the largest xfs_fileoff_t that we ever expect to see.
+ */
+#define XFS_MAX_FILEOFF		(BMBT_STARTOFF_MASK + BMBT_BLOCKCOUNT_MASK)
 
 typedef struct xfs_bmbt_rec {
 	__be64			l0, l1;
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_attr_inactive.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_attr_inactive.c
index 766b1386402a..9c88203b537b 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_attr_inactive.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_attr_inactive.c
@@ -25,22 +25,18 @@
 #include "xfs_error.h"
 
 /*
- * Look at all the extents for this logical region,
- * invalidate any buffers that are incore/in transactions.
+ * Invalidate any incore buffers associated with this remote attribute value
+ * extent.   We never log remote attribute value buffers, which means that they
+ * won't be attached to a transaction and are therefore safe to mark stale.
+ * The actual bunmapi will be taken care of later.
  */
 STATIC int
-xfs_attr3_leaf_freextent(
-	struct xfs_trans	**trans,
+xfs_attr3_rmt_stale(
 	struct xfs_inode	*dp,
 	xfs_dablk_t		blkno,
 	int			blkcnt)
 {
 	struct xfs_bmbt_irec	map;
-	struct xfs_buf		*bp;
-	xfs_dablk_t		tblkno;
-	xfs_daddr_t		dblkno;
-	int			tblkcnt;
-	int			dblkcnt;
 	int			nmap;
 	int			error;
 
@@ -48,47 +44,28 @@ xfs_attr3_leaf_freextent(
 	 * Roll through the "value", invalidating the attribute value's
 	 * blocks.
 	 */
-	tblkno = blkno;
-	tblkcnt = blkcnt;
-	while (tblkcnt > 0) {
+	while (blkcnt > 0) {
 		/*
 		 * Try to remember where we decided to put the value.
 		 */
 		nmap = 1;
-		error = xfs_bmapi_read(dp, (xfs_fileoff_t)tblkno, tblkcnt,
+		error = xfs_bmapi_read(dp, (xfs_fileoff_t)blkno, blkcnt,
 				       &map, &nmap, XFS_BMAPI_ATTRFORK);
-		if (error) {
+		if (error)
 			return error;
-		}
 		ASSERT(nmap == 1);
-		ASSERT(map.br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK);
 
 		/*
-		 * If it's a hole, these are already unmapped
-		 * so there's nothing to invalidate.
+		 * Mark any incore buffers for the remote value as stale.  We
+		 * never log remote attr value buffers, so the buffer should be
+		 * easy to kill.
 		 */
-		if (map.br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK) {
-
-			dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(dp->i_mount,
-						  map.br_startblock);
-			dblkcnt = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(dp->i_mount,
-						map.br_blockcount);
-			bp = xfs_trans_get_buf(*trans,
-					dp->i_mount->m_ddev_targp,
-					dblkno, dblkcnt, 0);
-			if (!bp)
-				return -ENOMEM;
-			xfs_trans_binval(*trans, bp);
-			/*
-			 * Roll to next transaction.
-			 */
-			error = xfs_trans_roll_inode(trans, dp);
-			if (error)
-				return error;
-		}
+		error = xfs_attr_rmtval_stale(dp, &map, 0);
+		if (error)
+			return error;
 
-		tblkno += map.br_blockcount;
-		tblkcnt -= map.br_blockcount;
+		blkno += map.br_blockcount;
+		blkcnt -= map.br_blockcount;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -102,86 +79,45 @@ xfs_attr3_leaf_freextent(
  */
 STATIC int
 xfs_attr3_leaf_inactive(
-	struct xfs_trans	**trans,
-	struct xfs_inode	*dp,
-	struct xfs_buf		*bp)
+	struct xfs_trans		**trans,
+	struct xfs_inode		*dp,
+	struct xfs_buf			*bp)
 {
-	struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
-	struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
-	struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry;
+	struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr	ichdr;
+	struct xfs_mount		*mp = bp->b_mount;
+	struct xfs_attr_leafblock	*leaf = bp->b_addr;
+	struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry	*entry;
 	struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote *name_rmt;
-	struct xfs_attr_inactive_list *list;
-	struct xfs_attr_inactive_list *lp;
-	int			error;
-	int			count;
-	int			size;
-	int			tmp;
-	int			i;
-	struct xfs_mount	*mp = bp->b_mount;
+	int				error = 0;
+	int				i;
 
-	leaf = bp->b_addr;
 	xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(mp->m_attr_geo, &ichdr, leaf);
 
 	/*
-	 * Count the number of "remote" value extents.
+	 * Find the remote value extents for this leaf and invalidate their
+	 * incore buffers.
 	 */
-	count = 0;
 	entry = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf);
 	for (i = 0; i < ichdr.count; entry++, i++) {
-		if (be16_to_cpu(entry->nameidx) &&
-		    ((entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) == 0)) {
-			name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, i);
-			if (name_rmt->valueblk)
-				count++;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * If there are no "remote" values, we're done.
-	 */
-	if (count == 0) {
-		xfs_trans_brelse(*trans, bp);
-		return 0;
-	}
+		int		blkcnt;
 
-	/*
-	 * Allocate storage for a list of all the "remote" value extents.
-	 */
-	size = count * sizeof(xfs_attr_inactive_list_t);
-	list = kmem_alloc(size, 0);
-
-	/*
-	 * Identify each of the "remote" value extents.
-	 */
-	lp = list;
-	entry = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf);
-	for (i = 0; i < ichdr.count; entry++, i++) {
-		if (be16_to_cpu(entry->nameidx) &&
-		    ((entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) == 0)) {
-			name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, i);
-			if (name_rmt->valueblk) {
-				lp->valueblk = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valueblk);
-				lp->valuelen = xfs_attr3_rmt_blocks(dp->i_mount,
-						    be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valuelen));
-				lp++;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	xfs_trans_brelse(*trans, bp);	/* unlock for trans. in freextent() */
+		if (!entry->nameidx || (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL))
+			continue;
 
-	/*
-	 * Invalidate each of the "remote" value extents.
-	 */
-	error = 0;
-	for (lp = list, i = 0; i < count; i++, lp++) {
-		tmp = xfs_attr3_leaf_freextent(trans, dp,
-				lp->valueblk, lp->valuelen);
+		name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, i);
+		if (!name_rmt->valueblk)
+			continue;
 
-		if (error == 0)
-			error = tmp;	/* save only the 1st errno */
+		blkcnt = xfs_attr3_rmt_blocks(dp->i_mount,
+				be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valuelen));
+		error = xfs_attr3_rmt_stale(dp,
+				be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valueblk), blkcnt);
+		if (error)
+			goto err;
 	}
 
-	kmem_free(list);
+	xfs_trans_brelse(*trans, bp);
+err:
 	return error;
 }
 
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_file.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_file.c
index 203065a64765..e41c13ffa5a4 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_file.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_file.c
@@ -187,7 +187,12 @@ xfs_file_dio_aio_read(
 
 	file_accessed(iocb->ki_filp);
 
-	xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED);
+	if (iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_NOWAIT) {
+		if (!xfs_ilock_nowait(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED))
+			return -EAGAIN;
+	} else {
+		xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED);
+	}
 	ret = iomap_dio_rw(iocb, to, &xfs_iomap_ops, NULL);
 	xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED);
 
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c
index 7b72c189cff0..30202d8c25e4 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c
@@ -1513,10 +1513,8 @@ xfs_itruncate_extents_flags(
 	struct xfs_mount	*mp = ip->i_mount;
 	struct xfs_trans	*tp = *tpp;
 	xfs_fileoff_t		first_unmap_block;
-	xfs_fileoff_t		last_block;
 	xfs_filblks_t		unmap_len;
 	int			error = 0;
-	int			done = 0;
 
 	ASSERT(xfs_isilocked(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL));
 	ASSERT(!atomic_read(&VFS_I(ip)->i_count) ||
@@ -1536,21 +1534,22 @@ xfs_itruncate_extents_flags(
 	 * the end of the file (in a crash where the space is allocated
 	 * but the inode size is not yet updated), simply remove any
 	 * blocks which show up between the new EOF and the maximum
-	 * possible file size.  If the first block to be removed is
-	 * beyond the maximum file size (ie it is the same as last_block),
-	 * then there is nothing to do.
+	 * possible file size.
+	 *
+	 * We have to free all the blocks to the bmbt maximum offset, even if
+	 * the page cache can't scale that far.
 	 */
 	first_unmap_block = XFS_B_TO_FSB(mp, (xfs_ufsize_t)new_size);
-	last_block = XFS_B_TO_FSB(mp, mp->m_super->s_maxbytes);
-	if (first_unmap_block == last_block)
+	if (first_unmap_block >= XFS_MAX_FILEOFF) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(first_unmap_block > XFS_MAX_FILEOFF);
 		return 0;
+	}
 
-	ASSERT(first_unmap_block < last_block);
-	unmap_len = last_block - first_unmap_block + 1;
-	while (!done) {
+	unmap_len = XFS_MAX_FILEOFF - first_unmap_block + 1;
+	while (unmap_len > 0) {
 		ASSERT(tp->t_firstblock == NULLFSBLOCK);
-		error = xfs_bunmapi(tp, ip, first_unmap_block, unmap_len, flags,
-				    XFS_ITRUNC_MAX_EXTENTS, &done);
+		error = __xfs_bunmapi(tp, ip, first_unmap_block, &unmap_len,
+				flags, XFS_ITRUNC_MAX_EXTENTS);
 		if (error)
 			goto out;
 
@@ -1570,7 +1569,7 @@ xfs_itruncate_extents_flags(
 	if (whichfork == XFS_DATA_FORK) {
 		/* Remove all pending CoW reservations. */
 		error = xfs_reflink_cancel_cow_blocks(ip, &tp,
-				first_unmap_block, last_block, true);
+				first_unmap_block, XFS_MAX_FILEOFF, true);
 		if (error)
 			goto out;
 
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c
index 904d8285c226..dfbf3f8f1ec8 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c
@@ -1544,7 +1544,8 @@ xfs_reflink_clear_inode_flag(
 	 * We didn't find any shared blocks so turn off the reflink flag.
 	 * First, get rid of any leftover CoW mappings.
 	 */
-	error = xfs_reflink_cancel_cow_blocks(ip, tpp, 0, NULLFILEOFF, true);
+	error = xfs_reflink_cancel_cow_blocks(ip, tpp, 0, XFS_MAX_FILEOFF,
+			true);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_super.c linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_super.c
index 8d1df9f8be07..a3a54a0fbffe 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_super.c
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/fs/xfs/xfs_super.c
@@ -512,32 +512,6 @@ xfs_showargs(
 		seq_puts(m, ",noquota");
 }
 
-static uint64_t
-xfs_max_file_offset(
-	unsigned int		blockshift)
-{
-	unsigned int		pagefactor = 1;
-	unsigned int		bitshift = BITS_PER_LONG - 1;
-
-	/* Figure out maximum filesize, on Linux this can depend on
-	 * the filesystem blocksize (on 32 bit platforms).
-	 * __block_write_begin does this in an [unsigned] long long...
-	 *      page->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - bbits)
-	 * So, for page sized blocks (4K on 32 bit platforms),
-	 * this wraps at around 8Tb (hence MAX_LFS_FILESIZE which is
-	 *      (((u64)PAGE_SIZE << (BITS_PER_LONG-1))-1)
-	 * but for smaller blocksizes it is less (bbits = log2 bsize).
-	 */
-
-#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
-	ASSERT(sizeof(sector_t) == 8);
-	pagefactor = PAGE_SIZE;
-	bitshift = BITS_PER_LONG;
-#endif
-
-	return (((uint64_t)pagefactor) << bitshift) - 1;
-}
-
 /*
  * Set parameters for inode allocation heuristics, taking into account
  * filesystem size and inode32/inode64 mount options; i.e. specifically
@@ -1650,6 +1624,26 @@ xfs_fs_fill_super(
 	if (error)
 		goto out_free_sb;
 
+	/*
+	 * XFS block mappings use 54 bits to store the logical block offset.
+	 * This should suffice to handle the maximum file size that the VFS
+	 * supports (currently 2^63 bytes on 64-bit and ULONG_MAX << PAGE_SHIFT
+	 * bytes on 32-bit), but as XFS and VFS have gotten the s_maxbytes
+	 * calculation wrong on 32-bit kernels in the past, we'll add a WARN_ON
+	 * to check this assertion.
+	 *
+	 * Avoid integer overflow by comparing the maximum bmbt offset to the
+	 * maximum pagecache offset in units of fs blocks.
+	 */
+	if (XFS_B_TO_FSBT(mp, MAX_LFS_FILESIZE) > XFS_MAX_FILEOFF) {
+		xfs_warn(mp,
+"MAX_LFS_FILESIZE block offset (%llu) exceeds extent map maximum (%llu)!",
+			 XFS_B_TO_FSBT(mp, MAX_LFS_FILESIZE),
+			 XFS_MAX_FILEOFF);
+		error = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_free_sb;
+	}
+
 	error = xfs_filestream_mount(mp);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_free_sb;
@@ -1661,7 +1655,7 @@ xfs_fs_fill_super(
 	sb->s_magic = XFS_SUPER_MAGIC;
 	sb->s_blocksize = mp->m_sb.sb_blocksize;
 	sb->s_blocksize_bits = ffs(sb->s_blocksize) - 1;
-	sb->s_maxbytes = xfs_max_file_offset(sb->s_blocksize_bits);
+	sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
 	sb->s_max_links = XFS_MAXLINK;
 	sb->s_time_gran = 1;
 	sb->s_time_min = S32_MIN;
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/include/linux/cpu.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/include/linux/cpu.h
index 29a6fa2f518d..b42e9c413447 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev,
 					struct device_attribute *attr,
 					char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/include/linux/kvm_host.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index dd4cdad76b18..ee7d57478a45 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ static inline void kvm_arch_end_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 }
 
-static inline bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm)
+static __always_inline bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	return false;
 }
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h
index 4c56404e53a7..8265b99d6d55 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h
@@ -672,9 +672,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
 	__u16 steppings;
 };
 
-#define X86_FEATURE_MATCH(x) \
-	{ X86_VENDOR_ANY, X86_FAMILY_ANY, X86_MODEL_ANY, x }
-
+/* Wild cards for x86_cpu_id::vendor, family, model and feature */
 #define X86_VENDOR_ANY 0xffff
 #define X86_FAMILY_ANY 0
 #define X86_MODEL_ANY  0
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/scripts/Makefile.extrawarn linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/scripts/Makefile.extrawarn
index 854e2ba9daa2..6a78afc6f13b 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/scripts/Makefile.extrawarn
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/scripts/Makefile.extrawarn
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-sign-compare
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-format-zero-length
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, pointer-to-enum-cast)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, unaligned-access)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, cast-function-type-strict)
 endif
 
 endif
diff --git linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 59f924e92c28..3efaf338d325 100644
--- linux-libre-5.4.216-gnu1/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ linux-libre-5.4.217-gnu1/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL	(11*32+ 3) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER	(11*32+ 4) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL	(11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE	(11*32+ 6) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit when EIBRS is enabled */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE	(11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit when EIBRS is enabled */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16		(12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
